CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/04/06

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03160440
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: April 6, 1957

f�1
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
6 April 1957
uopy NO. 134
DOCUMENT NO.
NO C!iPN:TIE
CL/S. Ci ANG,7.13 '10: i3 S
NEXT RENEW DATE:
T
PVIEWER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3.5(c)
'
� -ix ,,z5oxis/A
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
Approved _for Release: 20'19/12/04 C03160440
vp,
CONTENTS
AIN AND FRANCE SEEN INTENT ON ISOLATING NASR
THROUGH UN TACTICS (page �3).
2 NATO MEMBERS EXPRESS CONCERN OVER BRITISH DE-
FENSE PROGRAM (page 4).
ip 3. MOSCOW MAY PLAN TO PUBLICIZE WEAPONS TESTS
(page 5).
4.. USSR TO BEGIN NEW DELIVERIES OF HEAVY ARMS TO
EGYPT (page 6).
. FINNS UNMOVED BY SOVIET WARNINGS
(page 7).
9 11
6. AMBASSADOR MACARTHUR COMMENTS ON KLSHI GOV-
ERNMENT (page 8).
0
7. DISSIDENT SOUTH SUMATRAN COMMANDER ARMS
CIVILIAN SUPPORTERS (page 9).
8. PRIDI REPORTED HOPEFUL OF RETURNING TO THAI-
LAND SOON (page 10).
e4/09. SAUDI ARABIAN LOAN EXPECTED TO BOLSTER MOROC-
CAN GOVERNMENT (page 11).
1010. RETURNOF CYPRIOT LEADERS FEARED BY GREEK
GOVERNMENT (page 12).
6 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
TOF-S'ECRE71
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
CO 1AL 004.
1. BRITAIN AND FRANCE SEEN INTENT ON ISOLATING
NASR THROUGH UN TACTICS
Comment on:
Britain and France, in seeking an alter-
native to the renewed use of force to
achieve their objective of getting rid of
Nasr, have hit upon the idea of progres-
sively isolating Egypt in order to drive
it into the arms of the USSR, according
to Norwegian UN delegate Engen, who is
also a member of Hammarskjold's advi-
sory committee on Suez. He added that
the French argued there was no use in
seeking any agreement on the canal with Nasr since "his days
are definitely numbered" and a better agreement could be
negotiated with a subsequent regime.
The first step in the Anglo-French plan
would be to provoke a Soviet veto in the Security Council on
Egypt's behalf. The British have already privately advo-
cated calling an urgent meeting of the Security Council. Pres-
entation to the council of the French proposal on payments of
tolls�which blocks 20 percent until Egypt agrees to a settle-
ment along the lines of the six principles�would almost cer-
tainly provoke a Soviet veto.
An Egyptian UN delegate stated on 4 April
that his government strongly desired to avoid referral of the
Suez Canal issue to the UN in order to avert unwanted "help"
from the USSR and others. He said that such help would only
be embarrassing and designed to achieve purposes other than
assistance to Egypt.
6 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 3
CONFJ&FNIAL
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
tftiv *lase
2., NATO MEMBERS EXPRESS CONCERN OVER BRITISH
DEFENSE PROGRAM
Reference.
At the special itketing of the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) on 4 April for
presentation of the British white paper
on defense, the West German repre-
sentative expressed the deepest concern. He observed
that the reduction to some 400,000 men went further than
the plan which London had previously given the NAC, and
represented cuts below the safety level in case of emer-
gency. He stated that it was unfortunate that the reduc-
tions had not been used to advantage in the disarmament
negotiations with the USSR. He felt that ending conscrip-
tion would have extremely dangerous psychological effects
in other NATO countries.
The French representative gave this
personal view that the unilateral nature of the British ac-
tion undermined NATO procedures, and that the psycho-
logical impact of the reductions could jeopardize the over-
all NATO program. Belgium and Italy commented along
the same lines.
The British representative pointed out
that the paper represented Britain's world-wide defense
effort and should not be viewed solely from the NATO as-
pect. He also stated that London's action did not prejudge
the special NATO strategic review proposed by Chancellor
Adenauer.
