CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/09/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03160568
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: September 10, 1960

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10 September
Copy No, C 73
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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10 SEPTEMBER 1960
Watch Committee conclusions on Jor-
danian situation.
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Ulbricht implies further steps to be tak-
en against West German ties to West
Berlin.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Guinea obtains Soviet commitment of aid
for large hydroelectric project.
Shah said to be convinced further partici-
pation in CENTO is useless.
General Phoumi claims he is about to be-
gin "revolution" against government. Q.)
France to recognize independence of
Senegal on 11 September; later will pro-
pose admission to UN.
LATE ITEM
Situation in Congo.
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SPECIAL ITEM
cAt a special meeting of the Watch Committee on 9 Sep-
tem er 1960, the following conclusion was reached concern-
ing the Jordan UAR situation:
There is a likelihood that a coup, initiated by Syrians and
supported by Jordan, will be attempted against the UAR rule in
Syria in the next few days with the support of some disaffected
Syrian military elements. The prospects for the success of the
coup are not good in view of the Egyptian dominance of the First
Army, the efficiency of Syrian counter-intelligence and the alert-
ness of the Syrian security forces. The attempt itself would seri-
ously aggravate� tensions between Jordan and the UAR; an initial
success could well bring intervention by Jordanian forces in an
effort to protect the coup from UAR counteraction. The failure
of the coup after overt Jordanian military intervention could cre-
ate an intolerable situation for Husayn which the UAR could ex-
ploit to bring about his overthrow. UAR military intervention
against Husayn in Jordan would bring in Israel to avert the pros-
pect of a UAR-dominated Jordan. A major international crisis
would spring out of such a melee.
(Page 1) t
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
10 September 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Berlin: Ulbricht's speech of 8 September is designed to
define East German as well as Soviet policies toward West
Berlin by spelling out the limitations of Khrushchev's commit- citt,b...te-2
ment to maintain the status quo until "next spring." He warned ip
that this should not be interpreted to mean that the West had
been given a free hand to stage "provocations" and implied that
further measures against West German ties to West Berlin
would be taken. Ulbricht also proposed that the US consider
a phased disarmament plan for Germany, including conclusion
of a peace treaty at the end of the first phase in 1961. In another
effort to assert the regime's claims to sovereignty, he proposed
that East German representatives be permitted to address the
UN General Assembly meeting. (Page 3)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Guinea-Bloc: Guinea's economic ties with the USSR have ap-
parently been strengthened by agreements reached during Pres-
ident Toure's recent talks with Soviet leaders in Moscow. The
joint communique issued on 8 September announces that Moscow
has agreed to participate in the construction of the extensive
Konkour4 hydroelectric project, Guinea's highest priority devel-
opment scheme. Soviet participation presumably will involve ex-
tension of additional credits to Guinea. A new trade agreement,
covering the years 1961=1965, also was signed while Toure was
in Moscow, his first stop on a month-long trip which ill also in-
clude state visits to Ulan Bator, Peiping, and Hanoi.
(Page 5)
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Iran:
FJ
V.
the Shah is "in a very depressed
mood over trans's military situation and is convinced that
further participation in CENTO is useless. He may decide
to withdraw from CENTO and fall back entirely on the Irani-
an-US bilateral pact. Although the Shah's unhappiness at the
level of American aid and CENTO's inactivity is chronic, it
might be sufficiently intensified at this time by continuing So-
viet pressure, the election crisis, and the consequent upsurge
In opposition political activity to convince him that Iran should
i hdraw from CENTO.
(Page 6) ;
*Laos: Meneral Phoumi
he planned to start a revolu-
tion" on 10 September. The details of his plans were not
revealed, but he will apparently not go through with a previ-
ously mooted plan to set up a rival kingdom in southern Laos.
Phoumi's most likely course is the revival of plans to march
on Vientiane. The success of such a venture would depend on
the degree of support he still enjoys in the army, which is al-
most certainly considerably less than it was before the com-
promise agreement which led to the formation of the Souvanna
Phouma government on 30 August.
