CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/03/16

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: 2018 Sanitization
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03160619
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 16, 1959

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16 March 1959
Copy No. C 13
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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16 MARCH 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Tibet - Rebels reported holding Dalai
Lama.
Yugoslavia confirms recall of its min-
ister to Albania.
IL ASIA-AFIIICA
Iraqi-UAR - Situation report.
Jordan Imminent arrest of ten army
officers to tighten security.
Yemen - Imam indicates willingness
to accept American aid.
Laos delays asking for American
training personnel; fears offense to
French.
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III. THE WEST
0 Bolivia - General strike alert set;
armed violence may break out.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
16 March 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Tibet: As of 13 March the Dalai Lama was being held
captive by Tibetan rebels in his home in Lhasa, according
to a Chinese Communist message intercepted by the Chinese
Nationalists. The rebels detained the Dalai Lama in order to
prevent him from attending a social function of the Chinese
military command. The message indicates that Peiping will
attempt to "persuade" the rebels to give in, but will under-
take more forceful action should the unrest continue.
Yugoslavia-fklbania: Yugoslavia on 14 March officially
confirmed the recall of its minister to Albania. Albania prob-
e; ably will retaliate in kind. (Page 1)
9-
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq-UAR: The Qasim government has restored order
in Mosul, but tension is continuing along portions of the Iraqi-
Syrian frontier2 and the UAR may be encouraging dissidence
by Shammar bedouin in northern Iraq. A limited number of
UAR troops and tanks arrived at the Iraqi border northwest of
o Mosul on 14 March, apparently to assist police in discouraging
reprisal raids into Syria. Authorities in northern Iraq are also
concerned that dissident bedouin may attempt to sabotage oil in-
stallations. Anti-Qasim elements are now reported plotting
Qasim's assassination this week, while Syrian security forces
have been alerted against an attempt by Iraqi Communists
against Nasir. (Page 2)
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*Jordan: Gremier Rifai has approved a proposal by armed
forces chief Habis Majalli to arrest about ten army and police
officers, including the commander of the 3rd Brigade, suspected
of plotting against the government. Majalli also desires to ar-
rest Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff Sadiq Shara, when the
latter returns from his trip with King Husayn to Taiwan and th
United States. While Majalli may justify the imminent arrests
to tighten security prior to Rifai's departure
about 17 March to join the King in Washington, he appears to be
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Yemen: ahe Imam of Yemen has indicated willi ess to
accept certain American economic aid projects which were re-
jected last year as the result of the influence of pro-Soviet Crown
Prince Badr. Programs specifically mentioned included road and
airfield construction and provision of agricultural experts. At
least 350 Sino-Soviet bloc personnel now are in Yemen in conn
tion with bloc military and economic aid. The Imam's present
willingness to receive American aid may reflect concern on his
part over reports of plotting to overthrow the monarchy. A ma-
jor factor, however, is his desire to establish a better balance
in Yemen's relations with the bloc and the We.�9
(Page 4)
Laos: is reluctant to take the initiative in ending the
French monopoly on military training by calling on the United
States for training personnel. The cabinet, preoccupied during
the past several weeks by factional disputes, is now divided on
this issue. The Laotian authorities do not want to offend the
French. Their equivocation on this issue may also reflect con-
cern over the more strident tone Peiping interjected into its in-
tensive propaganda last week when it charged that Laos had aided
remnant Chinese Nationalist troops in forays into China
(Page 5)
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DAILY BRIEF
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III. THE WEST
Bolivia: Armed violence may break out in Bolivia as a
result of the tin miners' dissatisfaction with the government's
decree of 13 March related to wages and commissary prices.
The decree is opposed by the national labor organization whose
members form a powerful civilian militia. It has called a gen-
eral strike alert for the evening of 16 March. The government
probably can count on the weak regular armed forces and some
factions of the civilian militia, but the US charg�n La Paz be-
lieves that the outcome of a showdown is doubtful. He adds that
recent consultations between the Czech charg�nd Bolivian con-
gressional leaders could foreshadow a financial aid offer from
the Soviet bloc. Page 6)
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DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Yugoslavia "Freezes" Relations With Albania
Yugoslavia on 14 March officially announced the withdrawal
of its minister to Albania and his appointment to the Foreign
Ministry in Belgrade. Belgrade's initiative was foreshadowed
in Tito's speeches on 6 and 7 March-against-the bloc, when he
made it clear he would give blow for blow in reply to future at-
tacks against Yugoslavia. Although Belgrade desires to avoid
initiating a break in relations, its motivation appears to be to
make all attacks on Yugoslavia as unrewarding as possible in
the belief that Moscow also probably does not desire to initiate
a break.
