CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/10/03

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03164690
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: October 3, 1959

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3 October 1959
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
3.5(c) /
3.3(h)(2)
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INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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DATE.
REVIEWER
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3 OCTOBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chinese Communists persist in boost-
ing communes despite lack of Soviet
agreement.
Heavy air activity accompanies Soviet
Pacic Fleet exercise.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
UAR continues to attack Communist
China for permitting Bakdash speech
In Peiping.
Laos--UN subcommittee continues lim-
ited survey work.
Pakistan--Retirement of army chief of
staff points up friction within armed
forces.
Japan--Kishi improves his position for
gaining approval of revised Security
Treaty.
11
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\
III. THE WEST
Turkey--Relations between two major
parties embittered by physical attacks
on opposition deputies.
0 Cyprus--Makarios and Grivas will meet
next week to discuss differences.
0 Guatemala�Anti-US and pro-Communist
political forces gain strength.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
3 October 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - USSR: The Chinese Communists are
continuing to make claims for their communes, which, despite
expressed Soviet disagreement; they insist will help usher in
the era of Communism at some time in the future. In a major
article written for the October issue of the bloc's theoretical
journdl discussing Peiping's "10 years of successes," govern-
ment dhairman Liu Shao-chi asserted that as far as "our" coun-
try is 'Concerned, the commune--a new "road" which has been
"discovered" by the Chinese--will be "a suitable form of social
organization at the basic level alter China has entered Commu-
or nism." At least one Soviet theorist has recently contradicted
similar Chinese claims with the flat statement that the commune
is "impossible" in the future Communist society. The Chinese
leaders may still hope to gain at least limited Soviet endorse-
ment of the commune program while Ithrushchev is in China.
While it is unlikely that this ideological difference is drastically
weakening the Sino-Soviet alliance, Peiping's determination to
increase its prestige by introducing "new" theories and proce-
dures will he a constant irritant in the relationshin
Soviet Pacific Fleet Exercise: Extensive air activity in con-
nection with the current large-scale Soviet Pacific Fleet exer-
cise, simulating defense of the Soviet Far East, has been fea-
tured by the unprecedented association of Bison jet heavy bomb-
ers and has also included an unusual amount of Badger jet
medium bomber flight activity, The precise role of the jet
heavy bonabers in connection'with this exercise is not known.
(Page 1)
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
UAR - Communist China: The UAR is maintaining a hostile
attitude toward Communibt China following the anti-UAR speech
by Syrian Communist leader Bakdash on 28 September in Pei-
ping. The Cairo press says that the UAR charg�n Peiping has
been ordered home. Peiping has made no public comment as yet.
However: the Cairo press reports that the Chinese Communist
ambassador in Cairo refused to accept a formal UAR protest.
In Peiping: ranking Foreign Ministry officials have made ex-
cuses not to receive the UAR charg�
On 30 September, Cairo ordered the UAR press
attach�in Beirut to launch a strong press attack on Communist
China.
Nasir has already
tentatively decided to close the Chinese Communist consulate in
Damascus and is considering breaking off diplomatic relations
with Peiping.
� Laos: LA...el:though UN secretary General Hammarskjold expects
the UN subcommittee on Laos to arrive soon in New York to draft
its report, he will probably advise the delegates' governments to
leave some elements of the mission in Vientiane in order to assure
D a continuing UN presence. The subcommittee, now making a lim-
ited survey in northern Laos, is hampered in its work by the lack
of helicopters. Some delegates are looking toward a departure
date of 9 October: but others are willing to stay on to try to sur-
vev the forward arpas7
Pakistan: (The retirenient on 30 September of Lt. General
Habibullah: Pakistani army chief of staff, confirms earlier evi-
dence of a serious rift in Pakistan's top army leadership. During
the past year, friction has existed between Habibullah and Gen-
eral Musa, commander in chief. The reasons for Habibullah's
0 \ retirement have not yet been officially stated. Habibullah's appar-
ently forced retirement could generate significant discord within
the officer corps of the Pakistani Army and lower the military gov-
ernment's prestigeT, (Page 2)
3 Oct 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Japan: Kishi's position for securing approval of the revised
US-Japan Security Treaty has improved. Leaders of the most in-
fluential Japanese organization of businessmen have agreed to
finance a public relations program in support of the revised treaty.
