CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/07/30

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03163345
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: July 30, 1959

aApproved for
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3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
30 July 1959
Copy No. C 63
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO:
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
ADUTN,H190-k
AT oREviEwo:
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Nine 'saw,
30 JULY 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR may be furnishing Afghanistan
an ri-innal 4F24.000.000 in military
aid.
Pattern of North Vietnamese clan-
destine communications could in-
dicate new terrorist incidents in
South Vietnam.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Laotian communiqu�harges
partisans attacking Sam Neua army
posts are "well-organized units"
under North Vietnamese command.
Indonesia�Nasution seeks to in-
crease military participation in
government.
Top Pakistani Government officials
will move from Karachi to Rawalpindi
this fall.
UAR investigating extent of Commu-
nist indoctrination of UtiR students
in bloc countries.
Soviet-Iranian diplomatic impasse
continues.
IIL THE WEST
French Air Force flies mission over
Libya to check for Algerian rebel
activity.
LATE ITEMS
0 India accepts Soviet aid for Ttitil
Five-Year Plan.
USSR--Probable ICBM successfully
kLyi a f I'vura Tarn.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
30 July 1959
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Afghanistan: Moscow is to provide Afghanistan
with an additional $24,000,000 in military assistance,under
what appears to be a new agreement, which will require
Afghanistan to pay only one fourth the value of the new arms.
Last month Moscow agreed to cut in half Kabul's existing
arms debt. ther indications of increased Soviet-Afghan
military collaboration include the arrival in Kabul in late
June of a Soviet major general to take over direction of
Soviet military assistance activities, and acceptance by
Afghanistan of a Soviet invitation to send observers to So-
viet military maneuvers3
(Page 1)
Watch Committee conclusion�Berlin: No significant
indications bearing on he possibility of hostilities.
North Vietnam - South Vietnam: A marked increase in
clandestine communications between Hanoi and the tribal
minority area of central South Vietnam adjacent to the Lao-
tian-Cambodian border was noted on 26 July. This activity
could indicate preparation for further terrorism in South
Vietnam, inasmuch as a similar increase in such commu-
nications was noted before the 8 July assassination of
Americans at Bien Hoa. The tribal minority areas have
been a focal point for Communist agent operations since
mid-February
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Laos: The Laotian Government has acted quickly to im-
plicareiranoil as well as the Communist front inside Laos,
In the attacks on Lao Army garrisons in Sam Neua Province.
A communiqu�f 29 July charged that the attacks were car-
ried out by "well-armed and -organized" units under North
Vietnamese command. The Phoui Sananikone government has
also announced it is sending troop reinforcements to the area
and plans "harsh" punishment for leaders of the Communist-
front movement who have "collaborated with foreigners."
(Page 2)
Indonesia: Defense Minister Nasution has told the Amer-
ican ambassador that he intends to increase military partic-
ipation in the governmental apparatus. The ambassador be
the aim may be ultimate military domination of the
government. Nasution apparently plans to appoint officers
to all important ministries to "assist" in the implementation
of policy directives from the cabinet, where the army already
has substantial influence. Although Nasution may be able to
increase the army's role in this manner, the promulgation of
effective programs to solve Indonesia's numerous problems is
much less certain. (Page 3)
Pakistan: CPresident Ayub is firm in his decision thA. the
cabinet and some other top government officials will move to
Rawalpindi, in northern West Pakistan, some time this fall.
This is a preliminary step in his announced plan to shift the
capital of Pakistan from Karachi to the more attractive
Rawalpindi area. A move of top government leaders mainly
military men, will facilitate close liaison with army2head-
Rawalpindi. It will
we difficulties.
ea s,
oweve
(Page 4)
UAR: the UAR Government is engaged in screening Egyp-
tian oa-Syrian students in Sino-Soviet bloc countries to deter-
mine the extent to which they have succumbed to Communi!.9
30 July 59
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UAlt missions
abroad to have the students return at government expense
for a "cultural seminar" to be held in Cairo from 20 to 30
July; ''excuses of those who remain
behind will not be accepted." As of early July another inter-
cepted UAR officials in Moscow
-Ni7P-r_P�riegotiatirw-Alie_b_rogram for the next scholastic year.
