CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/09/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03163354
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: September 21, 1959

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21 September 1959
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
G4-
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63
DOCUMENT NO, /8
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21 SEPTEMBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chinese Communists anxious to
begin talks with India. on border
dispute.
Peiping apparently will not soften
its adamant position on resuming
trade with Japan.
Khrushchev's disarmament proposals
draw cautious Free World comment.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
�
if
Executions in Iraq may spark coup
c
attempt.
NJ_57-
Possible Iranian-Soviet agreement
would preclude US missile bases ,
.-1 0
in Iran.
�
In THE WEST
Reactions abroad to De Gaulle's
Algerian statement.
Brazil may negotiate large-scale
barter agreement with USSR.
0 Austrian Foreign Minister may touch
on South Tirol issue in UN speech;
Italians would regard such allusion as
provocative.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
21 September 1959
DAILY BRIEF
T. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - India: Peiping is clearly anxious to
�lend the recent exchange of accusations with New Delhi con-
cerning the border dispute and to begin talks on the issue.
the Chinese believe "preliminary negotiations may be started"
kr with India concerning a number of places along the frontier
�.P-P.jf:,,,,k, despite New Delhi's refusal to discuss the "entire" border. In
/1>mi ceder to improve the atmosphere, Peiping's propaganda media
1)er- ave been silent on the border issue since 16 September.
(Page 1)
Communist China - Japan:
3ommunist China is not planning
to soften its adamant stand against resumption of trade with
Japan. political relations "should not be
separated" from economic matters and warned that normal
Sino-Japanese relations will not develop until Tokyo "frees it-
self from outside interference," discards its hostility to Peiping,
and refrains from joining in any "two Chinas" policy. These
statements reflect Peiping's apprehension that ending the em-
bargo on trade with Japan at this time could be exploited by
Prime Minister Kishi as a victory for his unyielding China
policy. ,)
several days of conferences with Chinese leaders,
At the time of the discussions, a Chinese official complained
that Ishibashi was expressina views that were "exactly
the opinion of the Kishi government.,
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Reactions to Khrushchev's disarmament proposals: Non-
Communist comment on fihrushchev's disarmament proposals
has been generally cautious. Official comment, while frequently
expressing skepticism, has assured that the proposals will be
carefully studied. Influential West European information media
are stressing the propagandistic nature of the proposals and are
criticial of the absence of provisions for effective control. Nasir
has lauded the proposals as consistent with long-standing desires
of the Arab world, and they. have received top billing in Iraq.
Socialist and leftist elements in Japan, the United Kingdom,
Australia, Italy, and elsewhere, urge that fullest consideration
be given the proposals "as the best hope remaining in the world,
but to this enthusiastic response is sometimes added the hope
that Khrushchev is ready to accept an effective inspection and
control mechanism.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq: The execution on 20 September of Brigadier Tabaqchali
and twelve other army officers for association with the Mosul re-
volt last spring may spark a coup attempt by "nationalist" anti-
Communist elements, despite the probability that the dissidents
are not well organized or coordinated. Four civilians associated
with the security apparatus of the old regime were hanged at the
same time, possibly in an effort to demonstrate that Qasim deals
with all "traitors" impartially. Colonel Mandawi, head of the
"people's court" which tried Tabaqchali, and his henchman, chief
prosecutor Colonel Amin, left nno'hand Par ly on 20 September for
a vrit to Communist China,
possible
internal movements against the Iraqi regime, ana a popular demon-
stration against the executions was reported to have occurred in
Baehdad on the morning of 20 September.
� Iran: (The' Pkegident ot the Iranian senate, tteza nU4111d,LI
representing moderate nationalist opinion in Iran, reportedly ex-
pects that a Soviet-Iranian agreement will be signed which will)
21 Sept 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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(jreclude the construction of American missile bases on Iranian
soil. Highly critical of trends in Iranian domestic affairs, Hek-
mat believes that, unless Iran begins immediately to develop a
responsible parliamentary government, it will suffer a Baghdad-
type revolution)
(Page 3)
III. THE WEST
France-Algeria: Favorable reaction abroad to De Gaulle's
17 September proposals on Algeria, which were aimed partly at
Free World countries whose support he is seeking for France's
position in the United Nations, are thus far centered largely in
Western Europe. In Latin America, where Paris had particu-
larly hoped to retain support or to win over several countries--
Cuba, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela--which have indicated they
would probably vote against France, the impact of the De Gaulle
speech was considerably diminished because of preoccupation with
Khrushchev's visit to the United States. Many important "neu-
trals" such as India are likely to await the Algerian rebels' reply
to De Gaulle's proposals before taking a stand. The rebel govern-
ment is now meeting in TuOis. Communist bloc reaction has been
generally negative but to date has been e ressed primarily in low-
level propaganda commentary. (Page 4)
Brazil: The government may send a trade mission to Moscow
this week to negotiate a large-scale barter agreement involving
Soviet petroleum,
The amount invoivea may De as much as $100, 00,000, about
half of Brazil's annual oil import requirements. The USSR has of-
fered Brazil smaller amounts of oil several times in the past year
and during the summer reportedly offered to buy large amounts of
coffee as part of its continuing effort to conclude a trade treaty,
Several high-ranking Brazilian officials are opposed to large-scale
transactions with the USSR,. but President Kubitschek may believe
it offers the only politically feasible solution to the country's severe
foreign exchange difficulties. (Page 6)
21 Sept 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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South Tirol: Renewed tension between Austria and Italy
seems likely to result from Austrian Foreign Minister ICreisky's
declared intention of referring to the South Tirol dispute as an
"important subject" in his forthcoming address to the UN Gen-
eral Assembly. Although ICreisky has offered assurances to
American officials in Vienna that his speech will be moderate
he has stated he will make it clear that resolution of
the South Tirol problem is essential to the peace of this area of
Europe. Even a moderate reference in the UN to the problems of
the South Tirol will probably strike the Italians as provocative.
