CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/09/24

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03163357
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: September 24, 1959

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24 September 1959
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
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24 SEPTEMBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chinese Communist high level per-
sonnel changes aimed at avoiding
repetition of economic dislocations.
Communist bloc leaders may meet
with Khrushchev in Peiping in early
October.
I I. ASIA-AFRICA
Indian forces strengthen position
along Tibetan border.
Iraq--Protest demonstrations have
caused no serious incidents but polit-
ical atmosphere is tense.
Iran--Nehru made no effort to influ-
ence Shah on Iranian-Soviet relations
during visit to Tehran.
III, THE WEST
French reconnaissance overflights
of Libya scheduled.
Argentine President Fronclizi acts to
outlaw Communist party.
� Nicaragua--Rebel incursions into
Nicaragua from Costa Rica and Hon-
duras reportedly to occur soon.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
24 September 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China: Peiping has announced an extensive
reshuffling of government officials at the deputy ministerial
level. More than 400 appointments have been announced) but
most of these are reappointments; a lesser number represent
transfers to posts of comparable authority. Only about 20 of-
ficials--some of whom may have opposed the regime's recent
policies--appear to have lost out in the shuffle. The personnel
changes and some simultaneous organizational changes appear
to have been designed principally to avoid a repetition of the
serious economic dislocations which developed last year,
(Page 1)
Bloc Leaders' Meeting in PeipiivCA top-level meeting of
Communist bloc readers will apparently take place in Peiping
during the Chinese tenth anniversary celebrations in early Octo-
ber. When Khrushchev goes to Peiping after his American trip,
he will be accompanied or met there by "representatives" of the
bloc countries who, together with the highest Chinese officials,
will hear his report and comments on the results of the trip) ac
cording to the Yugoslav ambassador in Prague, who received
his information from Czech Deputy Foreign Minister Gregor.
Gregor, who was formerly Czech ambassador to Communist
China, also said that he is now busy briefing the Czech delega-
tion,which will include Antonin Novotny; first secretary of the
Czech Communist party. In addition to the ceremonial purposes
of the trip, Khrushchev will probably try to iron out any exist-
ing differences between Moscow and Peiping and also seek to
� allay Chinese Communist apprehensions over the effect of his
talks in Washington on Communist Chinese international objec-
tives) particularly Taiwan:)
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Sib-Indian border dispute:
Indian troops would not reoccupy Longju outpost if
Chinese forces withdrew. the Indi-
ans had withdrawn from one outpost, which had been specified
in a Chinese complaint, after it had been found to be on the
j Chinese side of the McMahon line.
New Delhi intends to defend other checkposts along the border.)
Indian military and security forces are strengthening their
positions along the Indo- Tibetan border. The Indian Army has
taken over from local security forces in the border area in
Kashmir as well as Assam State, and army units in Assam have
been reinforced. (Page 2) (Map)
Iraq: Although demonstrations on 20-21 September protest-
ing the Qasim regime's execution of anti-Communist officers
triggered no serious incidents, the political atmosphere in Iraq
remains tense. Rumors are widespread that new demonstra-
tions, possibly by Communist elements as well as by "national-
ists," will take place before the end of this week. Meanwhile,
the first trial of pro-Communists and others accused of incit-
ing the clashes last July in Kirkuk has opened before another
special military court, and is likely to exacerbate rather than,
as Qasim presumably hopes, calm the situation. The UAR is
making a concerted propaganda effort to encourage disorders.
(Page 4)
Nehru visit to Iran: (preliminary reports of Indian Prime Min-
ister Nehru's visit to Afghanistan and Iran confirm earlier impres-
sions that he went to those countries to study their relations with
the orbit rather than to give advice. Nehru made no effort to in-
fluence the Shah in his relations with the USSR in his initial con-
versations in Tehran and did not urge Iran to withdraw from
CENTO or to adopt a neutralist foreign policy. His remarks
both in Tehran and earlier in Kabul indicated that New Delhi)
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Cwould continue its neutral policy but that it is up to each nation
to choose its own course of action)
(Page 6)
Watch Committee conclusions: (Situations susceptible of
direct exploitation by Sib-Soviet bloc action which would jeop-
ardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East, par-
ticularly in Iraq and Iran)
Laos: (While the dissidents, with probable North Vietnames
assistance, continue to have the objective of establishing them-
selves in a strong position which they could use as the basis for
political bargaining or for the expansion of military operations,
dissident activity will probably continue at a low level during the
presence of the UN fact-finding mission in Laos)
(Middle East: The initiation of significant hostilities is un-
likelf in this area in the immediate future")
III. THE WEST
France-Libya: The French Defense Ministry plans two
more air reconnaissance missions over Libya, one on 25 or
26 September over the area north of the 30th parallel and
another on 2 or 3 October over the area south of the 30th par-
allel. Previous French flights of this nature, designed to check
on suspected Algerian rebel activity in Libva have cone unde-
tected by the Libyan Government
Argentina: President Frondizi has requested court action
to dissolve the Communist party and to withdraw its electoral
recognition. He is particularly concerned over threats by sup-
porters of the outlawed Peronista party to back Communist can-
didates in the March 1960 congressional elections and over the
Communist and Peronista labor unity pact to undermine the US-
backed stabilization program. Frondizi and the armed forces
are preparing for any violence that may ensue.
