DAILY SUMMARY - 1946/03/28

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Daily Summary Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03164646
• Document Creation Date: September 11, 2018

Approved for Release: 2018/09/05 C03164646
APPROVED FOR RELEASE - Historical Programs Staff 30 August 2018
T-OP-SEettET
GENERAL
2 8 MAR i946
1. Iranian re lies to Soviet notes- Qavam told Ambassador Murray on
27. March that he had not as yet concluded a final agreement with
the USSR, but intended to reply that day to two of the three notes
delivered by the Soviet Ambassador on 24 March (see Daily Sum-
mary of 26 March, item 1). The substance of the replies drafted by
Qavam follows;"
(a) On removal of Soviet troo s. Appreciation is expressed
for the Soviet decision to withdraw their troops and. the Soviets
are requested to notify the Security Council formally of this.
decision, omitting the qualifying phrase "unless something
unforeseen happens". .contained in the Soviet note._ (Accord-
hag to Qavam, the Soviet Ambassador now.states that the USSR
would omit this phrase "as soon as other agreements were
concluded,") � .
(b) On oil concessions� The following counterproposal is
made to the Soviet request for a joint Soviet-Iranian. company
to exploit Iranian oil, which Qavam believes is the "real crux"
of the present crisis: (I) each country should have equal par-
ticipation in the company (instead of 51% Soviet and 49%.
Iranian as suggested by the USSR); (2) Iran would contribute
land as her share of the capital but should not be required to
make any financial contribution, and the USSR would provide
technical personnel and equipment; (3) the joint adventure
should endure for 30 years (instead of 50 years as Proposed
by the USSR); (4) area's of Azerbaijan contiguous to Turkey
and Iraq should not be included among the areas to be ex-
ploited, in the interests of avoiding international friction"
(the Soviets proposed that exploitation should cover virtually
all of northern Iran); (5) any security forces required for any
purpose in connection with the exploitation should be solely
Iranian.
Qavam had apparently not yet drafted a reply to the third
Soviet note, in which the Soviets offered to intercede in the Azer-
baijan situation. In discussing this subject with the Soviet Ambas-
sador, Qavam had expressed his' willingness. to negotiate with the
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13WitAIRI.
Azerbaijanis "within constitutional limits" and his desire that they
send a delegation to open negotiations. In reply, the Soviet Ambassa-
dor had declared that if Qavam was prepared "to go no further than
that," it was useless to attempt negotiations. Qavam told the Ambas-
sador that he did not wish Soviet interference in the details of his
dealings with the Azerbaijanis but only desired the USSR's "general
moral support."
Qavam told Murray that he intended to keep his proposed
agreements strictly confidential. He said that he had Informed Am-
bassador Ala of the negotiations, but had instructed him (1) not to
reveal them to the Security Council or anyone else, and (2) if asked
whether an agreement had been reached, to say that he would have to
inquire of his Government. Murray indicated to Qavam that such ai
policy of secrecy (which Murray believes is the result of Soviet pres-
sure) might lead Qavam into serious difficulties.
Murray asked Qavam whether he considered formal Soviet
assurance to the Security Council regarding troop withdrawals as
sufficient protection. When Qavam asked for Murray's view, the
latter suggested that Qavam instruct Ala to see that the question re-
mained one of "continuing interest," even after present Council dis-
cussions and Soviet withdrawals. (Later that day Ala told Stettinius
that his main objective is to keep the Iranian question "definitely on
the continuing agenda of the Council.")
Murray believes that when Qavam reaches what he considers
to be a satisfactory agreement with the USSR, Ala will be instructed
to announce to the Council that (1) Soviet assurances of troop with-
drawals are satisfactory and (2) provided these assurances are ful-
filled, Iran considers the case closed.
2. Convocation of Paris Peace Conference�The French Deputy on the
Council of Foreign Ministers recently announced that his Government
had formally requested the US, UK and USSR to express their views
about convoking the Paris Peace Conference on 1 May.