Phoumi was unswayed by the new concessions offered by
Souvanna through a delegation of army officers Souvanna sent
to Savannakhet on 9 September. Phoumi also stated that it
would be a waste of time for representatives of US Ambassador
Brown to come to Savannakhet to persuade him to return to
Vientiane. Whatever the ultimate chances of success for Phoumi's
"revolution," his apparent final refusal to cooperate with Souvanna
will have the immediate effect of seriously weakening the premier's
position in the forthcoming neace talks with the Communist Pathet
Lao. increased Pathet Lao guerrilla
activity in four different areas of northern Laos, which presumably
represents an effort by the insurgents to strengthen their position
In the negotiations.
10 Sept 60
DAILY BRIEF
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(France-Mali: France plans to recognize Senegal as an in-
dependent country on 11 September and thereafter to propose
Its admission to the UN, even though Paris anticipates that such
formal acknowledgment of the breakup of the Mali Federation
will create difficulties both in Africa and in the UN. As far as
tA-PA6
Soudan is concerned, France believes its recognition of Mali
covers that country and plans no special action. The Soudanese
members of the Mali Government, who have proclaimed Bamako
the capital of the federation as well as of Soudan, appear deter-
mined to implement their threat to break off relations with any
nation recognizing Senegal's independence and have already moved
to terminate some French activities in Soudan. In addition, spe-
cial representatives have been sent to New York to push the
Soudanese position at the UN, and another Mali envoy was sched-
uled to depart for Moscow on 9 September.
LATE ITEM
Congo: UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, in a blunt speech
to the UN Security Council in which he stated that Kasavubu had the
constitutional right to fire Lumumba, affirmed his intention to keep
UN forces in the Congo and stated in effect that the UN must govern the
ongo until such time as a legal and responsible government is estab-
ished. Meanwhile, the Tunisian UN delegate is trying to round up
upport, particularly from African states, for a resolution�drafted
by Hammarskjold�which would authorize the secretary general to
take any necessary action to restore law and order in the Congo.
Action on the resolution is expected when the Security Council re-
convenes in the afternoon of 10 September.
In Leopoldville Premier Lumumba has strengthened his control
following his unexpected success in winning both Chamber and Senate
approval, and the American ambassador is concerned that it will be
very difficult for the UN to move against him. The ambassador be-
lieves that all attempts to rally moderates to oppose the premier
depend on disarming the Force Publique.
10 Sept 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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Further difficulties for the United Nations are likely to arise
with President Tshombe of Katanga. On 9 September he defied
UN control of three airfields, including that at Elisabethville, to
send several small planes to the northern part of ICatanga where
an invasion by Pro-Lumumba forces from Kivu was reported in
progress.
The five Soviet AN42 cargo planes which landed at Carlo
on 2 September enroute to the Congo, presumably with supplies
for the Lumumba regime, apparently have been ordered to return
to the USSR.
10 Sept 60
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(Preparations for Jordanian-Supported Coup Attempt
1,_In Syria (as of 1700, 9 September 1960)
Since mid-July King Husayn has been in contact with a
group of Syrian conspirators who have been planning a coup
to overthrow UAR rule and set up an independent Syrian gov-
ernment. They claim to have the support of key Syrian Army
elements, including the Qatana garrison near Damascus, as
well as the backing of several prominent Syrian politicians who
were former ministers in the UAR Government of the Syrian
region.
Following the assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister
Majalli on 29 August--which King Husayn is convinced was di-
rected by the UAR--the King urged the plotters to act as soon
as possible. He has provided them with substantial sums of
money and has promised direct military support if they should
be initially successful and the UAR Government takes military
counteraction against them.
The King now has received word that the conspirators in-
tend to launch their planned coup this week end. Some Jordani-
an military units have been repositioned and others alerted in
order either to provide quick military support if the King decides
that is necessary, or defend if the UAR reacts militarily against
Jordan.
