WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03159047
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2017
• Case Number: F-2015-02282
• Publication Date: July 21, 1972

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Noir'
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
CreL
21 July 1972
No. 0379/72
Copy N9
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CONTENTS (21 July 1972)
FAR EAST
EUROPE
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
1 Egypt-USSR: Ivan Go Home
2 China: Tampering with the Image
4 Indochina
9 Netherlands: Government
1 ails
9 Gromyko Visits Benelux
10 Portugal: Political Charade
11 USSR-France: Trade Prospects
11 Moscow Pushes US Trade Hopes
12 Western Europe: Togetherness
14 Law of the Sea: Problems
16 Yugoslavia: Economic Outlook
Cioudeci
17 Ghana: The Coup that Failed
18 Zaiie: Mobutu Rediscovers Africa
18 Burundi: A New Cabinet
19 Ethiopia: Insurgency Dampened
20 Libya: Qadhafi Pacified for Now
21 Iraq: Kurds and Baathists
21 Pakistan: Language Riots Over
22 Argentina: Lanusse Prevails
22 Cuba. Harvest and Trip Report
23 Mexico-US: Problem Solving
24 Uruguay: Tupamaro Ploy Fails
24 Brazil: Helping Out
24 Colombia: Terrorist Setbacks
25 Chile: Politics; Soviet Aid
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S E 1
EGYPT-USSR: IVAN GO HOME
President Sadat startled most of the world
on 18 July by publicly announcing that he was
asking the Soviet Government to withdraw its
training and advisory personnel from Egypt. He
added that Egypt 'would take control of Soviet
installations and equipment. TASS, using some of
the same terminology, the next day acknowl-
edged that the USSR was indeed withdrawing its
personnel, that the Soviets had "completed their
functions," and would "shortly return" to the
Soviet Union. Moscow explained that these forces
were to remain in Egypt for only a "limited
period" and that, following an exchange of
opinions, both sides had "deemed it exp_edient"
to bring them home. Moscow had nothing to say
on the issue of Soviet equipment in Egypt.
Almost as soon as the news was out, the
Egyptian press began waffling on the extent of
the Soviet withdrawal. Statements have ranged
from flat predictions that all Soviet military per-
sonnel are going home to reports that those ad-
Still laughing?
visers whose skills are vital to Egypt will remain.
The semi-official al Ahram quickly noted that
Cairo did not want to damage Egyptian-Soviet
relations and was eager for the bilateral treaty of
friendship and cooperation to continue in force,
it being the "faithful expression" of the great
cooperation between the two countries.
The number of Soviet military personnel in
Egypt is estimated at about 13,000. Some 1,000
are with the Soviet naval air squadron, 6,500 in
Soviet air and air defense units, 200 in the Foxbat
reconnaissance detachment, 800 attached to
Egyptian air defense units, and 4,500 advisers to
Egyptian air, army, and naval units. About 2,000
personnel associated with SA-3 battalions are be-
lieved to have left Egypt since late 1971.
President Sadat said his action was taken in
order to facilitate consultations on a "new stage"
in the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. Sadat's
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OrA_J
argument, which follows that of a series of ar-
ticles by al Ahram editor Haykal, was that Egypt
now requires complete freedom of action in deal-
ing with Israel. Sadat alluded to a disagreement
with Moscow over the supply and control of
Soviet weapons, and he said that he could not
accept restrictions on Egypt's ability to make its
own political decisions. Sadat observed that Cairo
did not want "friendly advisers" to fight Egypt's
battle, and he implied that by taking over mis-
sions and equipment formerly controlled by the
Soviets, he would free the USSR from responsi-
bility for Egypt's future actions.
The Soviets learned of the Egyptian decision
in advance. Soviet party chief Brezhnev himself
was very likely given the news by Egyptian Prime
Minister Sidqi in Moscow on 14 July in the course
of a five-hour discussion. Sidqi's trip was prepared
hastily after a series of unusual meetings in Cairo
involving the Soviet ambassador and came as a
surprise to the Egyptian Embassy in Moscow.
Foreign Minister Ghalib had to cancel a trip to
Belgium in order to join Sidqi in Moscow. Final
arrangements were made only a few days before
Sidqi left for the USSR on 13 July. Moscow's
relations with Cairo had been deteriorating for
some time so the Soviets may not have been too
surprised.
Many factors went into Sadat's decision, but
Soviet refusal to release new advanced weapons to
his armed forces, Soviet reluctance to endorse
military action against Israel, and the abrasive
rel at ions between some Egyptian officers�
notably Defense Minister Sadiq�and their Soviet
advisers clearly weighed heavily. Both the Soviets
and Egyptians in their public statements have
gone to some lengths to emphasize that the
friendship and cooperation between the two
countries remained unaffected by the termination
of the mission. Given good will on both sides, this
may turn out to be more than a pious hope, but
much remains to be sorted out between the two
countries and among the Egyptians them-
selves.
CHINA: TAMPERING WITH THE IMAGE
For some time now, efforts have been under
way in China to de-emphasize the cult of Mao,
reportedly with Mao's personal endorsement. A
People's Daily editorial on 6 July seemed to go
beyond this earlier limited objective. In calling
repeatedly for party cadre to acquire a thorough
knowledge of the "Marxist stand, viewpoint, and
method," the editorial seemed to be saying that
Mao's thought was no longer the focal point of
political study in China. Broadcasts to the home
audience have reinforced this impression.
In playing down Mao's theoretical contribu-
tion, the regime could be laying the groundwork
for a China without Mao, a notion that was sug-
gested by a People's Daily article of 11 June.
While clearly preserving Mao's historical position,
the article went to unusual lengths to explain that
no leader is irreplaceable. Surfaced in the midst of
a month-long series of leadership meetings in
Peking, the article may indicate that the succes-
sion question was on the leaders' agenda. In any
event, the deliberate way in which the regime is
moving on this score does not suggest any par-
ticular urgency at this juncture.
The declining attention given to Mao's ideo-
logical utterances could also signal another phase
Sk`Rk.I'
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Mao meeting Mrs. Bandaranaike, 28 June.
in the continuing struggle against extremist ele-
ments in the hierachy in Peking. During the Cul-
tural Revolution, these ideologues made selective
use of Mao's thought to justify various "revolu-
tionary" excesses. During his period of political
ascendancy, for example, former defense minister
Lin Piao sought to popularize the study of Mao's
thought through the wide dissemination�notably
in the famous little red book�of quotes, selected
by him, from Mao's written works and speeches.
In recent months, Peking has severely denounced
the book, asserting that cadre should not attempt
to take "shortcuts" by learning "individual
phrases, sentences� and conclusions," and the
little red book has conspicuously fallen from
public use.