(Page 7)
24 Sept 59 DAILY BRIEF
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Nicaragua: Simultaneous rebel incursions from across the
Costa Rican and Honduran borders will occur before the end of
this month,
the
President has been warned that the incursions may be preceded
by attempts to ass er him or his brother, who heads
the armed forces. (Page 8)
24 Sept 59 DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIJT BLOC
Chinese Communist Government Personnel Changes
Peiping has announced an extensive reshuffling of govern-
ment officials at the deputy ministerial level. More than 400
appointments have been announced, but most of these are reap-
pointments; a lesser number represent transfers to posts of
comparable authority. Only about 20 officials--some of whom
may have opposed the regime's recent policies--appear to have
lost out in the shuffle. There is no indication so far that these
will be subjected to further punishment.
The across-the-board reshuffle of deputy ministers seems
to have been undertaken to improve efficiency and to strengthen
some ministries by adding more deputies- a maneuver which
Peiping has tried periodically during the past ten years. Pei-
ping may also believe that the appointments will stimulate the
enthusiasm of officials for the regime's policies.
The three former coordinating staff offices for heavy indus-
try and construction, light industry, and transport and commu-
nications have apparently been amalgamated. Direction of this
new body has been given Li Fu-chun and Po I-pop his deputy, who
are also responsible for long-range and annual economic planning,
respectively. This move may have been designed to avoid a repe-
tition of the serious dislocations which developed last year, and
primary responsibility for preventing this will apparently fall to
Li and Po, whose public statements have indicated general sym-
pathy with Mao's "leap forward" program of the past year.
CONFIDENTIAL
24 Sept 59
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II, ASIA-AFRICA
The Sino-Indian Border Dispute
Public announcements indicate ttat
Indian military and security forces along the Indo-Tibetan bor-
der are being augmented, even though both New Delhi and Pei-
ping have stated their desire to settle the Tibetan border dis-
pute through peaceful negotiations.
CI:he current Indian attitud
been outlined
n no incidents since
26 August. India remains willing to leave the border post at
Longju unoccupied if the Chinese will withdraw from it. The
Chinese have not officially replied to this offer. The Indians
have withdrawn fro- the outpost at Tamadem (unlocated),
which was the subject of a Chinese complaint. After verifying
the location of the McMahon line in this area, the Indians found
the post to be on Tibetan soil
CIndian policy, is that India will
continue to occupy its other border posts along the McMahon line,
that it will avoid provocative action, but that "if the Chinese try
to enter into our territory, we shall oppose them." Both sides
publicly are still committed to a peaceful solution of the border
dispute through negotiation, but no means of bringing them to-
gether has yet been found)
While the controversy appears to be moving into diplomatic
channels, General K. S. Thimayya announced on 22 September
that the Indian Army had taken over from the local militia the de-
fense of the border between Tibet and Ladakh, the easternmost
province of Kashmir. On 21 September, the premier of Indian-
held Kashmir also announced that a second battalion of Ladakhis
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was being raised for the state militia. The army had taken
over border duties from state forces in Assam in early Sep-
tember.
army reinforce-
ments are being sent to Assam and that forces already in the
area are being redeployed. The identity and size of the units
are still open to question, however, there being some confusion
as to whether elements of brigade or battalion size are included.
parachute troops and artillery units are in-
volved.
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The Iraqi Situation
The political atmosphere in Iraq remains extremely tense,
although demonstrations in Mosul and Baghdad on 20 and 21 Sep-
tember against the Qasim regime's execution of a ti-
officers passed without serious incidents.
Crowds are reported to have shouted anti-Qasim slogans-an
have torn down the prime minister's pictures. However, on
the evening of 20 September Qasim drove through Baghdad streets
with an escort of only two officers. Security forces are much in
evidence and are on the alert throughout the country.
Since the announcement of the executions, the UAR has
whipped up a new rabidly anti-Qasim campaign. In Damascus
more than 40,000 demonstrators paraded through the city in
vehement protest against the "red massacre of Iraqi nationalist
elements." Shouts of "woe unto the criminal Qasim, Baghdad's
hangman" were heard. Similar demonstrations were staged in
Cairo and other cities throughout the UAR.
There are rumors in Baghdad that Communist-inspired dem-
onstrations will occur on the Moslem sabbath, 25 September. In
view of the high tension, it is doubtful that Qasim would permit
new demonstrations at this time, since they very likely would re-
sult in widespread disorders.
