CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/10/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03164696
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: October 10, 1959

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10 October 1959
Copy No. C 65
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
DOCUMENT NO.
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10 OCTOBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Indian Communist leader says Khru-
shchev has urged Communist parties
to avoid uprisings and other "warlike
situations:'
Chinese Communist official states Khru-
shchev advised Peiping to stop criticiz-
ing Nehru, � Peiping hints widespread discontent with
party leadership; some unidentified high-
ranking officials warned against "individ-
ualism." 0
Chinese Communists deny UAR "fabrica-
tions" in first public comment on recent
anti-Chinese campaign in UAR press. 0
II. ASIA-AFRICA
King Husayn says he plans no interven-
tion in Iraq at present, but preparations
being made for action "as necessary." 0
Yemeni Army troops in want of back
� incidents may occur.
0 Iranian intelligehce chief says he has un-
covered Kurdish terrorist net in northwest
Iran set up by Iraqi Communists and Kurds.
0 Ghana apparently planning more exten-
sive relations with bloc countries.
III. THE WEST
0 Ambassador Lodge reports Turkey's elec-
tion to UN Security Council in doubt.
0 Bolivia--President Siles threatens to re-
sign over election of one of his political
opponents to head Senate.
LATE ITEM
Iraq--Qasim may leave hospital Monday;
"no in-
structions for positive action" against
Iraq at present.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
10 October 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR�International Communist Movement: g9:irushchev,
prior to his visit to the US, told Indian Communist party secre-
tary Ghosh that Communist parties in India and other non-bloc
states should avoid uprisings and other "warlike situations"
since their oyer-all effect would he harmful to the growth of
Communism.
Ghosh pre-
sumably interpreted Ehrushchev's views to bolster his own
moderate line within the Indian party, described Ehrushchev's
principal point that without war for three or four years the bloc's
military position will surpass that of the capitalist powers, par-
ticularly the US. In the meantime, any uprisings by "progres-
sive forces" would be suppressed by reactionary e1ement53
(Page 1)
Communist China - USSR - India: 0--)uring talks with Mao
in Peiping on 2 October, Khrushchev suggested the inadvisabil-
ity of criticizing Nehru, who is a "popular figure" and whose
antagonism would impair the advance of Communism in Asia,
Khrushchev is said to have urged that Peiping re-
frain from public statements on the border issue. The Chinese,
who apparently accepted these recommendations, in fact have
not publicly criticized New Delhi since mid-September. Chou
En-lai's message on 6 October to Nehru playing down the border
issue as a mere episode in an "age-old friendship" is the latest
indication that Peiping hopes to create an atmosphere of recon-
ciliation. The Chinese, however, have given no indication of
willingness to accept Nehruts condition for talks by evacuating
their forces from areas claimed by Nehru to be Indian territorvD
roj
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Communist China: A recent article by a leading Chinese
Communist party official contains the regime's most explicit
admission of widespread discontent with the party leadership.
The article seems to be mainly addressed to the lower ranks,
but its warning against "individualism" on the part of high-
ranking party members may be directed at some of central
committee and politburo rank. Former Defense Minister Peng
Te-huai and his ex-chief of staff seem to be particularly vul-
nerable. Both men were absent from Peiping's 10th anniver-
sary celebration on 1 October and have not appeared since.
(Page 2)
Communist China - UAR: Peiping apparently does not want
a diplomatic break with Cairo, but has warned the UAR to stop
"fabricating rumors and slanders" about Communist China. In
its first public comment since the recent UAR attack--precip-
itated by Syrian Communist leader Bakdash's speech in Peiping--
the official New China News Agency categorically denied Cairo's
press charges on 8 October that the Chinese ambassador had
been recalled and that the UAR Embassy in Peiping is being
harassed. Citing the "friendship of the Chinese people to peo-
ple in the UAR," the Chinese broadcast advised UAR newspapers
to stop their anti-Chinese campaign. While the Chinese apparently
wish to avoid public recriminations, they are likely to respond
vigorously to any further UAR press attacks
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Jordan-Iraq: ICLing Husayn said on 8 October he planned no
action in Iraq "at the present time," but he has been quoted as
being ready to assume leadership of a movement to re-establish
an Iraqi monarchy. He has been encouraged in this regard by a
organization of royalist Iraqi exiles in Beirut. Following the at-
tempted assassination of Qasim, Husayn said plans were being
made to mobilize and deploy the Jordanian Army in order to pro-
tect Jordan's borders or. intervene "as necessary" in Iraq. Husayn
asserts he will not move without first consulting the US)
(Page 3)
10 Oct 59
DAILY BRIEF
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Yemen:
troops, some on rotation from Sana, were
gathered in Al-Hudaydah in want of back pay apparently held up
because of the government's financial difficulties. The Imam
recently reduced army pay and severely punished some elements
involved in disturbances earlier this year. New disturbances
could occur, which the Imam might find difficult to deal with,
as 1s hn renorted.. he has again suffered a physical re-
ran: nera a
disclosed that a Kurdish terrorist network has been uncovered
in northwestern Iran and that cautious steps are being taken to
roll it up to prevent those implicated from escaping to Iraq.
