CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1956/12/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03161777
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2019
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2019
• Publication Date: December 21, 1956

Approved for Release: 2019/10/23 C03161777.
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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
3.3(h)(2)
/
21 December 19563.5(c)
/
0/2
Copy No. 112
,�
nOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
171 DE-CLAk;GrED
CLASS. CH;Y�
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH eigeHEI 70-2
FIENIONER:.�,
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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CONTENTS
0. SHIFTS IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP RUMORED
(page 2a).
1. SYRIA CONTINUES TO OPPOSE RESUMPTION OF OIL
FLOW (page 3).
2. COMMUNIST CHINA OFFERS ARMS AND AID TO EGYPT
ON EASY TERMS (page 4).
3. QUIET APPEARS RESTORED IN HUNGARY
(page 5).
4. GUATEMALAN UPRISING REPORTEDLY SET FOR 24
DECEMBER (page 6).
5. SUKARNO MAY SOON ANNOUNCE PROPOSALS FOR
"GUIDED DEMOCRACY" (page 7).
6. INDONESIAN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR FOR
MILITARY EQUIPMENT (page 8).
7. YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR IN 7SCOW COMMENTS ON
MOSCOW-BELGRADE DISPUTE (page 9).
ANNEX -- Conclusions of the Watch Report of the Intelli-
gence Advisory Committee (page 10).
21 Dec 56
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�COATFIDENTIA
0. SHIFTS IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP RUMORED
The American embassy in Moscow has
been told
that a plenum of the Soviet Communist
Party central committee has already be-
gun and that personnel shifts within the hierarchy will re-
sult from the meeting.
Malenkov will succeed Khrushchev as party first sec-
retary and that Khrushchev will take over Bulganin's post
as premier. Bulganin, in turn, is to replace Voroshilov,
who will retire from his position as chairman of the Presid-
ium of the Supreme Soviet.
The explanation given for this move,
"which came up at the last minute," is that Khrushchev,
who is identified with successes in agriculture, would be
responsible as premier for the governmental program to
improve the economic situation of the working class. Mal-
enkov's appointment as first secretary would bring in a
man with "requisite firmness plus greater finesse" to deal
with ideological shortcomings of students and the intelli-
gentsia.
Molotov
apparently has played a considerable role in bringing about
the changes and has formed a close association with Malen-
kov.
Comment Repeated Soviet setbacks in Eastern
Europe and increasing signs of popular
dissatisfaction inside the USSR may have caused the Khru-
shchev leadership to lose its hold over the party presidium.
A dramatic shift within the hierarchy at this time, however,
would probably compound current Soviet difficulties by re-
vealing a lack of unity in the party presidium and casting
doubt on the continuance of the policies laid down at the
20th party congress.
21 Dec 56
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1. SYRIA CONTINUES TO OPPOSE RESUMPTION OF
OIL FLOW
Comment on:
The Syrian government apparently in-
tends to continue blocking the flow of
oil from Iraq to the Mediterranean,
despite its own pressing need for pe-
troleum products and pipeline royalties,
in the hope that denial of this oil will
lead Britain, France and the United
States to meet Arab political demands.
plan foreign minister, in response to India's demarche
urging quick repair of the Iraq Petroleum Company sabotaged
pumping stations, stated that pipes bypassing the stations
could be installed at once if the US issued a statement fixing
a date for an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip.
The Syrian government had already indi-
cated that, in view of the Anglo-French evacuation from Egypt,
it would agree to let the company's representatives enter the
country for discussions and to make repairs to the pumping
stations, but that there had been no decision to permit the
flow of oil. Company officials estimate that a limited quan-
tity of oil could start moving within a week after its techni-
cians arrived. The decision will almost certainly be made
by the Syrian army leaders who sabotaged the stations in the
first place. Military requirements for oil may lead them to
compromise.
Syria's petroleum stocks�estimated at
32,000 tons before hostilities as compared to annual consump-
tion of about 600,000 tons- -are believed nearing exhaustion.
Syria has been informed that shipments frdm,Lebanon will
stop on 10 January owing to a shortage of crude oil. The
USSR has agreed to ship 30,000 tons of petroleum to Syria.
Two tanker loads of fuel oil arrived this month. A third de-
livery is expected within the next few weeks. Despite these
Soviet deliveries, however, Syria faces a fuel crisis early in
January.
21 Dec 56
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2. COMMUNIST CHINA OFFERS ARMS AND AID TO EGYPT
ON EASY TERMS
The Chinese Communist defense min-
ister affirmed Peiping's readiness to
supply Egypt with "all possible aid"
and equipment "except for tanks and
heavy arms" on long-term credit or
��witnout payment;'
The Chinese requested a
detailed list of Egyptian requirements but pointed out that
it was necessary to solve the problem of sea transportation.
Comment
Peiping's offer of arms to Egypt sup-
ports the Soviet aim of preventing quick set-
tlement of outstanding issues by strength-
ening Nasr.
Cairo is probably not interested in re-
ceiving shipments of small arms and light equipment from
China, but almost certainly will seek to obtain Peiping's prom-
ise of some other kind of aid.
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wrica 121.1,i
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3. QUIET APPEARS RESTORED IN HUNGARY
Comment on:
The repressive measures of the Kadar
regime during the past two weeks have
restored a degree of order in Hungary
which may enable the regime to turn its
attention to restoring the Hungarian econ-
omy.. Although widespread distrust and
dislike of the regime remain, there appears
to be a growing belief among workers that
little is to be accomplished, at this point,
by continued active resistance or strikes.
The Kadar regime is combining its stern
police tactics with many promises of concessions, which
would represent an acceptance of a number of the pre-revolu-
tion economic demands of Communist moderates. It has, for
example, promised pay increases for those workers presently
active in certain industrial sectors, particularly coal mining.
