CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/11/25

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03160576
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: November 25, 1960

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25 November 1960
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
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25 NOVEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Pravda editorial reiterating Soviet posi-
tion indicates continuing inability to re-
solve Sino-Soviet dispute.
Incidents on Tibet-Sikkim border, alleg-
edly involving sniping by Chinese troops,
will further exacerbate Sino-Indian rela-
tions, but probably not deliberately engi-
neered by Peiping.
Vietnamese Communists receive belated
orders to exploit "advantageous" situa-
tion in South Vietnam following the abor-
tive 11 November rout) aaainst Diem.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Situation in Laos.
Thailand--Premier Sarit investigating
wave of coup rumors.
UAR--Unprecedented display of Syrian
friendliness toward the US may reflect
a desire for US economic aid.
III. THE WEST
�Appointment of new top French civil of-
ficials in Algeria expected to stiffen
rightist opposition there; civil "total
disobedience" reportedly being planned.
�Bolivian President claims he will hand
over presidency to vice president--a
leftist labor leader--if US economic aid
is not granted.
�Haiti- Student strike does not now
threaten regime; drastic police action,
however, could lead to widespread ri-
oting.
9Prk nk
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
25 November 1960
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-China: In apparent reply to the 21 November
People's Daily editorial which presented the familiar
Chinese arguments in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Pravda
on 23 November also editorialized on the declaration
which followed the meeting of bloc leaders in 1957. It
selected for emphasis, however, those aspects of the
declaration for example, on peaceful coexistence and
the preventability of war�which correspond to present
Soviet positions. This continuation of open discussion
between the Soviet and Chinese parties while interna-
tional Communist leaders are still meeting in Moscow
indicates that they have been unable to resolve their dis-
agreements and suggests that they have found it difficult
to formulate a communique which will satisfy both parties.
The moderate tone of the Pravda, editorial, however,
would appear to presage the probable nature of any com-
munique which may result�one placing heaviest empha-
sis on the majority Soviet view but so worded that the
Chinese can:sin it and continue to claim that their views
are valid. (Page 1)
rCommunist China - India: Relations between Peiping
crNew Delhi will be further exacerbated by several re-
ent incidents in which Indian soldiers were killed or wound
-
d on the Tibet-Sikkim border, allegedly by Chinese Corn-
unist snipers. Peiping has been pressing New Delhi for 6
ubstantive border negotiations, and it seems unlikely that
he incidents represent a premediated effort by Peiping to
precipitate new clashes with the Indians. Chinese troops
are in the area, however, probably attempting to check the
re-entry of Tibetan rebels gathered in Sikkim. New Delhi,
apprehensive about its defense position in Sikkim, has re-
_centiv_auemead alerted Indian troops in the area.7
(Page 3)
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North - South Vietnam:
the Communists were slow to react to the 11 No-
vember attempt against President Diem and still were not
clear on some details nine days later, the
Communists now hope to capitalize on the post- coup situa-
tion. recent North
Vietnamese directives, interpret the coup as symptomatic of
the difficulties besetting Diem and the resulting situation as
"very advantageous for us," call for political agitation to ex-
ploit dissension in the South, and repeat orders for political
assassination of "cruel individuals." In addition they directed
that help be given the escaping participants in the coup�some
of whom may still be at large�in the hope that they might be
useful in the Communist effort to create a united front of ele-
ments dedicated to ousting Diem.
(Page 4)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
*Laos: A mixed force of troops under the control of Sou=
a Phouma and the Pathet Lao, consisting of more than
six companies, is reported to be advancing along routes lead-
ing to Luang Prabang. One column evidently departed from
Muong Kassy on 23 November, followed by a larger force on
24 November. Luang Prabang is some 55 miles distant from
Muong Kassy, over difficult country, and an unopposed route
march might require about four days:I
mil=
itary headquarters in Savannakhet ordered the pro-Phoumi force 'ay'
in Luang Prabang to organize the perimeter defenses of the town,
including guerrilla activity in the surrounding vicinity. Also
Phoumi-controlled forces were ordered to commence pressure
operations against Vientiane.
