CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/08/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03160560
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: August 2, 1960

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2 August 1960
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
7 3
TELLIGENCE
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NEV. JEW DATE: OM.O. �
AWN! MR 101
9 JUN 1980
DATE: NEVIEWER:
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2 AUGUST 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Ghana apparently ready to negotiate Soviet
economic aid offer.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Possibility of uprisings in Angola.
Tapline may halt crude-oil deliveries
to Syria tomorrow; Syrians demanding
higher transit revenues.
Yemen--Imam, under increasing influ-
ence of pro-bloc advisers, raising ob-
stacles ainst US-financed road devel-
opment.
Libyan King may shake up cabinet.
General Norstad impressed by revolu-
tionary zeal and vigor of new Turkish
regime.
III. THE WEST
Britain keeping door open to eventual
membership in Common Market.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN ,,;;
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2 August 1960
DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Ghana-USSR:LIkrumah appears ready to negotiate a de-
tailed Soviet offer of large-scale technical and economic as-
sistance. Four senior Ghanaian representatives have gone to
Moscow to discuss the offer, which was made in June. The
Soviet proposal, which includes a credit to Ghana, possibly
amounting to $280,000,000, was reportedly accepted "in prin-
ciple" by the Ghanaian cabinet last month. Nkrumah is deter-
mined to implement various prestige and development projects
for which Ghana's own resources are inadequate, and he is con-
fident that he can contain bloc influence in Ghana:\
(Page 1)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Angola:Aingolan police authorities reportedly have dis-
covered a ca' he of machine guns and rifles in the Cabinda
area north of the Congo River. Information, as yet uncon-
firmed, suggests that the arms were for use in a local upris-
ing sometime this month, possibly by the pro-Communist
Revolutionary Front for the Independence of the Portuguese
Coloniesa
The possibility of imminent nationalist disorders in An-
gola is also raised
the anti-Communist Union of the
Peoples of Angola planned in the near future to launch "posi-
tive action" against the Portuguese in Angola, operating from
a base in the Congo. (Page 3) (Map)
UAR-Tapline: {-The dispute between the UAR and the Trans-
Arabian Pipeline Company (Tapline) over Syrian demands for ,i/o
sharply increased oil transit revenues may come to a head ill�
Tapline halts crude-oil deliveries to Syria's Communist-built J.
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aefinery on 3 August as scheduled. Company officials are con-
t/ vinced they must not accede to the Syrian demands despite the
0 risk that Nasir may retaliate and shut down the entire pipeline,
; which normally delivers daily about 460,000 barrels of Saudi
� crude oil to Sidon in Lebanon. Tapline is conducting eleventh
hour negotiations with Syrian officials, but prospects for a solu-
tion appear slightl
x emen. inew ub-nnancea roaa aeveiopment project is en-
dangel�W-Ey new obstacles raised by the Imam, who seems to
be falliniz further under the influence nf wrnalnrnmiini sato
the -ip
"American road project is being torn to pieces" by "destruction-
ists" who have the ear of the Imam, and that continuation of the
present trend will lead to "absolute failure" of the US project,
(Page 4)
Libya: King Idris may soon make substantial changes in the
Libyan cabinet, although no major foreign policy shift seems likely. 62
Prime Minister Kubar, who has held his post since May 1957, has
become increasingly frustrated by the King's refusal to delegate to
him sufficient power to run the government effectively Kubar is
reported to have sulbmitted his resignation. (Page 5)
Turkey: eaders of Turkey's provisional regime, in conversa-
tions on 25 July with General Norstad, impressed him with what he
termed their revolutionary zeal and vigor. General Gursel, in dis-
cussing the proposed forced military retirement program, said he
believed the plan could be put on a voluntary basis if modest pen-
sions were available. The Turkish leaders made no suggestion to
Norstad that they might feel forced to seek the necessary funds for
the retirement program from non-Western sources-i
III. THE WEST
) Britain: the Macmillan rus
overnment has not closed the door to seeking eventual membership
2 Aug 60
DAILY BRIEF
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Cin the Common Market. Influential sectors of the British press
and some members of Parliament have demanded a reassessment
of British policies to avoid isolation from the Continent. While
no early move is likely, the subject will probably be discussed
when Macmillan meets Adenauer in Bonn on 10 August.
