CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/07/28

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03169400
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: July 28, 1957

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#7 CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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28 July 1957
Copy No.
DC-CUM7.777
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NEI-XT REV:EW DATE:
H
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OFFICE OF CURRENT Ipki
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
36
3.5(c)
This document contains classified information affecting
the national security of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections
793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission
or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un-
authorized person, as well as its use in any manner
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-
ment of the United States.
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
1(0;
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CONTENTS
Oh. GUATEMALAN PRESIDENT CASTILLO ARMAS ASSASSI-
NATED (page 3).
DISAGREEMENT LOOMING BETWEEN 1ARCHBISHOP
MAKARIOS AND GREEK GOVERNMENT
(page 5).
11/4) 03. USSR REPORTED SEEKING TALKS WITH ITALY ON PEACE
TREATY OBLIGATIONS (page 6).
o )4. LEFTISTS OUSTED FROM GOVERNMENT OF INDIAN-HELD
KASHMIR (page 7).
5. PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT MAY TAKE COURT ACTION
AGAINST DISSIDENT VICE PRESIDENT (page 8).
28 July 57
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1, GUATEMALAN PRESIDENT CASTILLO
ARMAS ASSASSINATED
Comment on:
The assassination of Guatemalan Pres-
ident Carlos Castillo Armas has trans-
ferred control of the government to
politicians considerably to the right of
the late president's middle-of-the-road political position. Luis
Arturo Gonzalez, Castillo's constitutional successor, has
assumed at least nominal control of the government. The
country is under tight martial law. There is no indication
that the murder was part of a coordinated plan to seize con-
trol of the government.
Guatemalan police claim to have proof
that the assassin, who requested assignment to the president's
guard three months ago, was a Communist.
He may, however, have undertaken
the assassination on his own initiative. The underground Com-
munist Party has opposed assassination or revolution as polit-
ical weapons until after it has built up mass support
Gonzalez, who has no personal political
following, is to serve in the presidency only until a popularly
elected president can take his place. The constitution calls
for an election within four months. The powerful administra-
tion political machine, the National Democratic Movement, has
reportedly already decided that its candidate is to be Colonel
Francisco Oliva, present minister of defense. Oliva is be-
lieved to command the respect and loyalty of most army officers.
The government will be unstable during the
next several months as various opponents of Castillo, including
leftists and Communists both in exile and inside the country, at-
tempt to exploit his death in an effort to seize power. Some dis-
sident army officers may plot against the course adopted by the
28 July 57
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LCiIfLT
top army leadership. Instability will probably be heightened
in the long run if the government adopts extensive repressive
tactics and thus gives moderates common cause with leftists.
The army will remain the ultimate locus of political power and
may be a moderating influence on the more rightist politicians.
However, should President Gonzalez deviate from the consti-
tution or prove too weak to govern the country, the army may
peacefully set up a junta under Minister of Defense Oliva,
28 July 57
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SECRET
2. DISAGREEMENT LOOMING BETWEEN ARCHBISHOP
MAKARIOS AND GREEK GOVERNMENT
on 24 July that a disagreement is loom-
mg between Cypriot leader Archbishop
Makarios and the Greek government,
Makarios, is insisting
that the Greek delegation to the United Nations stand firm on
the self-determination and atrocity issues, with no retreat
or behind-the-scenes arrangements "as in previous years."
Comment
In preparing the resubmission of the
Cyprus issue to the UN, the Greek govern-
ment had favored a mild request for clarification of last year's
UN decision, but in early July gave in to Makarios' insist-
ence that the appeal be based on the Cypriot demand for
self-determination and condemnation of British atrocities.
Archbishop Makarios received Soviet
Ambassador Sergeyev at his Athens home on 26 July atwhich
time Sergeyev assured Makarios that the USSR would always
be on the side of the Cypriot people in their demand for self-
determination and that the Soviet delegation at the United Na-
tions will support the Greek appeal.