Despite general political and economic conditions in Syria
favorable to the coup planners, their chances of success do not
appear. good. The efficient UAR security and counterintelligence
organizations in Syria have long been aware of the danger of dis-
affection and plotting among Syrian Army officers, and sporadic
arrests and discharges have taken place. These security organs
have probably stepped up their efforts in view of the increased
tension between Jordan and the UAR following the assassination
of Majalli. Syrian military strength near the Jordanian border
was increased at that time, and UAR authorities are aware of the
recent movement of Jordanian armor, close to the border.
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It is possible that the UAR security, apparatus already has
the conspirators under close scrutiny and is planning to crack
down in a way which will demonstrate Husayn's involvement in
subversive activity against the LIAR. It is even possible that the
conspiracy is really a provocation aimed at trapping Husayn.
Such UAR action in implicating Husayn would further increase
tensions between the two countries, and Nasir might use the oc-
casion as justification for sanctioning an attempt to assassinate
the King. Cairo's propaganda, which claims that Husayn is a
stooge of the British and Americans, would probably accuse the
Western powers of being behind the coup.
Should the coup be successful initially or should Jordan in-
tervene militarily in Syria, the danger of broader hostilities in
the area would be acute. This would be especially true if coun-
terattacking UAR troops moved into Jordanian territory; in that
case, Israel would be almost certain to take military action rather
than run the risk of seeing the creation of a Nasir-controlled Jor-
dan. Israeli armed forces have maintained a very close watch on
the Jordanian situation following the assassination of Majalli; the
Israeli Government undoubtedly is considering the possibilit of
intervening should Husayn show signs of losing out.
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Ulbricht Unveils East German Plan for Berlin and Germany
In presenting to the Council of Ministers his regime's
memorandum to the United Nations concerning German dis-
armament, East German party boss Ulbricht on 8 September
undertook to define East German policy toward Berlin and
Germany. He warned that Khrushchev's pledge--made after
the breakup of the summit meeting in May�not to carry out
before next spring unilateral measures concerning Berlin,
such as the signature of a separate peace treaty with East
Germany, does not mean that West German and West Berlin
elements are permitted to "aggravate the anomalous situa-
tion in West Berlin." He intimated that East Germany will
take further measures to weaken West German ties with West
Berlin. Ulbricht's speech was published following the regime's
announcement that restrictions, apparently permanent, are
being placed on the entry of West Germans to East Berlin.
The proposal for a phased disarmament of Germany--
evidently intended to back up Khrushchev's over-all proposals
at the UN--is designed to present the Ulbricht regime in a
posture of reasonableness and perhaps to provide further justi-
fication for a possible future move to sign a separate East Ger-
man - Soviet treaty. The main new point in the current East
German proposals, which sum up various past plans, is the
provision for signature of a peace treaty with the "two German
states" and transformation of West Berlin into a demilitarized
free city at the expiration of the first phase in 1961.
Ulbricht also revealed that his regime is addressing a letter
to Secretary General Hammarskjold requesting permission for
East German representatives to present their views at the UN
General Assembly. This request is intended to enhance East
German claims to sovereignty and equality with West Germany--
which, although not a member of the UN, maintains a perma-
nent observer delegation in New York.
Olbricht
returned from his six-week v cation in the USSR highly satisfied
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with his discussions with Khrushchev,
Khrushchev agreect to
sign a separate peace treaty with the East Germans�without set-
ting any date. He specified that they were not to interfere with
Allied access to West Berlin, presumably at the outset, although
apparently they were given a free hand with the West Germans.