Lin Piao was removed from power last
autumn amid charges that he had launched a coup
to seize power and had several times tried to
assassinate Mao. But other important political
figures who were closely identified with the
promotion of Mao's thought remain active on the
political stage. These leaders could be expected to
oppose any further efforts to put less emphasis on
Mao's doctrinal leadership. Indeed, the ap-
pearance of an article in the July issue of the
party theoretical journal extolling Mao in lan-
guage reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution may
be an expression of that position. At the same
time, however, the curious "571 document"--a
manifesto allegedly drafted by Lin's supporters
and containing some unusually harsh criticism of
Mao's stewardship�is circulating throughout
China.
Taken together, these developments have
touched off a good deal of speculation among
ordinary Chinese. In recent weeks it has been
rumored that Mao is seriously ill (he will be 79 in
December), that another attempt was made on his
life, and that he will soon relinquish all of his
party positions. Mao's recent reception of two
foreign visitors has temporarily laid to rest rumors
about his ill health, but the obscure and often
conflicting political signals emanating from Pe-
king are likely to feed rather than dampen
popular concern over the status of and prognosis
for the "great helmsman."
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%me ShZirlik _L
INDOCHINA
THE BATTLE FOR QUANG TRI
South Vietnamese forces are progressing
slowly against continuing strong enemy resistance
to their counteroffensive into Quang Tri Province.
Some airborne units are inside Quang Tri City and
are reportedly moving closer to the Communist-
held Citadel, the fortress in the city's northern
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section. Other South Vietnamese airborne units
north and south of the city have been heavily
shelled, as have marine units on the east. During
the weekend, a marine force linked up with a
marine battalion airlifted last week to a point just
northeast of the city, and the combined force is
about a mile from the city.
Both sides appear determined to carry on a
sustained battle for control of Quang Tri Prov-
ince. Government forces apparently intend to
concentrate as much on the longer task of push-
ing Communist forces back from outlying areas of
the province as on a quick recapture of the prov-
ince capital. The Communists, for their part, are
making an all-out effort to defend their positions.
They are also sending in more forces to reinforce
units that have suffered heavy casualties in
ground action and air strikes during the coun-
teroffensive.
And for Hue
The Communists are maintaining consid-
erable pressure on government positions in Thua
Thien Province. Hue has been shelled fairly
regularly since early July, and government bases
on the city's southwestern flank have come under
ground and artillery attack. The seesaw battle
continued for Outpost Checkmate, a strongpoint
near Fire Support Base Bastogne and, following a
Communist ground attack on 14 July, govern-
ment forces abandoned the outpost for the third
time in two weeks. There is still no direct evi-
dence of enemy plans to launch a major attack on
Hue in the near future.
Action Elsewhere
The situation farther south has been gen-
erally quiet. On the central coast, government
forces have launched an offensive in Binh Dinh
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Province to retake the three northern districts
that fell to the Communists over two months ago.
The government troops have met with some
enemy resistance in the initial stages, chiefly at
Bong Son Pass on the Route 1 entry point to the
northern districts. In the Mekong Delta, enemy
harassment in Chuong Thien Province, which was
at a high pitch last week, has continued, as has
fighting in Dinh Tuong Province. In addition,
some of the action in this area has shifted east-
ward to Vinh Binh Province and to Kien Hoa
Province, where a district chief was killed in an
enemy attack on a government outpost on 17
July.
THE PARIS TALKS
As the open Paris talks resumed on 13
July, the Communists sought to create an
appearance of reasonableness. At the talks
themselves and at their post-meeting press
conferences, they tried to convey the impres-
sion that once military and political issues
were settled in general terms, they would be
willing to discuss creation of a new Saigon
government directly with the South Vietnam-
ese themselves. Such discussions, they im-
plied, would be predicated on the withdrawal
of US forces and the termination of US "po-
litical and military" support for the Saigon
government. This nuance�which was also
reflected in Communist statements at the
Paris session this week�seems designed essen-
tially to outflank the US refusal to impose a
coalition government on Saigon.
The Communists have generally main-
tained in the past that the US must formally
agree in principle, if not in detail, to both the
political and military aspects of their negoti-
ating proposal before a cease-fire could take
place. It has long been evident that the Com-
munists would be willing to establish a coali-
tion government themselves without any US
involvement, if the nature of the US military
withdrawal a d termination of support for
the Thieu regime created conditions in which
this could easily be achieved on their terms. It
is Hanoi's view that the Saigon government
would not last long without US arms and
political backing.
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SLUGGING IT OUT IN SOUTH LAOS
Government troops appear to be gaining the
upper hand in the fight for the Khong Sedone
area of south Laos. In early June, Lao forces
quickly pushed Communist troops from Khong
Sedone town, but the North Vietnamese have
stoutly resisted efforts to clear them from the
surrounding countryside. Low morale, supply
problems, �and heavy air strikes are taking their
toll of the Communist troops, and the intensity
of Communist shellings from east of the Se Done
River has diminished. Government forces last
week finally drove North Vietnamese troops from
several strategic positions north and west of the
town. The area is still not completely cleared, and
elements of four North Vietnamese battalions are
expected to contest further government advances.
Lao forces are faring less well in the Bolo-
yens Plateau area. Elements of the 9th North
Vietnamese Regiment have thwarted government
efforts to push east along Route 23 or north on
Route 231.
In the north, the government offensive to
capture Phou Pha Sai mountain southwest of the
Plaine des Jarres ground to a halt last week as
poor weather curtailed both combat and supply
flights. Four irregular battalions, which had been
attempting for more than a month to move on
Phou Pha Sai from the south, gave up and with-
drew, apparently because of supply problems.
Vang Pao will allow these troops to return to
Savannakhet Province and will replace them with
indigenous forces. The advance of another ir-
regular task force moving on the mountain from
the west was also halted temporarily because of
insufficient supplies.
Communist Envoy Back in Vientiane
The Lao Communists' special envoy for
peace talks, Souk Vongsak, arrived in Vientiane
on 15 July and three days later delivered a letter
to Prime Minister Souvanna from Communist
leader Souphanouvong. Neither side has yet re-
vealed the content of the new Communist mes-
sage.
CAMBODIA: NEW POLITICAL ROW
The political atmosphere in Phnom Penh is
beginning to heat up again. Opponents of Pres-
ident Lon Nol are charging that the rules estab-
lished by the government for the national as-
sembly elections on 3 September will favor
regime candidates. The key criticism is that the
city of Phnom Penh, which voted heavily against
Lon Nol in the presidential race earlier this year,
will be under-represented in the new assembly.
Although it has a population of 1.5 million, the
capital has been allotted only ten seats, while Koh
Kong Province, with 8,600 registered voters, has
four. Other points at issue include a requirement
that members of the military have the approval of
the high command to run in the election and the
procedures for counting and validating the votes.
The proportionally greater representation
awarded to rural areas in the legislature is obvi-
ously intended to compensate for the weak sup-
port the regime has in Phnom Penh. Only the
energetic backing of the military�particularly in
the countryside where the electorate is more
susceptible to government pressure�enabled Lon
Nol to win a majority in the presidential contest.