According to Bakhtiar; the organ-
ization is sponsored by Iraqi Kurds under Barzani, assisted by
Iraqi Communists and the Qasim regime. Its aim is said to be
creation of a Kurdish republic through a campaign of terror and
guerrilla warfare. A Communist-sponsored Kurdish republic,
set up in 1945-46 in northwestern Iran between the USSR and
Iraq, collapsed when the Iranian Army moved in..]
(Page 4)
Ghana - Soviet Bloc: Ghana, probably influenced in part by
Guinea's, example, appears to be giving its neutralist policy a
new emphasis by developing more active relations with the Sino-
Soviet bloc. Although the USSR now is the only bloc country with
a diplomatic mission in Accra, serious consideration apparently
is being given to an early exchange of ambassadors with Peiping.
Total bloc personnel in Ghana�including the existing Polish,
Czech; and East German permanent trade missions--now is es-
timated at 80, a figure expected to increase next year.
(Page 5)
III. THE WEST
United Nations: [Ambassador Lodge estimates "pessimistically"
0 that Poland thus far has a two-vote lead over Turkey for the UN)
10 Oct 59
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O
rie_curity Council seat now occupied by Japan. Even if Turkey
should pick up a possible 11 votes on the second or third ballot,
Ankara will not have the required two-thirds majority. The
resulting deadlock might cause the emergence of a neutral
dark-horse candidate, probably a member of the Asian-Afri-
can bloc. Balloting begins on 12 October.]
(Page--6)
*Bolivia: Bolivian President Siles plans to ask Congress
to accept his own resignation or rescind its 7 October election
of Ruben Julio as the new Senate chief, a post which includes
the right of succession to the national presidency. Saes' actual
resignation would probably set off rioting and an intense strug-
gle for power. Julio has recently allied himself with the left-
wing opposition to Siles in a bitter conflict with the President
over a cabinet appointment. (Page 7)
LATE ITEM
*Iraq: Prime Minister Qasim's condition is "very good."
and he is scheduled to leave the hospital on 12 October,
On 9 October senior military and cabinet
officials visited him at the hospitals and that evening scenes
taken in Qasim's hospital room were shown on Baghdad televi-
sion.
The government's stringent security measures have resulted
in the maintenance of order throughout the country.
the Iraqi Air Force to carry out reconnaissance o or-
der facing Syrias without violating the frontier. Baghdad radio
on 9 October began accusing "Cairo Fascists and their hirelings"
of bin rsnonsjble forihe assassination attempt.
present time there are no instructions for positive action."
10 Oct 59
"'DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev Advises on Communist Tactics
gihrushchev, prior to his visit to the United States, told
Indian Communist party secretary Ajoy Ghosh that Communist
parties in India and other non-bloc countries should avoid up-
risings and other "warlike situations" since their over-all
effect would be harmful to the growth of Communism,
While Ghosh presumably presented the So-
viet leader's remarks in a manner designed to give the greatest
possible support to his own moderate position within the Indian
party, Ehrushchev's instructions are consistent with Moscow's
current emphasis on relaxation of international tensi0ns:1
lairushchev was reported by Ghosh as having justified his
views on the grounds that if war can be avoided for three or
four years, the military strength of the bloc will surpass that
of the West, especially the United States. He also explained that
while the USSR would try to give aid in the event of uprisings by
"progressive forces" in non-bloc countries, violent actions would
lead reactionary elements to unite in suppressing thefg
Tale Soviet leader's counsel to Ghosh follows closely the ad-
vice given Indian Communists by letter from the Soviet party in
late July just before the fall of the Kerala Communist regime.
Moscow then suggested continuing to rely on "parliamentary means"
to come to power. The Chinese Communists, while agreeing with
this general policy line, suggested to Ghosh during his visit to Pei-
ping in early September that the Indian party should adopt a "tough-
er" line in opposing Nehru and Congress party policies or it would
risk losing the Indian Communist party's right wing to "reaction-
ary forces." Ghosh, who returned to Peiping for national day
celebrations on 1 October because of fears the Chinese might throw
their support to the left wing of his party and thus jeopardize his
position as party secretary, planned to leave Peiping for another
visit to Moscow on 10 Octob.5),
6,
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Peiping Continues Campaign Against Domestic Critics
An article by an alternate member of the Chinese Commu-
nist party's secretariat in the official People's Daily on 28 3ep-
tember contains the regime's most explicit admission of wide-
spread discontent with the party leadership. The article seems,
to be addressed mainly to the lower ranks, but contains a warn-
ing to "high-ranking functionaries" against "individualism."