(Page 6)
2 Aug 60
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in the Common Market. Influential sectors of the British press
and some members of Parliament have demanded a reassessment
of British policies to avoid isolation from the Contihent. While
no early move is likely, the subject will probably be discussed
when Macmillan meets Adenauer in Bonn on 10 August.
(Page 6)
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Ghana Repor ed Negotiating Large-Scale Soviet Aid
Ghana's President Nkrumah appears ready to negotiate de-
tails of large-scaiL technical
the Soviet bloc.
Nkrumah on 20 July approved for limited distribution a policy
paper which in effect advocated acceptance of such aid. The
paper, prepared by Ghana's ambassador in Moscow, expressed
the conviction that the USSR is sincerely trying to help Afri-
can states maintain a neutral position between East and West
and that acceptance of technical and economic assistance from
the bloc would not jeopardize Ghana's policy of neutralism. On
27 July three senior representatives of the Nkrumah regime de-
parted for Moscow, where they were to be joined by the chair-
man of Ghana's Industrial Development Corporation, Ayeh-
Kumi, who is a key figure in both the formulation and execu-
tion of Ghana's development program.
While the purpose of the Ghanaians' trip to the USSR has
not been made public, (heir
mission is to undertake detailed discussions based on a draft
assistance agreement offered by the USSR in June and accepted
"in principle" by the Ghanaian cabinet last month. The Soviet
proposal includes a credit to Ghana, possibly amounting to $280,-
000,000, and provides for a mixture of economically sound under-
takings together with a number of projects designed to achieve
immediate propaganda effect. The USSR would deliver equip-
ment and materials and also furnish technical aid for some 28
different projects. Not included among these, apparently, is the
Volta River hydroelectric-aluminum project in which Moscow re-
portedly also expressed an interest last June.
Nkrumah has been cautious in his dealings with the bloc
since Ghana became independent in 1957 and has repeatedly ex-
pressed a preference for Western aid�especially in connection
with the Volta project, for which Western financing now appears
likely. However, his determination to implement rapidly a wide
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(and costly variety of prestige and development programs has
caused him to become more interested in possible bloc aid.
He reportedly stated last month that Soviet economic and
technical assistance would not result in any change in the
political policies of Ghana or any other African state.
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2 Aug 60
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Nationalist Uk...ost in Angola
EPolice authorities in Angola have discovered a cache of
arms including 18 machine guns and over 300 rifles in the en-
clave of Cabinda north of the Congo River
suggests that the arms were to have been used in
an uprising sometime in August. Portuguese officials suspect
that the pro-Communist Revolutionary Front for the Independence
of the Portuguese Colonies (FRAIN) may have been responsible7
Portuguese officials have been particularly concerned about
security in Angola since the outbreak of disorders in the Congo.
the local military command-
er asked that parachute troops and an army battalion be sent im-
mediately from Portugal to strengthen the 9,150-man force in An-
gola. the governor general expressed his
fear that arms from the Congo would be smuggled across the bor-
der. the Angolan natives were being stimulated
by events in the Congo and that African troops might not be loyal
in the future. E0 n 3 June, 12 Angolan natives reportedly were ar-
rested as they attempted to cross into the Congo. They carried
ocuments containing plans of military installations in Cabinda
d information on Portuguese military units in Angola
The Portuguese apparently believe that FRAIN �which has
been based at Conakry--is leading the nationalist movement, but
the non-Com-
munist Union of the Peoples of Angola (UPA), led by Jose Gilmore,
is of more importance. Guinean Pres-
ident Sekou Toure plans to drop his sponsorship of FRAIN and to
back the Accra-based UPA. The UPA reportedly plans in the near
future to launch "positive action" against the Portuguese in Angola.
Gilmore, who has represented Angola at several African regional
meetings, is on the steering committee of the All-African People's
Conference. The committee, several months ago, designated 3
August as a "Day of Solidarity" for the people of Portuguese and
Spanish Africa to be observed throughout Africa.