In return for this support, Kishi promised not to dissolve the Diet
on the treaty issue. Ichiro Kono, a leading Kishi party rival, has
indicated he will support ratification of the revised treaty. This
suggests that important elements among anti-Kishi conservatives
are aband ning use of the treaty issue to undermine the prime
minister. Former Prime Minister Tanzan Ishibashi's recent
statements implying agreement with Peiping's criticisms of the
curit treaty may have brought matters to a heath
(Page 3)
III. THE WEST
Turkey: Bitterness between the two major political parties
in Turkey has intensified as the result of recent acts of violence
against opposition deputies. In the most recent incident, several
opposition deputies traveling in western Turkey were seriously
injured in an ambush by a mob of local Democratic party adher-
ents. The leader of the major opposition party fears the govern-
ment may ban his party. (Page 4)
Cyprus: Archbishop Makarios' decision to meet next week
with former EOKA leader Grivas in an attempt to remove differ-
ences between them is welcomed by the great majority of Greek
Cypriot nationalists, who fear that the dispute will benefit the
Communists. Makarios, stands to lose if agreement is not reached,
while Grivas' prestige will probably be enhanced regardless of the
u outcome. On Cyprus, a wave of lawlessness in recent weeks has
of- caused heightened tension between the Greek and Turkish commu-
nities. Meanwhile, Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot negotiators have
made some progress toward agreement on executive powers in the
future government of Cyprus. The first Cypriot elections may
take place in December.
3 Oct 59 DAILY I3RIEF
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Guatemala: rA7mbassador Mallory is seriously concerned
over Guatemala's future political orientation, particularly as it
may affect US interests. Some anti-US and pro-Communist po-
litical factions are being fostered by the beleagured President
Ydigoras in an effort to weaken the strong, leftist but anti-
Communist Revolutionary party. These factions are vying for
the backing of leftist ex-President Arevalo, who still retains
considerable popularity in Guatemala, and one group is be
to be receiving Cuban financial aid.
(Page 5)
3 Oct 59
DAILY BRIEF iv
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Extensive Air Support of Soviet Pacific Fleet Exercise
Soviet Pacific Fleet surface, submarine, and air units as
well as some 5th Long Range Air Army units are conducting a
large-scale exercise simulating defense of the Soviet Far East.
The extensive air support of the exercise has been fea-
tured by the unprecedented association of Bison jet heavy bomb-
ers and has also included an unusually large amount of Badger
jet medium bomber flight activity. Several flights by 5th
LRAA Bisons have extended southward as far as approximately
225 miles southeast of Tokyo, and numerous Badger flights have
been flown in other areas of the North Pacific.
The role of the jet heavy bombers in this exercise is not
known; they may have acted as an anti-naval strike force, they
may have been simulating hostile bombers approaching the So-
viet mainland over the exercise area, or they may have been
conducting over-water navigational flights.
In addition, surface and submarine units are operating in
the Sea of Japan, along the Kuril Islands, and in the vicinity of
Petropavlovsk, Kamchatka. Two destroyers and a tanker which
left the Sea of Japan through the Korea Strait on 24 September
have entered the Pacific and are moving northward off the east
coast of Japan. These units probably represent "aggressor"
forces.
Large Pacific Fleet exercises have been conducted annually
at this time during recent years. Last year's exercise, which
lasted from 29 September to 24 October, also included a wide
sweep into the Pacific Ocean by surface forces. This was fol-
lowed by an apparent attempt to penetrate the Kuril chain from
the Pacific without detection.,
3 Oct 59
ir`ChATI'i Al 11,..17E1 I lesEk1.0"C DI Ill rflki
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Retirement of Pakistani Army Chief of Staff Indicates
Army Factionalism
ILlte retirement of Lt. 'Gen. Habibullah on 30 September
confirms earlier evidence of a serious rift in Pakistan's top
army leadership. Although the specific reasons for Habibullah's
retirement have not been stated, a number of reports indicate
it was forced by General Musa, commander in, chief. During
the past year, friction has existed between Habibullah and
Musa, and Musa may have been responsible for the recent
retirement of one brigadier who supported Habibullah and the
transfer of anoth5g
Crthe military government under President Ayub, which
has been in control since 1958, may lose prestige when
Habibullah's retirement becomes public knowledge and gen-
erates rumors of infighting within top army echelons. Habi-
bullah was apparently considered more capable than Musa,
and he seems to have been well liked by his fellow officers.
The army officer corps may face a serious morale problem
which will require President Ayub's attenti29
The shift of the national capital from Karachi to the
Rawalpindi area, where army general headquarters is lo-
cated, is scheduled to begin this month, and this will facili-
tate closer contacts between Avub and army leaders'?
3 Oct 59
rsekrre Al ik.ITEI I le�Okle'r nil. I Erik!
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Kishi Secures Support for US-Japan Security Treaty Revision
Japanese Prime Minister msm nas improvea nis position
for securing ratification of the revised US-Japan Security Treaty.