(Page 5)
Iran-USSR: The Iranian-Soviet diplomatic impasse con-
tinues. The government of Iran is. maintaining an unequivo-
cally tough attitude toward the five-month-old Soviet prop-
aganda campaign. In response to Khrushchev's 26 June state-
ment of bolicv to Iranian Ambassador Masud-Ansari, Tehran
Iran, as
an indepe rip.nt ountr . would accept neitner impositions nor
threats.
the USSR is willing to negotiate "secretly" with Iran, but oniy
with the Shah personally or his "appointed representative."
He also claimed Soviet propaganda has "undoubtedly" harmed
the Shah and his regime, and that such broadcasts would con-
tinue pending restoration of good relatioRg.
ommittee con
uations susceptible ot direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc
action which would jeopardize US interests exist; in the Mid-
dle East, particularly in Iraq and Iran; and in Southeast Asia
Oin Laos.
The initiation of significant hostilities is unlikely in these
areas in the immediate future.
III. THE WEST
*France-Libya: Erhe French Air Force in Algeria on 29
July flew an aerial reconnaissance mission over Libya to look
for Algerian rebel activities there, despite US and Britis_Di
30 July 59
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[Warnings that an international incident might result. A second
overflight is scheduled for 5 August. The chief of intelligence
of the French Defense Ministry
Paris considered the proposed overflights a "military
necessity," and left him with the impression that future actions
of this nature wilLbe_carried_ in.it,a&re_cuirechlless of any
rnmnliratiryndl
*India-USSR: New Delhi announced on 29 July that it has ac-
cepted a Soviet offer of $378,000,000 in aid for India's third five-
year plan (1961-66). This credit brings total Soviet bloc aid to
India to $702,000,000--about 20 percent of the total foreign aid
received by India to date. While no announcement has been made
on the projects to be financed by the new credit, the high-level
Indian economic mission which visited Moscow in May apparently
secured Soviet agreement to double the capacity of the Bhilai steel
mill, construct a large petroleum refinery, and expand the scope
of several heavy machinery plants the USSR had previously agreed
to construct. Public attention in India has already shifted to the
third plan, which now calls for outlays of about $21 billion and
probably will have a $5-7.5 billion foreign exchange gap. The
USSR will receive widespread favorable publicity for its willing-
ness at this early date to support the goals of the third plan by
tavfpnriincr niri fnr Rpvpral nf the most imnortant nroiects.
*USSR: A valid launching operation involving a probable
ICBM test vehicle began at the Tyura Tam Guided Missile Test
Range at 0001 GMT 30 July (2001 EDT, 29 July) and culminated,
after a smooth countdown, in a firing four hours later. Prelim-
inary analysis of telemetry and radar intercept data indicates
the missile successfully reached the vicinity of the Kamchatka
Peninsula.
This operation was unusual as compared to all past ICBM
flight tests in that the countdown consumed only four hour's, in-
stead of the usual eight. On 16 May 1959, a launching attempt
30 July 59
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was madeP and although canceled shortly after X-4 hours, the
first four hours of the operation (X-8 to X-4) were compressed
In actual time to two hours. The factors underlying the shortened
launching time of the current missile are not yet fully known as
the exact relationship between this operation and the range op-
erations of 25 and 27 July have not been determined with any de-
gree of certainty. Further analysis of the range operation on
25 July indicates it could either have been a valid but unsuccess-
ful attempt to launch or an unprecedented 8-hour practice count-
down. Continued analysis of the 27 July range operation has
produced additional but not conclusive indications that a missile
may have been launched on that date and failed after a flight of
but a few minutes.