The press is giving wide circulation to
charges that the apportionment of assembly seats
is unfair, and the leaders of both the opposition
Republican and Democratic parties are reportedly
considering boycotting the elections. It seems un-
likely that they will leave the election to Lon Nol
and the splinter parties he is currently organizing
unless they are certain that the government is
intent on rigging the results.
1-EtREI
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In the Countryside
Cambodian and South Vietnamese troops
seeking to reopen a section of Route 1, the main
highway between Phnom Penh and Saigon, have
bogged down just short of their first objective,
the Communist-held town of Kompong Trabek.
The joint operation, which began on 4 July, has
been plagued by bad weather and poor logistical
support in addition to enemy resistance. Else-
where in the country, fighting during the week
continued at a relatively low level.
The Communists appear to be working to
build up their political infrastructure. In an ap-
parently methodical and systematic campaign to
extend control over the peasantry, the Corn-
munists, according to the government, have
forced an estimated 2,000 families to leave their
villages since 1 May and move to enemy-
controlled areas. The majority of these families
have been taken from villages within a 15-mile
radius of Phnom Penh and apparently are being
resettled in a sparsely populated area some 20
miles southeast of the capital. The Communists
may intend to release some of the captives after
giving them training and indoctrination in hopes
that they will return to undermine support for
the government in their native villages. The
removal of people from around Phnom Penh and
other urban areas also makes it easier for the
Communists to carry out surprice attacks against
such population centers.
� � �
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NETHERLANDS: GOVERNMENT FALLS
Prime Minister Biesheuvel and his cabinet
tendered their resignations to Queen Juliana yes-
terday. The Queen will probably ask Biesheuvel
to form an interim government to prepare for
national elections before the end of the year.
Disagreements within the cabinet on how to
deal with inflation and the $1-billion deficit
expected in next year's budget brought the one-
year-old government to an early end. Biesheuvel
failed this past week to save his fragile five-party
coalition after two cabinet ministers representing
the small but pivotal Democratic Socialist party
resigned on 17 July in protest against his efforts
to economize. The two men argued that reduc-
tions in ministerial budgets would not have been
necessary if the government had tackled inflation
by instituting wage and price controls. Demo-
cratic Socialists have called for controls since last
fall and have repeatedly criticized Biesheuvel for
failing to impose them.
Biesheuvel could reconstitute the coalition
without the Democratic Socialists. Although this
four-party arrangement would be two seats short
of a working majority in the 150-member parlia-
ment, Biesheuvel could rely on the tacit support
of a handful of ultraconservative Calvinists. There
are, however, too many contentious issues among
the remaining coalition parties to permit agree-
ment on anything other than the necessity for
new elections. The government parties will try to
schedule elections as late as possible, probably in
the spring of 1973.
GROMYKO VISITS BENELUX
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko sailed
through a busy round of diplomatic activity in
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium, but
left little of consequence in his wake. He signed
routine bilateral agreements, elicited vague prom-
ises of closer cooperation, and got some support
for beginning preparations for a conference on
security and cooperation in Europe.
Despite Gromyko's efforts to maintain
harmony during his 5-12 July tour, controversy
emerged, particularly in the Netherlands, where
his unimaginative style and Dutch firmness led to
difficulties in drafting a joint communique. As a
result, the bilateral declaration contained nothing
on interstate relations or inter-German relations;
Gromyko had proposed the inclusion of both
points. Also, the communique described the
Berlin Agreement as the "four-party agreement of
Gromyko (r.) greeted by Dutch foreign minister.
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Noisp, SEizsi4a1 4.01
3 September 1971" despite the usual Soviet ef-
forts to label it the "agreement on West Berlin."
In presenting the Soviet position on a Euro-
pean security conference in Luxembourg,
Gromyko urged Helsinki as the site of both the
preparatory talks and the conference itself, but he
reluctantly acknowledged that the US elections
would put off preparations until at least mid-
November. The foreign minister also outlined a
proposed format and agenda for the conference
and plugged for a "consultative" organ to con-
tinue the conference work. He clearly opposed
linking the conference and the question of mutual
and balanced force reductions. The Belgians
found Gromyko's outline of a quick, non-con-
troversial security conference superficial and
simplistic.
Gromyko avoided any implication that he
viewed the Benelux countries as a unit, which
might have been construed as a precedent for
Soviet dealings with the European Communities
as an entity. While the problem of how to handle
the EC was probably one of Moscow's considera-
tions in Gromyko's undertaking the trip, he
adopted a sardonic tone in his brief comments on
it, implying that it was impossible for the USSR
to know how to deal with the EC because of its
disunity.
PORTUGAL: POLITICAL CHARADE
The expected re-election on 25 July of Presi-
dent Thomaz to a third term will confirm
Premier Caetano as the top political man in Portu-
gal. Under Thomaz, who will be 78 in November,
the presidency will continue to be a largely
ceremonial office. Caetano will exercise the real
power.
The President's only important duty is to
appoint and dismiss the premier. Admiral Thomaz
has used this authority only once�in September
1968 when he relieved the gravely ill Salazar and
appointed Caetano. Once in office, Caetano took
a strong hold and, by the force of his personality
and by issuing decree laws, legalized many powers
that Salazar had informally assumed.
Since indirect election of the president by a
government-controlled electoral college began in
1959, it has been a cut-and-dried affair. The can-
didate is selected in advance by the government,
and the electoral college, composed of regime
supporters, does what is expected of it. This year,
there was some behind-the-scenes politicking for
the post by General Antonio de Spinola, the
dynamic governor and military commander in
Portuguese Guinea, and by General Kaulza de
Arriaga, the able military commander in Mo-
zambique.
Gaetano himself reportedly considered run-
ning for president, but gave up the idea when
senior military officers objected to losing the post
traditionally reserved for one of their number.
Caetano was unwilling, however, to serve as
premier under strong characters like the two gen-
erals. He believed they would seek to move the
presidency toward France's Gaullist model. Con-
sequently, the generals' tours of duty in Africa
were extended, and Thomaz was nominated. The
decision was announced earlier than usual in an
effort to cut off speculation about the choice of
the government candidate.
The decision to run Thomaz again permits
Caetano to go on dominating the political scene
and may give the premier a chance at the presi-
dency later on if he wants it. Caetano has used
the pre-election period to make a strong defense
of Portugal's retaining its African provinces. In a
recent TV and radio speech, Caetano cited Presi-
dent Thomaz as the symbol of national unity and
asserted that voting for him will affirm Portugal's
determination to remain united and committed to
a peaceful future for its overseas prov-
inces.
L1`6.1-1
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USSR-France
TRADE PROSPECTS BRIGHTENING
Soviet orders for plant and equipment from
France jumped sharply during the last six months
to some $425 million; this represents almost one
third of the nearly $1.4 billion of orders thus far
placed in 1972 in the developed West. These large
contracts, which include $205 million for pipeline
equipment and $65 million for six sea-going con-
tainer ships, put France well ahead this year in
the intensifying competition for Soviet trade.
