CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/02/04

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03169383
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: February 4, 1958

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DECLASSIFIED
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NEXT REVIEW DATE:
MTH: 7
DATIL EVIEWER'
4 February 1958
Copy No.
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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1. I
LATE ITEIVI
*Indonesian Dissidents Present Ultimatum to
President Sukarno in Tokyo
Indonesian dissidents presented an ultimatum to
President Sukarno in Tokyo on 4 February demanding
that he eliminate pro-Communist elements from the
Djakarta government or be overthrown. The ultima-
tum warned that a rival Lidonesian government had been
formed in Central Sumatra which presumably will be
placed in operation if Sukarno fails to comply.
The ultimatum was delivered by Colonel Warouw,
Indonesian military attache in Peiping who has been in
the confidence of the dissidents for some months and who
is a former commander in East Indonesia. Warouw was
accompanied by a "high staff officer" who recently arrived
in Tokyo from Sumatra.
The Indonesian dissidents have been planning action
against the central government along these lines for nearly
a month. Their ultimatum probably includes a demand that
a new anti-Communist cabinet be formed in Djakarta by
former vice president Hatta and the Sultan of Jogjakarta.
Both President Sukarno and the Djakarta government
are likely to reject the ultimatum, although they may at-
tempt to engage the dissidents in negotiations with a view to
stalling the formation of a rival regime. The Indonesian
Communist party can be expected to brand the dissident
move as traitorous and as part of an imperialist plot to
break up the Indonesian nation and to maintain Dutch influ-
ence. It will also press the Djuanda government to resist
and, if necessary, forcibly to suppress the dissidents.
A late press report quotes a leader of the anti-Commu-
nist Masjumi party in Djakarta to the effect that his wing of
the party would mediate between the dissidents and the
Djakarta government; other Masjumi leaders, including the
oartv's chairman are in Sumatra working with the dissidents.
4 Feb 58
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pact with Norway.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Kings of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and
Iraq plan meeting on 9 February to
discuss countermeasures to Egyptian-
Syrian union.
4 FEBRUARY 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR - Tyura Tam Range
GMIC statement, see p. i.
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USSR interested in bilateral nonaggression
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Syrian economic interests apprehensive
over effects of Syria's union with Egypt.�
Indian Government henceforth will
prohibit foreign debts requiring
payments before 1964.
Setback for anti-Communists in Okinawan
0
municipal election.
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7'
III. THE WEST
West Germany considering plans to
construct nuclear submarine.
Cuba - Growing dissatisfaction in
military may lead to anti-Batista
coup attempt in February.
French and West German Foreign
Ministries now more skeptical of
value of summit talks.
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vest
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
4 February 1958
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DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Probable Soviet ICBM launching attempt: The Guided
Missile Intelligence Committee issued the following state-
ment on 31 January 1958:
1. Since the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee
(GMIC) statement of 1145, 30 January 1958, additional in-
formation has been received which, in general, supports
the views contained in the statement.
2. A valid countdown took place and culminated in a
probable test ICBM launching attempt at 1507 EST (2007Z).
GMIC agrees that the events
0.d not appear to involve the launching of an
earth-satellite vehicle or other space vehicle. Available
evidence does not now permit a determination of the suc-
cess achieved.
Joint Staff reservation: The Joint Staff member be-
lieves that insufficient consideration has been given to the
possibility of an attempted ESV launching. He feels the
second paragraph should read as follows:
A valid countdown took place and culminlaunch-
in a attemnt at 1507 EST (2007Z). The events
Oid not result in e success-
ful launching of an ESV or other space vehicle. If an ICBM
test vehicle was launched, available evidence oes not now
cli
nermit determination of the success achieved,
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USSR "interested" in pact with Norway: Soviet Am-
bassador :to Norway Gribanov told top staff raena-;,
bers of the Norwegian Labor party newspaper on 29
January that the USSR "is interested" in a bilateral non-
aggression pact with Norway as well as a collective non-
aggression treaty between NATO and Warsaw states. In
view of Premier Gerhardsen's criticism of NATO's pre-
occupation with military strength, the USSR probably hopes
for a favorable Norwegian reaction. Norway would almost
certainly reject such a proposal at this time.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Egyptian-Syrian union-- ke a + reaction: Arrangements
are going forward for meetings, possibly about 9 February,
involving King Hussayn of Jordan, King Saud of Saudi Arabia,
and King Faysal of Iraq. Saud has agreed to Hussayn's pro-
posals that their treaties of friendship be "revived" as an
attempt to develop a psychological counter to Egyptian-Syrian
union, but has cautioned against taking such direct counter-
measures as confederation. (Page 1)
Egyptian-Syrian union�impact in_ Syria: Syrian eco-
nomic interests are apprehensive over the effects of Egyptian-
Syrian union, and a run on foreign exchange is reported to
have occurred in commercial centers in northern Syria.