Souvanna Phouma, while he denied to the American am-
bastador on 23 November that he had actually given an order
to attack Luang Prabang, has been active on other fronts. On
23 November he announced that within three or four days, the
Soviet Union would begin airlifting food and gasoline to Vientianej
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Evia Hanoi. On the same day, his government made a formal
request to the American ambassador in Vientiane that the
United States immediately cease all aid to General Phoumi's
Savannakhet regime. Souvanna has also continued his efforts
to persuade the King to convene a meeting of all factions in
Luang Prabang for a last try at forming a coalition govern-
ment. -1
Souvanna
is c nsidering either an appeal for UN intervention or the re-
turn of the International Control Commission if the United States
does not cease its support of Phoumi.
the UK, as co-chairman of
the 1954 Geneva truce conference, had previously objected to
the return of the ICC on the grounds that the Laotian Govern-
ment was opposed; if Souvanna should now reverse this posi-
tion, the UK might find it difficult to continue its opposition.
anoi and Peiping have seized on Vientiane's 16 November
sta ement that it would seek closer ties with Hanoi and Peiping.
North Vietnam on 19 November invited a Laotian delegation to
visit Hanoi and discuss "cooperation and mutual aid" proposals.
Souvanna Phourna's reply, released on 22 November by Vien-
tiane
agreed to "barter goods at our common frontier" but did not
respond to Hanoi's invitation to send a delegation. An official
Chinese Communist statement on 20 November "warmly wel-
comed" the Vientiane statement on improving relations and
said that Peiping "is Drenared to take corresponding measures
C,Thailand: Many coup rumors, of varying plausibility, are
again circulating in Bangkok. The possible participants in such
a move and their motivations are by no means clear. Premier
Sarit, however, is reliably reported to be considerably con-
cerned over the recent rash of reports and to be actively inves-
tigating them:
CirTAR: Syrian officials are displaiing an attitude of friend-
ly cooperation toward Americans unprecedented in recent years.
The Syrians appear to be taking their lead from Syrian Execu-
tive Council President Sarraj, whose recent show of warmth ks
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Cin marked contrast to his previously hostile, anti-US behavior.
-Sarraj, now apparently undisputed boss of Syria, has assumed
responsibility for reviving Syria's sagging economy and may be
counting heavily on American assistance:i
(Page 5)
III. THE WEST
France-Algeria: Rightist opposition to De Gaulle's Al-
gerian policy win probably be further consolidated by his ap-
pointment of the relatively liberal Louis Joxe as minister
of Algerian affairs, and the selection of Jean Morin as new
delegate general in Algeria. Morin is a tough administrator
apparently picked for his effectiveness in handling the prin-
cipal area of rightist concentration in France. [There are
Indications that the Front for French Algeria (AF) is plan-
ning "total disobedience" to paralyze all government services
nd force the army to take over in Algeria. /The government
Is alert to this possibility as well as to reported plans of Gen-
eral Salmi to return clandestinely to Algeria where FAF lead-
ers are said to expect him to lead such activities:-]
) (Page 6)
Ok
[Bolivia:
President Paz has told US Ambassador Strom on
22 november he may hand over the presidency "this week" to
Vice President Juan Lechin�Bolivia's leftist labor leader who
has often displayed an anti-US attitude�if US aid to meet press-
ing economic problems is not granted. Paz' difficulties are in-
tensified by a pronounced pro-Communist, leftist drift in recent
months, widespread labor and peasant unrest, serious vio-
lence in the Department of Cochabamba this month, and in-
creasing pressure on the bankrupt government to accept bloc
offers of aid. Strom believes that Paz' position is gravely
thregtened.-1 (Page 7)
me regime noes not appear immediately threatened ,
by the student strike that led it to impose martial law through- 0 out Haiti on 22 November. However, drastic police action
25 Nov 60
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against the students, likely should there be public demonstra-
tions, could cause a sudden swelling of antigovernment feel=
ing and even widespread rioting threatening the government.
President Duvalier's opponents are diverse and poorly organ-
ized, �but the President is unpopular, particularly in the
capital. The primary motivation for the strike is probably
resentment over the President's refusal to free a student lead-
er jailed without charges for some weeks.
(Page 8)
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Prospects for the Republic of Korea Over, the Next Few 11/9V
-
Years: Likely Future of Chang Government and Leftward
Trends, Economic Stability, and Foreign Policy, Especially
Toward the US and Japan,. Present and Future Status of Armed
Forces. NIE 42.1-2-60. 22 November 1960.
