CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/01/16

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03161977
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: January 16, 1957

CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
, ArWed farki.tleatattj3/04 C03167 z
3.5(c)
16 January 1957
131
TOP SECRET ZA
Copy No.
DOCUMENT NO.
NC) CHANGE IN CLASS,
I I DECLASSIFIID
CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S
NEXT REV/EW DATE:
AUTH: HR 71-
DAV:11 In REVIEWER;
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Atik ,Aw
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CONTENTS
1. ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW FROM SINAI BY 22 JANUARY
I (page 3).
2. PROBABLE EXTENSION OF SOVIET GUIDED-MISSILE
RANGE (page 4).
3. NEW SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING REPORTED
SCHEDULED (Top Secret Eider) (page 5).
4. BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE VIEWS ON YEMEN-ADEN SITU-
ATION (page 6).
5. SITUATION IN INDONESIA
6. YUGOSLAVS SUPPORT KADAR REGIME
(page 7).
(page 8).
7. JAPAN PROPOSES FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOUTH
KOREA (Secret Noforn) (page 9).
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1. ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW FROM SINAI BY 22 JANUARY
Israeli forces are to be "entirely out
of Sinai" except for Sharm al Shaikh
by 22 January,
Eban said Israel will not withdraw
r�iShi�h�htintul there are "adequate assurances
which protect genuine international interests!' Eban said
the stationing of UN forces at Sharm al Shaikh pending a
final settlement would make an Israeli withdrawal possible.
Eban deferred any discussion of the future of the Gaza strip.
Comment Eban's statements presumably result
from the 13 January meeting of the
Israeli cabinet. Israel is making a determined effort to
obtain freedom of transit in the Gulf of Aqaba and has indi-
cated it favors the maintenance of an Israeli police force
in the Gaza strip under UN supervision.
Egypt has maintained that no discussions
toward a settlement can be held prior to the restoration of the
status quo ante. Nasr has suggested that a "serious problem"
might arise if Israel has not withdrawn before the Suez Canal
is cleared.
units othe motorized frontier corps are being deployed
back into Sinai.
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2. PROBABLE EXTENSION OF SOVIET GUIDED-
MISSILE RANGE
Comment on:
A lengthening of the Kapustin Yar
missile test range eastward to a dis-
tance of 900 to 1,000 nautical miles
hc hotart i ririi (*afar]
The present most distant impact area is approximately 600
to 700 nautical miles east of the launching site.
Aircraft flights between the Kapustin
Yar area and the Akmolinsk/Karaganda region in mid-1956
may have been connected with the establishment of this
station. Although the station has not been involved in any
actual missile-firing operations,
.t compares in
both permanence and importance with the major administra-
tive bases in the three known impact areas.
On 13 January, following a 31-day
period of operational inactivity, the range resumed opera-
tions with a short-range (150 nautical miles) firing. How-
ever, this period of inactivity could still reflect prepara-
tions for the integration of a new impact area into range
operations.
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. NEW SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING
REPORTED SCHEDULED
Another meeting of the Soviet party cen-
tral committee will be held before the
5 February Supreme Soviet meeting,
ng will deal with ideological problems and with hous-
ing and other economic matters left unsettled in the decree of
the December meeting,
Ambassador Bohlen points out that any
personnel shifts which the party presidium has in mind could
be approved at such a meeting. He notes, however, that there
has been no reflection in Moscow of the Warsaw rumor that
Khrushchev won a "slim majority" over Malenkov in a vote at
the December plenum. He doubts that such a vote could have
taken place without becoming Moscow gossip.
Comment The December plenum apparently did not
come to grips with the problem of grow-
ing ideological disorientation among intellectuals and student
groups, and a stern warning on the issue from a party plenum
is a good possibility.
A new meeting of the central committee
could decide on specific goals for housing and make a final
review of the 1957 budget, which is to be approved at the
Supreme Soviet meeting. The December meeting of the
central committee apparently postponed decision on earlier
plans for an immediate increase of priority for housing,
which had already been approved by the State Economic
Commission for Current Planning,
The removal of M. Z. Saburov, who headed the
planning commission at that time, may have been caused in
disagreement over housing priorities.
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4. BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE VIEWS ON YEMEN-
ADEN SITUATION
The British Foreign Office is disturbed
over the extent of the Yemeni propaganda
campaign alleging British aggression
across the Aden border. Britain is "ur-
n ytrying to start a joint inspection of the Yemen-Aden
frontier area which has been under discussion with Yemeni
representatives in London since early December, accord-
ing to the American embassy there. Foreign Office officials
minimize the extent of the actual fighting in progress.