At Kishi's request, leaders of the Federation of Economic Organ-
izations (Keidanren)--the most influential organization of Jap-
anese businessmen--have agreedto provide $910000 toward a
public relations program in support of the treaty. In return,
Kishi promised not to dissolve the Diet on the treaty issue-3
Kishi warned faction leaders of his Liberal-Democratic
party on 23 September that he would dissolve the Diet and call
for a parliamentary election if the party split on ratifying the
treaty. He apparently is confident his position is strong on the
issue, and his promise to Keidanren probably was made in the
belief that the prospective financial burden of an election cam-
paign would keep his party in line. Kishi presumably will inform
his party rivals of Keidanren's warning that financial support from
businessmen may be withheld if an election is precipitated on the
treaty issue-.1
Thgre are indications that Kishi's rivals have decided that
theUS-Japan Security Treaty is not a good issue for unseating
the prime minister. Minister of Agriculture Fukuda told Ambas-
sador MacArthur on 29 September that influential politician Ichiro
Kono will go along with Kishi on the treaty. Fukuda does not ex-
pect the support of former Prime Minister Tanzan Ishibashil who
during a recent visit to Peiping subscribed to Chinese Communist
statements that the security treaty was an impediment to closer
Sino-Japanese relations. He does believe, however,. that Ishibashi
may be persuaded to refrain from open oppositionT1
3 Oct 59
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III. THE WEST
Political Bitterness Increasing in Turkey
Political tension is rising in Turkey in anticipation of the
reconvening of the Grand National Assembly on 1 November.
Twice, groups of opposition deputies have been attacked by
large crowds of local members of the ruling party. During
the most recent of these attacks� on 22 September, several
deputies were reported to be seriously injured.
The minister of the interior immediately sent the chief of
the Turkish National Police to investigate the incident. The
Turkish Government has banned any press accounts of the af-
fair and has publicly charged that the opposition Republican
People's party (RPP) is trying to subvert the governing Dem-
ocratic party. While the RPP is probably exaggerating the de-
tails of the incident for whatever propaganda value they may have,
the general account of the mob attack has been confirmed by 'Na-
tional Police officials.
esident Izmet Inonu, leader of the RPP, reportedly fears
that the government may decide to close down his party and has
cautioned RPP campaign teams visiting the provinces not to en-
gage in "aggressive" tactics. The recent forced resignation of
RPP Secretary General Gulek, chief spokesman for an aggres-
sive party policy, may have been intended as a conciliatory ges
ture to keep the government from banning the RPP prior to the
reconvening of parliament.
The RPP, which has 170 of the 610 parliamentary seats, has
maintained a running propaganda battle with the governing DP ever
since the last general election in 1957. Last spring Inonu him-
self was the target of violence at the hands of a DP mob. At that
time, special security precautions were taken by the government
to prevent the situation from getting out of hand.
3 Oct 59
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Guatemalan President Supports Leftist Extremists in Effort
To Split Opposition
Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras� faced with strong op-
position from the moderately leftist Revolutionary party (PR) and
conspiracies by the rightist Nationalist Democratic Movement
(MDN), is using leftist extremists in a desperate effort to retain
power. He fostered the recent organization of three new leftist
splinter parties from elements opposed to the moderate PR lead-
ership, a number of them with records of Communist collabora-
tion. Ydigoras apparently plans to subsidize one or more of these
parties in the crucial December congressional elections in the
hope that they will split the
ralie leftist splinter parties are vying for the backing of bit-
terly anti-US former President Juan Jose Arevalo, whose admin-
istration from 1945 to 1951 paved the way for Communist domina-
tion of the succeeding Arbenz regime. Though Arevalo, now in
Venezuela, has been in exile since 1954/ he retains wide popular-
ity in Guatemala. Arevalo's influence could weaken or destroy
the current PR leadership/ which is anti-Communist. The re-
sulting leftist political force would be formidable if united under
Arevalo's leadership and would probably be Communist infiltrated.
American Ambassador Mallory is seriously concerned over the
effect of these maneuvers on Guatemala's future political orienta-
tion, particularly as it affects US interests]
1The Castro regime in Cuba may be backing the Arevalo forces.
Last July/ Fidel Castro through his brother Raul is
to have offered financial aid to Arevalo. This offer appar-
was temporarily declined but,
a pro-Arevalo politician visiting Cuba in September was
given a first installment on a reported $200,000 for his party's
ttni vio aaerafill ei cernurfh" and for armed resistance if necessary3
SEfKET
3 Oct 59
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CO NTIAL
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