CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/01/19

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03161980
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: January 19, 1957

Akio, 4 t"4- L';:;d( h ) (2)
C03161980
.4
0
.//
7 1
.4//
�/
0
.//
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
AlaDA ' 3.11REVIEWER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3.5(c)
19 January 1957
Copy No.
31
DOCUMENT NO. � ..m.N� f
NO CHANC:,E ;11 CLASS.
F DECLASSIFIED
11'
/4
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS Ow
NEXT REVIEW DATE.
//
/*/#4#
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
Approved for C03161980
CONTENTS
1. THE SINO-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE
(page 3).
2. SUKARNO WARNED TO LIMIT COMMUNIST INFLUENCE
IN "REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL" (page 5).
3. EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER EXPECTS CLASH OVER
CANAL TOLLS (page 6).
4. THE POLISH ELECTION OUTLOOK
5. TENSION OVER THE KASHMIR ISSUE
(page 7).
(page 8).
6. YEMEN TO RECEIVE SOME CZECH ARMS VIA EGYPT
(page 9).
7. RIGHTISTS POSE THREAT TO FRENCH REGIME
(page 10).
8, JAPAN'S POLICY ON OICINTAWA AND BONINS OUTLINED
(page 11).
9. BURMESE-SOVIET ECONOMIC AID AGREEMENT
(page 12).
19 Jan 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
T A A A-01_4LL T A.C-11.1
1. THE SINO-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE
Comment on:
The Sino-Soviet communiqu�f 18 Janu-
ary, signed by Bulganin and Chou En-lai,
is largely devoted to a summary of inter-
national questions on which Moscow and Peiping are said to
have "perfectly identical" views,
The communiqu�tates that the USSR and
China "are prepared to continue to give necessary support" to
Middle Eastern states against "aggression and interference!'
This is a noncommittal reply to the American offer of troops
if a Middle East state should request them to oppose Commu-
nist aggression. An implication in the Sino-Soviet text that
support will be given against aggression from any source is
probably meant to please the Arabs, who have criticized Amer-
ican proposals as opposing only Communist aggression.
The principal significance of the commu-
niqu�ies in its reflection of the main lines of Sino-Soviet
strategy to prevent a further deterioration in intra-Orbit rela-
tions. The statement emphasizes the need for bloc unity a-
gainst the West, while asserting that past "mistakes" in
relations among bloc members are being corrected.
The communiqu�rovides further evidence
that Chou's mission in Moscow and Eastern Europe was that of
a moderator, primarily between the Soviet Union and Poland.
It reflects previous Chinese admonitions to the USSR to avoid
"chauvinism" and to the Eastern European states to suppress
"narrow nationalist feelings" It repeats the recent Chinese
formula for "unity" to be achieved by genuine consultation a-
mong bloc states, and avoids the usual citation of the USSR
as head of the bloc.
The Chinese had previously made clear that
their support for Gomulka's freedom from Soviet control was
19 Jan 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
'th ATUTTI ATFIPT AT
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
Approved for Release: 201.9/12/04 C03161980
contingent on his willingness to follow in general the Soviet
model in his internal program and the Sino-Soviet line in
foreign affairs. These conditions are glossed over in the
current communiqu�as they were in the Sino-Polish com-
muniqu�f 16 January,. The, latest statement does in-
clude, however, an indirect warning that the Soviet Union
and China would stand together in military action to pre-
vent any Communist state--in Europe or Asia--from leav-
ing the bloc.
19 Jan 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4
eilATET11171t7711 .4 T
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
2. SUKARNO WARNED TO LIMIT COMMUNIST INFLUENCE
IN "REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL"
Leaders of the Nandlatul Ulama (NU),
the second largest party in the cabinet,
have rejected the idea of a "revolution-
ary council" with strong Communist
n a ined by President Sukarno,
They warned Sukarno that if
Communist influence becomes dominant in any future gov-
erning body for Indonesia, the NU will promote a "holy war"
against the Communists. At the same time they notified
him that the NU will withdraw from the Ali cabinet on or
about 21 January when parliament reconvenes. The PSII,
a minor Moslem party, also will withdraw.
Sukarno hopes
to ditch the anti-Communist Masjumi party entirely and ac-
complish his personal ambitions through the National and
Communist parties and the NU. However, he has decided
to confer with former vice president Hatta, who is strongly
anti-Communist, and non-Communist parties apparently hope
Hatta can force Sukarno to compromise.
