CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/03/17

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: 2018 Sanitization
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03160428
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: March 17, 1957

Li TI Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 Jr s.341�oLa SIM. IL 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 74287/M07/74 /0" 17 March 1957 Copy No. 131 DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. I I DECLAK.IFIED CLASS. CHANCED TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE� AUTH4 011R DATF.1.440 � 2171EVIEVVER: _ OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 4,4; TOP SECRET rde,:d407/396e://d Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 �cow, Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 rrtArk rt rid-v r-v Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 Imre CONTENTS /0 1. DEATH OF PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT MAGSAYSAY (page 3). 2. THE GAZA SITUATION 3. THE GULF OF AQABA SITUATION (page 7). 40 RIGHTIST MANEUVERINGS IN SYRIA (page 5). (page 9)0 ''5O MOROCCANS INCREASING PRESSURE FOR AMERICAN BASE NEGOTIATIONS (page 10). 6. COMMUNIST CHINA REFUSES TO SIGN BORDER AGREE- MENT WITH BURMA (page 11). 7. YUGOSLAVS REPORTEDLY WILL NOT RECEIVE PROMISED SOVIET REACTOR (page 12)0 A. USSR DISMANTLING INSTALLATIONS ON HABOMAI AND SHIKOTAN ISLANDS ;page 13). 17 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2 or" r) cfnle-ont rvnr, Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 itiftk 1. DEATH OF PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT MAGSAYSAY Comment on: The death of President Ramon Mag- saysay in an airplane crash on 17 March occurred as the Philippine election cam- paign was entering full swing and will probably lead to a period of instability. The cause of the crash is still undeter- mined, and government spokesmen have not discounted the possibility of sabotage. Magsaysay's death is unlikely to result in major changes in Philippine domestic or foreign policies in the immediate future. The new president, Carlos Garcia, however, has neither the vigor nor the magnetism of Mag- saysay. He is, moreover, a party politician amenable to the control of the Nacionalista Party's Old Guard, which his had little sympathy for Magsaysay's reform programs. Magsaysay's death also makes the presi- dential election, which he was virtually certain of winning, a wide-open race. A number of ambitious politicians who have heretofore held back can now be expected to seek nom- inations, and the resultant maneuvering may well bring about a resurgence of the corruption and disturbances which char- acterized the 1949 elections. In addition, the armed forces and constabulary, which Magsaysay kept out of politics, may again become an instrument of the party in power. With pub- lic attention focused elsewhere, the Philippine Communist Party might gain a breathing spell to improve its political position. In this connection, there has been some sympathy for granting amnesty to Communists. Philippine-American relations--particularly the suspended negotiations over American bases--are certain to assume importance in the campaign. The chief critic of 17 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 Approved for Release:.2019/12/04 C03160428 'Now, American policies, Senator Claro Recto, had already en- tered the race against Magsaysay. In addition to carrying on his criticism of American policies toward the Philippines, he may also press for a more neutralist foreign policy and for developing relations with the Communist bloc. Other candidates may also feel compelled to question some aspects of Philippine-American relations as an earnest of their na- tionalistic fervor. Among the numerous possible candidates, however, none is pro-Communist and all have at some time or other admitted the need for close ties with the United States. 17 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4 na 1r, amgc.6 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 Ant, 2, THE GAZA SITUATION Comment on: sraeli foreign minister Meir told he American ambassador in Israel n 15 March that events appear to be eading rapidly toward the situation hich existed before the Israeli inva- sion of Sinai and that "results may be f a character none of us waits." She urther intimated that Israel was dis- leased that Hammarskjold was going to Cairo,since "no good" had come from his previous meetings with Nasr and that Israel places no faith in the UN or its secretary general. She emphatically reiterated that Israel would not permit the stationing of United Nations forces on both sides of the Gaza armistice lines. The new Egyptian administration in Gaza has begun putting the squeeze on the United Nations forces there. Under Egyptian pres- sure, the UN command has turned over its temporary headquarters to the Egyptian ad- ministrator, General Latif. UN spokes- men in Cairo have denied, however, that the forces will evacuate Gaza and move to the armistice line within 48 hours, adding that there is "no time limit" for such a move. It is reported that Latif has suggested that UN head- quarters be based in the El Auja demilitarized zone, which was occupied by Israeli military forces over a year ago de- spite United Nations protests. Egyptian Frontier Corps military detach- ments have occupied two check points; Rafay, which is on the 17 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 r�r. Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 Nape Gaza border, but just inside Egypt, and Abu Zenima, a cit on the Gulf of Suez and on the road to Sharm al-Shaikh the Egyptians are making no attempt to control entry into the strip, and that there has been a large influx from Egypt. Britain has informed the United States it, feels the UN should retain exclusive control of security in the Gaza strip for the "time being," i.e. , until there is a permanent settlement. Hammarskjold has said that Egypt, in the exercise of its rights, could reduce UN control in Gaza to practically nothing and that he can only use persua- sion on Nasr. He is inclined to stage his talks with the Egyptian president so they will appear to be exploratory and give the impression he is not expecting to reach a final agreement. The American army attache in Tel Aviv on 15 March reported no unusual military activity but said the Israeli army has enough strength in place to re-occupy Gaza without difficulty. 17 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6 _ Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 3. THE GULF OF AQABA SITUATION Comment on: While Nasr is pressing for a reasser- tion of full Egyptian political and ad- ministrative control over the Gaza strip, Saudi Arabia appears to be carrying the main Arab burden on the Gulf of Aqaba questionn On 15 March Cairo radio announced that the Saudi government had declared it would not allow any rights to be es- tablished for Israel in the Gulf of Aqaba. The Saudi position is stated to be based on the contention that the waters of the gulf are under the sovereignty of the Arab riparian states. The Saudis also cited paragraph three, article ten, of 'the 1888 Constantinople Convention, which states that the treaty provisions for international use of the Suez waterway do not cover the areas situated on the eastern coast of the Red Sea, site of the holiest places of Islam. The Saudis assert that the purpose of this provision was to ensure the safety of the Islamic countries, and to guarantee freedom of passage for ships bearing Moslem pil- grims through the Gull of Aqaba. The announcement stated that Saudi Arabia would take all steps to defend its historical and legitimate rights in the gulf and to preserve the safety of its land and territorial water. Following conversations with French of- ficials in Paris, Israeli foreign minister Meir reaffirmed that Israel intended to use its "right" of passage. Israeli mil- itary aircraft had again resumed low-altitude reconnaissance of Saudi positions along the eastern shore of the gulf. In De- cember Israeli aircraft and armed launches reconnoitered 17 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 Approve-dqoTRWa-ser 161-91/12/04 C03160428 Saudi positions at the entrance to the gulf and exchanged fire with the ill-armed Saudis, who were instructed sub- sequently not to fire unless fired on. Israeli plans to pass Israeli-flag mer- chant shipping through the gulf have not been revealed. An Italian and a Danish vessel, however, are expected to ar- rive at the Israeli port of Eilat on the gulf in the near future. Israeli officials have confirmed meanwhile that three "US- flag" oil tankers have been chartered for three years by agreement with a Swiss firm representing the American owners. The ships are to bring crude oil to Eilat from an undisclosed source on completion of the pipeline and stor- age facilities in early ApriL 17 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8 d-1 n cv rir+1 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 Ask 4. RIGHTIST MANEUVE I GS IN SYRIA Comment on: A rightist military group led by Colonel Nufuri, G-1 of the Syrian army, is ap- parently continuing its efforts to weaken elements in the Syrian army. Colonel Sarraj, the Syrian strong man, has been removed from his position as head of army intelligence and ordered to a post abroad. Other leftist-inclined of- ficers have been transferred to less influential positions. Rightist officers are reputed to have taken command of the all-important armored brigades and to be converging on Damascus. If these reports are true, this action would be a heavy blow to the leftists, and severe counter- action could be expected. Sarraj has previously been or- dered to posts outside the country but remained in Damascus. All other information from Damascus--such as the govern- ment's 17 March announcement that a contract had been signed with a Czechoslovak firm to build an oil refinery--indicates that Syria's leftward drift continues. 