CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/10/12

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03164697
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: October 12, 1959

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12 October 1959
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
NTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
65
DOCUMENT NO.
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12 OCTOBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev concedes this year's
grain crop will be below last year's.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq�Rigorous security measures
continue; propaganda media charge
UAR and West were allied with plot-
ters who attempted assassination.
Hammarskjold expects to establish
continuing UN presence in Laos un-
der his authority early next month.
Ceylon--Governor General assures US
that prime minister is pro-Western.
South Korea--Split averted in opposi-
tion party.
Cameroun extremists intensify plans
for terrorism.
'4401
III. THE WEST
()Brazilian meat shortage adds new irri-
tant to relations with US.
�British West Indies constitutional confer-
ence ends in impasse over Jamaican rep-
resentation.
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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
12 October 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: Khrushchev has publicly revealed in a speech at
Bratsk that this year's grain harvett will be "slightly less"
than last year's bumper yields. Crop prospects in fact ap-
pear to be poorer than Ithrushchev's phrase would imply. Un-
favorable weather and reduced grain acreage make it probable
that the current grain harvest will be well below last year's.
letrushchev continued optimistic over industrial prospects.
(Page 1)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq: The situation remains quiet, with most of the gov-
ernment's rigorous security measures still in effect. US Am-
bassador Jernegan, who saw Prime Minister Qasim briefly on
6 10 October, found him in good spirits and apparently progress-
ing satisfactorily. Radio Baghdad and most newspapers in the
capital are blaming the assassination n,ttemnt on olotters allied
with Western and UAR "imperialists."
Icp
(10
(Page 2)
Laos: (UN Secretary General Hammarskjold plans to arrive
in Laos on 2 November to make arrangements for the establish-
ment of a UN presence there under his administrative authority.
Some subordinates of the subcommittee are to remain in Laos
pending implementation of his plan. Hammarskjold reported that
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov raised no objection
when informed of the plan. Earlier,. Hammarskjold had been un-
willing to appoint a UN representative to Laos without a specific
mandate from the General Assembly or the Security Council. 3
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(UN representative operating under the direction of the secretary
general would have more authority to investigate incidents and
make recommendations than the present Security Council sub-
committee.)
Ceylon: (Governor General Goonetilleke assured the Amer-
ican ambassador on 8 October that Prime Minister Dahanayake
is sincere in his private assurances of a firm anti-Communist
and pro-Western position. Goonetilleke made a strong anneal
for increased US aid. The Governor General
if the Dahanayake government failed to survive
In Parliament, he would take over the government himself in
order to avoid early elections. The opposition parties have de-
cided to introduce a no-confidence motion when Parliament re-
convenes on 27 October; they may make only a token effort,
however, since many members are reluctant to face elections.7
(Page 3)
South Korea: The threatened split in South Korea's only op-
position party may have been averted by the decision of Demo-
cratic party coleader Cho Pyong-ok to withdraw from the party's
presidential race in favor of Vice President Chang Myon. Cho
probably estimates that the administration will use all necessary
means to prevent a Democratic victory in 1960, and that his candi-
dacy would encur the enmity of President Rhee, with whom he is on
good terms. The decision also puts Cho in a good position to cap-
ture the party's titular leadership.
; et, e ,s- Cee"ic-j
Cameroun: Ci" errorists directed by the Communist-influenced
extremist wing of the outlawed nationalist movement, the Union of
the Cameroons Population, are reported planning new
throughout Cameroun culminating in an attempted coup.
