ARGENTINA: PROSPECTS FOR THE JUNTA[SANITIZED] - 1977/02/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03159416
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: February 22, 1977

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
22 February 1977
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
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ARGENTINA: PROSPECTS FOR THE JUNTA
Argentina's ruling generals have made substantial
progress in dealing with the problems of leftist sub-
version and economic disarray that Zed to their take-
over nearly a year ago. Terrorist capabilities have
clearly declined and economic signs, such as a reduc-
tion of the inflation rate and last year's reversal of
the trade deficit are encouraging. Although the ini-
tial crisis is over, the divisive forces that have com-
plicated life for both military and civilian governments
in the past are rapidly reemerging. Ultimately, the
success of the junta is at stake; the regime will find
it increasingly difficult to govern unless it can restore
unity or at least stave off widespread disaffection.
There are already signs of restiveness in civilian
ranks, especially in the pivotal labor movement. More-
over, tensions within the junta itself have developed
because of personal rivalries and differences over how
to proceed.
Background
In theory, the regime has virtually unlimited powers
and can enforce its dictates by exercising tight military
control over the government at the national and local
levels. In reality, however, the situation is much more
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Re-
gional and Political Analysis and was coordinated by the
Office of Economic Research and the Directorate of Opera-
tions. Questions and comments may be addressed to 3.5(c)
3.5(c)
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3.5(c)
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complex and the military's control is far from complete
as a result of Argentine political practices and behavior
of the military.
Argentina's politics are marked by intense competi-
tion among political sectors, who are extraordinarily
jealous of their prerogatives, even by Latin American
standards. Although competition is keen, the interested
parties--including the military--are bound together by
a complex set of interrelationships.
Key sectors compete directly with each other largely
unfettered by formal institutions that smooth over dif-
ferences in other societies. The legislature and the
courts, for example, are viewed as entities that are
unable to mediate impartially the competition for power.
In Argentine society political parties serve more to ad-
vance personal ambitions than to promote ideologies or
philosophies. The limits of political activity are
set by how much an individual or group can get away with
before an opponent reacts.
The key political sectors are acutely aware of each
other's every move. Each group nearly always interprets
any gain by another as an automatic loss for itself. Com-
promise is not valued; instead, it is considered as a sign
of weakness. A certain amount of violence, while not
formally condoned, is regarded as within the rules of the
game.
No sector has ever completely dominated the others
for any length of time. Alliances and loyalties tend to
shift too readily for any group to maintain its hold in-
definitely. As a result, it is exceedingly difficult to
envision a durable totalitarian regime in Argentina, even
though the executive branch traditionally is granted ex-
tensive putative powers. Only with the greatest difficul-
ty can a particular approach to a problem gather the
necessary consensus to become firmly established.
Civilian Pressures
The chief source of potential trouble for the junta
is the labor movement, the most formidable civilian group-
ing since it achieved political maturity under the tutelage
of Juan Peron in the 1940s. There is considerable hostility
between labor and the military, much of it stemming from the
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days of Peron. The military, first spawned, but ultimately
rejected Peron. Workers, however, still retain a strong
loyalty to the man who for decades dominated Argentine
politics. They see the military as unalterably opposed
to Peron's populism and to the gains they perceive he made
for them. For example, every attempt to limit wage in-
creases or rein in the activities of unions is inter-
preted in this light. Many officers, on the other hand,
blame the Peronists for virtually all the ills Argentina
has suffered for more than a generation and consider it
their duty to extirpate all vestiges of Peronist influ-
ence. Many generals believe labor's ascendancy under the
former government nearly destroyed the nation's economy.
The military are no less politicized than their civil-
ian counterparts. Disputes and rivalries abound, but most
officers prefer not to risk a breakdown of military unity
by pressing their differences too far. The safeguarding
of military unity frequently means that crucial decisions
are deferred and important policies watered down.
Ironically, disputatious officers often seek the
backing of civilian groups in an effort to outmaneuver
fellow military men. Thus officers regularly scheme with
representatives of various groups, even the unions. Ci-
vilians do their best to exploit the officers' differences
by joining whatever side has the most to offer them. The
lineups change often, at times inexplicably.
�Further complicating the political scene is the pro-
pensity of the regime to undermine its own claims of author-
ity by failing to act promptly on policy matters. Whether
or not because of internal divisions, the government has
acted inconsistently on several major issues, displayed
serious lack of coordination on others, and failed to
act at all on still others.
Under these circumstances, civilians feel more or
less obliged to test the government at every opportunity.
This testing process is in full swing and manifesting it-
self in a number of ways. The unions are at the forefront
of the activity because they have so far been the most af-
fected by junta restrictions to date. Despite the govern-
ment's takeover of major unions and confederations and the
ban on all strikes, workers have repeatedly challenged the
junta by staying off the job, staging slowdowns and com-
mitting sabotage.
