CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/02/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03157467
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: February 11, 1955

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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Comment on Western European view that USSR will revert to
"hard" foreign policy (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
2. Ambassador Bohlen comments on Malenkov's downfall (page 4).
3. Comment on recent Soviet statements on Formosa (page 5).
4. MIG-17's possibly equipped with airborne intercept radar (page 5).
5. Warsaw conference suggests new Soviet position on troop with-
drawal from Germany (page 6).
FAR EAST
6. Hatoyama adviser sees China trade as only way to Japanese
independence (page 7).
7. Comment on Chinese Communist threat to Nanchishan (page 8).
8. Major troop transport mission on Yangtze River indicated (page 9).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
9.
WESTERN EUROPE
10. French may consider tripartite solidarity at stake in Near East
(page 10).
11. Comment on the French government crisis (page 11).
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GENERAL
1. Comment on Western European view that USSR will revert to
'hard" foreign policy:
Government officials and the non-
Communist press in Western Europe
are virtually unanimous in their view
that the new Soviet leadership will
adopt a "hard" foreign policy line.
Hope for a top-level East-West meet-
ing has dwindled. Chancellor Adenauer
states that his opponents' arguments
against German rearmament have been
blighted. The British Foreign Office
has announced that Eden will cut short
his Far Eastern trip which is to follow the Manila pact confer-
ence late this month.
A high Dutch Foreign Ministry official,
whose government foresees a reversion to Stalinism in the USSR,
states that Khrushchev may not restrain the Chinese Communists.
He described Molotov's speech as "belligerent."
Italy's Foreign Minister Martino be-
lieves a "hard" Soviet policy will help Rome's anti-Communist
campaign.
European Socialists, such as Aneurin
Bevan in Britain and the Social Democrats in West Germany, ap-
pear to share the general view that the Soviet Union will take a
harder line and are expressing regret at "the failure of the West
to grasp the hand offered by Malenkov."
The growing conviction that the Soviet
Union may revert to more belligerent cold war policies will lead
to greater attention to defense problems in Western Europe. Any
suggestion of stronger Soviet support for Communist China will
quicken the sense of urgency about an early settlement in the Far
East�
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SOVIET UNION
2. Ambassador Bohlen comments on Malenkov's downfall:
Ambassador Bohlen believes that
Malenkov's downfall is the logical
climax of a far-reaching split within
the top leadership involving two dif-
ferent concepts of the future development of the USSR. Signs
of differences between Khrushchev and Malenkov over eco-
nomic policy first appeared nearly a year ago, but problems
of foreign affairs, especially German rearmament, apparently
brought matters to a head in the latter part of December. The
ambassador feels that Malenkov's defeat marks a return to the
Stalinist outlook and will lead to a hardening all along the line
in both foreign and domestic policy.
Bohlen states that, while Khrushchev's
victory makes him the most powerful man in the USSR, it would
be premature to conclude that the period of collective leadership
Is drawing to a close. The personal power factor appears to be
the result rather than the cause of the policy dispute.
Although Malenkov's fate is uncertain,
his demotion appears to follow the traditional path of gradual
elimination, The ambassador comments, however, that Malen-
kov's statement to the Supreme Soviet was unlike the abject
groveling of discredited leaders in Stalin's day and contained no
specific repudiation of his policies as prime minister except on
the issue of heavy industry. In fact, Malenkov's deliberate ef-
fort to connect his guilt to Stalinist agricultural policies could be
an indirect slap at Khrushchev's agricultural program, which bears
more resemblanc,e to Stalinist coercive methods than did the in-
centives stressed by Malenkov in 1953.
One version of the affair, allegedly
emanating from the London Daily Worker correspondent in Moscow,
states that Malenkov walked out. of the recent central committee
debate on economic problems. It was supposedly only after this
that it was decided to relieve him as prime minister, it having
been planned for him to stay in that post as an expression of party
solidarity on the new line. Ambassador Bohlen is especially in-
terested in this unconfirmed version's implication that Malenkov
rather than Khrushchev forced the issue of his removal.
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Comment: In connection with the
ambassador's remarks on the continuation of collective lead-
ership, the removal of Beria and now the demotion of Malenkov
may render Khrushchev's consolidation of his position a simpler
task than that which Malenkov faced.
Comment on recent Soviet statements on Formosa:
The latest statements of Bulganin and
Molotov on the Formosa situation ap-
pear designed to convince the world of
Soviet-Chinese Communist solidarity. Bulganin's pledge of "full
Soviet approval and support" for the "noble cause" of the Chinese
people is the strongest statement Moscow has made on the Formosa
issue.
Like all previous Soviet pronouncements
on Formosa, however, these latest speeches made no specific com-
mitment of arms or aid, and both omitted the usual reference to
� Chinese determination to "liberate" the island, Bulganin main-
tained the careful distinction that it is the Soviet "people," not the
government, to whom the Chinese may look for sympathy and sup-
port, and Molotov did not give even this much support.
Both leaders reiterated that American
withdrawal from the China area is the only solution to the problem,
and both strongly reproached the UN for failing to demand this.
Initial Soviet comment on the much-
publicized fifth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet treaty on 14 February
has carefully skirted application of the treaty to the current Formosa
crisis.
MIG-17's possibly equipped with airborne intercept radar:
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Comment: Specially modified MIG-17's
could carry intercept radar equipment in pods under the wings or
possibly in the nose section.
� About 40 percent of the Soviet fighter
establishment of approximately 10,000 jet fighters is comprised
of MIG-17's, which were identified in operational Soviet units as
early as 1952. It is estimated that 200 airborne intercept radar-
equipped night or all-weather fighters will be in operational units
by mid-1955.
5. Warsaw conference suggests new Soviet position on troop with-
drawal Germany:
A conference of official delegations
from the Orbit states and of Communist-
front delegations from eight West Euro-
pean countries, which met in Warsaw on
6 February, has issued a statement that
four-power agreement is possible on the
simultaneous withdrawal of all occupation
troops from Germany, with the Soviet troops returning to the USSR.
The statement suggested the withdrawal from Poland of all Soviet
troops guarding military communication lines to Germany.
The proposal also included German unifi-
cation with "free and controlled" elections based on an electoral
law guaranteeing democratic freedotns, as was envisaged iii the
Eden plan. It declared that only a German settlement would make
an Austrian treaty possible and reaffirmed that ratification of the
Paris accords would ruin the chances for negotiations.
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