CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/05/17

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03160454
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: May 17, 1957

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
17 May 1957
Copy N0.134
DOCUMENT No.#2 6
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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DATE- %EWER,
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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1 S.! I 1.1 1J N., 1 LI
Nue
CONTENTS
. FRANCE MAY START NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
IN JULY (page 3).
nv,2� KISHI PREPARING JAPANESE PUBLIC TO ACCEPT NUCLEAR
DEFENSE WEAPONS (page 4)0
V3. USSR APPROVES NEW SYRIAN ARMS ORDER
(page 5).
f,\k.4. FORMER INDONESIAN VICE PRESIDENT SUPPORTS AUTON-
OMOUS MOVEMENTS (page 6).
st6. LAOTIAN PREMIER PLANS NEW ATTACK ON PATHET LAO
PROBLE (page 7).
PROPOSED ARMY OFFICER TRANSFERS AGAIN BUILD
Olk- TENSION IN SYRIA (page 8).
,'OANNEX--Conclusions of the Watch Report of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee
(page 9).
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1. FRANCE MAY START NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
IN JULY
Jules Moch, the French delegate to the
UN Disarmament Subcommittee, has
confidentially advised the American del-
egate that France "will decide in July"
to proceed to make nuclear weapons unless a partial dis-
armament agreement is imminent. Such an agreement
would have to include a "sound basis" for French renuncia-
tion of nuclear weapons.
Comment France could test an atomic bomb in late
1957 or early 1958
weapons research has
been under way for the past two or three years. At least a
year to 18 months would be required from the date of deci-
sion to manufacture such weapons.
Moch had indicated previously that French
conditions for abstaining from making nuclear weapons include
(1) similar abstention by West Germany and control over its
rearmament, (2) reductions in the Soviet army, and (3) some
inspection of the USSR. He has also specified renunciation by
the three nuclear powers of further nuclear weapons stock-
piling and testing.
Moch views the recent Soviet proposals
optimistically, even though this view is not shared by rank-
ing French Foreign Ministry officials. His disclosure to
Stassen may therefore be primarily designed to bring pres-
sure on the nuclear cowers to reach an early disarmament
agreement.
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Nilo"
2. KLSHI PREPARING JAPANESE PUBLIC TO ACCEPT
NUCLEAR DEFENSE WEAPONS
Comment on:
1)rime Minister Kishi's recent statement
in the Diet that Japan's military forces
can possess nuclear weapons for defense
purposes without violating the constitu-
on appears to nave been a carefully calculated move to
condition the Japanese public for the eventual arming of
Japan's forces with such weapons. Kishi may also hope to
gain support for an expansion of Japan's present guided-
missile development program.
an
evolution in Kishi's thinking had been brought about by strong
pressure from Japanese defense policy experts such as for-
mer admiral Nomura and former prime minister Ashida.
Kishi now favors the arming of Japan
with nuclear weapons but plans to move cautiously in view of
the sensitivity of the Japanese public on nuclear matters.
Kishi's stand conforms to the thinking of
many of the conservative leaders who advocate more advanced
weapons for Japan's forces and a greater build-up of air and
naval forces. Although Kishi has reiterated that he has no
present intention of introducing nuclear weapons into Japan,
the Japanese press has been sharply critical of the switch
from his past absolute rejection of such weapons, and accuse
him of trying to create a favorable impression in Washington.
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Nine
3. USSR APPROVES NEW SYRIAN ARMS ORDER
Comment on:
Damascus was informed
hat
the Russian command had approved "our
complete orderP This is the second arms
cuntract wmcn uyria has concluded with the USSR in the past
six months. It is probably smaller than the one concluded
last November. Most of the $30,0009000 worth of military items
contracted for at that time has been delivered.
largest part of the
new contract, including incendiary bombs and motor launches--
presumably torpedo boats�will be delivered this year. Other
equipment for the navy and for three coastal radar stations is
to be delivered in early 1958.
