CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/11/28
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Publication Date:
November 28, 1959
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28 November 1959
Copy No. C 65
CENTRAL
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)7
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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28 NOVEMBER 1959
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR--Personnel changes being made in
secret police organization.
Khrushchev to be among bloc notables at
Hungarian party congress next week.
North Vietnam preparing to receive large
number of Vietnamese refugees who have
been in Thailand.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Hammarskjold says Laotian officials im-
pressed him as being unopposed to de-
tente with North Vietnam and return of
ICC.
American Embassy comments on situa-
tion in Iraq.
Ethiopia reportedly considering Soviet of-
fer to hell) with agricultural development
program.
0
.---- - , III. THE WEST
.���-'
,4-' ,,f(;-.1,----,:���,.. ,----- \
� --.,/�-�,.;;; \ 0 Cuba--Latest cabinet shake-up reflects
Yr-- , --, continuing trend to left.
/ �
-,a,r1 - -z---,_.: 0 Panama--Further anti-US demonstra-
! I Tc tions being planned for today.
l _
4
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0 US and British oil representatives con-
cerned by French plan to get preferred,
position for Saharan oil in European
Common Market.
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CENYRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLE IN
28 November 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: A new state security chief was appointed in Soviet
Belorussia on 25 November, bringing to five the number of
republics to which a new secret police chief has been assigned
in the past two months. The new appointees, for the most part,
are veteran security officials who have been sent out from
im-
portant posts in the KGB apparatus in Moscow. In addition, two
Mew deputy chairmen of the all-union KGB were appointed in
October. This is the first sizable shake-up in KGB ranks since
1954. The shifts almost certainly reflect a drive by KGB chair-
man Aleksanak: Shelepin to reorganize the secret police appara-
tus he took over from Ivan Serov a year ago. They may also be
related in part to Moscow's annoyance at the persistent prob-
lems of nationalism and localism in the minority republics,
where some ranking officials have been fired for placing local
economic interests "above those of the Soviet state."
gear-leas Pi-9 +.4 n-rs vrai s -
Khrushchev-Hungary: Khrushchev will be among the bloc
leaders atte dim. the Hunaarian ',tarty nrwrPss onpnino rm fln
November.
Khrushchev uecision was macte witnin tne past week and was
unexpected; he will stay only two days. This visit--his fourth
since the 1956 revolt�will further underline Moscow's support
of Hungarian chief Janos Kadar, whose regime has been faced
with criticism from within the party in recent months. Khru-
shchev will probably echo Kadar's boast that the Hungarian party
has "come of age," that it has repaired the damage inflicted dur-
ing the revolt, and that it is prepared to match the political
progress of other bloc states. He may also use the congress as
a forum for announcing another foreign policy initiative, such
as a proposal for reduction or withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Hungary, although no evidence of preparation for such a with-
drawal has been discerned.
East German party leader Ulbricht will also attend the
congress,
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41S 60~ 'WI FANO
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� North Vietnam - Thailand: Hanoi will take maximum prop-
aganda advantage of the decision by the overwhelming majority
of Vietnamese refugees in Thailand to return to North Vietnam.
More than 45,000--some 90 percent--of the refugees requested
repatriation to the north during the 18-day registration period
which ended 20 November, according to a Thai Government of-
ficial.
North Vietnamese
authorities plan to break up the group ana integrate the return-
ees where possible by requiring them to join relatives who are
military and civil functionaries�especially those working on
state farms. (Page 1)
0110 ASIA-AFRICA
Laos:(jON Secretary General Hammarskjold, in reporting
on his recent trip to Laos, says he received impressions from
ranking Laotian officials, including the new King, that the door
Is not closed to a detente with North Vietnam or to the return of
the International Control Commission. These statements run
counter to views expressed by Laotian leaders to American of-
ficials, and could represent some softening of the Lao position.
They may, however, have been advanced to Hammarskjold to
encourage him in his efforts to provide a UN presence and eco-
nomic assistance for Laos.
(Page 2) -
� Iraq: Although quiet prevails on the surface, there is un-
easiness and maneuvering behind the scenes, according to the
latest appraisal of the Iraqi situation by the American Embassy.