They highlight the resurgence of the Soviet-
French "special relationship" since Brezhnev's
visit in late 1971.
France, benefiting from a pioneering eco-
nomic cooperation agreement signed by De
Gaulle in June 1966, averaged about $140 million
in Soviet orders annually during the 1966-69 pe-
riod, a level that topped most of the developed
West. Orders dropped off sharply in 1970, how-
ever, and fell even lower last year. The decline
pointed up the dissatisfaction of both the USSR
and France with the operation of their economic
agreements. Although the Soviets profited from
the acquisition of advanced technology and
know-how, they complained of large trade defi-
cits with France as well as the lack of success in
getting French businessmen to use Soviet equip-
ment in major French projects. French industrial-
ists remain critical of the quality of Soviet manu-
factured goods.
To shore up sagging Soviet-French coopera-
tion and economic activity, a new ten-year pact
was signed in Paris last October during the Brezh-
nev visit. The pact stresses cooperation in each
other's economic development programs and,
while it does not set right, the trade imbalance
underscores an intent that may help reach the
doubling of trade called for by the 1970-74 So-
viet-French trade pact. Much of this planned in-
crease probably will continue to come from
French exports. The French will have to explore
thoroughly Soviet export capabilities in order to
increase purchases from the USSR if they are to
maintain their current sales advantage. As matters
stand now, there is little that France wants to
import from the Soviet Union other than fuels
and raw materials.
6
MOSCOW PUSHES US TRADE HOPES
Occidental Petroleum Corporation's highly
touted agreement for extensive commercial re-
lations with the Soviet Union may be less than
meets the eye. The agreement is similar to others
signed by the Soviets with Western firms and
governments. Typically, these pacts are gener-
alized statements of intent, but trade depends
upon the future conclusion of contracts. Also,
Occidental's small size, lack of market outlets,
and inexperience in arctic operations make it a
poor choice for assisting in gas and oil exploration
and production in that area.
Occidental officials told the US trade mis-
sion, which arrived in Moscow on 20 July, that a
contract calling for 50-percent financing of a
$300-million chemical fertilizer plant in return
for part of the plant's production may be con-
cluded within two weeks. The Soviets may hope
that dangling the prospect of a variety of such
contracts before the US trade negotiators may
persuade them to resolve quickly�and on terms
favorable to the USSR�outstanding US-Soviet
economic problems. These include lend-lease
settlement, US credits, and licensing technology
as well as a trade agreement.
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S�JRET
WESTERN EUROPE: TOGETHERNESS
Representatives of the European Com-
munities and five European Free Trade Associa-
tion states not seeking EC membership�Sweden,
Switzerland, Austria, Portugal, and Iceland�are
due to sign industrial free trade agreements in the
next few days in Brussels. Although Finland�also
a member of the EFTA group�was also scheduled
to sign an agreement, signing will now be delayed
pending the formation of a new coalition govern-
ment in Helsinki. These agreements, the culmina-
tion of over seven months of negotiations, pre-
vent the re-establishment of tariffs on most in-
dustrial products between the enlarging EC and
the remaining EFTA group.
The pacts call for the elimination over five
years of most tariffs on industrial goods traded
between the EC and the remaining EFTA group.
The reductions on so-called sensitive products,
such as ferrous metals, paper, and clock move-
ments, will be stretched out for as long as 11
years in order to ease adjustment for certain EC
industries. This provision was the subject of long
negotiations. Helsinki, especially, was concerned
over its paper industry. Other issues were resolved
only this week. These included the "rules of
origin," which determine the eligibility of goods
for reduced tariffs and certain agricultural con-
cessions on the part of the EFTA countries�other
agricultural trade provisions were put off for
future consideration. The agreement provides
special treatment for Portugal's farmers and de-
veloping industries. The agreement with Iceland
will be held in abeyance pending resolution of the
fishing rights issues raised by Reykjavik's 50-mile
territorial waters claim.
The six EFTA countries hope to secure
ratification of the agreements by 1 January 1973
so that they will come into effect when the EC is
enlarged. There is opposition to the agreements in
all EFTA countries, but so far it has taken on
meaningful proportions only in Austria and Fin-
land. Austrian farmers may force the Peoples'
Party, which they strongly influence, to block the
needed two-thirds majority unless Vienna pro-
vides more protection for Austrian agriculture. In
Finns protest EC negotiations.
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Finland, the minority Social Democratic govern-
ment resigned this week so that a majority coali-
tion could take responsibility for signing the
agreement. Even if the new coalition, which will
probably be some time in forming, does sign,
chances for ratification may hinge on whether the
Soviet Union intervenes by opposing the EC ties.
In 1970, such action by Moscow discouraged Fin-
land from joining an economic union with the
Scandinavian countries.
If the six agreements are approved, all of
Western Europe will in effect be within the EC's
trading system next year. Greece, Turkey, and
Spain already have preferential trading arrange-
ments with the EC. Ireland has ratified its acces-
sion treaty, and the vote in Commons last week
ensured that Britain will follow suit. The new
pacts will maintain Nordic trading ties, which
should help facilitate approval of EC membership
in Norway and Denmark where referendums will
be held this fall.
Despite the diversity of these arrangements
and the lack of strong institutional ties, the eco-
nomic interdependence to which this trading
system will give rise may over the long run draw
the participating countries closer together. For
the US, Japan, and other countries outside the
trading area, however, the new agreements�like
some of the older ones the EC has negotiated�
raise difficulties. The agreements are of question-
able compatibility with GATT criteria and, while
these agreements will contribute to the growth of
trade among the signatories, established trade pat-
terns and export outlets involving non-partici-
pants may well be hurt. Disputes over these issues
will agitate international trade circles for some
years.
MOVES ON MONETARY REFORM
Community financial experts are trying to
fashion specific international monetary reform
proposals based on the broad agreement on prin-
ciples recently established by the finance min-
isters of the ten countries that will constitute the
enlarged EC. The finance ministers will convene
again in September, just prior to the Group of 20
and International Monetary Fund meetings, but
Chancellor of the Exchequer Anthony Barber has
indicated that he does not expect the EC to have
agreed on all the specifics of reform by then.
The ministers agreed on eight conditions as
requisites for a new international monetary
system:
� fixed but easily adjustable parities;
� general convertibility of currencies;
� effective control of international li-
quidity;
� adequate balance-of-payments adjust-
ment;
� reduction of the destabilizing impact of
short-term capital flows;
� equal rights and obligations for both
surplus and deficit countries;
� recognition of the interests of develop-
ing countries;
� compatibility with the progress of EC
economic and monetary union.
Their agreement left unanswered many difficult
questions, such as the role of Special Drawing
Rights, how to control international liquidity,
and the consolidation of reserve currency (dollar)
balances. They apparently did not discuss the
development of EC economic and monetary
union.