Tirana's relations with Belgrade generally have been the
worst of any of the satellites, and the Albanians are certain to
retaliate in kind and may suspend relations by withdrawing their
entire diplomatic force from Belgrade. While this tactic was
used by a number of satellites in the 1948 dispute with Yugo-
slavia, a similar "freeze" in Belgrade's relations with Peiping
last summer was not followed by such action from other bloc
members.
Belgrade's relations with Tirana have often been a bell-
wether of its relations with the rest of the bloc, and the pres-
ent developments may forecast an intensification of Yugoslavia's
dispute with the bloc. Neither Moscow nor Belgrade seems
willing, however, to shoulder the blame for a break in diplomatic
relations because of the resulting damage to its international po-
sition.
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq-UAR Developments
he city was quiet and that the army was in com-
plete control of the town.
tension is continuing along portions of
tne iraqi-syrian frontier north and west of Mosul, and that
scattered clashes were occurring between pro- and anti-Qasim
Iraqi tribal groups. The Qasim regime has been generally sup-
ported by the Kurds, Yazidis, and Christians, while the Sham-
mar bedouin,who reside on both sides of the border, have op-
posed the Baghdad government.
Fear of Iraqi reprisal raids on Sliammar villages in Syria
prompted the Syrian frontier police to
request the army to assume responsibility for security along
the border. When a limited number of Syrian army troops and
vehicles, including tanks, arrived at a Syrian frontier post
northwest of Mosul on 14 March, nearby Iraqi outposts likewise
appealed for reinforcements. While there is no indication of ma-
ior troop movements toward the border,
the UAR may encourage con:inued Shammar dissi-
dence in Iraq.
concern over gatherings
of armed bedouin, and possible incursions from Syria. Auth-
orities in northern Iraq also fear that dissident bedouin may
attempt to sabotage oil installations. Iraqi aircraft have at-
tacked dissident bedouin groups, and UAR charges that they
have attacked points on the Syrian side of the border may well
be true, reported reconnaissance
of Syrian villages by Iraqi aircraft. A Syrian Air Force exercise
- by elements of two jet fighter squadrons, which began on 14
March, may be aimed at countering Iraqi aerial incursions.
The Qasim government is attempting to ensure the loyalty
of the security forces by giving bonus payments to loyal troops,
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in addition to the pay raise in January. A very large govern-
ment housing program for government officials has been an-
nounced, and other perquisites are being considered.
Nasir has given permission for UAR teachers and tech-
nicians to withdraw from Iraq. The UAR Embassy in Baghdad
had advised that UAR nationals were no longer safe in Iraq,
and that no action was being taken by responsible Iraqi officials
because authority was being exercised by the various Commu-
nist organizations.
Initial Egyptian reaction to the failure of the Mosul upris-
ing was to express pessimism over prospects for hurting Qasim.
afinister of State All Sabri expressed belief that another Arab
nationalist counterrevolution in Iraq was unlikely fnr some timi
in view of Communist strength thereq
Nasir must consider the
cause lost in Iraq, or he would not have so violently attacked the
regime there. Late on 13 March, however,
Nasir instructed his press adviser in Cairo
to concentrate on an objective attack, free from insults, against
the rommunicts and Oacim and hig artivitu acrainQf Arab nnitu
me Iraqi nationalist movement now plans to assassinate Qasim
within a week, prior to the return of the Iraqi economic delega-
tion from Moscowj Earlier,
Syrian security Torces were alerted against an attempt against
Nasir by Iraqi Communists,.