25 Nov 60
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Moscow and Peiping Reopen Public Dispute
In apparent reply to the 21 November People's Daily
editorial which presented the familiar Chinese arguments
in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Pravda on 23 November also
editorlialized on the declaration which followed the meet-
ing of bloc leaders in 1957. That declaration was issued
on 22 November, and the use both Peiping and Moscow are
making of the third anniversary of its appearance suggests
that their current discussions, like the talks in Bucharest
in June 1960, have taken them back to the 1957 manifesto
as the only possible basis for a new pronouncement which,
while making another ritualistic assertion of bloc unity,
will in fact register failure to make any progress toward
resolving the basic issues in dispute.
The 1957 manifesto was itself a compromise document,
carefully formulated to reflect differing views on the pol-
icies to be pursued by international Communism. The doc-
ument emphasized Soviet views, but it included Chinese ad-
ditions which made it possible for each party to claim that
the declaration upheld its own views.
Throughout the course of the controversy, the Chinese
have heavily stressed only those elements which corre-
spond to their positions, and the burden of the argument
presented in the most recent PsigkLeh Daily editorial seems
to be that the declaration remains valid and that they are
faithful to it. In a separate comment on the declaration,
the Albanian regime's major paper has added its voice in
support of the Chinese positions.
The Pravda editorial, in contrast, has selected for
emphasis those aspects of the declaration which elaborate
the Soviet positions, while acknowledging, in brief, some of
the views stressed by the Chinese. While maintaining that
the Soviet party regards the "Leninist principle of peaceful
coexistence" as the correct line for Communist foreign
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CONFIDENTIAL
policy, it adds that this does "not deny the struggle of
classes; does not mean the conciliation of socialism and
capitalism."
Emphasizing that war can now be prevented by the
strength of the "socialist" forces, the editorial notes that
"as long as imperialism exists. . . there will exist threats
to the cause of peace." Reiterating the conclusion of the
1957 declaration that the main danger to Communism is
"revisionism," the editorial nevertheless pointedly observes
that "dogmatism and sectarianism" could also represent a
"basic danger at individual stages of development of one
party or another."
Moscow's reply to the Chinese, then, while remaining
firm on the basic issues, treats the doctrinal difficulties
much as the 1957 declaration did. The continuation of
open discussion between the Soviet and Chinese parties
while the meetings in Moscow are still in progress indi-
cates that they have been unable to resolve their disagree-
ments and suggests that they have found it difficult to for-
mulate a communique which will satisfy both parties. The
moderate tone of the Pravda editorial, however, would ap-
pear to presage the probable nature of any communique
which may result�one placing the heaviest emphasis on
the majority Soviet view but so worded that the Chinese can
sien it and continue to claim that their views are valid.
CONFIDENTIAL
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4.16.1%.0 11.11JI
NINO'
Indian Troops Fired On in Tibet-Sikkim Boirder Area
At least nve incuan soicuers nave men wounded and sev-
er possibly killed in the border state of Sikkim during the
past two weeks by rifle fire which allegedly came from Chi-
nese snipers in Tibet. The firing may actually have come
from armed Tibetan rebels who were forced out of their coun-
try following the rebellion in 1958 and are now attempting to
re-enter it by of Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal.
Df ChinOse troops were, in fact, involved, they probably
were not acting on specific orders from Peiping to provoke
clashes with the Indians. The Chinese have lately gone to great
lengths in promoting their "peacefulness" to repair the damage
done to their Asian reputation by the Sino-Indian border clashes
of 1959. Chinese forces now on the Sikkim border are probably
interested primarily in preventing the re-entry of rebels into
Tibet:3
Qt is unlikely that the activities of the Chinese and Indian
teams, now in Rangoon drafting a final report to pinpoint the
border claims of both sides, will be affected by the new inci-
dents.j
t Rumors of increased activity opposite Sikkim and continu-
ing reports of sniping activity along the Sikkim-Tibet frontier
have caused India to augment its forces in the Sikkim-Darjeel-
ing area to more than three brigades and to order an alert
among all Indian forces in the vicinity.
