CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/03/03

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03162005
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: March 3, 1957

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c) 3 March 1957 oe10
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14/
Copy NO. 131
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CI.IANGE IN CLASS,
I I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR
DA .REVIEWER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTENTS
1. THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL
(page 3).
2. REVOLT IN EAST INDONESIA
3. THE SITUATION IN THAILAND
(page 5).
(page 7).
0 IL) 4. SOVIET-HUNGARIAN DISCUSSIONS ON SOVIET TROOPS
REPORTEDLY TO BEGIN IN MARCH (page 8).
5. BRITAIN WARNS 0 0 HOLD LINE ON CHINA
TRADE CONTROLSIN (page 9).
3 Mar 57
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1. THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL
Comment on:
While some present pressures would
be relieved by an Israeli withdrawal,
both Israel and the Arab states, particu-
larly Egypt, would immediately face new
problems A final settlement of the is-
sues will probably be long and difficult.
Israel's request for clarification of with-
drawal guarantees following its announced
willingness to withdraw underscores its
doubts over the wisdom of such action.
Local pressures on the Israeli govern-
ment for freedom of transit in the Gulf
of Aqaba and prohibition of a return of
Egypt to the Gaza strip will remain strong. Israeli officials,
7fnoreover, have repeatedly charged in the past that the UN is
incapable of maintaining the security of the Arab-Israeli bor-
ders, and they may return to this stand. An Israeli army
spokesman announced on 2 March that six Arab infiltrators
had been killed in clashes with Israeli patrols near Gaza.
The Arabs, sullen that sanctions were
not imposed on Israel and suspicious that Western pressures
will now shift from Israel to them, are making a concerted
effort to maintain the focus of attention on Israel, and will
probably remain intransigent regarding negotiations on the
Suez Canal and a resumption of oil flow across the Arab states.
Israel's delay in removing its troops will almost certainly re-
sult in new pressures for UN sanctions. Nasr, moreover,
is likely to press for the re-
turn of Gaza to Egyptian administration and the removal of UN
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forces once Israel withdraws.
Hammarskjold should not guar-
antee anything about Gaza or its future and told Fawzi to deny
that Egypt had agreed to an international administration of
Gaza.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia have also voiced
opposition to the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway.
King Saud recently stated that Aqaba cannot be so regarded
since to do so would constitute a threat to Saudi Arabia and
the Moslem holy places.
the two countries are making
plans to strengthen their defensive positions in their respec-
tive areas along the gulf. Fawzi, in reference to Aqaba,
stated to Cairo that Egypt,if called
upon to state its position on Aqaba, had no alternative but to
rely on its "indeclinable" right. He declared that Aqaba is
part of Egypt's territorial waters and that Egypt will exercise
its rights there unless the International Court expresses a con-
flictine opinion and Egypt decides to adopt it.
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2. REVOLT IN EAST INDONESIA
Comment on:
The revolt of East Indonesian commander
Lt. Col. Samual on 2 March against
Djakarta's authority follows essentially
the same pattern as that of dissatisfied
army leaders in Sumatra last December.
Like the Sumatrans, the East Indonesians
are demanding greater autonomy and bet-
ter economic treatment.
East Indonesia, the territorial command
centered on Celebes and including the Moluccas, Lesser
Sundae and Bali, had earlier given numerous indications of
rising discontent. Samual himself had given the impression
that he sympathized with these dissident attitudes.
The East Indonesian break over the issue
of autonomy comes at a time when Moslem and non-Javanese
opposition to President Sukarno's plan to include Communists
NORTH
SUMAC
SOUTH
SUMATRA
JAVA
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
2 MARCH 1957
ir) MILITARY TERRITORIAL COMMANDS
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3 Mar 57
CON TB
JAVA
EAST JAVA
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in the government is on the upswing. It also coincides with
a recent report that Moslem leaders in East Indonesia, as
well as Sumatra, have been alerted to "take action" in early
March if Sukarno persists in his plans.