Although the finance ministers did not ad-
dress last week's flight from the dollar, the results
of the meeting had a decided calming effect on
international exchange markets. Heavy dollar sell-
ing had been triggered by reports that the French
appeared willing to consider a joint float of EC
currencies against the dollar. As a result, Euro-
pean central banks were forced to absorb more
than $2 billion in US dollars to keep their cur-
rencies within their internationally agreed ex-
change-rate ceilings. However, after the finance
ministers indicated continued support for fixed
rates, pressure on the dollar eased considerably,
and subsequent US dollar purchases aave addi-
sunnart.
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LAW OF THE SEA: PROBLEMS
The session of the UN Seabeds Committee
that began this week will run into mid-August. It
could determine whether a Law of the Sea con-
ference will be held in 1973. The main order of
business before the 91-member committee is to
agree on a list of issues to be discussed at the
conference. If the committee fails to reach agree-
ment, the General Assembly may well vote this
fall to postpone the conference for at least a year.
Although the committee chairman has suggested
compromises on items in a list drawn up last
March by 56 committee members, many of those
he has talked to think his proposals are worse
than the original ones.
The high degree of controversy stirred up
over how to word agenda items testifies not only
to the importance of the issues at stake, but to
the difficulties they give rise to. One involves the
rights of states to the ocean resources that lie off
their shores. Some Latin American countries have
been advocating territorial seas of 200 miles. The
declaration issued after the recent Caribbean Law
of the Sea conference, however, spoke in terms of
a 12-mile territorial sea and a broader "patri-
monial sea" in which the coastal states would
have exclusive rights. Even if this does�as some
people believe�indicate that an international con-
sensus for a 12-mile limit is emerging, the exact
rights coastal states would have over resources
beyond the territorial seas remain to be decided.
Another issue for which agreed agenda word-
ing has yet to be obtained is the right of passage
through straits. Because of its interest in the
Straits of Gibraltar, Spain has taken the lead in
pressing for substantial control by coastal author-
ities over transit through the more than 100
straits that would be enclosed if territorial seas
were extended to 12 miles. Many states, including
the US, fear that under these circumstances the
right of innocent passage under international law
would not be adequate to ensure the movement
of their vessels. The US and others, therefore, are
pressing for the right of free passage through
straits.
The Seabeds Committee is trying hard to
produce an agreed agenda, believing that little can
be gained from postponing the Law of the Sea
conference. Delay, it is reasoned, may lead to
unilateral action or regional arrangements, both
of which would complicate the process of
bringing an international conference to a suc-
cessful conclusion. This would, in any case, be
hard enough since, apart from the territorial sea
and straits issue, the conference would be dealing
with other intractable questions such as fishing
rights, marine pollution, and international
machinery to regulate the exploitation of the
deep seabeds.
IIM'SRQ1
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YUGOSLAVIA: ECONOMIC OUTLOOK CLOUDED
Economic performance in the first half of
1972 was markedly better than last year, but
prospects for a strong showing during the latter
half of the year are not bright. Belgrade's success
in restricting imports and in stimulating exports
led to a dramatic turnabout in the trade balance.
During the first six months, exports rose 30 per-
cent above the 1971 level, while imports declined
by 17 percent. As a result, some officials are
predicting a current account surplus this year
compared with the $320-million deficit registered
last year.
Trade prospects for the second half of 1972
are not as favorable as official predictions indi-
cate. Large imports of wheat, corn, and vegetable
oil will be necessary to supplement domestic sup-
plies, which will be reduced because of the
drought last spring. Moreover, import controls are
now beginning to affect raw material supplies.
This, in turn, is contributing to a general slowing
of industrial growth and may curb the regime
drive to expand exports.
The government's attempts to stabilize the
economy at home have been largely unsuccessful.
Despite an extended freeze, consumer prices are
expected to increase at more than double the
planned rate. The cost of living, fueled in part by
a 16-percent increase in food prices, rose during
June and is continuing to rise this month. This
normally is the season when prices decline. More-
over, government efforts to control the money
supply and personal incomes are being opposed
by the republics and the trade unions.
Implementation of recent economic reforms
has been delayed by the lack of consensus on
basic goals and foot-dragging by the republics.
Creation of a domestic foreign-exchange market,
for example, which had been slated for this
month, has been postponed until at least No-
vember,and steps to restrict investments of un-
profitable firms have had little effect. Neither the
government's stabilization program nor the most
recent round of decentralizing reforms attacks the
basic causes of Yugoslavia's economic instability.
The "boom-bust" pattern that characterized the
1960c nrobablv will continue in the
1970s.
A NEW VICE PRESIDENT
On 1 August, Rato Dugonjic, a 56-year-old
Serb from Bosnia-Hercegovina, will succeed
Macedonian Krste Crvenkovski as vice president.
Dugonjic, the second man io hold the office, is
experienced in youth work, an area of prime
concern since the student strike that precipitated
the political tension in Croatia last year.
The collective presidency was set up to pro-
vide for a smooth transition in the government.
Tito remains president for life, but in the event of
his resignation or death, the vice president would
take over as caretaker president. Still, power in
Yugoslavia is centered in the party, and it is here
that the struggle to find Tito's real successor will
take place. And here, there is as yet no c r-cut
order of succession or any heir-apparent.
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GHANA: THE COUP THAT FAILED
The government last week thwarted a coup
group that was trying to restore former prime
minister Busia and the disbanded Progress Party
to power. The plot was only one of several con-
spiracies the jittery military leaders had under
investigation at the time, an indication that they
are well aware�six months after they themselves
seized power�that their own position is far from
secure.
The conspirators' final meeting on the eve of
their planned coup had been penetrated by of-
ficers friendly to the government, and the secu-
rity forces moved swiftly the next morning, ar-
resting five civilians, eleven enlisted men, and one
junior officer, all of the Ashanti tribe. The civil-
ians included a former director of the Ghanaian
intelligence service and the deputy inspector gen-
eral of police. Also reportedly involved in the plot
were some 300 enlisted men, who were to have
arrested their officers. Enlisted men have been
unhappy since the military take-over last January
because they believe that only officers have ben-
efited from the coup.
The coup leaders had intended to form a
constitutional committee to run the country for
two weeks, at which time Busia was to reassume
office. Busia is in exile in London, but reportedly
would have returned to Accra if the coup had
succeeded.
An official statement charged that "dis-
gruntled businessmen" and officials of the
former Progress Party had attempted to over-
throw the government. The statement said that
foreign troops were to have been brought in to
overcome resistance�a clear reference to the gov-
ernment's suspicion (without much evidence) that
Ivory Coast was mixed up in the affair. The
government has said that everyone connected
with the plot would be brought to trial, and there
are indeed indications that it is going to crack
down hard on its opponents and critics. On 18
July, the regime banned two independent news-
papers, one of them Ashanti-oriented, and de-
creed death by firing squad for persons convicted
of subversion. The pro-government press has been
playing up the coup as an attempt by "busi-
nessman. intellectuals, and academic opportun-
ists" to regain the privileges they lost following
the military take-over early in the year.