The Foreign Office is also considering
asking for a UN fact-finding or boundary demarcation mis-
sion. London fears, however, that submitting the question
to the UN might benefit only the Asian-African bloc or lead
to unworkable procedures for adjudicating the border dispite.
Comment Under present tensions, the prospects ap-
pear very slim for reaching a settlement
of the border dispute either by direct negotiation or under UN
auspices. The British evidently consider they must make some
public gesture toward such negotiations, however, in order to
offset the effect of Yemeni, Egyptian, and Soviet propaganda.
Meanwhile, there are indications that British military opera-
tions in the disturbed area are more extensive than London's
guarded statements reveal.
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5. SITUATION IN INDONESIA
The withdrawal from the Indonesian
cabinet of the small Moslem party
PERTI on 15 January may provide the
impetus for further defections from a
regime which now has lost three of its
eight participants. Other minor mem-
bers which are considering withdrawal
are one Moslem and two Christian par-
t.
President Sukarno, presumably antici-
pating further defections, is said to be planning the forma-
tion soon of a "revolutionary council" under his leadership
to which the cabinet would be responsible. This council
would implement his proposal of a "guided democracy" and
permit him almost unlimited control over the government.
The Communist Party, which now has
about 16 percent of the seats in parliament, has demanded
proportional representation in any new cabinet. Sukarno
would be likely to press for leftist or Communist participa-
tion in the cabinet in order to realize "national unity!' He
may also insist on Communist participation in his "revolu-
tionary council!'
Meanwhile, in the Celebes, preparations
are reportedly being made to proclaim the central Celebes
area an "autonomous province:' Efforts by the Djakarta
government to resume normal relations with the three
Sumatran provinces continue to be ineffective.
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6. YUGOSLAVS SUPPORT KADAR REGIME
Comment on:
Several recent actions by the Yugoslav
government indicate that it intends to
support the Kadar regime in Hungary
for the present. On 11 January, a Yugo-
slav spokesman announced that a $2,000,000 credit and "cer-
tain facilities in mutual trade exchange" had been granted at
the recent request of the Hungarian government. He said
Hungarian-Yugoslav relations were "normal" and implied
that Belgrade was no longer pressing the issue of the Soviet
abduction of ex-premier Nagy last November.
A new Yugoslav ambassador is about to
depart for Budapest, a post vacant since shortly after the
�Nagy kidnapitig,_ and Hungary has named a new man for its
post in Belgrade, vacant since late October. The Belgrade
press gave tentative acceptance to the program outlined by
Premier Kadar on 6 January, despite its heralding of im-
pending harsh policies and close allegiance to Moscow.
Most Yugoslav Communist leaders prob-
ably recognize that only a harsh program by Kadar will
maintain Communism in Hungary at present, even though
this view conflicts with Vice President Kardelj's speech on
7 December, with its implied condemnation of the Kadar re-
gime and its extolling of the workers' councils as the only
true socialist force in Hungary. The Yugoslays may feel
that eventually a more liberal regime can evolve in Hungary.
Belgrade's attitude toward Hungary may
also be in part designed to counter the Soviet bloc ideologi-
cal criticisms of the Yugoslays as "revisionists:'
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7. JAPAN PROPOSES FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH
Japanese foreign minister 1Cishi proposed
to South Korean minister Kim in Tokyo on
10 January that formal negotiations be o-
pened for an over-all settlement and the
rmal relations between their two countries,
jsaid Tokyo was prepared to withdraw or disavow
the "offensive" remarks of a former Japanese negotiator, to
drop claims to former Japanese property in Korea, and to
agree to a mutual release of detainees with the promise that
no additional Koreans would be interned by Japan pending a
final settlement. He said "difficulties" would arise if an un-
derstanding were not reached before the Japanese Diet recon-
vened on 20 January.
Kim said he had recommended to Presi-
dent Rhee that he accept the offer as the best obtainable and
because it satisfies the major conditions which the Koreans
have set for a settlement. He fears, however, that Rhee will
offer by insisting that Japan recognize the Rhee line.
Comment
A settlement with South Korea is a primary
objective of Japan's new Ishibashi govern-
ment, and release of more than 800 Japanese fishermen has
top priority. Japanese officials feel the fishermen are being
held as hostages to force Japanese acceptance of Korean terms
and have stated that Japan will be compelled to alter drastically
its conciliatory attitude unless progress toward a settlement is
made soon.
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