Pointing out that Britain has now decided
to become a nuclear power, Adenauer on 5 April demanded
tactical atomic weapons for West Germany.
6 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
TOP SECRET
044
3. MOSCOW MAY PLAN TO PUBLICIZE WEAPONS TESTS
The temporary closing of the Soviet
Central Asian area to foreign travel
in late March may be for military rea-
sons, possibly in connection with atomic
tests, according to the American embassy in Moscow. This
impression is reinforced by a report
that foreign Communist correspond-
ents have all left Moscow for Central Asia within the last few
days.
a demonstra-
tion of successful tests of missiles, possibly with atomic war-
heads, would be very useful to give substance to the USSR's
current campaign to frighten countries in the Western alliance
system away from accepting United States atomic units on their
territory.
Comment The temporary travel restrictions may
have been imposed because of the immi-
nence of the nuclear test conducted by the USSR near Semi-
palatinsk on 3 April. While preparations for further tests of
this nature may be continuing, there is no evidence of the ar-
rival of observers in the test area such as would be expected
if a public demonstration were planned. If a Soviet ballistic
missile test were to be opened to observation for publicity pur-
poses, observers would probably be stationed at the Kapustin
Yar rangehead. Existing impact areas have long been closed
to travel. There is no present evidence of preparations for a
joint nuclear warhead-guided missile test operation. Prior to
previous tests of this nature, evidence of their imminence has
been available.
If a demonstration of military weapons is
planned for publicity purposes, as suggested by the Moscow em-
bassy, it would be calculated to have a strong impact on popu-
lar opinion in Western Europe, where there is considerable
official and popular concern about the effects of nuclear tests.
Soviet broadcasts recently have insisted that the USSR is ahead
of the United States in missile development.
6 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 5
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
1U1 lLUtL1
4. USSR TO BEGIN NEW DELIVERIES OF HEAVY ARMS
TO EGYPT
Comment on:
The first major Soviet bloc arms ship-
ments to Egypt since the November
hostilities are to arrive by the end of
April,
At least two
shipments of tanks, and possibly three, all with spare parts
and supplies, will be made.
The tanks will be delivered under a new
arms contract with the Soviet Union, which was negotiated
following Egypt's defeat in Sinai. Egypt at that time submitted
to the USSR preliminary requirements calling for replacement
of the approximately 100 tanks lost in Sinai, replacement and
reinforcement of antiaircraft and field artillery unite, estab-
lishment of an air force of up to 32 squadrons, additional elec-
tronic equipment, and naval vessels including submarines.
Although the USSR reportedly. believed . that Egypt overesti-
mated its military requirements, an Egyptian message from
Moscow to Cairo on 19 January reported that the USSR had
"approved all our requirements:'
6 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
5. FINNS UNMOVED BY SOVIET WARNINGS
Comment on:
The Finns generally regard the 26
March Izvestia warning against grow-
ing militarism in Finland as a periodic
reminder that Moscow continues to
keep a close watch on their activities,
according to the American embassy in
Helsinki. The Russians have on sev-
eral recent occasions expressed dis-
��d Finnish military leaders, and the Finnish defense
minister was warned on 22 March against allowing Finland
to "become a bridge against the USSR in the event of war.'
The Finns do not regard themselves as singled out for a
special attack, since the Scandinavian countries have re-
3ently been subjected to criticism from Moscow too.
President Kekkonen has ordered a bri-
;ade of troops permanently stationed in Finnish Lapland
to show Finland's determination to defend the area against
aoth East and West. Finland will probably use the exchange
3f high-level delegations on the anniversary in early April
A the 1948 Soviet-Finnish treaty of friendship and mutual
issistance as an occasion for reaffirming its policy of strict
leutrality.
6 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7
Approved for for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
Approved for Release.: 2019/12/04 C03160440
*fel
NO,
6. AMBASSADOR MACARTHUR COMMENTS ON
KISHI GOVERNMENT
Reference:
Ambassador MacArthur, in assessing
Japanese prime minister Kishi's actions
in his first six weeks in office, has con-
cluded that it is still uncertain whether
his government will prove a reliable partner in achieving
American policy objectives in Japan and the Far East. He
believes that unless Kishi ceases behaving "like a candi-
date in a domestic popularity contest" and begins to exert
strong leadership, the United States faces a gradual erosion
of its political and security position in the Far East.