Comment The NU's withdrawal from the cabinet
would bring about its collapse.
The army will probably join the non-
Communist parties in resisting Communist participation in
the council. In the face of Sukarno's insistence and con-
tinued government deterioration, however, most of these
elements are likely to agree to leftist "nonparty" partici-
pants who would be susceptible to Communist direction.
19 Jan 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 5
Approved for Release: 201-9/12/04 C03161980
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
V
3. EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER EXPECTS CLASH
OVER CANAL TOLLS
Egyptian foreign minister Fawz
expects a "showdown" with the
West over the question of Suez Canal
toll collection. Fawzi stated that the
US, Britain, afid France "are preparing" to promote the
idea that the United Nations, rather than Egypt, should col-
lect the tolls, and that these countries will "let the whole
world climb on our shoulders!'
"That is going to be a matter of conflict that we cannot
sidetrack. Egypt will be the one to collect the dues, and
the boat that is first to pay will be the first to go through.
The ship that does not pay will not enter. That is the con-
clusion and we cannot retreat from it!'
Fawzi added he had received a tele-
gram from Nasr on 15 January telling him "absolutely" not
to initiate any action with regard to a solution of the canal
matter.
Comment Lebanese foreign minister Malik said
after his recent visit to Cairo that Nasr
told him he had no intention of being dictated to by either the
UN or the Western powers. Nasr added that if the UN did not
approve of his method of operation of the canal and attempted
economic sanctions, he would obtain financial support from
the Soviet Union. He also said, according to Malik, that he
would never permit the transit of Israeli vessels.
19 Jan 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
AL '.a. AL .11..L
A
4- THE POLISH ELECTION OUTLOOK
Comment on:
On the eve of the 20 January parliamen-
tary elections, strong appeals by the
Catholic hierarchy to support the regime-
favored candidates may prove decisive
for regime candidates in many areas.
Gomulka's rapport with the Catholic Church
has been one of his greatest political assets.
Last-minute reflection by voters that pru-
dence dictates support for Gomulka may also counteract in
part the vigorous campaign of Gomulka's opponents to sabo-
tage the elections. An opinion poll taken by a regime-sponsored
youth journal states that "over half" of those questioned said
they would vote for the regime-supported candidates, while
30 percent intend to reject some regime candidates on their
ballot.
Of the candidates, about 50 percent are
members of the Communist Party, 25 percent are United Peas-
ant Party members, 10 percent are Democratic Party mem-
bers, and 15 percent are nonparty Catholics. Although collab-
orating with the National Front, the United Peasant Party has
reportedly conducted a vigorous campaign in the countryside,
and is expected to register gains over Communist candidates
in rural areas.
Whatever the result, the composition of
the new Sejm will be considerably different from that of the
present parliament, since only about 10 percent of the candi-
dates are now Sejm members. The number of top government
and party officials who are candidates has been greatly reduced.
For example, only half of the present council of ministers are
candidates, whereas, in the last Sejm, all ministers ran and
were elected.
19 Jan 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7
COATFIT)FAITT A T
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
Approved for ReCear;e7F01-9712/04 C03161980
V
5. TENSION OVER THE KASHMIR ISSUE
Comment on:
Tension reportedly is building up in both
India and Pakistan in anticipation of the
discussion that will follow India's presen-
tation of its case on Kashmir before the
UN Security Council on 23 January. The Pakistani proposals
presented on 16 January, which call for the introduction of a
UN force into Kashmir and the implementation of the long-
standing plebiscite agreement, are completely unacceptable
to India.
Each country is charging the other with
troop movements and aaaressive intentions
anti-Indian feeling there is
at such a pitch that hostilities might result if the UN does
not prevent integration of Indian-held Kashmir into India
on 26 January, India's Republic Day.
While there is always a possibility of some tribal
outbreaks, open warfare is not in the interest of either coun-
try and no significant troop movement has been confirmed.
The Pakistani government, which strictly controls tribal ele-
ments, would almost certainly exert maximum efforts to
prevent an uprising until all UN resources have been ex-
hausted.
19 Jan 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
4- I L. La I
th.
6, YEMEN TO RECEIVE SOME CZECH ARMS VIA EGYPT
Comment on:
Czechoslovakia offered on 12 January
to deliver "small arms and airplanes"
ordered by Yemen to Egypt by the first
of February if Yemen could transship
them. The small arms presumably are
rifles which Yemen has indicated it would airlift. The air-
planes are two helicopters for the imam's personal use,
they will be operated by Soviet bloc personneL The
Yemeni minister in Cairo also informed the imam that de-
livery of "the heavy arms" would be resumed when the Suez
Canal was reopened to traffic.
