CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/07/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03169398
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: July 27, 1957

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
dApproved for Release: 2019/12/10 CO3169398
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27 July 1957
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
This document contains classified information affecting
the national security of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections
793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission
or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un-
authorized person, as well as its use in any manner
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-
ment of the United States.
TOP CRET rea" OA
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065. NASRS ALEXANDRIA SPEECH
CONTENTS
4. SOVIET DIPLOMATS GATHER IN MOSCOW
(page 3).
It 2. TASS CORRESPONDENT URGES TOP-LEVEL EAST-WEST
TALKS (page 5).
3. BRITISH REACTIONS TO OMAN DISPUTE (page 6).
tb4. YEMENIS CONDUCTING NEW HOSTILITIES ON ADEN
FRONTIER (page 7).
(page 9).
014)6. NATIONAL LEFTIST FRONT FORMED IN LIAKISTAN
(page 10).
�7. SOUVANNA PHOUMA DESIGNATED TO FORM LAOTIAN
GOVERNMENT (page 11).
)'8. NEW CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT FORMED
(page 12).
!.1) 9. ARGENTINE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS ON
28 JULY (page 13).
10. TENSION MOUNTING ON EVE OF PHILIPPINE NOMINATING
CONVENTION (page 14).
()t11, UNUSUAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS OBSERVED IN ALBANIAN
CAPITAL (page 15).
27 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin P6Lge 2
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4.312.4.1 XL:, I
1. SOVIET DIPLOMATS GATHER IN MOSCOW
Comment on:
At least ten Soviet ambassadors to free
world nations have returned quietly to
Moscow since 14 July, and eight more
have not yet been reported back at their
posts since the June central committee plenum. These 18
ambassadors may have been joined in Moscow by still others.
The Soviet military attach�n Turkey reportedly said his am-
bassador was returning for "talks with Khrushchev." The as-
sembly follows closely recent gatherings of satellite and for-
eign Communist leaders who evidently went to Moscow for
briefings on the implications of the June shake-up of the party
presidium.
The ambassadors will probably receive high-
level briefings on foreign policy as well as a detailed explana-
tion of the purge, particularly as it affects the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs in the light of that ministry's direction by Molotov
and Shepilov. The talks may be in preparation for new moves
by Ithrushchev to implement foreign policy more boldly and
effectively, but changes are not likely to be as drastic as those
following Malenkov's fall. A similar gathering of Soviet am-
bassadors occurred in January 1955 immediately before the
ousting of Malenkov.
It may be speculated that the return of the
ambassadors is for one of three purposes:
a. They may receive a foreign policy brief-
ing stressing the continued validity of Khrushchev's 20th party
congress policy but outlining modifications or new emphases.
b. They may be presented with a major
Soviet foreign policy initiative involving a marked departure
from present Soviet policy, but still remaining within the gen-
eral assumptions of the 20th party congress. Such an initiative
might involve proposals for collective security in Europe or Asia,
some form of neutral zone around the Sino-Soviet bloc, or new at-
tempts to establish multilateral high-level government contacts.
27 July 57
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c. They may be briefed on what hap-
pened in the presidium shake-up and how the fall of the two
former foreign ministers will affect the ministry itself.
This could involve some personnel shifts in the ministry
and the diplomatic corps.
The list of ambassadors known to have
returned suggests that one main field of concern may cover
the underdeveloped areas and nations on the periphery of
the bloc. The gathering appears to include neither the Soviet
envoys to the traditionally "imperialist" powers�Britain,
France, Belgium and the Netherlands�nor ambassadors to the
Western Hemisphere with the exception of Ambassador to the
United States Zaroubin. Apparently none of the USSR's ambas-
sadors to Eastern European countries are in Moscow. The
majority of those who have returned are accredited to Asian
and European nations bordering on the Sino-Soviet bloc.
The meeting may involve policies whose
formulation had not been completed by the end of the central
committee meeting in late June. Soviet Ambassador to Iran
N. M. Pegov, who was in the USSR during the June plenum
and had subsequently returned to his post, is making another
trip to Moscow. The same
munist China P. F. Yudin.