Both officials forecast further pressures against the
The recent East German measures to tie East Berlin more
closely, to East Germany, by giving the sector border the char-
acter of an international frontier in defiance of four-power agree-
ments guaranteeing freedom of movement in the city, probably
are motivated in part by the regime's desire to take additional
steps to stem the refugee flow to West Berlin. Despite the sharp-
ly intensified security measures imposed last week end, more
than 3,000 East Germans and East Berliners escaped to the West-
ern sectors of Berlin in the week ending 6 September. More
than 126,000 East Germans have fled to West Germany and West
Barlin_so_far_this_vear.Anc u iAugust.
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Guinea Forging New Economic Ties With Sino-Soviet Bloc
Guinea's economic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc apparently,
will become still stronger as a result of President Sekou Toure's
visit to several bloc countries. According to the joint commu-
nique released on 3 September upon the conclusion of Toure's
two-day stay in Moscow, the USSR has agreed to participate in
the construction of the proposed Konkoure River hydroelectric
dam, Guinea's highest priority development project. The
project, which is similar to Ghana's Volta River scheme, en-
visages the establishment of an aluminum industry in Guinea
where there are large bauxite deposits, some of which are al-
ready being exploited by Western interests.
Although the extent of the Soviet commitment to the Konkoure
project was not announced, Moscow presumably will make addi-
tional long-term credits available to Conakry. The USSR's pres-
ent economic aid program in Guinea is covered by a $35,000,000
credit extended in August 1959.
A new Soviet-Guinean trade pact for the years 1961-1965
also was concluded while Toure was in Moscow, his first stop
in a month-long trip which will include state visits to Ulan Bator,
Peiping, and Hanoi. Such agreements, which Guinea has con-
cluded with a number of European bloc countries since 1958, are
resulting in the diversion of the bulk of Guinea's foreign trade
from the French franc zone to the bloc. This trade with the bloc
Is based largely on barter arrangements which are mortgaging
future as well as current Guinean export products, especially ba-
nanas.
Meanwhile, there is some circumstantial evidence
indicating that a Soviet vessel, the Firyuza,
now en route to Conakry is carrying a cargo of military items, pos-
sibly arms, loaded at Nikolaev in late August. In July a Polish
delegation believed to be on an arms-selling mission visited Con-
akry. Guinea has received at least two and possibly more ship-
ments of arms from Czechoslovakia since early 1959.
--SE-eRE-T
CE
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Shah Considering Withdrawing Iran From CENTO
The Shah,
is considering withdrawing Iran from
the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and relying on the
bilateral defense agreement with the United States for mili-
tary security.
The Shah, who again is in a depressed mood regarding the
level of US military aid and domestic budget problems, is said
to believe that Iran's participation in CENTO is leading the
country into greater military expenditures than it can afford.
He is discouraged over Turkey's exclusive reliance on NATO
for its defense and over lack of progress toward a CENTO com-
mand structure, of which he hoped to become commander in
chief.
The Shah is also reported disturbed by what he regards as
the lack of coordination between CENTO and the American mili-
tary mission in Iran. He believes this to be a further indication
that the United States considers CENTO of no importance. Heda-
yat claims that if Iran attends the CENTO Ministerial Council
meeting in Ankara in February,, it will probably be for the last
time.
The Shah for years has had periods of discouragement with
what he regards as the lack of material and moral support from
his allies. At present, however, he is in the middle of a crisis
over election scandals and faces the problem of how to hold new
elections that give the appearance of being free but are sufficient-
ly controlled to assure an obedient parliament. Domestic opposi-
tion elements, realizing his vulnerability, are taking full advan-
tage.
At the same time, the USSR is continuing to offer economic
aid in exchange for a written guarantee that no foreign bases
will be permitted on Iranian soil. Withdrawal from CENTO
would lighten Iran's financial burden and lessen the pressure on
the Shah from both the Soviet Union and neutralist-inclined pol-
iticians within Iran.
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aituation in Laos
General Phoumi
planned to start "a revolution" on 10 Septem-
ber. Phoumi was vague as to the precise nature of his revolution
but indicated that he was not planning to go through with a previous
scheme he had been considering of setting up a rival kingdom in
southern Laos. His most likely course of action would be the revival
of his plan to march on Vientiane. His chances of success in any
such venture would depend on the degree of support he still enjoys
in the Lao army, which is almost certainly considerably less than
It was before the Luang Prabang compromise agreement which led
to the formation of the Souvanna Phouma government on 30 August.