(Page 7).
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DAILY BRIEF iv
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L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Peiping Anxious to Start Negotiations With New Delhi
On Border Dispute
The Chinese Communists are clearly anxious to end the ex-
change of accusations with New Delhi concerning the border dis-
pute and to begin talks on the issue.
the Chinese believe "preliminary nego-
tiations may be started" with India concerning a number of places
along the frontier despite New Delhi's refusal to discuss the "en-
tire" border. Chi probably intended his remarks to be pa "
to Prime Minister Nehru during his visit to Afghanistan./
lne was
ready for a meeting with Nehru to discuss the border disputes
In order to improve the atmosphere, Peiping's propaganda
media have been completely silent on the border issue since 16
September. Communist China's last comment on the issue--a
People's Daily editorial of that date--asserted that the Chinese
had been reluctant to hit back at Nehru's chargessbut had done so
primarily because Peiping did not want to appear "weak." The
editorial suggested in moderate language that India cease its
"anti-China agitation." The Chinese Communists probably also
hope that an abatement in public recriminations will help to dis-
pel the notion that they are preparing for an aggressive adventure
against India and Nepal.
Peiping's position is that "provisional agreements on isolated
places" can be reached promptly, and prior to an over-all settle-
ment of the boundary between China and India which it probably
feels will be achieved only after protracted negotiations. The pro-
visional agreements would be designed to remove the immediate
source of friction between the two countries. Peiping has asked
21 Sept 59
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that Indian troops be withdrawn "from all places within Chinese
territory which they have invaded and occupied," but has not
made such withdrawal a condition for beginning negotiations.
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Iranian Parliamentary Leader Predicts Iran Will Sign
Agreement With USSR
he President of the Iranian Senate, Reza Hekmat is re-
ported to expect that a Soviet-Iranian
agreement will be signed which will preclude American mis-
sile bases in Iran. Hekmat, who is a member of one of Iran's
leading families and whose thinking is probably representa-
tive of many moderate Iranian nationalists, charges that the
Shah regards his dealings with the Soviet Union as his own per-
sonal affair. Despite the Shah's air, of firmness toward the
USSR in recent talks with Western representatives, there is
widespread anticipation that some type of Soviet-Iranian rap-
prochement will be reached in the near future_,)
(Possibly connected with future Soviet-Iranian discussions
is the expected arrival in Tehran on 28 September of an unidenti-
fied traveler
Soviet Am-
bassador pegov arrived, back in Tehran on 16 September as
scheduled)
diekmat also views domestic trends in Iran with consider-
able alarm and reportedly believes that, unless the Shah begins
immediately to develop a responsible parliamentary government,
Iran will experience a Baghdad-type revolution. Hekmat, like
many of the Shah's "loyal subjects," is trying to find and identify
himself with the "strong milita
ment to succeed the Shah)
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THE WEST
Reaction to De Gaulle's Proposals on Algeria
Favorable official reaction to French President de Gaulle's
proposals of 17 September for an Algerian solution has thus far
been confined mostly to France's NATO allies, who in varying
degrees have welcomed it as a "step in the tight direction" which
will facilitate their support of France in the United Nations de-
bate on Algeria.
(A British Foreign Office spokesman left the impression with
US representatives that the United Kingdom is prepared to support
De Gaulle's proposals and is hopeful of a UN resolution on Algeria
favorable to France. Canadian representatives in London share
this view, a Greek representative in London thought that the pro-
posals would "ease" Greece's position in the United Nations, al-
though)the opposition in Athens is said to be taking advantage of
the proposals to taunt the Greek Government for having accepted
an "unsatisfactory" Cyprus settlement.