-Businessmen will not express opposition openly, however,
and are inclined to console themselves with the hope that the
union will block Communist influence. There are reports of
violence in major Syrian cities between (1omniunists and
ASRP adherents over the union issue. :Page 2)
Indian financial problems: The Indian Government is
worried over the sharp rise in foreign debt servicing that it
mill face beginning in 1960, and has apparently decided not
4 Feb 58
TOP
DAILY BRIEF ii
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to permit any additional debt to be incurred requiring
repayment before 1964, except for projects which earn
foreign exchange quickly. With such a policy, Indian
concerns would find it very difficult, if not impossible,
to find foreign private ,credits.
(Page 3).
Naha, Okinawa, election: City assembly elections
on 27ebruary resulted in a setback for local anti-Com-
munist elements. The leftists won seven seats, and
independents of uncertain views won four. Pro-Western
candidates won only four seats. If the newly elected in-
dependents vote with the leftists, they will control a
majority in the city council.
III. THE WEST
Bonn plans nuclear submarine: The West German
defense minister plans to request a relaxation of WEU
treaty restrictions to permit the construction of a 3,000-
ton, nuclear-powered submarine. The request will prob-
ably be deferred, however, until a similar request to
produce an antitank missile has been considered by WEU,
and until the f WEU members is de-
termined. (Page 4)
Cuba: Growing disaffection within the military, the
principal bulwark of the Batista regime, is apparently pre-
cipitating a new antigovernment conspiracy by a group of
high officers. The group may be planning action during
February. (Page 5) (Map)
Summit talks--French, German views: The French
and the West German Foreign Ministries are taking a more
o\N-f pessimistic view toward fruitful summit talks, ars a result
of delayed reactions to Khrushcheves 22 January speech at
4 Feb 58
DAILY BRIEF iii
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Minsk. French Foreign Minister Pineau may formally
protest Khrushchev's slurs on Western leader's and their
Intentions. West German government circles, who feel
a summit conference is inevitable, believe Bonn will
be placed in a precarious position if the talks are focused
On disarmament to the exclusion of German reunification.
(Page 6)
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Vise WINO
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Plans to Counter Egyptian-Syrian Union
King Hussayn is proceeding with arrangements for
meetings with the Kings of Iraq and Saudi Arabia, which
he hopes may begin about 9 February, in a further effort
to develop a psychological counter to Egyptian-Syrian
union. Hussayn fears that Egypt and Syria will shortly
launch a campaign to bring adherence by Jordan and Leb-
anon.
King Saud, who is reported to strongly oppose Nasir's
move, has agreed to Hussayn's proposal that the treaties
of friendship among Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia be re-
affirmed. However, he has cautioned against such an open
challenge to Nasir as confederation. The Iraqis have pro-
fessed willingness to accept confederation with Jordan
whether Saud agrees or not. Crown Prince Abd al-Illah,
while indicating that Iraq for the present would take no ac-
tion for or against the new Arab state, expressed concern
that unless some constructive measures were adopted soon
Jordan would be drawn into Nasir's union. The crown prince
added that any initiative concerning closer association with
Iraq should remain with Jordan, since eagerness on the part
of Iraq would arouse suspicion in Jordan.
Jordanian leaders do not feel that participation by Leb-
anon at this time in an Iraqi-Jordanian confederation would be
helpful or desirable, since it would strengthen divisive forces
in Lebanon. Lebanon's President Chamoun fears that large-
scale Egyptian-Syrian subversion there is about to begin.