The writer specifically attacks "unit" leaders who object
to party interference and attempt to turn their spheres of re-
sponsibility into "independent kingdoms." These comrades, he
continues, say that the party should assume only "political and
ideological" and not "organizational" leadership. Calling this
attitude a serious political mistake, the writer states that the
party must completely expose this point of view and deal those
who espouse it a "determined blow." Some of these charges are
similar to those made in 1954 preceding the purge of two high-
ranking party leaders.
The article concludes with the most effusive praise of Mao
Tse-tung of the past year. This strong defense of Mao and his
policies--following similar efforts in the past few months--
points up the widespread criticism of the leadership, both within
and outside the party, which resulted from the "leap forward"
and commune programs.
This article illustrates again the intention of Mao and the
"party-machine" leaders to maintain their domination of the
party by threatening and punishing their critics. At the highest
levels of the party, former Defense Minister Peng Te-huai and
his ex-chief of staff seem to be particularly vulnerable to the
kind of criticism contained in this article. Both men were ab-
sent from Peiping's 10th anniversary celebration on 1 October
and have not appeared since.
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King Husayn Considering Possible Intervention in Iraq
gordan's King Husayn, encouraged by a group of royalist
Iraqi exiles in Beirut, is contemplating possible Jordanian in-
tervention in Iraq to prevent Communist domination of the
country. He probably also fears that a successful UAR-sup-
ported overthrow of Qasim would increase Nasir's potential for
subverting the Jordanian Government. The King reportedly is
ready to lead a movement to re-establish the Iraqi monarchy,
believing that, as a cousin of the late King Faysai of Iraq, he
is best qualified to claim the throne.7
1I1sayn, who has asserted Jordan would not take any action
in Iraq without prior consultation with the United States Govern-
ment, said on 8 October that he was not planning intervention
"at the present time," but that the Jordanian Army was making
preparations in case it became "necessary" to preserve the
integrity of Jordanian borders or to take action in Iraq. One
infantry brigade is being readied for a possible move to the
H-4 pipeline pumping station, about 50 miles from the Iraqi
border; other units are to be sent on maneuvers, and Jordanian
air units have been placed on alert. The American Army attach�
in Amman believes the Jordanians are capable of forming and
moving a small task force into Iraq in two or three dayq
Wayn almost surely regards prior assurance of British
or American support as a necessary prerequisite to any interven-
tion. He also has conferred with Iranian intelligence chief Bakhtiar
about possible Jordanian-Iranian action against Qasim]
The group of Iraqi exiles in Beirut with whom Husayn is in
contf has been urging him for weeks to support them in opera-
tions against the Iraqi regime. Calling themselves the Iraqi Politi-
cal Exile Committee, they met on 3 October and selected former
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Jawdat Ayyubi as president. Also associat-
ed with the group is Shammar tribal leader Shaykh Fannar FaysaL
In mid-September Husayn said they had not offered any specific
plan for overthrowing Qasim, but they claim to have
well as the Kurds'.)
in Iran among .v�nriniic frihiac ac
10 Oct 59
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Kurdish Terrorist Network Reported Uncovered in Iran
[Iranian intelligence claims to have uncovered an Iraqi-
sponsored Kurdish network in northwestern Iran and is
planning the early arrest of known leaders. According to
General Bakhtiar, chief of the Iranian national intelligence
organization Savak, captured Kurdish agents have disclosed
the names of over 400 members of an alleged Kurdish na-
tionalist organization which is plotting a campaign of terrorism
and guerrilla warfare patterned after the struggle in Algeria.
