CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/09/28

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03160573
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: September 28, 1960

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28 September 1960 3.3(h)(2),
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Copy No. C 73
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
IIEI LASS.
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28 SEPTEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Algeria--General Assembly almost cer-
tain to adopt resolution which goes beyond@
calling on parties to negotiate.
Buganda's demands for autonomy threaten
to delay independence for Uganda.
Congo--Army group suggests round-table
conference of political leaders.
Laos�Negotiations due to begin in Luang
Prabang on compromise government.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
28 September 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. AM-AFRICA
UN-Algeria: &he Algerian issue will probably provoke
"ot-az'ti-f
the most emotional debate--with the exception of the Congo--
at this session of the General Assembly. The strong drive
of the Algerian rebels' provisional government for a UN-con-
ducted referendum, France's announced refusal to participate
in the UN debates, and predominance of African and Asian
members sympathetic to Algeria's cause make it almost in-
evitable that this General Assembly will adopt a resolution
on Algeria. The resolution may go beyond a mere call for
negotiations among the parties. Meanwhile, rebel premier
Ferhat Abbas is reported to be en route to Peiping on his
first visit to a Sino- Soviet bloc country:I
(Page 1)
Uganda: thernands for autonomy by Buganda, the key prov-
ince of the British East African protectorate of Uganda, threaten
to embroil Uganda in a major political crisis and to set back
London's plans for constitutional reform leading toward Uganda's
early independence as a unified state. The Buganda provincial
government has declared its secession from Uganda and an-
nounced a policy of non-participation in protectorate elections
and legislative affairs. British authorities have stated clear-
ly that they will not permit secession, and they reportedly are
prepared to take strong action, including the removal of Bu-
ganda nrovincial cab.net ministers, to prevent it,
(Page 3) (Map)
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*Republic of the Congo: Pressure from elements of the
Congolese Army for the institution of civil government ap-
pears to be undermining the position of army chief Joseph
Mobutu. On 27 September, President Kasavubu accepted a
plan advanced by an army group for a round-table conference
of Congolese political leaders, including Lumumba and Ka-
tanga President Moise Tshombd. Lumumba quickly endorsed
the projected meeting, and announced that he had himself
invited various political leaders to the conference after an
army delegation had urged that the government "start function-
ing again." Although Mobutu has sporadically labored to bring
about a reconciliation between ICasavubu and Lumumba,, the
present effort appears to have been undertaken without his ex-
plicit concurrence.
Lumumba's remarks suggest that he views a round-table
conference as a means of reasserting his claim to the pre-
miership. Although anti- Lumumba spokesman Joseph Ileo,
In endorsing the conference, ruled out any re-establishment
of the Lumumba government, it is likely that under present
circumstances any successor to Mobutu's military govern-
mcAnt would he dominated by pro-Lumumba elements.
Laos: General Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum are due
to arrive in Luang Prabang on 28 September to Oegin consul-
tations with representatives of the Souvanna Phouma govern-
ment looking to a compromise agreement. Resolution of the
many points at issue between the two groups will be difficult,
and further meetings may well be necessary. Meanwhile,
Captain Kong Le remains in Vientiane, in a position to oppose
any solution not to his liking. Vientiane's action in dropping
what are believed to be token groups of paratroopers behind
Phoumi's lines in southern Laos could harden the attitude of the
Phourni - Boun Oum group even before the Luang Prabang
talks get under way. Preliminary reports of increased fight-
ing between the Pathet Lao and the Lao Army in Phong Saly
and Sam Neua provinces are too sketchy to permit an assess-
MOM' nf ita waluarifxr7
28 Sept 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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15th UN General Assembly Likely to Adopt Resolution
On Algeria
(With the exception of the Congo, the Algerian issue will
probably provoke the most emotional debate at this session
of the General Assembly. The 13 new African members--
although under strong French influence�are sympathetic to
the Algerians' cause and some have already expressed their
resentment of Paris' reported threat to break off aid if
French Community states vote against France on Algeria.