The process of fragmentation in Indonesia
may not end with SamuaPs action. The restiveness of neigh-
boring Borneo suggests that leaders on that island may be
considering similar action. If this should occur, the Djakarta
government will have lost control over virtually all of Indonesia
except the island of Java.
Meanwhile, former vice president Hatta
has publicly warned that Sukarno's plan is bound to fail. This
statement will probably have the effect of stiffening resistance
to Sukarno's concept, particularly by the Moslem parties.
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3. THE SITUATION IN THAILAND
The state of emergency declared through-
out Thailand on 2 March was designed to
cope with apparently spontaneous demon-
strations of popular disgust over irregu-
larities in Bangkok during the 26 February
national elections. There is no evidence
that, as implied by the government, these
demonstrations have been inspired by the
Communists. Late reports indicate that
tension in the capital city has somewhat
abated, although the situation remains
potentially explosive.
The American embassy in Bangkok has been
informed that the government has appointed
a commission of nonpolitical career offi-
cers to investigate electoral irregularities.
In addition, Premier Phibun has reminded
the public of its legal recourse under the electoral la* in any
cases of fraud.
The Thai army chief, General Sarit, who
during the emergency is in command of all armed forces in-
cluding the police, may be tempted to take advantage of his
enhanced powers to undermine his rival, Police Director Gen-
eral Phao. As the official who would be held responsible for
electoral frauds, Phao is in a highly vulnerable position. While
the government radio denies reports that the police chief has
been taken into custody, he apparently has not been participat-
ing in the emergendY meetings of high officials.
In commenting on the present crisis, Khuang
Aphaiwong, the leader of the opposition Democrat Party, re-
portedly stated that everything depended on Sarit, with many
people expecting the latter to emerge as the people's hero by
stepping in to demand new Bangkok elections while at the same
time getting rid of Phao.
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4. SOVIET-HUNGARIAN DISCUSSIONS ON SOVIET TROOPS
REPORTEDLY TO BEGIN IN MARCH
Recent statements by Hungarian Foreign
Ministry officials support a report passed
to American officials by the Austrian min-
ister in Budapest that Soviet-Hungarian
discussions on a "status-of-troops" agree-
ment are to begin in March. A Hungarian
-Foreign Ministry official told an AP corre-
spondent that such discussions would begin
in the "second half of March," and the Hungarian protocol
chief informed the British air attache that talks on the sub-
ject of Soviet troops in Hungary "are beginning:'
The Austrian minister believes the re-
gime may hope to head off expected unrest on 15 March, the
anniversary of Hungarian independence, through a "broad
hint" that if all goes well some favorable result will be forth-
coming. The American legation in Budapest adds that it is
not impossible that the USSR has made the successful handling
of the situation in March by the Kadar regime a prerequisite
for negotiations on the reduction or redisposition of Soviet
forces in Hungary.
Comment The reduction or redisposition of Soviet
troops, while it would not reconcile the
population to the current regime, would reduce some of the
tension by making less obtrusive the principal symbol of sub-
jugation and defeat.
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5. BRITAIN WARNS OF INABILITY TO HOLD LINE ON
CHINA TRADE CONTROLS
The British government doubts that it
will be able to "hold the line" much
longer in maintaining controls on trade
with China over and above those with
e rest soviet bloc, the Foreign Office informed the
American embassy in London on 1 March. The government
contends that in view of Britain's precarious balance of pay-
ments situation, the additional China controls are an un-
necessary burden on the economies of both Britain and its
dependent overseas territories. It also cites the severe
pressure at this time from political and business circles
for a relaxation of controls.
With regard to East-West trade in gen-
eral, the government considers that controls should be con-
fined to items of real strategic importance and not used as
a weapon of economic warfare. It believes present controls
are more extensive than strategic considerations require
and sees no justification in recent events for adding to them.
Comment This appears to represent a significant
shift in the government's position. On
4 February the American embassy reported that while the
government agreed with its critics on China controls, it
would not accede to their demdnds for relaxation for reasons
of international policy.
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