The Iraqi economy is stagnant, unemployment and prices are
highs, agrarian reform is lagging, and the development program
is bogged down. Aid from the bloc is unlikely to bring about
early improvement. Prime Minister Qasim remains an enigma.
Plotting by Nationalist elements and the Communists is likely
to continue. ) (Page 3)
28 Nov 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Ethiopia-USSR: Haile Selassie is reported to be consid-
ering a Soviet offer to provide financing and personnel to help
carry out his ambitious agricultural development program.
He discussed land reform with officials in Moscow last sum-
mer and at the time accepted a $100,000,000 Soviet credit for
economic development, including agricultural as well as in-
dustrial projects. The Emperor may hope the Soviet offer
will attract increased Western- articularly US--interest in
the program. (Page 4)
III, THE WEST
Cuba: The shake-up in high government posts on 26 Novem-
ber is a further step in the leftist trend that has been evident for
the past three months. "Che" Guevara, named to head the Na-
tional Bank, will now be in a position to implement his convic-
tion that Cuban independence must be achieved by shifting trade
patterns away from reliance on the United States. The new min-
ister of public works, Osmani Cienfuegos, is probably ,a Com-
munist. The officials replaced were relatively moderate, and
the remaining moderates in the government, convinced that Cuba
is rapidly heading for economic collapse and Communist take-
over, will almost certainly be replaced. (Page 5)
Panama: Anti-US demonstrations will probably take place
on 28 November in spite of some recent lessening of tenSion.
Panamanian student groups, civic organizations, political op-
portunists, and professional rabble rousers are continuing
to plan demonstrations pressing for the right to fly the Pan-
amanian flag in the Canal Zone and other US concessions. Long-
time American residents in Panama say the undercurrent of
anti-American feeling is stronger now than at any time within
memory. Members of the weak De la Guardia administration
are disturbed at the prospect of mob violence, which could turn
'against the Panamanian Government; they again may take no de-
cisive action to prevent or control outbreaks.
28 Nov 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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European Common Market� Sharp tensions between the
European Economic Community EEC or Common Market) and
the newly formed European Free Trade Area (Outer Seven) are
likely to be aggravated by determined French efforts to secure
a preferred position for Saharan oil in the EEC. Under the
French plan, EEC oil products not produced from Saharan and
EEC crude would be subject to a special internal tax. British
oil representatives and the American industry are concerned
that their share of the EEC oil market will be greatly reduced
if the French plan goes through. The British Government re-
portedly believes Paris will make major concessions to its
EEC partners to secure adoption of the plan
(Page 6)
28 Nov 59
DAILY BRIEF iv
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Bulk of Vietnamese in Thailand Ask Repatriation
Hanoi can be expected to take maximum propaganda advan-
tage of the decision of about 90 percent--over 45,000--of the
Vietnamese refugees living in Thailand to request repatriation
to North Vietnam. Recent broadcasts from Hanoi have an-
nounced the formation of welcoming committees to receive
refugees from abroad, and intercepted messages indicate that
detailed plans are being prepared for their settlement. The
messages suggest that North Vietnamese authorities intend,
where possible, to integrate returnees by requiring them to
join relatives who are members of the armed forces or civil
functionaries�especially those associated with state farms.
Hanoi has carried on a lengthy propaganda campaign among
the refugees to encourage repatriation and recently began beam-
ing special broadcasts to northern Thailand. Hanoi's broadcasts
have reportedly been the only information medium available in
many refugee areas. The repatriation program is scheduled to
be completed in mid-1962, but the American Embassy in Bang-
kok doubts that Hanoi will carry out the agreement in good
faith,
the first group
of 1,000 repatriates is scheduled to leave for Haiphong on 5 Jan-
uary 1960. Members of this group have already disposed of
their property, according to Thai press reports, and Thai Red
Cross officials are making arrangements for their transporta-
tion to the port of Bangkok. Travel facilities from Bangkok
have not yet been arranged, but the North Vietnamese Red
Cross "advisers" in Bangkok are reported to be satisfied with
the repatriation proceedings to date.