For the present, two equally valid postulations can be made:
(I) the current flight test, occurring only 61 hours after termina-
tion of the 27 July operation, could be the successful conclusion
to a valid launch attempt which actually began on 25 July, car-
ried through on 27 July, and was prevented on those dates by
technical difficulties; or (2) a missile was launched on 27 July
which failed shortly thereafter in flight. If the latter is correct,
and a launching was followed in 61 hours by a second firing on
an abbreviated countdownitime scal.e, this could mean that a sig-
nificant phase in the Soviet firing program has been reached.
30 July 59
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Nee
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Military Aid to Afghanistan
The Soviet Union, under what appears to be a new
$24,000,000 arms deal with Kabul, will provide Afghanistan
with T-54 medium tanks and other land armaments, as well
as jet aircraft. The agreement, apparently concluded in
Moscow in June, probably is designed to complete the re-
equipping of the Afghan armed forces with bloc weapons and
equipment. Under the agreement, Kabul will have to pay only
$6,000,000--one fourth the Soviet list price of the materiel it
is to receive.
The Soviet Union, since the start of its military aid pro-
gram in Afghanistan in 1956, has already supplied Kabul with
an estimated $75,000,000 in arms aid. Repayment originally
contracted for by Afghanistan was less than $75,000,000, how-
ever, and Moscow last June cut in half the agreed price of all
arms which had been sold to Afghanistan. Thus, while Soviet
military aid to Afghanistan is increasing, the cost of this aid
to Kabul remains small.
There are other indications of increased Soviet-Afghan
military collaboration. afghanistan has accepted a Soviet in-
vitation to send to the USSR a mission of Afghan officers to
observe Soviet military maneuvers during late August and ear
September. In late June a Soviet major general arrived in
Kabul to assume direction of Soviet military assistance per-
sonnel who hitherto apparently have operated as individuals
in various Afghan military training programs. {
\ in addition to Soviet instructors provided for under
the agreement, advisers to the defense ministry could be in-
cluded but that both categories should be referred to in the
agreement as "military techniciany
30 July 59
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Situation in Laos
Laotian Army reinforcements, Ejonsisting of four infan-
try companies ;1 are expected to arrive by 30 July in Sam Neua
Province, whefe widely scattered units of two government
battalions have come under attack by Communist partisans
and several outlying posts have been lost in recent days. a
parachute battalion is being held in reserve for commitment
if needed. Laotian Army commander General Ouan appears
confident that order can be restored, but the low capability of
the national army is a serious obstacle, and the army appar-
ently lacks firm information on enemy locations and intentions3
The US Military Attach�n Vientiane was informed on 28
July that rumors were sweeping the town of Sam Neua that a
force including North Vietnamese is moving on the town from
the 9ast. The attach� sources allege that the defense force had
dwindled to a dozen men. These reports are unconfirmed.
The government, meanwhile, has acted quickly to impli-
cate North Vietnam and the Laotian Communist-front organ-
ization--the Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ)--in these attacks. A
29 July communiqu�harges that the "well-armed and -or-
ganized" .dissident units in Sam Neua Province are under
Hanoi's command. The NLHZ leaders, who by now appar-
ently have been arrested in Vientiane, were threatened with
harsh punishment for "collaborating with foreigners." at.e-
cently NLHZ chief Prince Souphannouvong protested vigor-
ously against government repression of his party, which he
claimed enjoyed "solid" foreign backing. He threatened a
full-scale return to guerrilla warfare unless alleged govern-
ment persecution ceassg
Laos' open condemnation of North Vietnam is designed to
undercut the expected upsurge in Communist propaganda which
has been accusing the government of collaborating with the
United States to rekindle the civil war in Laos and start a new
Indochina war.
