CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/10/08

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03164694
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: October 8, 1959

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8 October 1959
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8 OCTOBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Sihanouk tells Cambodians to choose
between him and dissident exiles in
"referendum."
Rebel harassment continues in Laos.
Ceylonese prime minister tells US
ambassador he will follow moderate
course; regrets closing of British
bases.
Lebanon- -President Shihab forms
new, expanded cabinet.
LATE ITEM
Baghdad quiet under increased secu-
rity measures after assassination
attempt on Qasim.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
8 October 1959
DAILY BRIEF
IRHE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Cambodia: Prince Sihanouk has called on Cambodians
to "choose between" his own leadership and rebel leaders
Sam Sary and Son Ngoc Thanh who, he charges, are sup-
ported by "certain foreign powers" and advocate alignment
with SEATO. Sihanouk said that if he wins the as yet un-
scheduled referendum, any nation which continues to sup-
port the rebel leaders "will be considered a nation hostile
to the Cambodian people." The announcement follows a pub-
lic trial of supporters of the abortive coup last spring by Dap
Chhuon, in which both Sam Sary and Son Ngoc Thanh were in-
volved. Sihanouk had also accused Thailand and South Viet-
nam of supporting the coup. The public revival of these charges
threatens to renew dissension between Cambodia and its neigh-
bors. (Page 1)
Laos: Rebel harassment and propaganda activities con-
tinued in widespread areas of Laos during the past few days.
Skirmishes and concentrations of rebel groups are reported in
southern Laos. Aircraft on a resupply mission to Lao troops
surrounded at Muong Son in western Sam Ner Province were
sub'ected to rebel mortar fire on 5 October,
Page 2) (Map)
Watch Committee conclusion�Laos: Dissident activity
has remained at a low level. 'The dissidents, however, with
probable North Vietnamese assistance, continue to have the
objective of establishing themselves in a strong position which
they could use as the basis for political bargaining or for the
expansion of military operations.
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Ceylon: TEime Minister Dahanayake, in his first official
conversation with the American ambassador on 6 October, made
a bid for American support,. Dahanayake commented critically on
certain Communist-bloc actions and said he wished to work closely
with the West. He also felt it a mistake for Ceylon to have taken
over British military bases on the island, and said he hoped he
could find a way to undo the effects of this error. Dahanayake,
who is not yet assured of a working majority in Parliament, will
probably move slowly, however, in making any changes, in order
not to antagonize nationalistic elements:j
(Page a)-
*Lebanon: President Shihab, succumbing to pressures from
religious sects not represented in the former four-man cabinet,
on 7 October reshuffled and doubled the size of the cabinet. Again
headed by Prime Minister Karami, the new cabinet includes rep-
resentatives of several additional religious groups. Shihab will
probably be unable to keep the tight control he formerly exercised
over the cabinet. (Page 4)
LATE ITEM
*Iraq: Baghdad is quiet following the unsuccessful assassina-
tion attempt of 7 October on Prime Minister Qasim by an as yet
unidentified assailant. All borders have been closed, and heavy
patrols of police and troops are guarding all major cities. The
army has been placed on the highest state of alert, and troop units
have been ordered to reinforce border posts.
Qasim, according to press reports, appeared before a crowd
gathered at the hospital where he was treated, and later a short,
reassuring speech by the prime minister was broadcast over Radio
Baghdad. A number of army units have sent Qasim telegrams of
support.
Military Governor Abdi has appealed to the public to re-
main calm and has banned all meetings and demonstrations. The
8 Oct 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Communists have rallied to Qasimts support, and crowds are re-
ported to have chanted "Long live Qasim; death to Nasir"--a
sign that the Iraqi people suspect the UAR was behind the attack.
An intensive roundup of opposition elements, especially pro-
Nasir sympathizers, will very likely ensue.
ryfatch Committee conclusion�Middle East: Situations su
ceptibli of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which
would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East, particu-
larly in Iraq and Iran. The situation in Iraq continues to be tens
The attempted assassination of Qasim has resulted in intensifie
security measures and may be followed by numerous arrests of
suspected antiregime elements. Although efforts are being made
to maintain order, further attempts against Qasim are possible,
and factional strife may break out. In these circumstances, di-
rect UAR involvement in Iraq, with a consequent increase in the
danger of broader hostilities in the area, is possible?
8 Oct 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. TirinOMMUNIST BLOC..ir
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Cambodian Leader Proclaims Referendum
Cambodian Premier Sihanouk has proclaimed a people's
referendum to choose between hisS leadership, based on a policy
of neutrality, and that of dissident leaders Sam Sary and Son
Ngoc Thanh, "who advocate Cambodia's membership in SEATO."
Sihanouk has announced he will resign in favor of a "neutral"
premier during the as yet undesignated referendum period, and
has promised to go into exile or submit to trial if the vote goes
against him. Victory is a foregone conclusion, and Sihanouk, in
a move to forestall charges of a rigged vote, proposes that the
referendum be organized under the supervision of the Interna-
tional Control Commission (ICC) and of observers from "those
foreign powers which have supported Sam Sary and Son Ngoc
Thanh."
The referendum announcement follows a recent public trial
of accomplices of dissident General Dap Chhuon, who lost his
life in an abortive coup against Sihanouk last spring. The trial,
which resulted in 16 death verdicts including in absentia sentences
for Sam Sary and Son Ngoc Thanh, rehashed evidence of support
of the coup by South Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, Thailand.