28 July 57
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111_11R_ailtiWU
3. USSR REPORTED SEEKING TALKS WITH ITALY ON
PEACE TREATY OBLIGATIONS
The Italian Foreign Ministry is reportedly divided over
tactics, with one group advocating an immediate request that
the USSR renounce its unsettled financial claims against Italy.
The present plan, however, is probably to stall on negotiations.
Comment
Against the $100,000,000 reparations owed
by Italy to the USSR under the 1946 peace
treaty, the Soviet Union took as a down payment Italian assets
in the Balkans, which it valued at $25,000,000. The Italians
have consistently maintained that these assets exceeded
$100,000,000 in value and refused to make any payments in
manufactured goods as provided in the treaty. In February
1952, Italy notified Moscow that it considered itself relieved
of further reparations obligations because of Soviet opposition
to Italian membership in the UN. Soviet support of Italy's suc-
cessful 1955 application elicited no change in this position.
The Soviet Union has long sought negotia-
tions with Italy leading to closer relations and high-level
Italian visits to Moscow, and it may believe that raising peace
treaty issues will force Italy into talks. Moscow would prob-
ably be ready to renounce its reparations claims in return for
some Italian concessions, particularly if it thought such a ges-
ture would improve prospects for the Italian Communist Party
in the national elections which may be held this fall.
The principal issue which Italy would prob-
ably raise in talks is the return of some 50,000 Italian war
prisoners captured on the Soviet front in World War II.
28 July 57
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t.4 _I V / 1,./1_14/ V I 1211-4
4. LEFTISTS OUSTED FROM GOVERNMENT OF
INDIAN-HELD KASHMIR
Comment on:
Popular unrest in Indian-held Kashmir
and dissension within the ruling National
Conference Party led by Premier Bakshi
apparently have prompted the Indian gov-
ernment to conduct a major house-clean-
ing in that state, despite the prospect of
UN Security Council discussions in August
or September. Pakistani propaganda may
be expected to stress instability in Kashmir,
the unrepresentative nature of Bakshi's government,and the fail-
ure of Nehru's policies.
The reshuffle of Bakshi's cabinet, announced
on 26 July, ousted strong pro-Communist members who had
survived the reorganization of 1953, when India fired Premier
Sheikh Abdullah for "independent" tendenpies. The new moves
presumably reflect New Delhi's feeling that stricter control is
necessary. Two of the six new ministers are from Jammu
Province, where opposition to the Bakshi government is strong-
est, and their appointment probably represents an effort to ap-
pease that opposition. A seventh minister is to be named later.
As a result of the cabinet reshuffle, the Com-
munist Party may emerge for the first time as a cohesive polit-
ical unit under publicly identifiable leaders such as Ghulam
Sadiq--an ousted minister--who has long feuded with Bakshi.
Though the party probably would act "constitutionally" so as
not to embarrass the parent Communist Party in India, its
emergence as an overt political force would create additional
problems for New Delhi.
28 July 57
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5. PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT MAY TAKE COURT
ACTION AGAINST DISSIDENT VICE PRESIDENT
Comment on:
First Vice President Diaz, who failed
in an attempt to turn a 24 July opposi-
tion rally into a mass demand for resig-
nation of President de la Guardia and
thus succeed legally to the presidency
himself, has been subpoenaed to explain press accounts that
he tried to incite armed revolt at the rally. No specific
charges have been filed but the attorney general reportedly
has ordered an investigation to determine whether there is
basis for trying Diaz. According to Panamanian legal sources,
the vice president is subject to ordinary processes of law, and,
if found guilty, could be divested of office by either the Supreme
Court or the National Assembly. Under a law against publicly
insulting the president, Diaz could be prosecuted for having
called De la Guardia "a bum."
Legal action to remove the disgruntled
Diaz probably would not put an end to coalition opposition moves
against De la Guardia, but it would remove from the political
scene the most active threat to the stability of his administra-
tion. The positive support given the administration by the power-
ful National Guard has strengthened De la Guardia's position and
he probably feels he can safely get rid of his rival
28 July 57
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1192IV1IDEN-RAL
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