Other plotters may be deterred by the fact
that the coup was nipped in the bud. It is clear,
however, that the government is in trouble and
has a long way to go before it gains the support it
needs to govern effectively. As the country's
economic problems deepen, coup plotting and
dissatisfaction with the government's per-
formance will doubtless increase.
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ZAIRE: MOBUTU REDISCOVERS AFRICA
President Mobutu Sese Seko, having
achieved a measure of stability at home, is again
showing interest in African affairs. Recently, he
has taken a number of steps to improve Zaire's�
and his own�stature in Africa.
At the Organization of African Unity heads-
of-state conference last month, Mobutu took the
lead in defeating the re-election bid of former
secretary general Diallo Telli. Many African
leaders had long been dissatisfied with Telli, but
they hesitated to act against him until Mobutu
stimulated them. Mobutu also was instrumental in
the election of Telli's successor. He picked up for
Zaire one of the three assistant secretary-general
posts, through which he hopes to exercise a mod-
erating influence over the organization.
Mobutu has been courting two states,
Guinea and Algeria. His acceptance there provides
especial satisfaction since leaders of these coun-
tries have viewed Zaire as the "sick man of Af-
rica." Last June, he made his first visit to Guinea,
where he noted the similarities between his own
philosophy of "authenticity" and Toure's long
opposition to imperialism. The two leaders agreed
in principle to pool Guinea's alumina and Zaire's
electric power resources. Toure will repay the
visit in November, and will help mark the seventh
anniversary of Mobutu's rise to power.
Mobutu is planning a state visit to Algeria,
and the Algerian foreign minister will travel to
Kinshasa next month to make arrangements. The
visit holds a special significance for Mobutu and
Zairians. Former prime minister Tshombe was
hijacked to Algeria in 1967 and imprisoned there
in protest against his use of mercenaries.
Mobutu is also endeavoring to polish his
image as an African nationalist, tarnished some-
what by his ambivalence toward the Zairian-based
Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile. Al-
though he supports the group, he firmly restricts
its activities to avoid jeopardizing his discreet
contacts with the Portuguese. Last month, he
cooperated with Congolese President Ngouabi in
bringing about a reconciliation, in principle, be-
tween the two major anti-Portuguese nationalist
movements. Although the reconciliation seems
doomed from the start, it has helped Mobutu
finesse African suspicions of his sincerity in the
cause of African nationalism.
BURUNDI: A NEW CABINET
President Micombero appointed a new
cabinet last week to replace the one he threw out
on 29 April. Although it is weighted in favor of
Tutsi moderates and includes several Hutus, it is
not likely to bring an early end to the tribal
slaughter of the past ten weeks.
Tribal and factional bitterness, always strong
in Burundi, has been so intensified in recent
months that it will be a long time before any
government, whatever its intentions, can begin to
restore stability throughout the country.
Micombero dismissed his previous cabinet because
it had been paralyzed by the intrigues of a group
of Tutsi extremists from southern Burundi who
were plotting against a moderate faction from the
north. Despite the dismissals, the extremists were
the major force behind the current Hutu
ET
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SEG-W
Nor
repressions because of their strong influence in
the army and the bureaucracy. They can be ex-
pected to continue their vendatta against the
Hutus and the moderates too if they get in the
way.
Micombero returned the leader of the ex-
tremist faction to his former position as foreign
minister. He also appointed extremists to the
posts of education and public works. Tutsi mod-
erates got the justice and interior posts. As a
conciliatory gesture and to counter growing West-
ern criticism, Micombero appointed Hutus to the
posts of civil service, information, and social wel-
fare. Apparently, the government had protected
these particular individuals throughout the repres-
sion for just this purpose. They are not likely to
have much authority, as the bureaucracy is now
completely dominated by Tutsis.
Micombero revived the post of prime min-
ister, which he had abolished when he seized
power in 1966. He appointed Ablin Nyamoya,
who served as prime minister in the mid-1960s.
Nyamoya is not a forceful personality, and he will
have trouble keeping the heterogeneous new cabi-
net in harness.
So far, the announcement of the new gov-
ernment has had little effect on reducing the
climate of fear throughout Burundi. The Tutsis
apparently remain at fever pitch. They fear a
Hutu invasion from neighboring Rwanda, where
the Hutus are in power. The Tutsis also fear
reprisals from Hutu refugees who have fled to
Tanzania. Even after the new government was
formed, Hutus were still being executed in the
capital, and no let-up of the slaughter in the
countryside is expected.
ETHIOPIA: INSURGENCY DAMPENED
The easing of military rule in part of Eritrea
suggests that the province's insurgent movement
has been run down by internecine fighting and by
stepped-up government military and propaganda
efforts. During the past several months, the gov-
ernment has lifted certain travel restrictions and
abandoned or removed some road checkpoints in
northeastern Eritrea in effect since December
1970. The province's governor general has re-
turned to a limited form of civilian administration
in some parts of the province that had been under
martial law. At least 70 veteran insurgents have
surrendered with their weapons in recent months,
taking advantage of a new government amnesty
program.
Despite the improved security situation, the
insurgents may prove tenacious. They still can
pull off hit-and-run raids, minings, and terrorist
activities. The government has not scored any
recent, dramatic victories over insurgent units and
it has not captured any high-level rebel leaders.
Nevertheless, the Addis Ababa government, al-
ways cautious, would not have eased its controls
unless it believed it could keep the lid on.
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LIBYA: QADHAFI PACIFIED FOR NOW
A serious dispute within Libya's ruling Rev-
olutionary Command Council has been resolved
by the appointment of a predominantly civilian
cabinet with Major Abd As-Salam Jallud, a lead-
ing member of the council, as prime minister. The
council, however, is still the major instrument of
power, and Colonel Qadhafi remains chairman.
The council had been promising a new
cabinet for some time, but early this mpnth a
major split developed among council members.
Qadhafi apparently demanded that an all-ciVilian
cabinet be named as a first step toward the awn-
tion of the council and the establishment of a
political structure similar to those of Libya's con-
federation partners, Egypt and Syria. A majority
of Qadhafi's colleagues, including Jallud and
other influential council members, resisted,
insisting that the military retain key portfolios in
the new cabinet. The response of the tempera-
mental Libyan leader was typical�he threatened to
resign and sulked in seclusion for nearly two
weeks.
Qadhafi has, for some time, wanted to re-
place the council with a president, prime minister
and cabinet, backed by a legislative assembly and
the Arab Socialist Union as the country's sole
political organization. The recent agreement to
merge the Arab Socialist Union organizations in
Libya and Egypt probably inspired Qadhafi to
step up the pace of domestic reorganization to
prepare for closer political ties between the two
countries. Many of his colleagues favor a more
cautious approach toward their powerful neigh-
bor, and they are not ready to relinquish the
exclusive power the council has held since the
overthrow of King Idris in 1969.