Aside from the referendum's inherent advantages of rallying
further popular support, Sihanouk's primary aim apparently is to
stigmatize external support of the dissident "Free Cambodia"
movement. He has warned that if he wins, any nation which con-
tinues to abet the treasonable activities of Sam Sary and Son Ngoc
Thanh "will lose the friendship of the people of Cambodia." Sihanouk
apparently is convinced that South Vietnam has not only continued
to support the Cambodian dissidents but has recently stepped up its
intrigues to a dangerous level. Sihanouk's course is likely to an-
tagonize South Vietnam and could bring a revival of dissension between
Cambodia and its neiahbors which the CommimiqtR. nuIr again ex-
ploit.
8 Oct 59
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Communist Harassment in Laos Continuing
ontinuing small-scale
clashes in widely scattered areas and to Communist efforts, par-
ticularly in southern Laos, to build a potential for guerrilla
warfare through recruitment of new personnel and the occasional
seizure of arms. The Laotian Government is concerned espe-
cially over reports of concentrations of rebel forces in Cham-
passak, Attopeu, and Saravane provinces because the area is
only lightly held and the army cannot spare units now employed
in the north71
Sam Neua Province, Communist elements which for some
weeks have been in the vicinity of the government post at Muong
Son are reported to have begun attacking the post on 5-6 October.
Aircraft on a resupply mission to Lao troops surrounded at Muong
Son were subjected to rebel mortar fire on 5 October. In the
northeastern part of the province, Laotian Army efforts to re-
gain the ground lost in the 30 August Communist attacks on sev-
eral posts on the Nam Ma River are meeting with uncertain
results.
UN subcommittee contingent has flown to Luang Prabang
for a brief visit to interrogate prisoners and take statements from
wounded soldiers. The bulk of the mission is expected to leave
Laos shortly, but a few individuals may remain to assure a con-
tinuing UN presence._
8 Oct 59
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Ceylonese Prime Minister Privately States
Anti-Communist Views
The strong anti-Communist line taken by Prime Minister
Dahanayake in his first official conversation with the American
ambassador since assuming office on 26 September is consist-
ent with previous indications that Dahanayake intends to pursue
a moderate course. The prime minister sharply criticized the
conditions attached to the Sib-Soviet aid programs in Ceylon,
and said he wished to work closely with the West. He also de-
plored former Prime Minister Bandaranaike's termination of
Britain's, military base rights in Ceylon in late 1957, and ex-
pressed his hope to modify the effects of this mistake]
The import of Dahanayake's, statements is reduced consid-
erably, however, by his comment that he cannot express such
views publicly, and by his previous public pledges to continue
Bandaranaikegs neutralist-socialist policies. Dahanayake has
said publicly that he will soon implement Bandaranaike's long-
standing, popular proposal to change Ceylon's status from that
of a British dominion to a completely independent republic. Re-
turning the naval and air bases to British control would not only
be imcompatible with Ceylon's future status as a republic, but
probably would be stiffly opposed by the island's influential
Buddhist-nationalist forces, which Dahanayake is considered
to represent. Furthermore, any substantial shift to a pro-West
orientation probably would not be endorsed by the Ceylonese Par-
liament, in which Dahanayake has not yet been guaranteed a safe
majorit_cy-,3
0:71_ahanayake presumably values congenial relations with all
foreign diplomatic personnel in Ceylon, and his conversation with
the American ambassador seems primarily a bid for continued
American support. He may have conversed with Communist-bloc
diplomats in a different vein. At a press conference on 2 Octo-
ber a seven-member Soviet parliamentary delegation which ar-
rived in Ceylon on 16 September reportedly expressed satisfac-
tion with Dahanayake's assurance that Ceylon t foreign policy
would remain unchanged3
giould Dahanayake remain in office long enough to take action
on his indicated policies, his anti-Communist sentiment probably
would be demonstrated primarily in connection with suppressing
strikes by labor unions affiliated with Ceylon's leftist political par-
ties,
CONFITIEN-MT
8 Oct 59 CENTRAI INTFI I ICZ,FNICF RI III FTINI
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The Lebanese Situation
President Shihab on 7 October succumbed to pressures from
political leaders of Lebanon's many religious sects and enlarged
the four-man Karami cabinet to include eight members. The
new cabinet includes representatives of several additional sects.
Former Interior Minister Raymond Edde, who had long professed
a desire to return to his law practice, was dropped. His polit-
ical rival Pierre Jumayyil, head of the Maronite Phalange, re-
mains as minister of public works, and ailing Husayn Uwayni will
retain the Foreign Ministry portfolio. Karami now holds the posts
of prime minister, finance, and defense.
Lebanon's deteriorating relations with the UAR may become an
issue in the new cabinet. During the past month several incidents
have occurred to complicate Prime Minister Karami's policy of
cordial relations with the UAR-
an
embargo on the import of Lebanese apples to the UAR, tll�old
ing of extensive anti-Iraqi demonstrations throughout Lebanon,
and a recent prohibition of travel by Syrians to Lebanon. Any of
these incidents may be exploited by various interested parties,
especially by ex-President Chamoun, who recently suffered an
election defeat in the Druze area.
President Shihab's control over the cabinet will be loosened,
and he is likely to be plagued with a return to the traditional con-
fusion of Lebanese politics, with various factions contending for
the spoils of office. His program of governmental reform, already
slowed by cabinet dissensions, is likely to be further hampered.
Accompanying this new state of affairs will be a less complacent
parliament and increased demands for new parliamentary elections.
SE
8 Oct 59 CFKITRAI ikITFI I IftrkIrPP1 III TIM
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department ,
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CO TIAL
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