Soviet bloc military specialists are al-
ready engaged in training Yemeni personnel in the use of
military equipment which arrived in Yemen in early October.
19 Jan 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9
--T-AP�crgC.12ET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
V
CI V
7. RIGHTISTS POSE THREAT TO FRENCH REGIME
American officials in Paris believe
that right-wing groups might attempt
to overthrow the Fourth Republic if the
Algerian situation "goes very sour:'
General Charles de Gaulle is extremely
active politically and there are indications he has even less
concern for constitutional legality than heretofore. In a
10 January talk with Ambassador Dillon, he talked freely
of a change toward an authoritarian non-Communist govern-
ment. He appears to foresee financial difficulties rather
than Algeria as provoking the end of the present regime.
If a really difficult crisis should arise,
President Coty would call on De Gaulle to form a govern-
ment, according to Cotyls military adviser.
Comment Speculation regarding De Gaulle's return
has increased markedly during the last
four months. De Gaulle is unlikely to be seriously consid-
ered unless France's internal situation becomes chaotic. The
threat of violence by the more than 1,000,000 Europeans in
Algeria, however, raises serious concern over the possible
ramifications in Paris.
19 Jan 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 10
�SECRETApproved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
%A 14.01%.���A%A.4
8. JAPAN'S POLICY ON OKINAWA AND BONINS OUTLINED
Foreign Minister Kishi informed the
Japanese ambassador in Washington on
9 January that Japan regards the status
of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands as a
matter to be dealt with by Japan and the
r than by the UN. Kishi said the legal po-
sition of the islands was unchanged by Japan's membership
in the UN.
if the mat-
ter were raised in the UN it would "uselessly antagonize" the
United States and might be used as propaganda by the USSR.
Kishi noted that the prospect is for the United States to con-
tinue its "strategic hold" on the islands "for the time being:'
Kishi said the government can foresee
an ever-increasing emotional appeal on the part of the Jap-
anese people for the complete return of the islands He
added that the government intends to answer this appeal "by
relying on the good faith of the United States and doing all we
can to further a realistic settlement of the issue:'
Comment With the probability of general elections
this year, the government feels con-
strained to take some action on this issue. Exploitation of
the Okinawa land question by the Socialists helped them make
gains in the upper house election in 1956 and they are con-
tinuing to make "Okinawa reversion" a paramount political
issue The government has already decided to make token
compensation to Okinawans for use of land by American
forces during the occupation period and probably will accept
an American invitation to send a Diet delegation to Okinawa
in the near future.
19 Jan 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 11
0 D
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
wirr re*, r1",
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
9. BURMESE-SOVIET ECONOMIC AID AGREEMENT
Comment on:
An economic agreement signed on 17 Jan-
uary in Rangoon completes the negotiations
for Soviet construction and equipment as
"gifts to the Burmese people" of a tech-
nological institute, a hospital, theater,
hotel and a "cultural and sports center" which will include a
stadium. The first Soviet offers were made during the Bul-
ganin-Khrushchev visit to Rangoon in December 1955.
Moscow, according to a TASS dispatch, will
provide engineers and technicians and also will bring Burmese
to the Soviet Union for training on the projects, which are to
be completed in 1963. In return, the agreement states, Burma
'twill present as a gift to the Soviet people a corresponding quan-
tity of rice and other Burmese goods!'
Burma, which has had difficulty in procur-
ing suitable imports from the Soviet Union, may use some of
its current $10,000,000 credit with the USSR to pay for this
equipment and technical assistance. Reduction of credits in
this manner may help dispel some of Burma's recent disillu-
sionment with barter trade, The projects themselves are of
a type most likely to make a favorable impression on the Bur-
mese public.
19 Jan 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 12
-SfeRE-T-
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980
I
CORRECTION TO ITEM 1, PAGE 3, OF CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DATED 18 JANUARY 1957
The first sentence of the comment
should read: "While it would be in Egypt's interest to ex-
aggerate what may have been a general and unspecific
Soviet proposal, Moscow is likely to increase its eco-
nomic aid to Egypt, which until now has been relatively
small!'
19 Jan 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 13
Crrin
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03161980