CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/07/30

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03160558
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2016
• Case Number: F-2014-02699
• Publication Date: July 30, 1960

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The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized persons, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
30 July 1960
DAILY BRIEF
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Republic of the Congo: Tension is mounting in Elisabethville,
the capital of Katanga, according to the American Consulate. The
African populace is said to fear violence stemming from Katanga's
secession. Its pro-Belgian premier, Moise Tshombe, is making
an effort to ensure the loyalty of the Katanga Army and the police.
Although Belgian troops have been largely successful in restoring
order in Katanga, its claim to independence has been disavowed
by Tshombe's parliamentary opposition, the Balubakat party. The
consulate believes that the Lumumba government may encourage
an incident in Katanga to dramatize "popular opposition" to an in-
dependent Katanga and the need for UN troops.
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I_LJapan:' Fotteign Minister Kosaka implied to AmDassaaor (b)(3)
MacArthur on 27 July that any move toward accommodation
with Peiping would be delayed until after the general election
expected this fall. Kosaka stressed, however, the government's
need to maintain a public posture of "reasonableness and de-
sire" to improve relations with Japan's Communist neighbors;
this might initially be limited to the negotiation of a series of
technical agreements on such matters as postal affairs and mete-
orological exchanges. He expressed his personal view that the
issue of Okinawa's reversion to Japanese control should be avoided
during the coming election campaign. Kosaka also appeared per-
sonally more willing to compromise with South Korea�within the
limits imposed by public oDinion�than did his Dredecessor.
30 July 60
DAILY BRIEF
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Katanga Situation Approaching Critical Stage
Tension is mounting in Elisabethville, the capital of Katan-
ga, in the absence of any agreement among the Belgians, the
United Nations, and the Congolese concerning Katanga's political
future. Africans in Elisabethville reportedly fear violence, and
many have sent their families out of the city. Premier Tshombd
has strengthened his personal security measures and has an-
nounced that all members of the Force Publique and police who
have demonstrated their loyalty to his government are tOS be
given an extra month's pay.
UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, who reportedly was
invited to visit Katanga by Tshombd, has rejected suggestions
that he go there. His refusal to meet with Tshombe reflects
Hammarskjold's tough stand in favor of Congo unity and his in-
sistence on a complete Belgian troop withdrawal. Brussels'
announcement that it will withdraw to Belgium 1,500 of its
10,000 troops in the Congo appears designed as a gesture in
the direction of compliance with the UN resolution for the
evacuation of Belgian. forces. Brussels apparently hopes that
Tshombe will be able to negotiate with Lumumba conditions
under which Katanga could rejoin the Congo; Belgian Premier
Eyskens declared on 28 July that the question is "no longer"
the unity of the Congo but the form which a unified Congo should
take. Tshombels opposed to the highly centralized form of
government espoused. by Lumumba, but is prepared to accept a
loosely joined Congo federation.
Despite some support in Brussels, Tshombes position ap-
pears tenuous. Not even Belgium has formally recognized
Katanga's independence, and Tshombe's parliamentary opposi-
tion walked out of the assembly on 27 July in protest over the
premier's "arbitrary" declaration of Katanga's independence,
The US Consulate observes that the Lumumba government may
encourage an incident in Katanga to dramatize "popular opposi-
tion" to an independent Katan
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'New Japane&�Zovernment's Foreign Policy
- CJapanese Foreign Minister Kosaka implied to Ambassador
MacArthur on 27 July that Japan's new government would de-
lay in seeking any accommodation with Communist China un-
til after the general election expected this fall. However, he
emphasized the government's need to maintain a public posture
of "reasonableness and desire" to improve relations with Ja-
pan's Communist neighbors; this might initially be limited to
the negotiation of a series of agreements relating to postal af-
fairs, exchange of meteorological information, and other tech-
nical matters. 3
LKosaka flatly rejected a neutralist course for Japan and
said that a decisive Liberal-Democratic party victory in the
election must be the new government's first step in restoring
free-world confidence in Japan. He indicated his personal in-
tent to avoid pressing the US to return Okinawa as long as the
American civil administration does not try to alienate the
Okinawans from Japan and continues to cooperate with the
Japanese in long-term economic development projects on
Okinawa. Kosaka complained, however, of the US refu.sal to
allow the Okinawans to fly Japanese flags. He added that he
hoped Tokyo would be permitted to introduce on Okinawa a
family registration system along Japanese lines.
CKosaka said he and Prime Minister Ikeda consider South
Korea the first line of Japanese defense against Communist
aggression and acknowledged the need to improve relations
with Seoul. He appeared more willing than his predecessor
to consider South Korean objections to the repatriation of Ko-
rean residents in Japan to North Korea but emphasized that
Japanese opinion, especially during an election campaign,
would limit his ability to compromise.
[Ikeda told MacArthur on 28 July that he plans to stress
domestic rather than foreign policy issues during the coming
campaign and will concentrate on improving social welfare
and strengthening democratic government. Ikeda asserted
that, while he felt quite expert on domestic problems, he
plans to regard former Prime Minister Yoshida as his main
adviser on international matters. Because Kosaka lacks
diplomatic experience, it is likely that Yoshida and Ikeda rath-
er than the foreign minister will set the foreign 1*
30 July 60
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CUrir-rt&LALUAL,
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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