Phoumi stated that the first step in setting his revolution in
motion had been to blow up the bridges around Pakse, to the south
of Savannakhet. This may suggest that Phoumi has no confidence
that the Fourth Military Region commander, whose headquarters
are at Pakse, will support him.
Even while Phoumi was revealing his intent to resume overt
opposition to Souvanna and Captain Kong Le, a delegation of army
officers was in Savannakhet bearing Souvanna's "final" offer in his
repeated efforts to induce Phoumi to return to Vientiane to take up
his duties as deputy premier and interior minister. The delegation
was armed with what seemed to be adequate assurances to Phoumi
that he could safely return to Vientiane, but Phoumi is described
as having a fixed idea that Souvanna wanted to kill him. Phoumi
also told the American observer that it would be a waste of time for
representatives of US Ambassador Brown to come to Savannakhet.
He stated that he "will never go to Vientiane. As it is no�w I would
rather live in Bangkok."
Whatever Phoumi's chances are for ultimate success in his
revolution, it will have the immediate effect of seriously weakening
Souvanna's position in the forthcoming peace talks with the Pathet
Lao insurgents. Former_Premi
considered it essential for Phoumi to return in order to strengthen
Souvanna's position in the forthcoming negotiations with the Pathet
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ao. Somsanith is of the opinion that Souvanna learned how to
deal with the Pathet Lao from his experiences in 1957 and 1958,
but that without Phoumits presence the premier might weaken and
concede too much. Both Souvanna and Somsanith have stated that
a major role for Phoumi had been envisaged in the talks with the
Pathet Lao.
There are growing indications that the Pathet Lao is accel-
erating its guerrilla operations in an apparent effort to strength-
en its bargaining position. in-
creased insurgent pressure in four widely separated areas in
northern Laos. The most seriously f-ff
fected sector appears to be northern Sam Neua Province.
7
concern with which
the Sam Neua commander views his position.
he expressed the fear that Sam Neua town itself, with its air-
field, might fall unless reinforcements were urgently dispatched.
He may have overreacted to sketchy reports from his widely
dispersed patrols; however, the area of his responsibility is
vulnerable to enemy attack and was the scene of the major fight-
Initial Pathet Lao uprising of last summer.
The crisis in Laos continued to have repercussions among
Laos' neighbors. Thai Premier Sarit is reliably reported to be
deeply disturbed over what he considers the failure of the United
States to give adequate support to his nephew, Phoumi, who
epitomizes the same strongly anti-Communist position in Laos
that Sarit represents in Thailand. Sarit
and his government were
taking a new look at their relations with the United States in view
of what he terms American "mishandling and inaction" in the
Laotian crisis. Sarit's influence may be an important factor be-
hind Phoumi's decision on remaining in Savannakhet. South
Vietnamese leaders are alsn critical of US actions in Laos.
Meanwhile, Cambodian chief of state Prince Sihanouk,
has
offered Phnom Penh as a neutral meeting place for Souvanna and
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firince Souphannouvone. leader of the Pathet Lao and Neo Lao
Hak Sat. Sihanouk, who feels that the
Laos iLaos has created a dangerous political vacuum in South-
east Asia, is seriously considering proposing a Lao-Khmer con-
federation as a means of developing a neutral zone between China
and North Vietnam on the one hand and the Western-nrientpri entin-
tries tnitharea on the other.