4 Feb 58
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Mr 4 LP' 1 1 I .1.11.1.11.4.1. I L.4A.
Syrian Business Interests Fear Impact of Union
With Egypt
The Syrian business community is apprehensive over
the effect of Egyptian-Syrian union. The ministers of
economy and public works have issued statements that
Egyptian financial regulation will not be imposed on Syria
immediately and that the Syrian currency will remain
strong.
Despite these reassurances, commerce in some areas
is reported in the doldrums, a heavy demand for foreign
exchange has developed in northern Syria, and the Central
Bank is attempting to maintain confidence in the Syrian pound.
Businessmen are endeavoring to negotiate a five-year mora-
torium with Nasir relative to protective tariffs, Syrian indus-
try, currency unification, and proposed mass Egyptian emi-
gration to Syria. Syrian labor circles are decidedly unen-
thusiastic over the prospect of an invasion by new "refugees,"
which will depress Syrian wage levels and aggravate unem-
ployment. Plans to utilize Egyptian peasants in agricultural
work in the Syrian Jazira are somewhat visionary, since
large-scale mechanized operations requiring a small labor
force are practiced there.
Businessmen, most of whom are moderates in their po-
litical inclinations, hesitate to express their opposition to
union with Egypt openly and are inclined to console themselves
with the hope that union will block the rapidly groWing Commu-
nist influence.
Internal dissension over union has resulted in fights in
several towns between pro-union Baathists and anti-union
Communists.
4 Feb 58
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
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India Concerned About Short-term Debt Obligations
The Indian Government expects its debt servicing costs
to rise so sharply after 1959 that it has decided to prohibit
the contraction of any additional debts requiring payments
before 1964. The government has confidentially informed
the US Embassy that Indians projected debt repayment sched-
ule--both principal and interest�will rise from $73,000,000
in the fiscal year beginning April 1959 to $193,000,000, $259, -
ooq 000, and $233,000,000 respectively in the following three
years.
Additional borrowing will be permitted only for projects
that will earn or save enough foreign exchange to cover the
obligations by 1964. Under this policy most private lenders
will refuse additional credits to Indian concerns, and more
long-term loans will have to be obtained by the Indian Govern-
mzent.
4 Feb 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
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III, THE WEST
Bonn Plans Atomic Submarine
West German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss
plans to request a waiver of WEU treaty restrictions to
permit Bonn to construct a 3,000-ton nuclear-powered
submarine,
If the waiver is granted, Strauss will seek a con-
tract for nuclear propulsion equipment with the American
firm which built the Nautilus.
Bonn will probably defer any request for treaty re-
vision until the present request for permission to produce
an antitank missile is acted upon, and until the political
reaction of WEU members is determined. London, and
possibly Paris, might take a critical attitude toward a Ger-
man request dealing with submarines, fearing possible un-
favorable public reaction. The NATO commander's rec-
ommendation and a two-thirds vote in the WEU council are
required for approval.
The WEU treaty restricts German submarine construc-
tion to types of less than 350 tons and prohibits any con-
struction of nuclear-powered warships. The current German
naval program calls for 12 submarines of approximately 300
tons. Strauss has recently been interested in US progress
in nuclear propulsion, and a group of German scientists has
recently completed designs for a nuclear-powered merchant
ship.
4 Feb 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
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MAWS 0 tAATANZAS
HAVANA
�CIENFUEGOS
CUBA
190
MILES
ORIENTE
OSANTIAGO DE CUBA
10905
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IJE.L.EN
wise Nor
Possible New Military Conspiracy Against
Cuban Government
Growing disaffection among the Cuban military, the
principal bulwark of President Batista's regime, is pre-
cipitating a new antigovernment conspiracy by a group of
senior officers,
The group may be planning action during February. It is
led by Maj. Gen. Martin Diaz Tamayo, newly appointed
G-3 of the Cuban Army, and is believed to include active
and inactive officers who were involved in abortive upris-
ings last September and in April 1956. Fidel Castro's
revolutionary movement is not yet known to be involved,
although members of his group did take part in the Septem-
ber naval revolt at Cienfuegos.