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Labor's defiance reflects a mix of economic and
political concerns. Workers have in fact lost considerable
purchasing power due as a result of inflation, while pay
raises have been limited in the name of austerity. At
the same time, labor leaders bridle at the continuing
limits placed on their authority and activity. Union
leaders are in a particularly difficult situation.
Stripped of their ability to demand benefits for workers,
there is little they can do to retain the already waning
loyalty of the rank and file. They must try to deliver
something tangible for union members, if they are to re-
build their support.
We believe that the labor bosses will continue to
press the government by encouraging labor protests but
only those that stop short of provoking serious retalia-
tion. Only in this way can the leaders strengthen their
credibility among those they purport to represent. The
junta's relatively mild reaction thus far to labor pro-
tests probably has encouraged union leaders to pursue
this tactic.
Other civilian sectors bring pressure to bear in
whatever way they can. Currently, a vigorous debate is
going on regarding restructuring the executive authority.
The question revolves on whether the presidency should
continue to be held by a member of the junta or should
go to a "fourth man." Most of the arguments suggest
that the present government setup worked well during the
initial crisis and subsequent consolidation of the junta's
authority, but that it does not give the presidency
enough authority to direct longer term policies and plans.
Some commentators contend that to leave the presidency
within the military junta increases rather than reduces
the potential for crippling military rivalries.
The debate not only raises substantive issues but
also presents another opportunity for Argentines to put
pressure on the regime. It is difficult for President
Videla to ignore the debate, which is at least tacitly
approved by some potential military rivals eager to ad-
vance their own ambitions. He clearly will need to devote
an increasing amount of his time to protecting himself
politically. As a result, it will be hard for him to
address the policy issues he is expected to deal with
as chief executive.
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How far civilians can go in pressing the government
depends on their tenacity and on the tolerance of key
generals. The outcome hinges on a complicated series of
relationships between Videla and other officers as well
as between civilians and the military. The efforts of
civilians could be counterproductive.
Military Opposition
Videla is committed to a form of military rule
that is moderate in all areas except counterinsurgency,
and he seems to value open dialogue with a wide variety
of military and civilian groups. Videla's conciliatory
approach has caused him problems, however, particularly
from rival officers. Some claim that his mild manner
stems from weakness and that it invites continued defiance
from civilians. A sizable number of officers reject
Videla's policy of conciliation and have called for
greater restrictions on civilians and an even more ruth-
less campaign against the terrorists. Videla and his
military supporters have spent a good deal of time work-
ing to block this concept.
Navy chief and fellow junta member Admiral Massera
has been especially strident in his criticism of the
President, apparently in order to gain the support of
officers opposed to Videla's moderate ways. Massera's
tactics are brazenly opportunistic and self-serving; he
is reported to be in contact with certain civilians in-
terested in seeing him move up.
The planning minister, General Ramon Diaz Bessone,
could pose a more serious threat to Videla. Last year
Diaz Bessone engineered the establishment of the post he
now occupies, and he is now next to Videla in the line of
succession. This was accomplished over the President's
objections. Diaz Bessone, who enjoys a reputation as a
hard liner, obviously has his eyes on the presidency.
At some point, Videla's military critics may muster
enough support to force him to abandon his moderate ap-
proach or step aside. The arguments of such officers
would take on increased importance if in the interim,
under the leadership of Videla, the government should
suffer a major reverse either in the anti-terrorist
fight or on the economic front.
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Outlook
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The military cledrly do not intend to give up power
in the near future. The problems they intervened to
tackle are not subject to short-term solutions, and the
officers are committed to their solution. As a practi-
cal matter, moreover, there is no alternative to military
rule in sight.
The eradication of subversion will continue to pre-
occupy the regime. The military are encouraged by the
very real losses they have inflicted on the terrorists,
but they know that the war is still not won. Many be-
lieve the Peoples Revolutionary Army has been all but
destroyed, but there is less optimism regarding the urban-
based Montoneros. Although the Montoneros have been
hurt by the counterinsurgency campaign, they retain the
ability--and the will--to carry out attacks on businessmen,
police, and others. It is possible that changes at the
top will take place within the next month or so. Rumors
to this effect are rampant in Buenos Aires. Should Videla
lose either the presidency or his position in the junta,
it will be taken as a decisive defeat for his moderate
policies and a corresponding gain for his hard-line op-
ponents.
Real or perceived pressures from the US on human
rights may have an important influence on Videla's abili-
ty to retain the upper hand. If he is seen as caving in
to the US, the hard-liners can hope to use nationalistic
arguments to strengthen their case against him. Videla
must, therefore, make it clear to his detractors that he
is willing to stand up to Washington.
Whether ot not Videla remains in office the human
rights problem will persist in Argentina. It will con-
tinue to be a troublesome factor--and a potential cause
of friction with the US--as long as the Argentine military
believes it faces a serious subversive threat.
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