A re-examination of foreign trade treaties has also been called
for and "substantial cuts" in capital investments will be made.
The regime has stressed, however, that economic chaos threat-
ens the fulfillment of such pledges and may result in extensive
unemployment.
Efforts to broaden the basis of political
power continue but have met with little if any success. Kadar
has reportedly failed to establish a coalition utilizing Small-
holder or Peasant Party officials, and apparently will be un-
able to achieve a compromise as long as he is so closely asso-
ciated with the Soviet elements in Hungary.
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4. GUATEMALAN UPRISING REPORTEDLY SET
FOR 24 DECEMBER
An uprising against the Castillo Armas
government in Guatemala is scheduled
for 24 December,
army
elements in two provincial capitals are to join the revolt and
that revolutionary leaders have two aircraft.
Comment The revolt, which is reportedly planned
by an exile faction in Costa Rica, El
Salvador, and Mexico led by non-Communist former Guate-
malan army officers, is almost certain to fail. Guatemalan
security forces are alerted to the plot.
As recently as 7 December the attempt
was set for "about" 20 December. It has also been reported
that the revolt is to coincide
with an attempt to assassinate the president. Arms have ap-
parently been smuggled across the Salvadoran and Mexican
borders, and the plotters reportedly expect support from ele-
ments in the army. In this respect they are likely to be dis-
appointed; key army leaders are believed to be loyal and those
few officers who are reportedly disaffected do not command a
significant number of troops.
21 Dec 56
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5. SUKARNO MAY SOON ANNOUNCE PROPOSALS FOR
"GUIDED DEMOCRACY'
Comment on:
President Sukarno may unveil his plan
for correcting Indonesia's internal prob-
lems on 22 December before the All-
Indonesian Veterans' Congress. Sukarno
ea iast month that he would offer suggestions in mid-
December on a "guided democracy" and de-emphasis of po-
litical parties.
Among the 2,000 veterans that are to be
brought into the city are 500 students whose attendance has
been especially arranged by army chief of staff Nasution.
These student veterans, noted for their "direct and violent"
approach to political actions, could easily be used as a hard
core for a demonstration demanding that political parties
capitulate to� Sukarno.
There have been indications of increas-
ing co-operation between Sukarno and Na,sution.
have recently intimated that when Sukarno
returned from his vacation this week he would initiate a
series of actions, with Nasution's support, to enhance his
personal control over the government.
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6. INDONESIAN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR FOR
MILITARY EQUIPMENT
Comment on:
Indonesia may be turning to the Soviet
Union for military equipment. The gov-
ernment is known to be planning to re-
equip its armed forces, now handicapped
by both shortage and obsolescence of arms
and equipment.
An army spokesman stated on 17 Decem-
ber that any purchases would be made in
accordance with Indonesia's "independent and active foreign
policy!' He was also quoted as saying that the choice of the
source was usually determined by considerations of quality
and price.
reports from Djakarta suggest
that agreement has already been reached with the USSR for
the supply of a large number of jeeps.
an initial shipment of 550 will arrive in
March 1957, with 5,000 others scheduled for later in the
ear. The Soviet
long-term credit
had been agreed on to permit Indonesian arms purchases.
The Soviet Union's attempts to forge closer
links with Indonesia are considerably facilitated by President
Sukarno's admiration for material accomplishments under Com-
munist systems, particularly in China. On his return from a
tour of bloc countries last fall, Sukarno publicly advocated
closer contacts with the Orbit and specifically mentioned the
advantages to be gained through co-operation in the military
field.
21 Dec 56 Current Intelligence Bulletin
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YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW COMMENTS ON
MOSCOW-BELGRADE DISPUTE
In a series of recent conversations with
Ambassador Bohlen, the Yugoslav am-
bassador in Moscow has expressed the
belief that Soviet-Yugoslav relations will
'eteriorate further in "all aspects," but will stop short of
y rupture similar to that of 1948.
He felt that Soviet leaders resented Yugo-
lay vice president Kardelj's speech of 7 December more than
resident Tito's speech at Pula in Novembe; because it ex-
bored questions of ideology more deeply and was more crit-
ical of Soviet action in Hungary. The Yugoslav ambassador
believed that the Soviets were finding it more difficult to ex-
ercise restraint in replying to Yugoslav arguments.
Comment Apparently convinced that Moscow does
not intend to permit the controversy to
result in an open breach, the Yugoslav regime seems to be
enjoying its ideological jousting with the USSR. The Yugo-
slays presumably see the exchange as furthering significant-
ly Yugoslav influence and prestige throughout the world, par-
ticularly among the uncommitted nations.
Yugoslavia's leading paper Borba in its
latest contribution to the debate on 19 December, tOok issue
with Pravda's recent suggestion that the current exchange is
now inopportune "when reaction is attacking Communist par-
ties!' It declared that the seriousness of the current interna-
tional situation, in fact, demands "open, loyal and comradely
exchanges of views between Communists!' The Yugoslays have
been particularly critical of Moscow's refusal to give full and
accurate press coverage to the Yugoslav argumentation.
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ANNEX
Watch Report 333, 20 December 1956
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee
Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the
Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:
A. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate hostili-
ties against the continental US or its possessions in
the immediate future.
B. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate hostili-
ties against US forces abroad, US allies or areas periph-
eral to the Orbit.
C. A deliberate initiation of hostilities in the Middle East
is improbable in the immediate future. The USSR con-
tinues to give diplomatic, propaganda, and material
support to Egypt and Syria, and persists in its effort
to prevent a settlement of outstanding issues in the Mid-
dle East.
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