the campaign will begin with attacks on
the British Consulate in Douala--Cameroun's principal port--on
15 October, and on the American Consulate General in the capital
city of Yaoundd on 19 October. Incidents have occurred in both
cities since late June, when terrorist operations were intensified
in a last-ditch effort to induce the UN to order new elections beforej
12 Oct 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
FrriD o or, i) Cur
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Ge scheduled independence of the French-administered trust
territory on 1 January:1
III. THE WEST
Brazil: arazil's relations with the US are cooling under
the pressure of financial difficulties, popular unrest over eco-
nomic conditions, and exploitation of this situation by demagogic
politicians eyeing the 1960 presidential elections. The latest
irritant results from attempts by opponents of US investment to
blame the present serious meat shortage on the foreign packers
and to urge nationalization of their plants. Three US packers
and one British firm control some 40 percent of plant capacity)
(Page 4)
British West Indies: be recent constitutional conference of
the West Indies Federation has reached an impasse because of
Jamaica's unwillingness to compromise its demand for increased
representation. Absence of progress toward wider federal powers
and early independence may cause Trinidad's anti-American pr
mier, Eric Williams, to use dramatic means to stir up West
Indian nationalist sentiment--such as a renewal of his campaign
a ainst the US naval base at Chaguaramas.`
(Page 5)
12 Oct 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev on Soviet Economic Prospects
In a speech at Bratsk on 8 October, Soviet Premier Khru-
shchev admitted for the first time that the grain harvest will be
"slightly less than last year," but he said there would be� "enough
grain." Khrushchev displayed his usual optimism for this year's
industrial output, which he says is running 4 to 5 percent ahead
of schedule.
Precipitation this year has been well below normal in some
grain areas, and only average yields can be expected in others.
Also, the acreage devoted to grain crops in the USSR this year is
some 10-15 million acres less than during the past several years.
Thus it seems probablp that the current grain harvest will be well
below, rather than "slightly less" than, the record harvest of
130,000,000 metric tons, last year--possibly in the neighborhood
of the mediocre, 105,000,000-ton harvest of 1957.
Because Soviet agricultural production has been much higher
since the New Lands were first brought to use in 1954 and 1955, the
smaller crop will not create a domestic food shortage. Soviet ef-
forts, to catch up with the US in production of livestock products will
be affected by the smaller feed supply, however, and less grain
will be available for export. The relatively poor crop this year,
the first of the Seven-Year Plant will probably heighten criticism
of shortcomings in agriculture,which are to be discussed at the
plenum on agriculture scheduled for late November.
CONFIDENTIAL
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
The Iraqi Situation
The situation in Iraq remains quiet, with most of the gov-
ernment's rigorous security measures still in effect. Military
Governor Abdi has shortened the curfew hours,
the state of alert of some army
units outside Baghdad has been reduced. US Ambassador Jer-
negan, who saw Prime Minister Qasim briefly on Saturday,
found him in good spirits and apparently progressing satisfac-
torily.. The government is planning nationwide celebrations for
the day--early this week--when Qasim is expected to leave the
hospital.
Radio Baghdad and most newspapers in the capital are blam-
ing the assassination attempt on plotters allied with Western and
UAR "imperialism." The president of the vehemently pro-Com-
munist People's Court, Colonel tiffandawi, is reported to have
cut short his visit to Communist China and to be hurrying back
to Baghdad in case his services are needed for a new set of
trials,
the
first persons ordered arrested were relatives and friends of pro-
UAR nationalists rprentiv P xp eu t rl by thp ansim onvprnmpnt Cln
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Situation in Ceylon
rdovernor General Goonetilleke, in WalZ,LILB LAIL, bov.L.Ll. cal
situation in Ceylon with the American ambassador on 8 October,
assured him that Prime Minister Dahanayake was sincere in ex-
pressing privately to the ambassador his anti-Communist posi-
tion and his desire to work closely with the West. Goonetilleke
appealed strongly for increased American economic aid during
the next two "crucial" years. He expressed the belief and hope
that Dahanayake would be able to survive the present crisis and
last out the remaining 18 months of the government's constitu-
tional term]
Poonetilleke's strong endorsement of Dahanayake probably
is motivated by fear that his own position as Governor General
is secure only as long as the present government remains in of-
fice. if Dahana-
yake failed to survive in Parliament, he would take over the gov-
ernment himself�probably by making maximum use of his con-
stitutional powers--in order to avoid elections in the near future')
Dahanayake's command of a working majority in Parliament
remains in doubt. The combined opposition parties have decided
to introduce a no-confidence motion when the House of Representa-
tives reconvenes on 27 October� Opposition spokesmen are vig-
orously protesting the government's continuation of a state of
emergency, its stringent censorship regulations, and its failure
to reconvene Parliament immediately. Despite their publicly
expressed determination to defeat the government, leftist ele-
ments apparently continue to be reluctant to face elections and may
therefore abstain or absent themselves in sufficient numbers to
enable Dahanayake to win the test vote. The prime minister's
own divided party is likely to give him nearly unanimous support
in order to stay in off1ce3
umors apparently are widely prevalent in Colombo of a con-
spiracy behind the recent assassination of former Prime Minister
Bandaranaike, implicating certain ministers and high government
party officials. The Communist party, which has taken the stand
that the government is now completely controlled by "reactionar-
ies," is instructing its branch organizations to spread such rumors
so as to undermine public confidence in the new leadership. The
maintenance of close press censorship, with any speculation on
Bandaranaike's assassination specifically banned, probably is
lending substance to reports that members of the government were
involved.