The recent appointment of Lt. Gen. Pedro Rodriguez
Avila as army chief of staff may have contributed to in-
creasing dissatisfaction among the military. Rodriguez,
who has a reputation for ruthlessness and is widely dis-
liked, is not considered qualified for his new job. Addi-
tional unrest in the army has resulted from increased police
brutalities in dealing with both civilians and army personnel.
A well-coordinated and -organized plot among the military
could unseat Batista.
4 Feb 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
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Nor -IbehultrittM�Trit7=
Summit Talks--French� West German Views
The French and West German Foreign Ministries, on
the basis of the speech Khrushchev made at Minsk on 22
January, are taking an increasingly pessimistic view on
the prospects for a worthwhile outcome from summit talks.
French Foreign Minister Pineau may formally protest
Khrushchev's slurs on Western leaders and their intentions.
A Foreign Ministry spokesman characterized the speech as
"one of the most aggressive, insulting and intransigent" he
had ever read, and compared its tone to Hitler's. He be-
lieves Khrushchev's remarks on the Soviet position on Ger-
many and Eastern Europe express "toughness and overween-
ing confidence."
Chancellor Adenauer cited Khrushchev's speech as
evidence of Soviet unwillingness to pursue "constructive
negotiations," but he also reaffirmed his support for ef-
forts to make progress on international problems. Bonn
will publicly support disarmament negotiations, but it can
be expected to raise strong objections to the exclusion of
German unification from summit discussions.
4 Feb 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
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Novi LA51. 1.LACAL V / 11114 Nee/
DISTRIBUTION
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Operations Coordinating Board
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
4 February 1958
ILy BRIEF,
Egyptian-Syrian union--impact in. eco-
nomic interests are apprehensive-over-the effects of Egyptian-
Syrian union, and a run on foreign exchange is reported to
have occurred in commercial centers in northern Syria.
Businessmen will not express opposition openly, however,
and are inclined to console themselves with the hope that the
union will block Communist influence. There are reports of
violence in major Syrian cities between Communists and
ASRP adherents over the union issue.
Indian financial problems: The Indian Government is
worried over the sharp rise in foreign debt servicing that it
will face begi -ruirlig-in 1960, and has apparently decided not
to permit any additional debt to be incurred requiring
repayment before 1964, except for projects which earn
foreign exchange quickly. With such a policy, Indian
concerns would find it very difficult, if not impossible,
to find foreign private credits.
(Page 3).
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Nal
LATE ITEM
Indonesian Dissidents Present Ultimatum to
President Sukarno in Tokyo
Indonesian dissidents presented an ultimatum to
President Sukarno in Tokyo on 4 February demanding
that he eliminate pro-Communist elements from the
Djakarta government or be overthrown. The ultima-
tum warned that a rival Lidonesian government had been
formed in Central Sumatra which presumably will be
placed in operation if Sukarno fails to comply.
The ultimatum was delivered by Colonel Warouw,
Indonesian military attach�n Peiping who has been in
the confidence of the dissidents for some months and who
is a former commander in East Indonesia. Warouw was
accompanied by a "high staff officer" who recently arrived
in Tokyo from Sumatra.
The Indonesian dissidents have been planning action
against the central government along these lines for nearly
a month. Their ultimatum probably includes a demand that
a new anti-Communist cabinet be formed in Djakarta by
former vice president Hatta and the Sultan of Jogjakarta.
Both President Sukarno and the Djakarta government
are likely to reject the ultimatum, although they may at-
tempt to engage the dissidents in negotiations with a view to
stalling the formation of a rival regime. The Indonesian
Communist party can be expected to brand the dissident
move as traitorous and as part of an imperialist plot to
break up the Indonesian nation and to maintain Dutch influ-
ence. It will also press the Djuanda government to resist
and, if necessary, forcibly to suppress the dissidents.
A late press report quotes a leader of the anti-Commu-
nist Masjumi party in Djakarta to the effect that his wing of
the party would mediate between the dissidents and the
Djakarta government; other Masjumi leaders, including the
party's chairman are in Sumatra working with the dissidents.
4 Feb 58
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