In recent months Soviet bloc military aid
in the Middle East has been placing increased emphasis on
technical aid and training in the use of bloc equipment.
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4. FORMER INDONESIAN VICE PRESIDENT SUPPORTS
AUTONOMOUS MOVEMENTS
Comment on:
In a 16 May speech in Central Sumatra,
former Indonesian vice president Hatta
supported provincial demands for au-
tonomy and warned Djakarta that pre-
vailing political strife "if allowed to
take its own course would lead to anarchy' He stated that
recent actions in the provinces are not "separatist or pro-
vincial" but a movement aimed at the development of the
whole Indonesian archipelago. Also speaking at the rally
was Colonel Simbolon, former commander in North Sumatra,
who is believed to be the principal architect of the Sumatran
autonomous movement. He echoed Hattais statement that
recent uprisings in the provinces were not aimed at sep-
arating the outlying areas from the Djakarta administration.
Hatta, although no longer holding a gov-
ernment post, is still recognized as a national leader. His
speech probably will be used by Sumatran leaders to unify
the non-Javanese provinces against the Djakarta government
in the interest of promoting a return to "federalism," ac-
tually a confederacy of Indonesian states.
Although most provincial leaders have no
desire to fragment Indonesia, neither do they have any in-
tention of compromising with the Djakarta government on the
issue of provincial autonomy.
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5. LAOTIAN PREMIER PLANS NEW ATTACK ON PATHET
LAO PROBLEM
Prime Minister Souvanna PhoumaYs
government is not expected to fall as
had been anticipated last week,
Souvanna is preparing to deliver
a major speech before the National Assembly sometime next
week in which he will review his efforts during the past year
to reach a settlement with the Pathet Lao and present a "new"
plan for breaking the deadlock.
this plan will con-
tain some features objectionable to the United States, such
as the establishment of a coalition government. It will, how-
ever, take a tougher line toward the Pathets, viewing them
as suppliants, and will set forth firm conditions for a settle-
ment0 it will be unacceptable to the Pathets
and will probably lead to a complete breakdown of negotia-
tions. Souvanna, who has considered such a possibility, would
then turn the problem over to the Geneva cochairmen, or, fail-
ing to receive satisfaction, would then take it to the UN.
this approach to
the Pathet problem will obtain the overwhelming approval of
the assembly.
Comment Despite the extensive dissatisfaction with
Souvanna Phouma, the prospect of a pro-
longed political crisis may have dissuaded leading figures
from bringing down his government at this time. If Souvanna
continues in office, any departure from his earlier policies
offering dangerous concessions to the Pathet Lao is likely to
be more in form than in substance.
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6, PROPOSED ARMY OFFICER TRANSFERS AGAIN BUILD
TENSION IN SYRIA
Comment on:
eports indicate that a new political
crisis is building up in Syria over pro-
posed transfers of over 100 army offi-
cers. Among those scheduled to be
transferred abroad are members of
the rival Sarraj and Nufuri factions.
Four of the pro-Nufuri and three pro-
Sarraj officers are to be sent to the
USSR for advanced training, while
Colonel Sarraj, the leftist chief of intelligence, is to be
sent to Cairo.
Tension in army circles is increasing
because members of the two factions suspect the other of
attempting to gain an advantage as a result of the transfers.
Actually this program of transfers appears to be a maneu-
ver by the moderate nonpolitical "Damascene" officer group
to weaken both factions. Rightist elements believe the net
result will be a weakening of Baath (leftist) influence in the
army. Leftist officers may feel that any change at this stage
would be unfavorable to their interests and might take counter-
measures to block these moves.
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ANNEX
Watch Report 354, 16 May 1957
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee
Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the
Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:
A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostil-
ities against the continental US or its possessions in
the immediate future.
B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostil-
ities against US forces abroad, US allies or areas
peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.
C. Early deliberate initiation of hostilities by Israel or
the Arab states is not probable. Although tensions
continue between the Arab states and Israel and among
certain Arab states themselves, these are not likely to
lead to serious conflict in the immediate future.
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