12 Oct 59
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III. THE WEST
Political Exploitation of Brazilian Meat Shortage Threatens
US Investments
le serious shortage of meat in Brazil, following hard on
shortages of other staples which caused near-riots in Septem-
ber, has put the public in an ugly temper. This has caused
deep concern among Brazilian officials and prompted calls for
nationalization of the large packing houses. Public impatience
with shortages, corruption, and high living costs was demon-
strated in the municipal elections on 7 October in Sao Paulo,
Brazil's largest city, when a rhinoceros--a "write-in candidate"--
polled the largest vot_S
The three large US packers and one British firm--which con-
trol �otal of some 40 percent of plant capacity--suspended opera-
tions during late August and early September, protesting they
were losing money under price ceilings. They resumed slaugh-
tering in mid-September after the government threatened to take
over temporarily all large packing houses unless normal supplies
of meat reached the market immediately, Some Brazilian pack-
ers are also under close government scrutiny, but the govern-
ment privately admits it cannot police all of the small packers,
many of which are selling in the black market. Meat has been
rationed, and butcher shops closed three days a week.3
�
be situation is susceptible to exploitation by demagogic pol-
iticians eyeing the 1960 presidential elections, as well as by ex-
treme nationalists and Communists who oppose US investment
and influence in Brazil, A government official has stated
that concern over social unrest is the overriding factor at
present, and that consideration for foreign investment is tem-
porarily secondary. These considerations also influenced Pres-
ident Kubitschek last June to suspend talks with the International
Monetary Fund which were to precede a reauest for US financial
assistance:-
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CONPIIITNTIA 1.
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No Progress at West Indies Constitutional Congress
(Lack of any progress at the constitutional confeL eme among
members of the West Indies Federation may cause Trinidad's anti-
American Premier Eric Williams to seek dramatic means to
achieve his goal of wider federal powers and early independenceg
(The conference reached an impasse over the first agenda
item of representation and adjourned on 7 October, apparently
leaving for committee consideration this and other issues�in-
cluding federal finances and taxation and the question of a cus-
toms union. The deadlock resulted from Jamaica's demand for
49 percent of the legislative seats in order to reflect its numer-
ical and economic preponderance in the Federation. Trinidad
and the smaller islands were willing to increase Jamaican rep-
resentation by offering 40 percent of the seats in an enlarged
legislature instead of Jamaica's present 37.7 percent.)
ITIke delegates apparently preferred to delay political and
economic evolution of the Federation rather than take decisions
unpalatable to Jamaica, which has threatened to secede. Di-
visive factors have been accentuated by the open clash between
profederalist forces led by Williams and Jamaica's insistence
on "states' rights." Williams wants broader federal powers in-
volving a budget nearly 15 times the present size. Jamaica ve-
hemently opposes a federal income tax and customs uniono which
it considers threats to its present economic advantage. Future
developments will be influenced by whether London continues its
present role as observer or intervenes more actively in an ef-
fort to keep the Federation together and proceeding toward in-
dependence--which London hopes to grant within about five yearsi
(Williams evidently seeks to create a strong federal system
which would give him a wider political forum if he becomes its
prime minister. He may revive his now quiescent campaign
against the US naval base at Chaguaramas in an effort to arouse
West Indian nationalism. He may also maneuver to unseat the
weak federal prime minister, Sir Grantley Adams'.)
"���
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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