�India's quick reaction to the events in Sikkim, which will
almost certainly further strain Sino-Indian relations, under-
scores New Delhi's concern over the defense of this strategic
border area. Should the reports of sniping activity continue, it
is likely that New Delhi will lift its current restriction on Indian
counterfire.i
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Vietnamese C-ni.puu.u.i.01.0 .1.1lJ1JV J.U11.11.1.161.1.�
Developmentswil gouth
Vietnamese Communists, at first slow to react to the up-
rising against President Diem on 11 November, apparently are
now acting on the orders of North Vietnam in the hope of ex-
ploiting the situation. Even though the Communists had no hand
in the coun and no sympathy for its objectives.
recommended that help be given to es-
caping members of the coup group. Communist cadres were told
to keep an eye open for escapees who could be useful in the effort
to form a united front of elements dedicated to ousting Diem.
the Communists were
still uncertain�nine days after the coup�just which South Viet-
namese military units had been involved and what had happened
to them.
the Communists were antagonized by
the anti-Communist statements made by the coup group and had no
sympathy for the plotters, despite their possible value in the Com-
munist drive to topple Diem.
In terms duplicating Hanoi's public statements,
the coup had failed because it was anti-
Communist and "did not rely on the people."
however, as symptomatic of the severe
difficulties besetting Diem and the resulting political situation as
"very advantageous for us." Proceeding from this point,
outlined a program of combined violence and political action
designed to culminate in a revolt more to Hanoi's liking. The ef-
forts of this program will be directed toward stimulating opposi-
tion against Diem's agrovilles, where large groups of South Viet-
namese farmers have been relocated for security reasons; ex-
horting peasants to demand an end to anti-Communist military
operations; and atterripting to subotrE, the Solitlr Viet-
namese Army. The guerrillas were told again to assassinate
"cruel individuals" who get in the way.
Although the Diem government is attempting to tone down the
more extreme demands of a quasi-official "People's Committee
against Rebels and Communists" for reprisals against the coup
instigators, Diem remains under pressure to crack down on his
political opponents. Any such campaign of repression would lead
to increased public dissatisfaction and play into Communist hands.
4,40.0.411w �
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Syrians Appear to/Be Seeking Improved Relations With US
tyhe American consul generai in Damascus has noted a
series of recent incidents indicating an official Syrian ef-
fort to improve the heretofore cool relations with the United
States. The effort has been most noticeable in Syrian deal-
ings with both private and official Americans on economic,
technical, and cultural matters. The Syrian director of
technical assistance, for example, recently stated that "the
opportunity for expanding American cooperation was un-
precedented," and representatives of American business
firms and other American visitors have remarked on the
favorable reception they have received.)
/Syrian Executive Council President Abd al-Hamid Sar-
raj startled American officials recently by his friendly at-
titude during the farewell call of the former American con-
sul. Sarraj had been considered perhaps the most ardently
anti-American member of the Nasir regime.
since achieving what appears to be near
absolute authority in Syria, following Nasir's cabinet re-
shuffle in September, &rraj has put on a new face and is
generally accepted by Syrian officials as the one who can
cut red tape and bring administrative order and effectivenesg
'--Sarraj's future may be tied to the Nasir regime's devel-
opi1nt program in Syria, for which foreign aid is indispen-
sable. Soviet bloc economic aid to the UAR has so far been
channeled to Egypt for the most part. Western and especial-
ly American assistance, long favored by lesser Syrian offi-
cials, now may be sought on a considerably larger scale:/
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De Gaulle Appointments May Add to Rightist Discontent
The appointment of Louis Joxe as minister of Algerian
affairs and Jean Morin as delegate general in Algeria will
probably further consolidate rightist opposition to De Gaulle's
Algerian policy. Joxe is a career civil servant with liberal
views who has been ambassador to both Bonn and Moscow
and, until his new appointment, was minister of education.
Considered completely loyal to De Gaulle, he will probably
have strong support from French political elements which
favor a liberal solution.
To replace the previous delegate general, Paul Delouvrier,
who was selected primarily for his ability as an economist and
manager, De Gaulle has seat� Algeria one of the ranking 1 civil
and police administrators in France. As superprefect of the
Toulouse region since mid-1958, Morin is experienced in deal-
ing with the heavy concentration of rightist elements in south-
west France--including the paratroop training camp at Pau.
Administratively, the personnel changes will strengthen
De Gaulle's hand prior to his visit to Algeria early next month
and to the national referendum on Algerian policy--now set
for the first two weeks of January. However, the changes
will also emphasize the gulf between De Gaulle and the right-
ists, will probably encourage them to close ranks, and may
occasion further rightist demonstrations.