Despite their differences with Qadhafi, other
members of the council refused to accept his
resignation and a compromise was reached by
which the council would remain the major
policy-making body between the cabinet and
New York Times Magazine
Qadhafi as president. The Egyptians probably
helped to arrange the compromise, and they re-
portedly are pleased with Jallud's increased
executive responsibilities because he is a more
consistent and effective administrator than the
unpredictable Qadhafi. Nevertheless, Cairo still
favors Qadhafi for the top political position,
presumably because of his liberal financial assist-
ance to Egypt�too liberal for most of his col-
leagues.
The new cabinet will have little political
power, but it will probably try to steer Libya on a
more practical and responsible course. Seven of
the 16 civilian ministers announced so far are
holdovers from the previous cabinet. Two
others�the foreign minister and the planning min-
ister�are seasoned professionals in their respec-
tive fields. Qadhafi formerly managed foreign af-
fairs without holding the portfolio, and he is
expected to continue to take primary responsi-
bility for Libya's external policies. Major Jallud
and Major al-Huni, who remains as minister of
interior, are the only two council members in the
cabinet unless, as the press has suggested, Qadhafi
remains as minister of defense.
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IRAQ: KURDS AND BAATHISTS
Government forces and Kurdish irregulars
clashed last week in northern Iraq. An uneasy
peace, which generally has held since the peace
accord was signed in March 1970, has been re-
stored for the moment, but the potential for
renewed fighting is high.
Although the perennial fighting that marked
the 1960s has not recurred, neither the Baathist
rulers in Baghdad nor the Kurdish rebels have
given up their efforts to do the other in. The
Baathists have yet to implement all of the polit-
ical provisions of the 1970 agreement�including
the granting of limited self-government to the
Kurds�and are reported, probably correctly, to
have tried to liquidate Kurdish leader MuIla Mus-
tapha Barzani. In turn, Barzani has resisted both
Baathist and Soviet pressure to bless a national
coalition government with his participation. He
continues to plot the overthrow of the unpopular
Baghdad regime and has sought assistance abroad
for his plans.
Kurds in the mountains have shown con-
tempt for the Arabs on the plain since antiquity,
and the Baathist regime negotiated the peace
agreement only after repeated failures to pacify
the rebels by force. Baghdad needs and wants an
end to internal strife, but ethnic hostility may
again prove stronger than political perception and
increase the danger of a resumption of another
sputtering war on the frinrs of the Arab
world.
PAKISTAN: LANGUAGE RIOTS OVER
A week of strict curfews enforced by the
army and a compromise on the provincial lan-
guage issue have ended civil disorders in Karachi
and other cities in the Sind. Urdu speakers took
to the streets earlier this month when the
provincial legislature passed a bill making Sindhi
the official provincial language. Under the com-
promise, the bill has become law, but it is accom-
panied by an ordinance postponing the imple-
mentation of many of its provisions for 12 years.
Rivalry between Sindhi and Urdu speakers re-
mains and could well lead to more violence in the
future.
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ARGENTINA: LANUSSE PREVAILS
President Lanusse's new rules for the presi-
dential election next March have evoked tough
statements from Peronists but have attracted sup-
port from other quarters. Peronists and anti-
Peronists alike have interpreted Lanusse's chal-
lenge to Peron to return by 25 August if he wants
to run for president as an indirect proscription of
the old dictator's candidacy.
The military has officially endorsed the
President's proposals, although Lanusse appar-
ently feared that he had opened himself to the
charge of being "soft on Peron." He told a group
of businessmen that when he left home to outline
his plan to the military he was not at all sure that
he would still be president when he returned. In
retrospect, he seems to have regained the initia-
tive with respect to his opponents in the military
and to Juan Peron in Madrid.
The Radical Party�second largest in Argen-
tina�was especially pleased with Lanusse's chal-
lenge to Peron, his actions against the Peronist
labor confederation, and his fixing of 25 August
as the date by which government officials, includ-
ing Lanusse himself, must resign if they wish to
run in the election next March. The Radicals see
Lanusse's statements as improving their chances
of having a major voice in the next government.
Lanusse favors a Radical for president probably
with a military man as vice president.
reportedly has assured Ricardo
Balbin, the long-time Radical leader, that his
party will have its man in the presidency when
the 1973 elections are over. With this thought
foremost in his mind, Balbin is prepared to sup-
port the military on almost anything, although he
will continue to make occasional noises aimed at
attracting at least some Peronist support.
Lanusse's announcement that all potential
presidential candidates must be in Argentina be-
fore 25 August and remain in the country until
the election on 25 March has put Peron in a
difficult position. It is unlikely that he will risk
returning to his homeland, even though he has
tried to keep that possibility open to improve his
bargaining position with the military government
and to maintain unity within the Peronist move-
ment. Top Peronist leaders are already claiming
that the residency requirement is illegal and noth-
ing more than a thinly disguised attempt to pre-
vent Peron from winning the election.
Despite Peronist objections, 25 August has
become a crucial date in the presidential race. The
two main adversaries in Argentine politics to-
day�President Lanusse and Juan Peron�must
definitive move by then.
CUBA: HARVEST AND TRIP REPORT
Cuba's annual 26 July celebration will prob-
ably be highlighted by a Fidel Castro speech on
recent developments in Cuban policy. The Cuban
leader has not delivered a speech in Cuba since 1
May, and he almost certainly will take this occa-
sion to expound on a number of subjects.
Castro may devote a major portion of his
speech to Vietnam. Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, leader
of the Viet Cong delegation at the Paris Peace
Talks, reportedly will attend the 26 July rally.
Her presence could easily inspire a lengthy criti-
cism of US policies in Vietnam by the Cuban
leader.
Another topic might be his recent trip to
Africa, East Europe, and the USSR. Since his
return on 6 July, Havana has maintained a virtual
silence on this subject. This lack of comment may
indicate that Fidel is not completely satisfied
with the outcome of his trip. The US-Soviet
summit meeting and its implications for Cuban
security may still bother him despite Soviet
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attempts at reassurance. The central problem,
however, may well be the economic advice Castro
received from the Soviet leadership. The Soviets
may have extracted a promise for more orthodox
economic programs in lieu of the haphazard ap-
proach Cuba has followed in the past. However
Castro may cloak it, Cuba's recent admission to
CEMA provides the Soviets with another means
for influencing Cuban economic decisions. The
Cuban leader, however, is unlikely to be critical
of the Soviets in public.
Fidel will undoubtedly express great satisfac-
tion with the re-establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions with Peru. The renewal of ties further
undermines the 1964 OAS sanctions, which until
recently have isolated Cuba from most other na-
tions of the hemisphere. This, in Castro's view, is
a major victory for Cuba against "imperialism," a
theme heavily emphasized by the Cuban media in
recent days.
Page 23
There will be little to cheer about when
Castro turns to domestic matters. The sugar har-
vest will probably be only about 4 million tons
and could be as small as the 3.8 million tons
achieved in 1963�the record low during Castro's
rule. To mollify a weary and disappointed popu-
lation, Castro will probably have to give elaborate
explanations of the poor harvest and may call for
even greater sacrifices to overcome Cuba's con-
tinuing agricultural problems.