30 July 59
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Nasution Outlines Plan for Increased Military Role in
Indonesian Government
Plans for increased military participation in the Indor
nesian governmental apparatus through the appointment of
officers to "assist" all important ministries in implementing
policy have been outlined by Defense Minister Nasution to the
American ambassador. Nasution may envisage a system sim-
ilar to that in Burma, where army officers attached to key
ministries in effect act as administrators behind civilian heads.
He pointed out that policy decisions would continue to be made
by civilian instrumentalities,but admitted that, behind this demo-
cratic form, the military, with already substantial representa-
tion in the cabinet, might have the dominant voice.
Although Nasution may be able to ingrease the army's role
in this manner, the formulation of effective programs to solve
Indonesia's complex political and economic problems remains
uncertain. His plan apparently has the approval of President
Sukarno, who is currently backing the army to maintain a balance
of political power. Should Sukarno regard Nasution's growing
influence as a threat to his own position, he would probably move
to downgrade or remove him, possibly by working through ele-
ments in the air force and among the regional army commanders
who have expressed some dissatisfaction with the army chief's
role in the cabinet.
CONFIDENTIAL
30 July 59
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Pakistani Cabinet To Be Moved to Northern West Pakistan
In Fall
president AyubEas told the American ambassador that he
hasrmlfdecided tdmove the cabinet and some other high o
ficials to Rawalpindi, in northern West Pakistan, some time
this fall. This is a preliminary step in his announced plan to
shift the national capital of Pakistan from Karachi to the Rawal-
pindi area. The entire move is to be completed over several
years as funds become available.
Many army and civil service leaders come from the Punjab
and from Pathan areas in the north and dislike the enervating
climate in Karachi. The new location will facilitate closer con-
tacts between government leaders and army headquarters, which
has long been in Rawalpindi. It will also enable Ayub to main-
tain more contact and greater control over the army than is pos-
sible in Karachi.
Beginning the shift with the cabinet, however, seems likely
to undermine the military regime's efficiency by separating its
military leaders from the civil administration, creating seri-
ous communication, and administrative difficulties. These would
probably disrupt implementation of the regime's reform and re-
construction policies.
Many Pakistanis who live outside the Punjab and Pathan
areas have long resented what they consider Punjabi domina-
tion of the government. Thus, they are likely to oppose moving
the capital from "neutral" Karachi to the Punjab area.
The government has announced its decision to establish a
secondary national capital in East Pakistan, presumably in the
hope of lessening Bengali resentment toward the move. This.
however is nrobablv a distant prospect.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Cairo Concerned Over Communist Indoctrination of UAR
Students
The UAR on 4 July ordered its missions in the Sino-So-
viet bloc to arrange for the return of Syrian and Egyptian sti-
dents in order to determine the extent to which' C.ey have suc-
cumbed to Communist political indoctrination. The students
were to arrive i:.; Cairo between 15 and 20 July for a "cultural
seminar," and no excuse was to be accepted for failure to at-
tend. The order applied to university students not attending
agricultural or indlistriar institutions. ET hose whom the gov-
ernment believes have fallen victim to Communist indoctrina-
tion will not be allowed to return to their studies,
1'
The government has prdbably been concerned over the pos-
sibility of Communist indoctrination for some time, but apparent-
ly it began to consider action only after Nasir's conflict with the
Communists early this year. The recall decision may have been
influenced also by information the government received early
this month that Iraqi and Syrian Communist students were planning
a conference of all Arab students in Europe. UAR missions were
advised to attempt to block the conference. The UAR has also
prohibited its youth from attending the current Communist-dominated
festival in Vienna.
A rPnort in Anril romniled hv e UAR Interior Ministry,
� gives the number of UAR
civilian students in the Sino-Soviet bloc as approximately 760.
Cairo's concern over the Communist efforts to "convert" these
students has not been sufficient to prevent it from concluding a
recent new agreement with Moscow for the training of an additional
300 persons in the USSR during the coming academic year.
30 July 59
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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