Possibly to take the sting out of "nationalist" accusations of
Qasim's partiality for the Communists, the special military court
set up to try participants in the July Kirkuk riots has begun the
trial of four of the accused. At least six others charged with com-
plicity are scheduled for later trial. The prosecutor is demand-
ing the death penalty for those implicated in the disorders. At
this juncture, however, a new series of trials is likely to exacer-
bate the situation, since pro-UAR nationalists are unlikely to be
mollified by the execution of a few low-level Communists.
Rumors of impending coup attempts against Qasim continue.
Anti-Qasim elements may have been caught off balance by the
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suddenness of the executions. However, they may feel that their
chances of success diminish the longer they delay action against
the regime. Military governor Abdi continues to back Qasim, and
Baghdad garrison troops apparentiv are carrying out orders with-
out question.
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Prime Minister Nehru's Visit to Iran
CPreliminary press and diplomatic reports regarding
Prime Minister Nehru's, recently concluded visits to Kabul
and Tehran indicate that he made no effort to settle Afghan
and Iranian problems, that he did not actively oppose CENT�,
and that he did not urge Iran to adopt a policy of neutrality)
In both capitals Nehru made it clear in public remarks
thafindia would continue its present neutral course regard-
less of occasional irritations and provocations. His attitude
toward others, however, is illustrated by his answer to a
newsman's request in Tehran that he give his opinion on the
new Central Treaty Organization. Nehru said, "I have always
lived far removed from all pacts. I don't suppose a change of
name makes it different from what it was. This is simply my
personal opinion. It is for each country to decide." This new
restraint on Nehru's part has been evident since the Tibetan re-
volt broke out last March)
(The Shah of Iran stated that in his talks with Nehru, the
Indian prime minister did not attempt to change Iranian policy
toward the USSR or give advice of any kind. Minister of Court
Ala said that Nehru made no effort to influence the Shah in his
relations with the USSR. The Shah added that Nehru is a much-
changed man and that he is more realistic in his outlook toward
Communist countries. Nehru indicated to the Shah that aggres-
sion should be resisted)
(These preliminary reports of Nehru's visits confirm earlier
impressions that he traveled to Afghanistan and Iran primarily
to study their relations with the orbit and to acquire background
material to guide his own thinking about world problems rather
than to give advice)
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III. THE WEST
Argentine President Asks Courts to Dissolve Communist Party
Charging the Communist party with subversion, Argentine
President Frondizi requested on 22 September that the courts
dissolve the party and withdraw its electoral recognition. Be-
hind this action is his concern over threats by supporters of
the outlawed Peronista party to back Communist candidates in
the March 1960 congressional elections. He is also concerned
over an intensification of strike pressure against austerity meas-
ures under the US-backed stabilization program as a result of
the labor unity pact signed by the Communists and Peronistas in
August.
The government also anticipates an increase in violence
from Communist and Peronista agitation.
Communist party members were mak-
ing bomb casings and other weapons in railway shops in the prov
inces of Entre Rios and Corrientes for later shipment to other
large cities) Considerably before the present 48-hour strike was
scheduled, Peronista exiles in Bolivia talked about the joint
Peronista strike plans, saying an armed attack against the Fron-
dizi government would follow in October.
The armed forces strongly endorse anti-Communist meas-
ures and a firm policy against labor agitation. The new war
secretary has warned that the army would "come out with all
its power if foreign interests endanger the country" through strike
action.
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Nicaraguan President Expects. New Revolutionary Attempts
Simultaneous rebel incursions into Nicaragua from Costa
Rica and Honduras, supported by internal revolutionary groups,
will occur before the end of this month,
the President has been warned
that the incursions may be preceded by attempts to assassi-
nate either him or his brother, General Anastasio Somoza,
chief of the armed forces.
The rebel force that would enter from Costa Rica presum-
ably is the same one that raided a Nicaraguan border town on
7 September and then withdrew into Costa Rica. The raiders
numbered about 40 men, but Somoza believes the strength of the
entire group now is about 80. The group alleged to be poised at
the Honduran border is of unknown strength but probably is also
small. Both forces could probably be dispersed quickly if they
should enter Nicaragua, as were other rebel groups earlier this
year--unless coordinated action by the internal opposition were
to be sufficiently energetic and widespread to distract and divide
the 5,500-man National Guard,
The President fears that the violently antiregime students
known to be prominent in the revolutionary groups now organiz-
ing inside the country do, in fact, plan coordinated revolutionary
action with the invading bands. A leaflet was being distributed
in many Nicaraguan cities last week announcing a new invasion by
a "liberation army" and calling on all able-bodied citizens to join
the "21st of September Movemenq a student-led internal revolu-
tionary group named for the date in 1956 when the late President
Somoza, rhh incumbent, was fatally wounded by an as-
sassin.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Cperations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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