Castro's main problem is how to boost
flagging morale and restore vitality to the Cuban
revolution. To renew enthusiasm, Castro may
employ a combination of tactics, including a tem-
porary relaxation of austerity measures and prom-
ises for a better future. (CONFIDENTIAL)
MEXICO-US: PROBLEM SOLVING
An interim agreement has been signed to
reduce the salinity of Colorado River waters de-
livered to Mexico, and the Echeverria administra-
tion now is turning its attention to the status of
Mexican migrant workers in the US.
The US has already begun diverting over halt
of the relatively saltier drainage from the Wellton-
Mohawk irrigation project away from the Col-
orado River and replacing it with better quality
water. This arrangement will satisfy Mexico until
the end of the year.
The illegal Mexican workers in the US pose a
more complicated and emotional problem. Last
year, the US deported over 300,000 Mexican
workers. The issue was discussed during Echever-
ria's recent visit to Washington, and it was agreed
to undertake a study of the problem. Mexico is
forming a study group, and Foreign Minister
Rabasa has requested that the US take similar
action.
Both issues are hot potatoes for Echeverria,
and moves toward solving them would justif the
optimistic cast given his visit to the US.
WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 Jul /;.?
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URUGUAY: TUPAMARO PLOY FAILS
The Tupamaros, who seem to be in real
difficulties, reportedly have tried to make a deal
with the military and have been turned down.
The Tupamaros may have been trying to
exploit recent dissatisfaction within the armed
forces over congressional criticism of their role in
counter-terrorism. A group of irate army officers
had issued a proclamation, "Any action that
tends to defame conduct by members of the
armed forces in their struggle against subversion is
treason." In addition, the Tupamaros may have
seen a chance to try a different approach to their
stated objective of forcing a military coup d'etat,
which they believe would result in a more repres-
sive government and thus create the next staae in
y process.
BRAZIL: HELPING OUT
Brazil, convinced of the need to influence
events in nearby countries, is giving support,
to the governments of
Bolivia and Uruguay. I he Medici government re-
gards instability in these countries as a potential
threat to Brazil's own security. Furthermore, Bra-
zilians probably regard the ability to influence
events in Bolivia and Uruguay as a victory in their
rivalry with Argentina, and as a warning that no
country in the area can permit a leftward drift
without risking some form of Brazilian involve-
ment.
Page 24
The Medici
government is expected to deliver small arms and
tear gas in the near future. Brazil also plans to
provide medical services in the interior of Bolivia,
apparently hoping to bolster President Banzer's
political support at home.
For some time, Brazil has been supplying
Uruguayan security forces with arms and financial
aid. It may have been helping Uruguayan au-
thorities in their recent offensive against urban
terrorists. Uruguay's naval attache in Brazil has
indicated, for example, that the leader of an anti-
Tupamaro unit in the navy received some of his
training in Brazil.
As a result of the self-confidence being gen-
erated by political stability and economic growth,
Brazil's interest and involvement in the affairs of
neighboring countries will almost certainly grow.
Brazilia must be cautious, however, as many Latin
American countries are already concerned about
Brazil's power and ambition.
COLUMBIA: TERRORIST SETBACKS
The army's intensive three-week-old cam-
paign against the pro-Cuban National Liberation
Army has led to well over 100 arrests and sub-
stantially reduced the group's potential as a guer-
rilla force. Most of the arrests have taken place in
cities in mountainous Santander Department,
where the guerrillas have successfully mounted
hit-and-run operations against military patrols and
outposts for years. Few, if any, active insurgents
have been affected as yet, but their prospects for
eluding capture in the future have been reduced.
Those arrested were members of an urban support
network, which reached from the cities of Bogota
and Cali in the south to Barranquilla in the north.
The relatively benign Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Columbia and its parent organization,
the pro-Soviet Colombian Communist Party, have
not been included in the army's current cam-
paign.
WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 Jul 72
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The army's current operation has taken the
entire left by surprise and reflects a significant
strengthening of the government's counter-
insurgency position.
CHILE: MORE HEATED POLITICS
The political temperature, rising for several
weeks, is high. The government's response to the
challenge from the opposition congress is picking
up steam, and the electoral victory of the Com-
munist candidate in Coquimbo last weekend
boosted morale on Allende's team. The President
himself has publicly criticized the legislature and
the judiciary, claiming both have acted uncon-
stitutionally against his government.
Taking to the streets last week to defend the
government, followers of the Popular Unity
parties were harangued by suspended Interior
Minister Del Canto and later disrupted the
deliberations of congress and the Supreme Court.
Larger demonstrations have been promised.
Allende is resisting attempts by the opposition to
limit his use of the considerable power of the
Chilean executive; he has counter-attacked with
constitutional argument and intimidation.
Allende has been portraying himself as the de-
fender of the constitution against an irresponsible
congress, a situation reducing his reluctance to
make use of extra-legal means of pressure on
occasion.
The momentum of the government's
counter-offensive was sustained by the victory of
the Popular Unity candidate in Coquimbo. While
the victory in this generally leftist province was
anticipated and the specific implications are still
being debated, the psychological importance of
the triumph remains. Adding to the government's
optimism, the results of the labor confederation
elections held last May were finally announced.
The Communists and Socialists were in first and
second place. The Christian Democrats believe
Page 25
they actually won the second spot, but Socialist
and Communist vote counters apparently over-
came their mutual animosities to juggle the op-
position party into third place.
Attention is turning to the March 1973 elec-
tions. Allende has eliminated legal alternatives to
the existing election federations, causing addi-
tional problems for the Christian Democrats.
They have been forced, reluctantly, into a close
but fragile association with the right, a situation
already being exploited by the government. Pub-
lic squabbling between the Nationals and Chris-
tian Democrats in Coquimbo, especially the
youth brigades, was a limiting factor on the op-
position campaign. The Socialists are also uncom-
fortable with the federation concept, but have
less trouble with it than the Christian Democrats.
The Socialist Party leader recently pointed out
that in elections held in 1972, where only two
candidates were presented, the government has
not always won a majority, but has at least come
close to 50 percent. This is ten percent more than
the left was able to obtain prior to 1971, and the
leftist parties hope to be able to garner enough
additional support to win a definite majority in
1973. Their success is by no means assured. US
Embassy officials calculate that government pop-
ularity is declining, and may hit a low of 40
percent by election time.
AID FROM MOSCOW
Moscow's extension of significant new long-
term credits to Santiago gives a big boost to the
Allende government and the hard-pressed Chilean
economy. It follows a thorough evaluation by the
USSR of the political and economic situation in
Chile. The credits will be used for the purchase of
machinery and equipment and for project assist-
ance. Additional sums will be forthcoming from
the USSR and the East European countries to
finance Chile's current trade. Moscow had already
given Santiago a $50-million short-term, hard-
currency credit and two long-term credits totaling
$97 million for Droiect assistlnce and machinery
exports.
WEEKLY SUMMARY 21 Jul 72
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