17 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 rel"r r Fr' Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 ilkte "W` 5. MOROCCANS INCREASING PRESSURE FOR AMERICAN BASE NEGOTIATIONS Morocco is increasing pressure de- signed to induce the United States to begin negotiating agreements govern- ing American military bases. Rabat has tightened restrictions on private vehicles of American military personnel and has adopted a tough policy regarding the expansion of Voice of America facilities, insisting that no definite agreement can be nego- tiated, nor any expansion authorized, unless conversations begin on the military bases. Comment The reported exorbitant rental demand of the Moroccans and Parisi: legal title to the bases are likely to complicate settlement of the issue. Morocco has opposed tripartite negotiations, and France op- poses bipartite talks between the United States and Morocco. 17 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 10 crevr-r Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 6. COMMUNIST CHINA REFUSES TO SIGN BORDER AGREEMENT WITH BURMA Pleading the pressure of other engage- ments, Chou En-lai has refused to meet with Burmese premier U Nu during the latter's visit to South China and expressed regret at his inability to sign a border agreement at this time, as U Nu had requested. Chou gave as his reason the difficulties in persuading the border peo- ples to accept the Burmese proposals. Comment The Burmese are willing to settle the border dispute along the lines tentatively agreed to by U Nu and Chou En-lai last October. Chou's re- fusal to sign now will be a severe disappointment to the Bur- mese and in particular to U Nu, who would gain considerable personal credit from the finalization of the agreement. Peiping's stand on the border issue may still be influenced by public reaction in Asia. The Burmese government initiated a publicity campaign last summer which brought strong pressure on Peiping to negotiate with Rangoon. The Chinese are somewhat apprehensive that Rangoon may re- vive this campaign. [7 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 11 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 Arr .ink 77-17-11r1 ir/ 'At /7111911r IV Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 7. YUGOSLAVS REPORTEDLY WILL NOT RECEIVE PROMISED SOVIET REACTOR The Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow has said that the promised Soviet reactor "will not be delivered" to Yugoslavia, During an "exploratory" visit to Yugo- slavia by the French high commissioner of atomic energy on 13 March,Yugoslays at the plant designed for the Soviet reactor "as much as admitted" that further construction had been "sty- mied!' Comment The USSR has shown its readiness to ex- tend its ideological dispute with Belgrade into the economic sphere. Moscow last month "postponed" fulfilling its agreement to develop an aluminum plant in Yugo- slavia and more recently has stepped up its criticism of the Yugoslav economy. Belgrade has admitted privately that negotiations with the USSR regard- ing the reactor provided for under a joint Yugoslav-Soviet agreement of January 1956 have been disappointing. On 8 March, however, the Yugoslays announced that "no unfore- seen difficulties" had appeared in nuclear reactor negotiations with the USSR and that talks were "developing normally." Reportedly no Soviet equipment or material for the Yugoslav nuclear program has been delivered under the 1956 accord. The Yugoslays have recently indicated a strong interest in reopening negotiations with the United States regard- ing nuclear assistance. 17 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 12 M. -' Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 CO3'160428 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428 z 8, USSR DISMANTLING INSTALLATIONS ON HABOMAI AND SHIKOTAN ISLANDS Soviet personnel on Habomai and Shikotan Islands, north of Japan, were observed. during February and early March dis- mantling facilities and packing them for shipment, Soviet craft were also observed transporting crates from these islands to nearby Kunashiri. Comment The Soviets could be preparing to with- draw from Habomai and Shikotan--neither of which has any strategic importance�as a gesture of good will toward the Japanese which would allow them to exploit the continued presence of American forces on the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands. The USSR has agreed to return Habomai and Shikotan to Japan on conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty. Japanese prime minister Kishi has publicly discounted prospects for opening peace treaty negotiations with the USSR this year, however, and has emphasized that such negotiations would depend on the prior settlement of such issues as Japa- nese nationals missing in the Soviet Union, fishery quotas and trade arrangements. 17 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 13 Approved for Release: 2019/12/04 C03160428