CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/07/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03169384
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: July 14, 1957

r . ,r Approved for Release: 2019/12/10
J.L"-� J.
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
14 July 1957
Copy No.
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
110�'
�
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
� CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains classified information affecting
the national security of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections
793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission
or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un-
authorized person, as well as its use in any manner
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-
ment of the United States.
I
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CONTENTS
. ISRAEL AGREES TO PLACEMENT OF UN OBSERVERS ON
ISRAELI-SYRIAN BORDER (page 3).
0 /1. NEW JOBS REPORTED FOR PURGED SOVIET LEADERS
page 4).
IN. BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE VIEWS SOVIET PURGE
(page 5).
O 4. PUBLIC REACTION IN MOSCOW TO SOVIET PURGE
(page 7).
. BONN FAVORS RECESS IN DISARMAMENT TALKS UNTIL
AFTER GERMAN ELECTION (page 9).
(page 10).
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1. ISRAEL AGREES TO PLACEMENT OF UN OBSERVERS
ON ISRAELI-SYRIAN BORDER
The Israeli permanent UN representa-
tive has informed the American delega-
tion that Israel has agreed with the United
Nations Truce Supervisory Organization
on the establishment of five UN observer
posts in the area of the recent incidents
along the Israeli-Syrian border. The arrangement is to go
into effect on 13 or 14 July for a trial period of one month,
but does not provide for observers in the demilitarized zone.
The Israeli official assured the delegation that Israel was not
going to sabotage the arrangements. He said he was displeased
at rumors of an early Security Council meeting.
Comment This limited Israeli acceptance of numer-
ous United Nations requests for observers
along the Israeli-Syrian border appears to be an attempt to
avert a full-scale Security Council investigation of continuing
tensions in the demilitarized zone and the recent incidents on
the border.
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2, NEW JOBS REPORTED FOR PURGED SOVIET LEADERS
Molotov had asked to be ap-
pointed ambassador to a South American
country since he lacked a specialty other than that of diplomat.
He was temporarily attached to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, pending a decision.
Shepilov,
had been appointed to work in the local Soviet press in Ic.azah-
stan and had already left Moscow. Kaganovich had been as-
signed to the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow as a scien-
tific adviser.
Malenkov,
the main force in the group opposing Khrushchev, was being
sent to a Siberian Council of National Economy to head a local
electric power station administration.
The fates of Pervukhin and Saburov were
not known publicly in the USSR except for the official announce-
ment of their demotion and removal, respectively.
Comment The Paris newspaper. France Soir on
12 July, quoting Soviet diplomatic sources,
stated that Molotov had been offered the Soviet ambassadorial
post in Argentina.
By 14 July Soviet citizens had not yet been
informed of Malenkovis appointment as director of the Ust-Kamenog-
orsk electric power station in "elast Kazakhstan, announced to the
West by Moscow radio on 10 July,
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3. BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE VIEWS SOVIET PURGE
British Foreign Office specialists on
Soviet affairs are divided as to Khru-
shchev's motivation for the June purge.
The majority believes he set out some
time ago systematically to undermine Malenkov, and that
what united the "antiparty" group on quick action was a re-
port that Khrushchev intended to link Malenkov's name with
the "Leningrad Affair" (a purge of the Leningrad party or-
ganization in 1949) when he went to the Leningrad anniver-
sary celebration scheduled for 22 June.
Khrushchev is said to have been moti-
vated both by personal ambition and by impatience with re-
straints imposed by collective leadership, which he felt was
inherently too unstable to function in present-day Russia.
The British embassy in Moscow re-
ported in early June that the effect, though not the motiva-
tion, of Khrushchev's economic reorganization plan was to
weaken the power of �Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Per-
vukhin, and Saburov by eliminating centralized industrial
ministries. Candidates for the Gorky and Leningrad eco-
nomic regional councils, for example, reportedly were nom-
inated by the local oblast party committees, which are subject
to the wishes of Party First Secretary Khrushchev.
