CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/10/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03164688
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: October 1, 1959

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1 October 1959
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CENTRAL
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INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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1 OCTOBER 1953
I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR continues substantial relax-
ation of jamming of VOA broadcasts
to USSR after Ichrushchev's depar-
ture from US.
Communist China assumes reason-
able attitude in border negotiations
with Burmai
Khrushchev's Peiping speech suggests
Soviet dissociation from tougher Pei-
ping policies in interest of detente with ,
West.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
UAR continues preparations to take
advantage of possible Iraqi crisis.
UAR - Chinese Communist relations
further strained by speech of Syrian
Communist in Peiping.
III, THE WEST
0 France invites Algerian rebel requests
for clarification of De Gaulle proposals.
()Latin American Communist leaders
assemble in Peiping; may confer with
Chinese officials on new plans.
0 Cuba--Fidel Castro concerned over grow-
ing difficulties.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
1 October 1959
DAILY BRIEF
to
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: The substantial relaxation of jamming of Voice of
America broadcasts to the USSR has continued since Ithru-
shchev's departure from the United States. Jamming of VOA
broadcasts intended for Eastern European audiences, howeve
has continued. /in a talk with US officials on 15 September in
Washington, Yuri Zhukov, chairman of the State Committee for
Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, said this relaxation
was an "experiment" to see whether the VOA would cease "pur-
suing the cold war./
(Page I)
rnmmunist China - Burma:
Peiping, aware that its rep-
utation as a "friendly neighbor" has suffered considerably from
the dispute with New Delhi over the Sino-Indian border, is anxious
to avoid charges of recalcitrance in talks on the Sino-Burmese
border problem. In the mildest exchange between the two gov-
ernments in recent months, a Chinese Foreign Ministry official
expressed to the Burmese ambassador Peiping's
hope that the Burmese Would agree to meet either in Peiping or
Rangoon to begin negotiations. The official said that Peiping
could not accept Ne Win's border "package plan" outright, but
that it was "very close to the mark" and negotiations would un-
doubtedly "achieve results." (Page 2)
*USSR - Communist China: Soviet Premier Khrushchev's
emphasis on peaceful coexistence in his 30 September speech
in Peiping is apparently designed to convey the impression to
the West that he intends to maintain the atmosphere of detente
by dissociating the USSR from Peiping's harder foreign policy
line. His remarks that "we must do everything possible to
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preclude war" and that "we should not attempt to test the sta-
bility of the capitalist system by force" vary markedly in tone
from recent Chinese Communist pronouncements. Both Khru-
shchev and Soviet party presidium member Suslov, who spoke
in Peiping on 28 September, reflected Moscow's continuing re-
luctance to endorse Communist China's current economic pol-
icies, although they made the usual affirmations of Soviet sup-
port and friendship. Both speakers avoided any reference to
China's commune program and to the "leap forward;' and Sus-
lov's extended praise of Soviet industrial and agricultural tech-
nology appears to be an indirect suggestion to the Chinese that
they would nnrcJn1v to the USSR's
In these fields.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
UAR-Iraq: The UAR appears to be continuing its prepara-
tions to take advantage of a possible crisis in Iraq,
Nasir's key man in UAR planning on
Iraq, Col. Abd al-Majid Farid, has been called from Damascus
to Cairo "because of a very important matter." He has asked
the UAR agent in Baghdad to gather information on the existence
of a reserve transmitter at Radio Baghdad and is consulting with
the UAR press attach�n Beirut. The UAR is making available
to Syrian Interior Minister Sarraj rifles and large quantities of
ammunition which could be used in a move against Cm.
Iraqi military governor
Major General Abdi has been "closeted" in his home and that
the Communists 1717g. infnrmnel Oasim of others allegedly plot-
tincr against him_
UAR - Communist China: The already strained relations
between the UAR and Communist China will deteriorate further
as a result of the 28 September speech in Peiping by Ehalid
Bakdash, refugee Syrian Communist. Bakdash� speaking at the
1 Oct 59
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Chinese Communist tenth anniversary celebration, attacked the
UAR's anti-Communist policies. Peiping has repeatedly shown
its irritation with Cairo's anti-Communist campaign and with
UAR criticism of Chinese action in Tibet. The UAR press has
reprimanded the Chinese Communist Government for allowing
Bakdash's attack, and the UAR Foreign Ministry has
a formal protest to the Chinese ambassador in Cairo.