The strong drive of the Algerian rebel provisional govern-
ment to gain support for a UN-conducted referendum, plus
France's announced refusal to participate in the UN debate,
may lead many UN members to support a resolution which
goes beyond a mere call for negotiations among the parties
concerned.:,
�I Although France's allies at best hope for a mild resolu-
tion, the Afro-Asian bloc�taking advantage of the unusual
circumstances prevailing at this assembly�is likely to sub-
mit a draft resolution which not only incorporates the rebels'
aims but also condemns France. While such a strong reso-
lution probably would not gain the necessary two-thirds ma-
jority support, it is almost inevitable that this year's assem-
bly will adopt some type of a resolution on Algeria. Last
year's assembly failed by one vote to adopt a fairly mild
one which called for negotiations.
LTunisia, the spearhead at the UN for the Algerian issue,
is reported undecided whether to accept an alleged "offer" by
the Alerian rebels to form an Algerian-Tunisian federation.
According to the Turkish UN delegate, Tunis asserts that it
might have to accept the offer if the "Western world continues
to show a lack of interest in Tunisian problems." Tunisia
also reportedly believes that Algeria may soon be forced to
accept Chinese Communist help against French forces.
Atebel Premier Ferhat Abbas, heading a five-member
delegation, is reported to be en route to Peiping on his first!
SECRET
28 Sept 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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Now NS
Grisit to a Sino-Soviet bloc country. The decision of Abbas,
the outstanding pro-Western moderate among the rebel lead-
ers, to attend the Chinese Communist national day observance
on 1 October apparently is a pointed gesture designed to im-
press Western governments that the rebels are determined
to "accept aid whenever they can find
CFrench support of the UN has been steadily deteriorating
as the issues of Algeria and, more recently, French nuclear
testing have subjected France to increasingly hostile interna-
tional criticism. De Gaulle's slighting references to the UN
in. his 5 September press conference were probably designed
to condition the French public to defeat on the Algerian issue
this year. Paris can be expected to refuse to take cognizance
of any UN resolution, although protests will probably be forth-
coming to all allies of France which fail to vote against "out-
side interference" in the Algerian problem.)
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28 Sept 60
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
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Political Crisis Developing in Uganda
LThe renewed efforts of the traditional rulers of Buganda�
the key region of Uganda protectorate�to assure their polit-
ical future is creating a major colonial crisis for Britain. Lon-
don's efforts to push constitutional reform in Uganda may bog
down if the Buganda rulers are not persuaded to participate in
the protectorate's political life and abandon efforts to establish
an independent state within a weak Uganda federation.
L Discussions in London between Buganda and British offi-
cials deadlocked in mid-September when the Africans broke
off the talks because of dissatisfaction with London's promises
to safeguard their province's separate political identity. Pro-
vincial leaders, who have backing from three other tribal rulers
in Uganda, fear that the elections planned by Britain for next
February would undermine the royal regime in Buganda.-
On 21 September the provincial legislature denounced local
electoral registration and also opposed increasing the power of
the Uganda protectorate government to deal with intimidation of
the voters in any region. On 23 September the legislature voted
to terminate the Buganda agreement with Britain in effect de-
claring Buganda's secession from Uganda--and appointed a com-
mittee to set the date of independence.
Britain is expected to react sharply to these moves. The
second-ranking British official in Uganda expects a crisis and
believes it is better to have it quickly before the rest of the
protectorate becomes further involved. He has hinted that the
government will use its reserve powers to remove Buganda
ministers. On 26 September he publicly announced that Lon-
don would not permit Buganda to change the basic protectorate
agreements unilaterally, would not recognize any secession so
long as Britain governs Uganda, and would not consider any
constitutional change at this time
CONFIDENTIAL
28 Sept 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
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IAL
NW�11
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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