CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/07/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03169394
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: July 23, 1957

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,40 CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains classified information affecting
the national security of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections
793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission
or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un-
authorized person, as well as its use in any manner
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-
ment of the United States.
c96r,M05174/
Copy No. 11,
23 July 1957
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CONTENTS
SSIBLE TOP-LEVEL BLOC MEETING IN MOSCOW
(page 3)0
112. REORGANIZATION OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
INDICATED (page 4).
PIO 3. NASR'S SPEECH TO PARLIAMENT ON 22 JULY
(page 5).
(116 4. INTERNAL SITUATION IN YEMEN
(page 6).
��5
0 PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT SHOWDOWN MAY BE IMMI-
(1 NENT (page 8).
b60 INDONESIAN COMMUNISTS MAINTAIN BIG LEAD IN CEN-
TRAL JAVA ELECTIONS (page 9).
23 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
TOPECRET
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41ATOP SECRET
1111
1. POSSIBLE TOP-LEVEL BLOC MEETING IN MOSCOW
Comment on:
A secret meeting of Soviet and satel-
lite party leaders in Moscow may have
preceded or followed the 18 July con-
ference of Soviet Party First Secretary
Khrushchev with representatives of the
anian, u arian and Yugoslav Communist Party leaders.
If such a meeting was held, it probably was for the purpose of
discussing with the satellite leaders the significance for them
of the recent Soviet presidium shake-up.
Janos
Kadar, Hungarian party and government boss, had gone to
Moscow. The Hungarian press had noted on 4 July that Kadar
was beginning his summer vacation, but his activities have
been unreported since that time.
On the same day, 4 July, First Secretary
Gomulka of the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party started
a "vacation" in South Poland and was not reported back in the cap-
ital again until the late evening of 20 July. Gheorghiu-Dej, first
secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party, has not been ob-
served since early July. East German leader Ulbricht was not
mentioned by the press as being in East Germany from 15 through
21 July.
All of these Communist leaders therefore
could have participated in an unpublicized conference in Moscow
at any time between 17 and 20 July. Khrushchev and Bulganin re-
turned to Moscow on 16 July from Czechoslovakia.
23 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
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2. REORGANIZATION OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS INDICATED
Comment on:
The sole remaining first deputy chair-
man of the USSR council of ministers,
Anastas Mikoyan, has now been identi-
fied in the Soviet press merely as dep-
uty c airman the council of ministers. Gosplan head
Iosif Kuzmin, as reported earlier, was referred to as a
deputy chairman on 17 and 18 July. Mikoyan was last iden-
tified as a first deputy chairman on 24 June; Kuzmin as late
as 12 July.
This action appears to be part of a broad
reorganization of the council of ministers now under way to
adjust both to the changed role assigned it under the economic
reorganization and to the loss of five deputy premiers in the
June shake-up. For the time being, the post of first deputy
chairman apparently either does not exist Or is vacant.
23 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4
CONJI&ENTL4L
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3. NASR'S SPEECH TO PARLIAMENT ON 22 JULY
President Nasr's three-hour address to
Egypt's new parliament on 22 July was
essentially a review and justification of
the five-year history of his regime�
A large portion of the speech was devoted
to a laborious accounting of the regime's record and plans with
regard to domestic affairs. Nasr announced a five-year pro-
gram of industrial production and a plan for uranium prospect-
ing and manufacture of heavy water. He confirmed a previous
announcement that Egypt intended to proceed with the first
phase of construction on the Aswan high dam. He also rehashed
his often-repeated charges against the "imperialists" who he
said threaten the future of Egypt and have "squatted upon us for
hundreds of years, nay thousands of years." He did not deviate
appreciably from the line he has taken in the past on such sub-
jects as the Suez Canal, Israel, the Baghdad Pact, and rela-
tions with East and West.
While this speech contained no dramatic dis-
closures, there remains the possibility of some surprise move
in the major announcement reportedly scheduled for 25 July or
in Nases "People's Day" speech in Alexandria on 26 July.