Cairo ordered the Syrian In-
terior Ministry to boycott the anniversary celebrations at the
Chinese Consulate in Damascus.
(Page 3)
Watch Committee conclusions: ..'ituations susceptible of di-
rect exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopard
ize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East, particu-
larly in Iraq_and IraIg
Laos: ssident activity has remained at a low level. The
dissidents, however, with probable North Vietnamese assistance
0 continue to have the objective of establishing themselves in a
strong position which they could use as the basis for political
bargaining or for the expansion of military operatioaq
Middle East: Tounting tensions in Iraq have increased the
possibility of early attempts to assassinate or overthrow Qasim.
Whether successful or not such moves might well be followed
by anarchy or civil war between nationalist and Communist fore s.
Under these circumstances, direct UAR involvement in Iraq9 with
a consequent increase in the dancer of broader hostilities in the
area, is possible
France-Algeria:
III. THE WEST
IA
if the
Algerian rebel government "officially asks clarification of
1 Oct 59
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rc-ertain aspects of De Gaulle's 16 September proposals, the
French Embassy would transmit the requests to De Gaulle in
"greatest secrecy." that
Gaulle's cease-
fire offer of October 1958 still stood and the embassy is
ready to issue laissez-passer to any leaders of the rebel pro-
visional government desiring to go to Paris to discuss such a
cease -fir...0
(Page 4)
Latin America - Communist China: The top leaders of
the Argentine, Brazilian, and Venezuelan ommunist parties,
who are in Peiping for the Chinese tenth anniversary celebra-
tion,, each spoke at the formal opening ceremonies. The pres-
ence of these and other prominent Latin American Communist
leaders provides an opportunity for Chinese officials to discuss
with them new tactical plans in furtherance of Chinese objectives
in Latin America, and to review accomplishments since the last
meeting of Latin American leaders in Peiping early this year.
The Chinese, who are seeking to increase their role in the guid-
ance of Latin American Communists, have stepped up their cul-
tural and propaganda activity in the area in 1959.
Page 5)
Cuba: Prime Minister Fidel Castro's attack of 28 Septem-
ber on press and other critics of his revolutionary program re-
vealed a concern over his increasing difficulties. His high praise
of "Che" Guevara, whom he placed in charge of industrial plan-
ning, may reflect awareness of the distrust which many respon-
sible Cubans feel for Guevara, who is generally regarded as pro-
Communist. Castro may react vigorously to editorials on 29
September in leading Havalla dailies which claim that freedom of
the Cuban press is limited. (Page 6)
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR Continues Selective Jamming
Monitoring of Voice of America transmissions to the USSR
reveals that the selective relaxation of Soviet jamming has con-
tinued since Khrushchev's departure from the United States. Jam-
ming of all broadcasts to the Eastern European satellites has
continued. During the period 25-29 September, 88 percent of
Russian-language broadcasts, 86 percent of Latvian, 92 percent
of Lithuanian, and 54 percent of Estonian were audible
Lin _a. talk with US officials in Washington on 15 September,
Yuri Zhukov, chairman of the State Committee for Cultural Rela-
tions with Foreign Countries, said this relaxation of jamming was
an "experiment" to see whether the VOA would cease "pursuing
the cold war." He expressed hope that the US could halt transmis-
sions by such anti-Soviet stations as Radio Baikal and Radio Free
Russia and said if this were done the USSR would stop jamming
altogether. He warned, however, that if results were "negative,"
jamming would be resumed.]
Zhukov further said the Soviet Government was also prepared
to enter into reciprocal agreements, which would increase the cir-
culation of Amerika and USSR magazines: open reading rooms in
Moscow and New York public libraries, and implement the article
in the US-Soviet exchange agreement concerning radio-television
exchanges on political subiectsi
./30 E113E7A. L.