West German Chancellor Adenauer charac-
terized De Gaulle's speech as "wonderful," though the official
press comment was considerably more restrained. The Italian
Foreign Ministry has reportedly recommended that Foreign Min-
ister Pella accept the speech as evidence of a progressive policy
justifying continued Italian support of France. The American
Embassy in Rome expects, however, that there will be "sniping"
from center-left elements; including oil magnate Enrico Mattel;
who are "interested in influencing Arabs and of avoiding the
colonialist label." Most other official comment in Western Europe
is privately favorable, but officially restrained.
In Latin America, where Paris had particularly hoped to re-
tain support in the UN or to win over several countries--such as
Cuba; Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela--which had indicated they
would probably vote against France this year, the impact of De
Gaulle's proposals was considerably diminished by preoccupation
with Khrushchev's visit to the United States. There are few indi-
cations of official thinking. The acting foreign minister of Uruguay
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has commented that he felt the speech did not change
the situation much. In traditionally pro-French Brazil, the
government must take into account important Syrian and Leb-
anese minorities and general public sympathy for Algerian
independence.
Reaction is scant in free Asia and Africa, with such im-
portant "neutrals" as India apparently awaiting the Algerian
rebels' reply to the proposals following the rebel government
meeting now being held in Tunis.
Arab reaction, though sharply critical except in Tunisia,
also appears to be played down pending the rebel pronouncement
expected early this week. Communist bloc reaction has been
negative and generally confined to low-level propaganda expres-
sions. In the strongest statement to date, Moscow in a broad-
cast of 19 September charged that the speech supports the
conviction that De Gaulle favors continuing the war. Peiping
on 19 September characterized the proposals as "deceptive."
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Brazilian-Soviet Trade Negotiations
President Kubitschek has asked the chief of
Brazil's National Petroleum Council (NPC) to be a member of
a "negotiating mission" which may leave for Moscow this week
to discuss a large-scale barter agreement involving Soviet
petroleum, The
amount involved may be as much as $100,000,000,
The NPC reportedly is drawing up a memoran-
dum opposing the transaction, probably because Soviet oil in
trial shipments earlier this year proved unsuitable for process-
ing in government-owned refineries.
President Kubitschek, however, may believe such a deal
offers the only politically feasible solution to Brazil's severe
foreign exchange difficulties. While Kubitschek appears to have
the backing of his new foreign minister, technicians in the For-
eign Ministry are not yet persuaded that the transaction would be
advantageous. Brazil has been urgently seeking long-term credits
from American oil suppliers who normally provide most of the
country's $250,000,000 annual oil import requirements. Dissatis-
fied with the American counteroffers, the government reportedly
has considered forcing the US-owned refineries to process Soviet
crude oil.
The USSR has notably stepped up its trade offensive in Brazil
during 1959, offering to barter oil, wheat and other products which
have been in short supply in Brazil due to foreign exchange prob-
lems. Several reports during the past summer indicated that the
Soviet Union is willing to accept large quantities of coffee in re-
turn. In past talks with the USSR, Brazil has insisted on firm
guarantees against resale of coffee in Brazil's traditional markets,
apparently without success, and has shipped only small quantities.
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Renewed Tension Over South Tirol Expected to Follow
Austrian UN Move
Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky's apparent determination
to refer to the South Tirol issue as an "important subject" in his
forthcoming address to the UN General Assembly seems likely to
raise new obstacles to an early settlement of this long-standing
Austrian-Italian territorial dispute. Italy has long considered
the South Tirol an internal matter�or at worst, a problem to be
resolved in bilateral talks with Austria--and even a moderate
reference in the United NationStd :the problem will probably Strike
Rome as provocative)
6creisky has assured American officials in Vienna that his
speech will be as "modrateasJi can make it," but he is re-
ported to have declared hat he will make it clear that
resolution of the South iro problem is essential to peace and
tranquillity in that part of Europe. He probably intends to stress
the "tragic social-economic situation of the South Tirolese who
are strangers in their own land," and will call for full regional
autonomy of the predominantly German-speaking part of the South
TiroL Italy has shown no intention of granting such autonomy,
probably feeling this would be followed by demands for full self-
determination and return of the area to Austria
(Although Kreisky is generally considered a moderate on the
issue, he has seemed especially anxious to champion the South
Tirolean cause, and, since he took office in the summer, he has
had several conferences with South Tirolean leaders. He evidently
hopes his UN speech will satisfy these leaders
ther talks with the Italians.
Kreisky expects no r ese a s, an in t e
event of failure, will attempt to inscribe the issue on the agpncia
for the UN Gym era _ AQCa vvsbly's 1960 session).
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IDNIIDENTIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Cperations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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