27 July 57
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SECRET
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4
2. TASS CORRESPONDENT URGES TOP-LEVEL
EAST-WEST TALKS
A TASS correspondent
would like a meeting "on the highest
level" with the United States, not only because Khrushchev
needs international prestige but mainly because the USSR
believes a high-level meeting would provide the best chance
for settling outstanding problems. He also expressed the
view that chances are good at present for a visit by Marshal
Zhukov to the United States which would provide opportuni-
ties for serious negotiations.
The correspondent suggested that dis-
armament and the withdrawal of Soviet and American troops
from such countries as Germany and Poland would be suitable
topics for discussion. He said troop withdrawals from any
East European country would depend on what agreement could
be reached on Germany. He added that guarantees to keep
Germany from becoming the greatest European power in
NATO were a prerequisite to free elections in Germany, but
then expressed serious doubts about arllowina anti-Communist
parties to develop in East Germany.
Comment Since the Moscow shake-up, there have
been increasing indications of Soviet in-
terest in high-level meetings--particularly bilateral ones�with
Western leaders. Moscow seems interested in such meetings
more to promote its campaign for "relaxing international ten-
sions" than to reach agreement on major East-West problems.
The USSR may feel that a high-level meeting would provide a
better forum to exploit its disarmament proposals than the UN
subcommittee. It may be willing to discuss European security
and the Middle East, but there has been no change in its in-
sistence that the unification problem must be settled by the
Germans themselves.
27 July 57
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11. LI A
3,. BRITISH REACTIONS TO OMAN DISPUTE
Concern over Anglo-American rela-
tions is probably responsible for the
heavy play given the Oman dispute in
the British press and for what the US
embassy describes as "a sense of un-
easiness which has penetrated all sec-
tions of the government's parliamentary
majority and is shared by sections of
the Labor opposition." While parliamentary and public
opinion has not yet become emotionally aroused over the
present dispute, Conservative members of Parliament have
been "defensive and apprehensive" since Suez regarding
British oil interests in the Persian Gulf area. The em-
bassy comments that the party would probably "split wide
open" if repercussions of the rebellion forced Britain to
abandon its hegemony there.
Government supporters profess little
worry about growing Arab nationalism as a real political
force but, according to the embassy, "they do fear and resent
the prospects of Arab nationalism backed by American oil in-
terests." According to a Foreign Office official, latent sus-
picion of ARAMCO accounts for the large volume of press
coverage on the dispute, Despite some baiting of the govern-
ment by the Labor Party's foreign affairs spokesman, Aneurin
Bevan, Labor has been generally cautious in its parliamentary
approach, apparently fearing to adopt an attitude which the Brit-
ish public might consider unpatriotic.
Since there is a general belief in parliamen-
tary circles that use of the Royal Air Force is not a desirable
means of settling this type of dispute, London opinion probably
welcomes the announcement from Sharja on 26 July that air
strikes have been suspended, At a lunch conversation with
Foreign Secretary Lloyd on 25 July, Ambassador Whitney re-
ceived the impression that Lloyd is "very much disturbed lest
the limited action in which Britain is involved in Oman become
a serious matter." Lloyd expressed dismay at even the thought
of committing British troops,
27July 57
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4 YEMENIS CONDUCTING NEW HOSTILITIE
ON ADEN FRONTIER
Comment on:
Yemenis Ail recent weeks have again
provoked hostilities on the Aden Pro-
tectorate frontier. Elements of the
,Yemeni army have supported local
tribesmen in these actions, which have
centered in the area of the Beihan Valley
of the Western Aden Protectorate.
Yemeni forces,
reinforced by 150 regular troops and
dissidents from the Aden Protectorate,
have attacked forts and occupied several points within the
Aden Protectorate, and ambushed patrols
Yemenis have
moved an artillery piece into a village within the Protectorate,
and are building a road from the interior of Yemen into a sa-
lient seized in Protectorate territory.
1, r.Aectora te boundar
� � Endefinite boundary
.....