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Peiping Anxious to Improve Relations With Rangoon
A Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry official told
the Burmese ambassador that Peiping
wants to improve its relations with Rangoon and hopes the
Burmese will agree to border negotiations. In the mildest
exchange between the two governments in recent months,
the Chinese official said that, while Peiping could not ac-
cept Ne Win's "package plan" for a border solution outright,
it was "very close to the mark" and he did not doubt that
negotiations could "achieve results." This display of mod-
eration suggests that the Chinese, aware their reputation
as "friendly" neighbors has suffered considerably from the
Sino-Indian border dispute, are anxious to start working-
level talks with the Burmese. Even if such negotiations
are prolonged, as they are likely to be, the Chinese would
hope to avoid charges of recalcitrance.
The Chinese official, who was replying to a Burmese
aide-memoire which apparently dealt with major problems
in relations, indicated another step to improving "friend-
ship" would be for the Burmese to return the defector, Liu
Ping-yi, to Chinese custody. The Chinese spokesman did
not repeat the blustering demands for Liu and the strong
objections to his Rangoon trial which marked earlier Chi-
nese talks with the Burmese ambassador.
Burma's package proposal for a border settlement was
originally offered on a "take it or leave it" basis. Prime
Minister Ne Win indicated that if it was rejected
by the Chinese, boundary negotiations would be broken off.
Peiping's position may, however,
be sufficiently encouraging to cause Ne Win to reconsider and
agree to further explorations of the Chinese position. Ne Win
is due to retire from the prime ministership after the nation-
al elections early next year. He would undoubtedly like to
have a border settlement as one more feather in his cap be-
fore his resumption of full-time military duties
T C E
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Cairo Protests Anti-UAR Speech Made in Peiping
UAR President Nasir,rwho last week described his relations,
with the USSR as in a "downward trendl now is involved in a dis-
pute with Communist China, On 28 SOtember, refugee Syrian
Communist leader Khalil Bakdash, speaking at Peiping's tenth
anniversary celebration, severely criticized UAR policies. The
UAR charge, who represented his government at the celebration,
walked out of the meeting, and the UAR Foreign Ministry promptly
summoned the Chinese Communist ambassador in Cairo and de-
livered a formal protest. While it is not expected that Cairo will
carry official action any further, the UAR press has taken up the
incident, caustically reprimanding the Chinese for allowing Bak-
dash to speak. This is likely to elicit propaganda reaction from
Peiping and result in further deterioration in relations between
the two countries. Caira,has meanwhile
ordered the Syrian interior ministry to boyco:t the 1 October cele-
brations in the Chinese Consulate in Damascus.
Peiping's displeasure with Nasir stems from his anti-Com-
munist campaign and from the conviction that the UAR is trying
to undermine Communist China's position among the Afro-Asian
neutrals. Along with the USSR and other members of the bloc,
Peiping joined in the exchange of recriminations with Cairo touched
off by Nasires, attack on local Communists last winter. The UAR-
Chinese dispute focused specifically on relations between the two
countries when Cairo criticized Chinese action in Tibet.
In May, Communist China made an effort to patch up the sit-
uation by muting its own propaganda, but UAR commentary on
Tibet continued, and since mid-July the Chinese have periodically
attacked Cairo's policies. Recently, the UAR representative on
the Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity
Council reportedly took issue with his Chinese counterpart over
the Sino-Indian border dispute.
'')F) SERI Tr
1 Oct 59
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III. THE WEST
De Gaulle Using Tunis As Channel to Algerian Rebels
r!._.'rench Ambassador Gorse in Tunis, though not under "for-
mal instructions," has informed Tunisian Defense Secretary
Ladgham that if the Algerian rebel government "officially" seeks
clarification through the Tunisian Government of certain aspects
of De Gaulle's 16 September proposals for Algeria, the French
Embassy will transmit the request in "greatest secrecy" to
De Gaulle, The French counselor of embassy, who informed
US officials of this on 28 September, said Gorse told Ladgham
that De Gaulle's October 1958 offer of a cease-fire still stood,
and that the embassy was ready to issue a laissez-passer to any
rebel leader desiring to go to Paris to discuss a cease-fire. The
counselor said this was of the utmost sensitivity and emphasized
that if certain French Army circles learned of this the whole
process might be endangerec9
aenying that the 16 September proposals were a French
maneuver to get through the United Nations debates, Gorse told
Ladgham that De Gaulle's offer could not be modified and "obvi-
ously there could be no political negotiations," but France stood
ready to make its intentions regarding all aspects of the program
"fully understood." The Algerian rebels, according to a press re-
port, have indicated that if France would agree to negotiate, they
might not press their claim to be the legal Algerian government.