Continuing his speech-making in Syria on 15 March, Nasir
declared that the Arab people had not shed their blood against im-
perialism to hand over Iraq to the Communists. He added that
there was more tyranny in Iraq today than at the time of Nun i Said,
but that the Iraqi and Arab people would defeat this new "red dic-
tatorship." An obliging member of the Higher Islamic Council in
Syria has issued a decree declaring that since Qasim and his ad-
herents are "dissidents to religion and Arab nationalism,' a holy
jihad against them becomes a public duty." In Beirut on 15 March,
bombs were thrown at the Soviet cultural center and at the home, of
a leading Lebanese CommuniSt.,
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Yemen Seeks Additional American Economic Aid
S_er men's Deputy Foreign Minister Al-Amri has told Am-
bassador Hare that the Imam of Yemen is now willing to accept
some American economic aid projects which had been rejected
last year under the influence of pro-Soviet Crown Prince Badr.
Projects in which the Yemenis were specifically interested in-
clude construction of a modern road to link the northern and
southern capitals of Sana and Taiz, and provision of agricultural
experts. The Imam also reportedly suggested that the United
States undertake to construct modern airfields at Sana, Taiz,
and Hodeidal rather than to make an aerial survey of Yemen as
earlier proposed.]
At least 350 Sino-Soviet bloc personnel, mostly Chinese
Comm- unists, are now in Yemen in connection with bloc military
and economic aid. In addition to providing about $309000,000
worth of military aid, including piston aircraft, the bloc is en-
gaged in port- and road-construction work, and development of
small consumer-goods factories-D
d_the Imam's motive in seeking the new American aid may re-
flect satisfaction with the recent prompt and effective response
to his request for relief grain deliveries. He may also be more
anxious than before to cultivate American support in view of the
widespread reports of antiregime plotting in Yemen.]
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Laos Equivocates on Requesting American Military
Training Personnel
Lie Laotian Government is reluctant to take any initia-
tive to bring American military training personnel into Laos
to supplement the efforts of the inadequate French military
training mission. France has made it clear it wishes to
maintain its monopoly over Laotian Army training, and the
Laotian Government is equivocating in informing France that
it wants American personnel to supplement the 80 additional
men France has offered to send. The cabinet, which has been
almost paralyzed for the past several weeks by bitter factional
disputes, is reported divided on the issutj
Crs-)p Laotian staff officers have been disturbed over the
decline in the Laotian Army's capabilities which they attribute
to the performance of the French mission and are not satis-
fied with France's recent offer to send additional men. The
Laotian foreign minister has indicated that Laos' hesitancy
stems from deference to France's sensitivity over its exclusive
position, a marked switch in view of the cabinet's 21 February
decision to terminate the French mission, a decision later re-
versed on American advic
g____Jaos' position may reflect its concern over Communist
propaganda charges that Laos is becoming an American mil-
itary base. These charges took on a more strident tone last
week when Peiping accused Laos of aiding remnant Chinese
Nationalist troops in forays into China:D
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III. THE WEST
Armed Violence Threatens in Bolivia
Armed violence may break out in Bolivia as a result of
the government's wage decree of 13 March for tin miners
which had been insisted on by the International Monetary
Fund as a prerequisite for continuing financial aid. The US
charge in La Paz notes that recent consultations between the
Czech charge and Bolivian congressional leaders could fore-
shadow a financial aid offer from the Soviet bloc, which would
be very difficult for the Bolivian Government to refuse under
present circumstances.
The miners' wage decree is opposed by the national labor
organization, which has called a general strike for the even-
ing of 16 March and whose members form a powerful civilian
militia. The Siles government probably has the support of the
weak regular armed forces and some factions of the civilian
militia. Siles apparently sought to increase his support from
armed civilians by appointing Indian leader Jose Rojas to the
cabinet on 13 March. The US charge in La Paz was recently
told that President Siles is extremely nervous,. On the one
hand, he threatens to resign and turn the government over to
the labor leaders if they continue their defiance, and on the
other hand, he insists he will impose government authority at
any price. The chargd believes the outcome of a showdown is
doubtful.
The evacuation of nonessential Americans from La Paz has
begun. The rightist opposition party may join the miners' mq.-
itia if it attacks the US Embassy in retaliation for supporting the
International Monetary Fund on the wage question. ,
SEC E T
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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