The Kurds reportedly plan to disarm Iranian gendarmerie and
army posts on the Iraqi border and establish bases for night
operations in the area with Iraqi logistic support-3
(p�nder interrogation, the Kurdish agents, who may have
been tailoring their remarks to fit Iranian preconceptions and
thus ease their own lot, claimed that Iraqi Communists, Iraqi
Kurds under Mustafa Barzani, and the Qasim regime were
helping to develop the clandestine Kurdish organization for the
purpose of creating an independent Kurdistan, which would in-
clude parts of Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. These alleged
plans parallel traditional Kurdish aspirations, but reports from
Iraq suggest that Barzani has become disenchanted with his
alleged Communist sponsors and that Qasim, enmeshed in his
own national problems, probably has no desire to become even
clandestinely involved in external ventures
(Tran has apparently launched a major coordinated campaign
by Savak, the border guards, and the army's counterintelligence
corps in an effort to roll up the Kurdish network while still in its
initial stages. According to Bakhtiar, the most dangerous par-
tisans--including the top leadership--will be arrested in the near
future. The Iranians are said to be moving cautiously to keep
members of the Kurdish organization from being warned and to
prevent their escape to Iraq-:,)
rffaving been alerted, Iranian security forces can probably
eliminate any immediate threat from this source in the absence
of any general breakdown of internal security. They would prob-
ably find it difficult, however, to cope with the tvoe of guerrilla
warfare that apparently was being Planned)
10 Oct 59
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Ghana Expanding Relations With Bloc
Ghana now appears to be implementing its long-professed
policy of "positive neutralism and nonalignment" in a more ac-
tive manner as far as its relations with the Sib-Soviet bloc are
concerned. Motivated apparently by an increasing interest in
exploring the possibilities of bloc economic and technical aid as
well as by a desire not to appear appreciably less "neutralist"
than Guinea, the Nkrumah regime is exhibiting increased recep-
tivity toward bloc efforts to promote contacts. These efforts
have been progressively intensified since late 1958.
Although the Soviet Embassy established in August is the
only bloc diplomatic mission in Accra at present, Prime Min-
ister Nkrumah has apparently been giving serious consideration
to an early exchange of ambassadors with Communist China. An
announcement to this effect may possibly be made in connection
with the current visit to Peiping of a Ghanaian trade and good-will
mission. Since its independence in 19572 Ghana has held that it
"Inherited" recognition of Peiping from Britain and has consistently
voted in the UN against postponement of the Chinese representation
issue. Guinea's decision to establish diplomatic relations with
Communist China was announced on 4 October.
Meanwhile, the European satellites�especially East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, and Poland, which have permanent trade missions
in Accra spearhead the bloc's drive in Ghana. Their representa-
tives, including trade delegates and technicians, now account for
over 60 of the estimated 80 bloc personnel resident in Ghana.
Most of the Communist-bloc countries send periodic special del-
egations which have offered technic 1 assistance and conducted
industrial feasibility surveys. The East Germans, striving for
international recognition, have been particularly active. Last
month they induced Ghana to sign agreements providing for the
training of 50 Ghanaian students in East German universities,
technical schools, and factories.
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IIL THE WEST
Security Council Contest May Result in Deadlock
Ifile close contest between Turkey and Poland for the UN
Security Council seat now occupied by Japan may result in a
deadlock and the emergence of a neutral dark-horse candidate--
probably from the Asian-African bloc. Ambassador Lodge esti-
mates that Poland thus far has a two-vote lead over Turkey, with
neither having the necessary two-thirds majority. Even with 11
votes which may switch to Turkey on the second or third ballot,
Turkey will not have the 54-plus votes needed. Voting is by se-
cret ballog
C16_,ny UN members, now committed to Poland, might have
supported Turkey if its candidacy had been announced sooner.
In addition to Communist support, Poland has the backing of
many UN members who consider this council seat allocated to
Eastern Europe, Six Latin American members are supporting
Poland for this reason. Other members claim they do not under-
stand the United States' strong opposition to Poland in view of
the "present detente" between Moscow and Washington
a_iloting begins on 12 October, and it is possible that as
many as 30 ballots will be required before the issue is resolved.
In 1955, when a contest occurred between the Philippines and
Yugoslavia, 34 ballots were insufficient to resolve the problem,
and the two divided the
E TIAL
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Bolivian President Plans Ultimatum to Congress
Moderate Bolivian President Siles plans to go before a
joint session of Congress to force that group to choose between
his own resignation and a reversal of the Senate's 7 October
election of Ruben Julio as Senate chief, a post which stands
first in line of succession to the presidency. Julio has recently
allied himself with the left-wing opposition in a bitter conflict
with the President over a cabinet appointment.
Siles seeks a vote by both houses of congress, apparently
hoping that the majority in the Chamber of Deputies may be suf-
ficient to overcome the opposition's majority in the Senate. One
of his supporters won the top office in the lower house last Au-
gust by 32 to 29.
lSues' actual resignation would set off an intense struggle
for power. Control of the government machinery is an impor-
tant factor in the decisive government party nominating conven-
tion, scheduled for December for the 1960 presidential election.
Tensions would probably lead to rioting and possibly to clashes
among the armed groups of civilian militia, which could involve
the army.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
�rONFIDENT-1412--
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