These developments will further disturb relations between
Thailand and South Vietnam, which have been strained since the
Thai - North Vietnamese Red Cross agreement on repatriation
was concluded last August. South Vietnam, which claims legal
jurisdiction over the Vietnamese refugees in Thailand, holds
that Bangkok's actions are affording Hanoi a gratuitous psychol-
ogical victory.
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Hammarskjold's Impressions of Trip to Laos
eUN Secretary General Hammarskjold, reporting on his
trip to Laos after his return to New York, said he had re-
ceived the impression from talking with Premier Phoui, King
Savang, and other leaders that the Laotians were not unalter-
ably opposed to the International Control Commission and would
"welcome" its return if India would "play ball" by limiting ICC
activities to border inspections at the Lao Government's re-
quest. Hammarskjold termed this idea unrealistic, but felt
that it represented more flexibility concerning the ICC than he
had anticipated)
(On the subject of Lao-North Vietnamese relations, Hammar-
skjold said King Savang had told him that a cable received from
President Ho Chi Minh on the occasion of Savang's recent acces-
sion to the throne was "just one of many in a chain of communi-
cations between the President and myself." The King was said
to have described Ho's outlook as favoring discussions with him
and looking on Laos as a friendly county. Savang told the secre-
tary general, however, that he was unwilli:zg to start negotia-
tions at this time because Ho refuses to withdraw North Viet-
namese troops and describes the Lao Government as "against
the people." Hammarskjold regards the hitherto unpublicized
communications between Ho and Savang as a favorable develop-
ment
iHammarskjold's impressions of LOtian attitudes on the re-
turn of the ICC and a possible detente with North Vietnam run
counter to the views on these issues expressed by Lao leaders
to American officials, and could represent some softening of
their position. Any such softening might reflect confusion and
discouragement over the conflicting counsel the Lao may feel
they are receiving from friendly countries. These views may
have been advanced to Hammarskjold, however, only to en-
courage him in his efforts to provide'a UN presence and eco-
nomic assistance for Laos.i
CONFIDENTIAL
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The Situation in Iraq
An air of uneasy calm prevails in Iraq, according to an
appraisal by the American Embassy in Baghdad. Qasim's
impending departure from the hospital is engendering a feel-
ing that something will break very soon. Maneuvering be-
tween contending Communist and anti-Communist factions
continues. The Communists appear to be disheartened by
Qasim's failure to give them full backing, while Arab nation-
alists resent his support of many pro-Communist policies
and of the execution of Arab nationalist officers last Septem-
ber. Moderates are fearful of the Communists and discour-
aged by Qasim's failure to provide the country with effective
lea,dership and guidance.
The Iraqi economy is stagnant, and unemployment al-
ready high, is increasing, as are prices. Political uncertain-
ties have put a damper on investments. The important devel-
opment program is bogged down because of inadequate plan-
ning and the almost total lack of competent technicians in the
government to carry it out. The highly publicized agrarian
reform program is lagging, the crops this year have been
poor, and little improvement is in sight for 1960. Soviet bloc
economic assistance appears unlikely to bring about any early
improvement in the country's economic situation.
Qasim's recent utterances have degenerated to near inco-
herency, while his messianic complex seems to have grown,
according to the American Embassy. His personal popularity
has dropped greatly, and his exhortrtions to the people seem to
have less effect.
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CONFID1NT1 A I .
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Nur�
Ethiopia Considering Soviet Aid for Agricultural Program
Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie is reported considering
a Soviet offer to assist his ambitious agricultural development
program. The Emperor discussed land reform with officials
in Moscow last summer and at that time accepted a $100,000,000
Soviet line of credit, part of which presumably will be utilized
to develop Ethiopia's primitive but potentially rich"agric'ultUral
resources.
The Emperor, who has long sought to modernize agriculture
In Ethiopia and thereby increase the living standard of his 16,-
000,000 subjects, first announced the development program on
28 August following his return from visits to Moscow and Prague.
A major item in the program, which is still in the formulation
stage, would make available 50,000,000 acres of government-
owned land on both a cooperative and an individual settlement
basis. The program apparently also envisages providing the
services of agricultural technicians and government-sponsored
experimental farm projects, in addition to liberal credit terms
both for purchasing land and for securing technical advice.