Kishi, in preparation for possible elec-
tions, is promoting tax cuts, social welfare programs, and
a more "independent" foreign policy. He has not opposed pop-
ular sentiment on issues such as rearmament, nuclear tests
and weapons, and internal security matters. MacArthur notes
that his attitude on these issues has often not been helpful to
American interests.
MacArthur believes Kishi's chances for a
lengthy tenure in office are good. His vigor, cleverness, and
political competence have helped him achieve some success
in pulling the factions of the Liberal-Democratic Party together
and overcoming the disadvantages of a "fascist" past and his
lack of popularity.
6 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
-SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
T-OP�sEeRE-71 4001
7. DISSIDENT SOUTH SUMATRAN COMMANDER ARMS
CIVILIAN SUPPORTERS
Comment
Col. Barlian, who leads the South
Sumatran autonomy movement, pre-
sumably has armed members of various political and la-
bor organizations which on 31 March issued a statement of
loyalty to him following an abortive countercoup by pro-
Djakarta officers.
Barlian may have taken this step not
only to guard against any new Djakarta-inspired move to
overthrow him, but also to offset any threat by Commu-
nist paramilitary units in the area. Armed civilian groups
would also be useful to him in the event of Communist la-
bor disturbances in the oil fields of South Sumatra, which
constitute the major source of the area's revenues.
6 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9
TOP SECREi
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
ticr
8. PRIDI REPORTED HOPEFUL OF RETURNING TO
THAILAND SOON
Comment on:
Former premier Pridi hopes to be able
to return to Thailand next month, ac-
cording to his wife, who has just re-
turned from four years in Communist
China. She told the Bangkok Press on 4 April that her hus-
band, now in Canton, was "disturbed" about economic con-
ditions in Thailand, as well as "disunity" among the Thai
people, and that he hoped Thailand would emulate the neu-
tral policies of its neighbors. Madame Pridi also insisted
that Communist China is engaged in "peaceful construction,"
rather than war preparations.
Pridi has been in exile since 1949. His
return at this time would be intended to further Chinese Com-
munist objectives. Left-wing elements fared badly in the re-
cent Thai elections, but their lack of success may have stemmed
largely from the absence of an effective nationally known leader
such as Pridi.
There are indications that certain Thai
officials may favor allowing Pridi to come home. While Pre-
mier Philp= and Defense Minister Sarit are reportedly still
against such a move, there is a possibility they might ac-
cept Pridi's presence in the belief that he would be useful in
dealing with the Chinese Communists.
6 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 10
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
114, SECRET
9. SAUDI ARABIAN LOAN EXPECTED TO BOLSTER
MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT
Comment on:
This loan, together with the $20,000,000
aid agreement concluded with the United States on 2 April,
can be expected to bolster Rabat's position in financial nego-
tiations with France. Paris has been withholding prom-
ised credits to Morocco in the hope of gaining military and
economic concessions from the financially hard-pressed
Moroccan government.
6 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 11
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440
4.1r.,L.A.r.,
10. RETURN OF CYPRIOT LEADERS FEARED BY
GREEK GOVERNMENT
Comment on:
The imminent arrival in Greece of
Archbishop Makarios and the question
of whether EOKA chief George Grivas
should return to Greece are causing
concern and confusion within the Greek
government. Prime Minister Karaman-
lis reportedly is "nervous" over the ar-
rival of Makarios, who, he says, "is in
a position to Overthrow the government in 12 hours." Kara-
manlis apparently hopes to win Makarios approval of a
moderate line on the Cyprus question. He fears, however,
that the archbishop may publicly adopt an extreme position
and, in co-operation with opposition leaders, arouse Greek
public opinion against the government's moderate policy.
v tiovernment leaders are also fearful that
Grivas may accept a British safe-conduct to leave Cyprus
for Greece and then join forces with rightist opposition
leader Markezinis. As the military hero of the Cyprus
struggle, Grivas would probably add considerable popular
appeal to Markezinis' Party of Progressives.
6 Apr 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 12
'�"SEC�RE-T
Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160440