Any rebel representatives who would go to Paris under such an
arrangement would represent only the FLN.1
aris, in line with its policy of nonrecognition of the provi-
siona Algerian government, is officially ignoring the rebel re-
sponse of 28 September, The European settlers in Algeria view
the rebel response as flatly negative:I
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Key Latin American Communist Leaders Gather in Peiping
(The presence of several prominent Latin American Commu-
nist party leaders at the Chinese tenth anniversary celebrations
provides an opportunity for them to discuss with Peiping officials
new tactical plans in furtherance of Chinese objectives in Latin
America and to review their accomplishments since the last such
meeting in Peiping early this year. Luiz Carlos Prestes, Victor
Codovilla, and Jesus Faria, top officials of the Brazilian, Argen-
tine, and Venezuelan parties respectively, spoke at the opening
ceremony. Key representatives of the Colombian, Cuban, Uru-
guayan, Ecuadoran, Chilean, Panamanian, and Costa Rican Com-
munist parties are also in Peiping, along with a number of non-
Communist political, congressional, and cultural figures from
several Latin American countries'el
[The Chinese, who are seeking to increase their role in the
guidance of Latin American Communists, have registered some
successes in the program they outlined to the representatives of
12 Latin American parties who met in Peiping after the 21st
Soviet party congress in early 1959. These plans included in-
creased Latin American travel to China, the training of Latin
American Communists in China, and the development of a Chi-
nese propaganda network in Latin America. Subsequently, a
Chinese journalist delegation visited four Latin American coun-
tries, and the official New China News Agency has opened a
branch in Havana and reportedly hired correspondents in Chile,
Colombia, and Venezuela. Latin American travel to China dur-
ing the first six months of 1959 far surpassed the total for all of
19563
[None of the 20 Latin American nations has diplomatic rela-
tions with Communist China. Cuba, however, recently became
the first Latin American nation since 1952 to abstain in a United
Nations General Assembly vote on the question of Chinese UN
representation-3
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Status Report on Cuba
Fidel Castro's preoccupation with growing economic prob-
lems which threaten the realization of his reform program have
heightened his marked sensitivity to criticism and his reliance
on trusted companions from active revolutionary days. This
was particularly evident in his TV appearance on 28 September.
Castro made prolonged attacks on Havana dailies which have
questioned government actions and on the decision of the In-
ter-American Press Association to discuss whether freedom
of the press exists in Cuba. Havana's leading newspaper,
Diario de la Marina, which has Catholic and conservative
backing, did not back down under the attack but charged ed-
itorially on 29 September that press freedom is limited by
the revolutionary government in many ways short of censor-
ship. It was, surprisingly, joined by other independent pa-
pers, in the first such strong and open exception to Castro's
words since the revolutionary victory on 1 January.
In the same speech Castro emphasized his great reliance
on "true revolutionaries," naming among others "Che" Guevara,
whose strident anti-Americanism and suspected pro-Commu-
nism add to the general suspicion of him among Cubans. Castro
announced that a government program for industrial planning
would be headed by Guevara and that although private invest-
ment would be accepted, outside help was not really needed.
A reference to "investigation" of two large US-owned nickel
and cobalt plants at Moa Bay and Nicaro indicated that the gov-
ernment hopes to increase its income from them but has not
yet decided by just what means.
Castro's drastic solutions are only complicating the eco-
nomic problems arising from his reform program.
tested source reports that the Cuban Government will econo-
mize by reducingthe army from its present 30,000-35,000 to
15,000 "select and trusted" troops. Discharges already made
are causing much discontent because unemployment is unusual-
ly high.
1 Oct 59
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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