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Congo Situation
UN Secretary General Hammarskjold told the Security
Council on 10 September that the UN must control the Congo
until a responsible government is in power. He implied that
the UN has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of a
country when conflict in that country threatens international
peace. Hammarskjold intends to ask the council for authoriza-
tion to use any action necessary to restore law and order in the
Congo. The Tunisian UN delegate, meanwhile, is attempting
to round up support, particularly among the African states,
for a resolution�drafted by Hammarskjold--which would give
the secretary general this authorization. The council is ex-
pected to act upon this draft resolution when it reconvenes the
afternoon of 10 September. The council earlier had defeated
a Soviet proposal to have the council meet in Leopoldville.
In Leopoldville Premier Lumumba has strengthened his
control following a demagogic speech to the Senate in which
he repeated his previous success with the Chamber of Deputies
in winning over hostile legislative bodies by a vitriolic attack
on the United Nations. The American ambassador is concerned
that it will be very difficult for the UN to move against Lumumba
who can claim both houses of the Assembly back him against
Kasavubu and his supporters. Disarming of the Force Publique
will be much harder to justify, and continuance of UN control of
airfields and radio station even more difficult. The ambassador
believes that all attempts to rally moderates to oppose Lumumba
depend on disarming and control of the Force Publique and
police, and if this is not soon accomplished Lumumba will be
able to consolidate his dictatorship rapidly.
Lumumba publicized an order given earlier to his soldiers
stating that he, not President Kasavubu, was commander in chief
since Kasavubu had been removed from office. He also announced
that he had become chief of state, and that three pro-Kasavubu
ministers had been dismissed--Foreign Minister Bomboko, Minister
to Belgium Delvaux, and Finance Minister Nkayi. Despite the se
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pronouncements and the assembly's rejection of ICasavubu's dis-
missal of Lumumba, Joseph Ileo�ICasavubu's selection for pre-
mier�reportedly was attempting to form a new government which
he proposed to submit for legislative ratification next week.
The premier received some international backing in his dispute
with the UN when the leaders of Guinea's 750 man force in the Congo
asked Sekou Toure to withdraw them from the UN force and leave
them free to join Lumumba's forces.
An incursion of a unit of Lumumba's forces in Kivu province--
estimated to total about 300 men--across the river at the boundary
between Kivu and Katanga on 9 September has aroused fears in
Katanga that Lumumba's long heralded invasion was taking place.
In this area around Kongolo President Tshombe of Katanga is not
popular with the tribes, and a Lumumba attack might receive
popular support there. Such an attack would also avoid Katanga's
main defenses which are further west along the Kasai frontier
and in the vicinity of the big air base at ICamina.
Tshombe's efforts to airlift troops to northern Katanga have
been handicapped by UN control of the airport at Elisabet hville.
Armed Katanga troops, including Belgian officers, however, forced
the UN command to allow two planes to take off from the airport,
although a later effort to take off men and supplies in a DC-3 was
prevented by UN personnel. Both the UN command and the Katanga
Government have protested these incidents. The UN command has
given orders for the Swedish troops to "stand firm." The Katangan
Government has expected the main Lumumba attack to be from Kasai
along the railroad via Kamina, but Lumumba's forces there are still
tied up battling secessionists around Bakwanga. Katanga has about
1,100 gendarmes with 30 Belgian officers and 1,800 police with 40
Belgian officers to oppose the invasions. These groups a
relatively well armed hut ninny nprsonnel lack training.
TOP SECRET
10 Sept 60 CFMTDAI im-rri I inFkirF RI III FTIN Page 11
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- UI" 3CUKL, 1
Niue
(The five Soviet AN42 cargo planes which landed at Cairo
on 2 September enroute to the Congo presumably with supplies
for the Lumumba regime apparently have been ordered to re-
turn to the USSR. The fact that these large military transports
did not complete their scheduled flight to the Congo probably is
in part the result of the UN takeover of the Congo's major air-
fields. The unexpected return to the USSR of the AN-12's tends
to confirm previous indications that the aircrafts were carrying
arms and may have been intended for use in Lumumba's military
operations against the secessionists.'
TOP SECRET
10 Sept 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 12
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03160568
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03160568
CUNHL)LI'II!AL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03160568
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