23 July 57
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CONFJIIENTIAL
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4, INTERNAL SITUATION IN YEMEN
Comment on:
Recent reports that the disease-ridden
Imam of Yemen now is in rapidly de-
clining health point to a period of in-
ternal violence and instability over
determination of his successor. Crown
Prince Badr, the Imam's oldest son, has
told the American ambassador that the ab-
solutist Imam might soon have to relin-
quish some responsibility, since when he
was indisposed the activity of the country
and the government virtually ceased.
The crown prince, who may hope to use
the newly arrived Soviet arms as a means of securing his suc-
cession, has claimed to have the support of Yemen's important
religious and tribal leaders, as well as officers in the army,
who are anxious that the Imam give the crown prince greater
responsibility. He also claims to have the support of King Saud.
The crown prince himself has admitted, however, that he is op-
posed by antimonarchical "free Yemeni" revolutionaries resid-
ing in Egypt and Aden, and by hostile members of his own rul-
ing family who are also supported by Cairo. In addition, the
crown prince has expressed the belief that the British might
support his uncle, Prince Hassan, for the throne.
On the other hand,
opposition to the Imam's present policies
which are associated with his son is so widespread that were
the Imam to die at this time, the crown prince would not be able
to rally more than ten percent of the effective forces within the
country� both the northern and south-
ern tribes are organizing to prevent the succession of the crown
prince, and reportedly favor Prince Hassan. Opposition to the
Imam and his son is also based on the contention that the Imam
23 July 57
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had no right to designate his son as crown prince, since the
ruler has been traditionally selected by tribal leaders in the
north.
Hassan, who was formerly prime minis-
ter, left Yemen shortly after an unsuccessful attempt to over-
throw the Imam in 1955 and now heads the Yemeni delegation
in the United Nations. Hassan's supporters reportedly believe
that if he returns to a nearby country to lead opposition to the
crown prince within a few hours after the Imam's death, the
crown prince would be obliged to flee. In their opinion Has-
san's failure to bid promptly for leadership would encourage
the crown prince's supporters as well as the Cairo-backed "free
Yemeni" movement.
23 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7
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5, PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT SHOWDOWN MAY
BE IMMINENT
Comment on:
The American embassy in Panama be-
lieves First Vice President Diaz, who
formally broke with the government
coalition in late May, is "ready to stake
all" at the antiadministration rally he has organized for 24
July in his attempt to oust President de la Guardia and suc-
ceed him. De la Guardia is evidently concerned, for he
warned in a surprise nationwide radio address on 20 July
that the government would "take all measures the circum-
stances demand against any attempt to overthrow the ad-
ministration by violence."
The warning was reinforced by the pres-
ence at De la Guardia's side of the top officers of the National
Guard, whose approval is essential to any Panamanian govern-
ment. Guard Commandant Vallarino reiterated his recent
pledge to maintain order. The embassy believes the warnings
were designed primarily to convince the public of guard support
for the President. De la Guardia may welcome a showdown as
an opportunity to put an abrupt end to Diaz' bid for power. The
broadcast warning may also help to absolve the administration
in advance should bloodshed occur.
Despite serious public dissatisfaction over
De la Guardia's inability to solve pressing economic and polit-
ical problems, Diaz probably overestimates his own popularity
as an alternative leader. He and his henchmen may try to com-
pensate for this lack of support by inciting mob violence.
23 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin
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MINT 11./11,
6. INDONESIAN COMMUNISTS MAINTAIN BIG LEAD IN
CENTRAL JAVA ELECTIONS
Comment on:
With about a quarter of the votes counted,
the Indonesian Communists have a two-to-
one lead over their closest rival, the Nat-
tional Party, in the provincial and local
elections that were held in Central Java
on 17 July. As of 22 July, the Communists
had 1,224,000 votes compared with the Na-
tionalist Party's 613,777 votes, while the
two major Moslem parties--the NahcUatul
Ulama and the Masjumi�followed with 444,461 and 149,332
votes respectively. The total vote cast for some 60 small par-
ties was negligible. The final official count is not expected
until mid-August. Elections in two more subdivisions on 27
July will complete the voting in Central Java.
23 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin
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