LThere are indications that the Front for French Algeria
(FAF) is planning "total disobedience" in Algeria in the
immediate future. The civilian population will be encouraged
to ignore the curfew, to refuse to pay taxes, and--with the
cooperation of civil servants--to bring about a complete break-
down of postal, sanitary, electric, and police services in
order to force the army to take over supervision of these pub-
lic services.lahe delegate general's office is reportedly pre-
pared to requisition workers to maintain essential services.
The government also knows that FAF leaders expect General
Salan, the retired former commander in chief in Algeria
who has been criticizing De Gaulle's policies from Spain, to
return clandestinely and lead FAF activities.
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Nair
Bolivian President Threatens to Step Down
I �poiivian President Paz told Ambassador Strom on 22
November that he may hand over his office "this week" to
Vice President Juan Lechin�the leftist labor leader who
has often displayed anti-US attitudes�if US aid is not
granted to meet his pressing economic problems. Paz as-
serted that he himself opposed aid from the Communist
bloc, which was readily available, but that Lechin would
not hesitate to go "to the other side." Strom believes that
Paz' position is gravely threatened, especially by current
overdue government obligations, and that a credit of about
$5,000,000 would be required to support him through an
interim period. -1
-Paz' difficulties are complicated by a pronounced pro-
Communist, leftist trend in recent months�particularly
within the ruling Nationalist Revolutionary Movement party
--widespread labor and peasant unrest, and violence this
month in the Department of Cochabamba, leading to the
promulgation of a state of siege there on 19 November. Dem-
onstrations were conducted against Strom during his visit
to the city of Cochabamba on 14 November, and further anti-
US outbreaks are possible.)
Pressures are also mounting on the bankrupt adminis-
tration to accept bloc offers of aid, especially a Soviet offer
to build a tin smelter in Bolivia. The government announced
recently that a commercial mission would leave shortly for
Western Europe, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR to seek
credits for Comibol, the national mining corporation, and
Paz has indicated that it will also investigate a rumored
Soviet credit offer of $60,000,000 to Bolivia national petro-
leum agency. Czechoslovakia, the only bloc country with
which Bolivia exchanges diplomatic missions, has also been
discussing arrangements with Bolivia for supplying enuip-
ment and supplies to Comibol.
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NW/
Student Strike Prompts Martial Law in Haiti
The Duvalier government on 22 November imposed martial
law throughout Haiti as a reaction to the calling of a long-
threatened student strike which the government described as
politically motivated and Communist-controlled. The strike
is believed to have been touched off chiefly by resentment over
President Duvalier's refusal to free a student leader who has
been in jail without charges since 1 September. Leaders of
the principal student organization, which encompasses uni-
versity and high school students, are apparently sympathetic
to the Castro regime in nearby Cuba, and the possibility of
Cuban influence in the strike cannot be eliminated. Yesterday,
as the strike continued, the government ordered all schools
in the country closed until after Christmas and summarily
expelled from Haiti French-born Archbishop Poirier--who
was threatened with arrest last year when he critized the
regime--accusing him of giving $7,000 to aid the students.
There apparently is no immediate threat to the regime,
as the opposition is poorly organized and made up of diverse
elements. Businessmen and government employees yesterday
staged a demonstration in Port au Prince in support of Duvalier.
The President is generally unpopular, however, particularly
in the capital, and any drastic police action to break up student
demonstrations might lead to widespread rioting that could bring
the government down.
the student strike might spread to other groups in the capital
and said the students had been promised "of the
taxi drivers' and dockworkers' unions. an unidenti-
fied army officer had told the :studgnts tha o e army" is
opposed to the President. There is no evidence to support the
latter statement; loyal officers are believed to retain a tight
rein on the military, which has been cleverly manipulated into
rival elements which are unlikely to work in concert and no one
of which is believed capable of a successful move against the
President at this time.
CUS officials in Port au Prince, who commented on 23 No-
vember that the government was exhibiting an attitude of con-
fidence, also reported local speculation that the regime had
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deliberately encouraged the strike to provide pretext for ar-
resting political opponents and to try to convince the United
States that Haiti has a large Communist problem and will
require massive aid.
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LAANir iurav lA L
%el Nage
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03160576
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