CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/07/26

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03160554
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: July 26, 1960

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26 July 1960
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26 JULY 1960
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Qasim, in move to improve popular sup-
port, creates new dispute with Western-
owned Iraq Petroleum Company.
Thailand opposed to any increase in
American military aid to Cambodia. 0
�
Sukarno may be considering nationalizing
two more companies with Dutch interests
as counter to scheduled Dutch naval visit
to West New 'Guinea. 0
The situation in the Congo.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
26 July 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq: In a move aimed at bolstering his flagging popular
support, Qasim has charged the management of the Western
owned Iraq Petroleum Company with arbitrary breach of its
agreements with the Iraqi Government at the expense of the
"rights of the Iraqi people." His statement, broadcast on 21
July, and a Baghdad radio attack of 24 July, are sweeping dis-
tortions of the facts concerning the company's decision to re-
duce production in southern Iraq because of an exorbitant in=
crease in Iraqi port dues on oil exports. Qasim says the gov-
ernment will negotiate before adopting any "restrictive measures,"
but he has chosen to make this the most serious dispute between
the government and the oil company since he took over two years
ago. (Page 1)
Thailand: Thailand has expressed strong opposition to any
increase in American aid to Cambodia, despite Prince Sihanouk's
threat to turn to the Communist bloc if Cambodia's defense "needs"
are not met. The acting foreign minister, in conversation with the
American ambassador, argued that the Thai people would not under-
stand America's favoring of a neutral over a loyal ally, particularly
as Cambodia already .receives than
Indonesia: ine inaonesian Ciovernment may be considering
early nationalization of the Shell and Unilevei- enrnnani PSwhlih
have some Dutch capital and field personnel.
such a proposal was to be introduced in Indo-
;nesia's Supreme Advisory Council at the instigation of the Commu-
-4 nist labor federation, and that it has Sukarno's approval as a
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countermove to the visit of Dutch naval units to West New Guinea
next month. The Indonesian Government has been unable to main-
tain production levels in other Dutch enterprises seized since late
1957, and this weighed against a political need for an anti-
Dutch move. (Page 2)
*Congo: With approximately 7,500 UN troops now in the Congo,
and with 'Belgian forces still policing large sectors of the interior,
the Congo security situation continues to improve. Any prospect
for a coup attempt by anti-Lumumba elements during the Congo
premier's visit to the US appears to have diminished with the ad-
1--journing of the Congo Senate, a stronghold of anti-Lumumba sen-
timent.
Brussels' reported willingness to permit a UN presence in
Katanga and Premier Tshombe s call for a loosely joined but united
Congo federation, suggests that neither Belgium nor Tshombe
now wants to press the issue of Katanga's independence
(Page 3)
26 July 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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CUNFIVNALL
Nor
Qasim's Dispute With the Iraq Petroleum Company
The management of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC)
has reduced exports of Iraqi oil through the Persian Gulf to
about 25 percent of the normal level in response to a unilater-
al move by the Iraqi Government to raise port dues on oil ex-
ports from 6.5 cents per ton to about 78 cents per ton. These
exports come from production in Iraq's southern fields, of which
Rumayla and Zubayr are by far the largest.
After failing in efforts to have Premier Qasim revoke the�
decision on port dues, the Western-owned company formally
Informed the Iraqi Government in a letter. dated 20 July that
it was suspending production at Rumayla and cutting it back
at Zubayr by about one third. The output from the southern
fields normally accounts for more than 30 percent of total
production in Iraq and last year provided some $70,000,000
of oil revenues to .the government. The cutback of production
to its present level entails a loss of revenue to the government
of more than $4,000,000 per month. Had production and ex-
ports continued at the normal level, the Iraqi Government
would have obtained new income of roughly $750,000 per month
from the increase in port dues.
In contrast to his previous and generally successful tactics
of private negotiation of differences with IPC, Qasim this time
has launched a propaganda attack He is presumably trying to
use this issue to bolster his flagging popular support. On the
basis of a sweeping distortion of the facts, he has accused the
company of a breach of its agreements with the Iraqi Govern-
ment at the expense of the "rights of the Iraqi people." He has
singled out IPC's new chief representative in Iraq for special
criticism, but has declared that Iraq will unrrtake negotiations
before adopting any "restrictive measures."
26 July 60 CPKITRA I IIKITFI I inpkirr RI II I PTIKI
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TOY �-M*44Q:
Indonesia May Nationalize Shell and Unilever
The Indonesian Government may be considering the nation-
alization of two foreign companies--Shell and Unilever--which
have some Dutch capital and field personnel.
such a proposal was to be introduced
in Indonesia's Supreme Advisory Council at the instigation of
the Communist labor federation, SOBS, as a countermove to
the August visit of Dutch naval units to West New Guinea.
President Sukarno, who reportedly desires to nationalize all
foreign capital eventually, to have ap-
proved the proposal bul to have withheld his "com-
plete backing."
General Nasution, army chief of staff and
concurrently minister of national security, agrees "in princi-
ple" that the oil industry should be nationalized.
The Indonesian Government has been unable to maintain
production levels in the former Dutch enterprises which it
has seized since late 1957. Shell produces 20 percent of In-
donesia's crude oil and supplies approximately 70 percent of
refined petroleum products required domestically. Unilever,
one of the few large manufacturers in Indonesia, is a major
supplier of margarine and cooking oil for the domestic market.
Disruption of the activities of these companies would further
aggravate the deterioration of the Indonesian economy at con-
sumer levels and would affect two products vital to the ordi-
nary household--kerosene and cooking oil. These factors
presumably will be weighed by the Indonesian Government
against the political need for an anti-Dutch move in reaching
a decision.
Capital, other than Dutch, in the two companies is prin-
cipally British. Under a 1959 decree, there would be com-
ensation for non-Dutch capital in nationalized enterprises.
--TOP-SEGREZ
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E t.
The Situation in the Congo
With approximately 7,500 UN troops now in the Congo--out
� of a total of 12,000 committed�the security situation continues
to improve. In the interior, however, the major responsibility
� for security continues to rest with the Belgians, whose total
� forces in the Congo number about 10,000.
Brussels' reported willingness to permit a UN presence in
Katanga, together with Katan.ga Premier Tshombe's remarks
endorsing a Congo federation of autonomous states, suggests
that neither party will press the issue of Katanga's "independ-
ence?' Tshombe announced Katanga's secession from the Congo
on 11 July, but has yet to gain formal recognition even from Bel-
gium.
Congo Premier Lumumba
views his present visit to the United Nations, expected to last at
least a week, as incidental to an appeal to the United States for large-
scale aid. if he does not receive what he
asks, Lumumba may well turn to the bloc.
Lumumba recently stated to Gnana's presment xruman
that while Soviet troops were no longer required in the Congo, he
would probably accept Soviet equipment and other assistancej
In an unexplained move, the Congo Senate on 22 July voted it-
self� a three-week vacation. The lower house had agreed the previ-
ous day to adjourn until 1 September. The action by the Senate--
which has been the main center of criticism directed at Lumumba's
leftist policies--suggests that Lumumba's opponents will await the re-
sults of his trip before considering further action. Lumumba report-
edly desires to abolish the Senate and establish a unicameral legis-
lature, and he might take advantage of the Senate's adjournment to
take action against it.
26 July 60 CCkiTn All IkITCI "2)2g3/11.31ad03760554 Page 3
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'tit PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CO AL
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