While Moscow is anxious to begin implementation of its
economic aid agreement with Ethiopia, it is unlikely that the
Soviet Union has offered to finance and assume responsibility
for the whole land reform program. The USSR probably has of-
fered, however, to furnish agricultural equipment and techni-
calassiStancQ. Haile Selassie, aware of Western concern over
Soviet aid to Ethiopia, may hope the offer will attract increased
We US--interest.
The composition of the Soviet delegation now in Addis Ababa
indicates that Moscow probably will also offer to aid Ethiopia in
exploiting its gold mines and in constructing an oil refinery. The
Soviet credit will probably also be used to develop light industry,
including such projects as a pharmaceutical plant.
A Czech mission which arrived in Addis Ababa on 5 Novem-
ber is discussing with Ethiopian officials implementation of an
economic aid credit reportedly amounting to $20,000,000.
CONFIDENTIAL
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%IS
Cuban Government Changes Increase Leftist Power
The shake-up in high government posts on 26 November is
a further important step in the leftist trend that has been ac-
celerating in Cuba for the past three months. Ambassador Bon-
sal sees it as stressing Fidel Castro's commitment to extreme
leftist policies and his growing receptivity to guidance by
Communist-oriented elements.
Ernesto "Che" Guevara, new head of the National Bank,
now will be in a position to determine the allocation of foreign
exchange and thus implement his precept that to achieve true
independence Cuba must shift the pattern of its trade away from
dependence on the United States. He laid the basis for expanded
trade contacts during a three-month trip last summer to nine
Afro-Asian countries and Yugoslavia. Guevara is likely also
to be instrumental in implementing Castro's long-planned na-
tionalization of private banking in Cuba. The 31-year-old
Guevara, an Argentine by birth, is one of the 12 survivors
of Castro's original landing force that launched the two-year
guerrilla war. Castro relies heavily on him for advice. Gue-
vara's economic knowledge is basically weak and colored by his
concept of the Cuban revolution as a class struggle in which the
government, in alliance with the peasant and worker classes,
must "change the economic panorama" of the country and its
social system.
The new minister of public works, Capt. Osmani Cien-
fuegos, is probably a Communist. He has served since last
March as director of the Cuban Army's indoctrination program.
The new minister for the recovery of misappropriated assets,
Lt. Commander Rolando Diaz, is a naval officer of unknown po-
litical orientation.
The three officials replaced are relative moderates. The
remaining moderate officials, including the ministers of fi-
nance and communications, have lost virtually all influence
and are almost certain soon to be replaced. They are convinced
that Cuba is rapidly headed for economic collapse and a Commu-
nist take-over.
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�CONRDENT�A�
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French Petroleum Plan Likely to Aggravate European
Rivalries
(Existing tensions between the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC or Common Market) and the newly formed European
Free Trade Area (Outer Seven) led by Britain are likely to be
aggravated by determined French efforts to secure a preferred
position for Saharan oil in the EEC. Like the American oil in-
dustry, British oil representatives are concerned that the
French plan will greatly diminish their share of the EEC oil
market, and London reportedly believes Paris is prepared to
play "trump cards" to secure its objectives)
ainder the EEC treaty, crude oil, as a raw material, is
not subject to a tariff. Paris now is suggesting that the mem-
ber countries levy an internal tax on petroleum products re-
fined from "non-Community" crude. To take account of the
EEC's requirements for crude of various types the tax system
would operate after exclusion of a tax-free quota at least equal
to the gap between EEC oil production and consumption needs)
4rance appears to be making headway in selling the plan to
its EEC partners. Paris is rumored willing to offer to support
Brussels' desire to become the EEC "capital" in return for
Belgian support for this proposal. The Dutch have hinted they
might be "forced" to accede to the French plan if offered con-
cessions on agricultural exports to France. West Germany's
position will probably be determined largely by the present close
political ties between Bonn and Paris--and perhaps by the fact
that utilization of Saharan crude (which is high in gasoline con-
tent but low in fuel oil) could have some advantages for the
Ruhr's hard-pressed coal industry. Although a responsible
Rome official has said Italy could not accept the plan because
Italian refineries use non-EEC crude, the French may be will-
ing to make exceptions for crude produced in areas in which
EEC countries have a financial interest)
-CONFIDENTIAL
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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