The "antiparty" group failed not because
its members were maladroit but because they had no choice
but to launch a desperate counterattack in the face of Khru-
shchev's pushing them toward political oblivion. In this view,
Khrushchev knows where he is going and now has a relatively
free hand. He will counter his only potential rival, Marshal
Zhukov, by building up his own prestige and the authority of
the Communist Party.
The minority view in the Foreign Office
is that Khrushchev barely escaped being overthrown by a ma-
jority in the presidium and acted defensively. He only stood
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to lose by destruction of the myth of "collective leadership,"
under which others could be made to share responsibility for
what were essentially Khrushchev policies. Khrushchev saved
his career but solved none of his problems. The stability of
the regime has been further compromised by his now obvious
dependence on Zhukov and the military.
Comment The majority opinion offers an answer to
the question of why the "antiparty" group
moved against Khrushchev in the presidium with no assurance
that the central committee or the military would side against
Khrushchev.
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4, PUBLIC REACTION IN MOSCOW TO SOVIET PURGE
The "impressionistic conclusions" of
the American embassy in Moscow from
conversations with more than 100 Soviet
citizens, are that the Moscow public re-
acted to news of the June purges with keen interest, outward
calm, and detached resignation. "They never tell us what is
going on and there is nothing we can do about it," was a fre-
quently heard statement.
No one expressed any "wrath" or "indig-
nation" at the "perfidious actions" of the ousted leaders. On
the contrary, most citizens expressed disapproval of the cen-
tral committee's action. Uneasiness or fear that there might
be mass purges and arrests was a frequent reaction.
Many citizens took a cynical attitude, view-
ing the events as merely a struggle for power among "top dogs"
which was not relevant to the interests of the people. lzvestia
on 9 July, perhaps with this attitude in mind, asserted that the
"party's fight against the opposition group" was based on matters
of principle and was not the same as the "mistakes connected
with the personality cult of J. V. Stalin."
A number of people showed open sympathy
for Molotov particularly, probably because he is an "Old
Bolshevik" and a symbol of continuity. "How can they do that
to Molotov after his many years of service?" Malenkov, widely
popular among the masses for his consumers' goods program,
was described as "a good man; he did a lot for the people."
The embassy has not received any reliable
reports of public disturbances. No unusual troop movements
were observed in Moscow on 3 or 4 July when news of the purge
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began to spread through the city and there was no visual evi-
dence or report of precautionary security measures at the time
the plenum was held. The embassy adds that the first news of
the change reached it on 3 July.
The embassy believes the regime has suf-
fered a loss of prestige among the population as a result of the
ousters but does not see this as affecting its ability to maintain
stability. The spectacle of open warfare among the top leaders
of the "monolithic" party, and the campaign of vilification loosed
overnight against the deposed leaders, does not enhance respect
for the party leadership. Furthermore, the ousters do not seem
to have been a popular move. In the final analysis, however, the
relative popularity of the Khrushchev team will depend more on
the results of its policies than on what it did to the ousted group.
The Soviet public is primarily interested in
an increased living standard, peace, and freedom from arbitrary
arrest. The present leadership has pledged its support to these
goals and will be judged by the degree to which it keeps its pledge.
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5. BONN FAVORS RECESS DT DLSARMAMENT TALKS UNTIL
AFTER GERMAN ELECTION
Herbert Blankenhorn, West German per-
manent NATO representative, told Amer-
ican Ambassador Perkins on 12 July that
his government was concerned about the
disarmament negotiations and hoped they could be recessed
until after the 15 September German election. He said the gov-
ernment was not against an agreement, but did not know what
effect inclusion of a European inspection zone might have on the
campaign, how inspection might work, or what its implica-
tions might be in regard to German unification and neutraliza-
tion.
He said the Germans had in mind propos-
ing to the North Atlantic Council a series of conditions, which
he did not describe, for future steps in disarmament after the
first phase. Bonn felt it must be able to point to some initia-
tive in connection with unification and disarmament.
Comment The Germans have indicated that they want
a Western understanding on when and how
the unification issue will be pushed. They have also been skit-
tish about ground inspection, apparently because they are afraid
it would formalize the German interzonal border.
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