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US Road Project in Yemen Endangered
Imam Ahmad of Yemen, under the influence of anti-Western
and pro-Communist bloc advisers, is posing obstacles to the con-
struction of the US-financed road from Mocha to Taiz and Sana. The
Imam has objected to aerial photography of the route, pointing out
that the "Chinese do the work on the ground." Also, he is critical of
plans to erect buildings for the American engineers and believes
they should live in tents, despite freezing winters in the Yemeni
highlands and tropical temperatures in summer along the coast.
Preparations for constructing the Taiz camp have been suspended,
although those at Mocha are proceeding.
Pro-Western Yemeni officials and the US Legation state that
"powerful anti-Western elements" are steadily at work on the Imam,
imputing to the US the worst possible motives. They have charged
US-British collaboration in plots against Yemen and insincerity re-
garding the road project. Any delays in implementing the project
will work to their advantage and that of their Russian and Chinese
supporters. Although the majority of Yemenis are believed to be
pro-American, the Imam has lost his sense of political perspective
and apparently is unaware of the Communist menace. The combina-
tion of Communist-supported opportunists and reactionary leaders
of the "back to the thirteenth century" moveme t =maim tikbeLirkithe
ascendancy over the Imam at the present time.
the "American road project is being torn to pieces" by "destruction-
ists" who have the car of the Imam and that continuation of the Pres-
ent trend will lead to "absolute failure" of the project.
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Changes Likely in Libyan Cabinet
King Idris may soon replace Prime Minister Kubar and
other cabinet members, although no significant policy shift
seems likely. Kubar, who also serves as foreign minister,
has been prime minister since May 1957, continuing in that
post through two major ministerial shake-ups. He has been
essentially pro-Western, though a tough and persistent ne-
gotiator on the amount and type of US and British aid to Libya.
In the last few months he has been increasingly frustrated
by the King's refusal to delegate to him sufficient power to run
the government effectively. Certain of the King's palace ad-
visers have sought to undermine Kubar whenever they could,
and the provincial governors, responsible directly to Idris,
have exercised authority in matters which clearly belong
within the federal government's jurisdiction. Kubar recent-
ly told the American and British ambassadors of his intention
to ask the King to relieve him of duty, or at least grant him
a long holiday abroad. Since then Idris has sent a royal
circular letter to all officials criticizing corruption in govern-
ment--a move which Kubar considers an attack on his admin-
istration. the
King has also refused Kubar permission to take leave at this
time, and the prime minister has formally submitted his resig-
nation.
2 Aug 60 rCkITO A I IkITCI I irtckirc DI II I CTIkl
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Norr
rilritain and the Common Market
The Macmillan government evidently has not closed the
door to seeking eventual membership in the six-nation Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC or Common Market), despite
the generally negative line taken by Selwyn Lloyd on 25 July
when he made his final speech in the House of Commons as
foreign secretary. The government is much concerned about
the long-run consequences of the split between the EEC and
the British-backed European Free Trade Association, or Outer
Seven, following the EEC's decision last May to speed the im-
plementation of the Common Market and to take the first steps
toward putting into effect its common external tariff by the
end of this year.
Failure of repeated British efforts to reach some accommo-
dation with the EEC, short of joining it, has probably intensified
the opposition of President of the Board of Trade Maudling and
some other cabinet members to any consideration of joining the
supranational Common Market. At the same time, however,
there have been growing demands from influential sectors of the
British press and some members of Parliament for a reassess-
ment of policies, lest the United Kingdom become only "a group
of windy islands off the Atlantic coast of Europe."
Lloyd's recitation
of the obstacles to early British membership was influenced by
recent remarks by French President de Gaulle,
he favored British
membership in the EEC but that the time is not now propitious.
Lloyd presumably wanted to dampen public pressures for early
moves by the Macmillan government.
Lloyd's speech should not be interpreted as
representing a definitive governmental decision not to join the
Common Market.
The subject probably will be discussed when Prime Minis-
ter Macmillan visits Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn on 10 August.
London hopes that the German business community's desire
for wider trading opportunities will bring pressures on the French
for an EEC accommodation with Britain, and that Adenauer will
use his personal influence with De Gaullp in this direction.
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CO/Nt II)LIN I IAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary-of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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