In previous discussions of this matter among the Deputies,
the Soviet representative had indicated that the USSR (a) would try to
postpone the Conference until greater agreement had been obtained
on drafts of the Italian and Balkan treaties and (b) regarded the Con-
ference solely as an occasion for the four powers charged with
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Approved for Release: 2018/09/05 C03164646
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE - Historical Programs Staff 30 August 2018
drafting the treaties to push through the drafts that they have agreed
upon, limiting as much as possible any discussions by the smaller
powers and any consultations with the enemy states.
EUROPE-AFRICA
3. USSR: Soviet ruling group substantiallnms1--Charge Kennan
reports that the recently published lists of high Communist Party
officials indicate no important change in the membership of the
inner ruling group of the USSR. Within this group, however, there
have been significant shifts of position and title. Foremost among
these is the open recognition of the importance of Georgi Malenkov,
whose position in Soviet internal affairs appears to be second only
to that of Stalin. Continued Party domination of the Army is indi-
cated by the fact that no professional military figure was admitted
to high party councils. Active political power in the USSR appears
to be restricted to a small group within the Politburo: Stalin,
Molotov, Malenkov, Laverenti Beriya, and possibly Zhda.nov,
Mikoyan, and Bulganin.
4. AUSTRIA: Qpjakt ,_gysz.inktjz_ggng.t=tteL--Erhardt reports that
the Allied Council, Vienna, has been unable to agree on the interim
draft constitution submitted by the Austrian Government. The US,
British and French commanders have pressed for its adoption, but
the Soviet member has objected to a number of provisions, including
those giving "too many" powers to provincial and local governments
rather than to the Central Government. Erhardt comments that this
conflict raises doubt as to whether Western and Soviet views can
ever be harmonized on any Austrian constitution.
5, YUGOSLAVIA.: US note State Department has
instructed Embassy Belgrade to inform the Yugoslav Government
that many US Army officers possess first-hand evidence that would
bear on any contemplated trial of General Mihailovich on charges
of collaboration with the enemy. The Embassy is to request infor-
mation as to the date of the trial and the facilities which will be made
available for US witnesses to present their evidence.
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Approved for Release: 2018/09/05 C03164646
APPROVED FOR RELEASE - Historical Programs Staff 30 August 2018
FAR EAST
6. CHINA: S e f S et ith f m M eh uested--
The Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs has advised Embassy Chung-
king that on 27 March the Chinese Government had agreed to the
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria by the end of April but
had requested the Soviet Government to furnish a definite schedule
of the withdrawals.
THE AMERICAS
7, BOLIVIA: Fooda_ 22 March, an agent of General
Lanza (leader Of Bolivia's Liberal Party) told US Charge La Paz
that (a) Bolivian democrats had no chance of winning in the May
elections, which were certain to be fraudulent, (b) Lanza accordingly
planned "to seize power by force" sometime after June, and (c) if
he should be successful, Argentina would undoubtedly stop its ship-
ments of food to Bolivia. The agent inquired if, under these circum-
stances, the US would provide the food necessary to maintain the
revolutionary government in power.
Three days later the Charge had a long talk with President
Villarroel, who stated that, while he was no special friend of
Argentina, he had to treat that country with "every courtesy"
because of Bolivia's dependence on it for food. He indicated that a
military alliance pact between all countries of the western hemi-
sphere including Argentina, was of particular importance to Bolivia,
which is presently at the mercy of "avaricious and more powerful
neighbors."
8. ARGENTINA: Visit of naval group_tILTAisved- -The State
Department has advised Embassy Buenos Aires that the contemplated
visit of an Argentine Naval group to the US would not be consonant
with US policy of refusing Argentina any assistance that would
strengthen its armed forces (see Daily Summary of 14 11/.1arch1 item
5). The US Naval Attache in Buenos Aires believes, however, that a
strict implementation of this policy will result in the loss of "the
present and long-standing cordial friendship and cooperation of the
Argentine Navy."
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