CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/02/10
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03157466
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Publication Date:
February 10, 1955
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10 February 1955
Copy No.
88
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 2.t
NO CHANGE IN CLASS rx
Li DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: _La-42--REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
.Comment on Western European reaction to change in Soviet
leaders (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
2. Comment on Ma,lenkov's new status (page 4)0
3. Comment on Zhukov's appointment as Soviet defense minister
(page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Hostilities between Hoa Hao and Vietnamese troops said to be
imminent (page 5).
SOUTH ASIA
5. Comment on fall of government in south Indian state of Travancore-
Cochin (page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Anti-Western, leftist blocs seen entering next Syrian cabinet
(page 6).
* * * *
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GENERAL
Comment on Western European reaction to change in Soviet
leaders:
The initial reaction in Western European
capitals to Malenkov's resignation has
been confined largely to speculation about
a continuing power struggle in the Soviet
hierarchy. Most government spokesmen
believe that Khrushchev's increased in-
fluence will lead to a more belligerent
propaganda line in Soviet foreign policy,
if not to a harder policy itself.
The British Foreign Office feels that if
Khrushchev becomes "boss," the USSR will be under a leadership
less intelligent, more emotional, and tougher than the "collective"
under Malenkov. A hardening of internal Soviet policies is pre-
dicted. The admission that the Soviet leadership is not infallible
is expected to have repercussions in the Satellites.
Italian premier Scelba believes that any
crisis within the USSR throws further confusion into external Com-
munist circles, He instructed his press chief to comment along
the line: "The Russians have chosen guns, not butter."
A French Foreign Ministry spokesman
called the change an "internal affair." Political party leaders who
believed that talks with the USSR should be held before the Paris
accords are ratified argue that the change in Soviet leaders makes
such talks more urgent. Those politicians who have opposed talks
before ratification continue to do so.
In West Germany as well as in other West-
ern European countries, government leaders should be able to capi-
talize on what they view as a "tougher" Soviet line at the expense
of their opponents who advocate a "soft" policy toward the USSR.
Now, as at the time of the Korean outbreak, increased Communist
belligerency may tend temporarily to stem talk about the likeli-
hood of an early understanding with the Communists,
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SOVIET UNION
2. Comment on Malenkov's new status:
The appointment of former premier
G. M. Malenkov as minister of elec-
tric power stations and as a deputy
chairman of the Council of Ministers
indicates that he retains, at least nominally, a position of con-
siderable authority. There are also indications that he remains
a member of the party presidium.
Malenkov's influence is probably very
limited, however. His new assignment may be temporary in
order to provide a decent interval before further demotion, and
may have been made to allay fears of an immediate widespread
purge.
Malenkov's responsibilities as a deputy
chairman of the Council of Ministers are not clear. It is possible
he will take over supervision of all three ministries now operat-
ing the electric power complex. M. G. Pervukhin, who is still a
party presidium member and a deputy chairman of the Council of
Ministers, has been resnonsible for this complex since Stalin's
death.
3. Comment on Zhukov's appointment as Soviet defense minister:
The appointment of the Soviet Union's
most able military leader, Marshal
Zhukov, as defense minister, underlines
the importance the regime attaches to
increased military preparedness. This was also demonstrated in
the rise in military allocations in the 1955 budget and the eleva-
tion of Bulganin, the previous defense minister, to chairman of
the Council of Ministers.
Zhukov's appointment will strengthen pop-
ular confidence in the ruling group as a whole. The prestige of
the officer corps, which had already risen since Stalin's death,
will be further enhanced.
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Zhukov is reputed to have a realistic
view of international power relationships. He will now be in a
position to make professional military views known in strategic
matters affecting Soviet government policy.
Although a party member since 1919,
Zhukov has no known personal allegiances to individual political
leaders. He has a history of impatience with outside interference
in military matters, resulting in reported altercations with some
top-level party and security chiefs.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
40 Hostilities between Hoa Hao and Vietnamese troops said to be
imminent:
General Soai, a member of Diem's cabi-
net and the most influential of the Hoa
Hao military leaders, told the American
embassy in Saigon on 9 February that a
"violent conflict" is imminent between the sect's forces and Viet-
namese national army troops in southwestern Vietnam. Soai stated
that deliberately provocative acts on the part of national army troops
in the area controlled by the sect have so inflamed Hoa Hao forces
that "some accidental spark" could set off open warfare. He also
said he was planning to return to his troops to prepare them for con-
flict,
The embassy is convinced this is a real
crisis that could even bring about the downfall of the Diem regime.
An open battle at this time, in addition to publicly demonstrating
the lack of unity within free Vietnam, would seriously affect the
government's current efforts to reoccupy the southwestern terri-
tory, until lately held by the Viet Minh.
Comment: Hoa Hao forces number approx-
imately 20,000, and the sect is reported to exercise control over an
area with a population of nearly 1,000,000. General Soai has the
personal allegiance of some 7,000 troops. Vietnamese army strength
in southwestern Vietnam totals about 20,000 men.
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The Hoa Hao, in common with the other
sects, can be expected to oppose vigorously any government at-
tempt to reduce its lucrative control over its domain. Most ob-
servers agree on the importance of solving the sects' problem in
order to increase the government's stability, but thus far Diem's
attempted solutions have stirred up additional dissension both
within and between the sects. This dissatisfaction reportedly has
already spread to the national army.
SOUTH ASIA
5. Comment on fall of government in south Indian state of Travancore-
Cochin:
The fall of the 11-month-old Praja Social-
ist government in Travancore-Cochin state
on 8 February illustrates the political in-
stability which plagues south India. Al-
though the government's defeat was engineered by the Congress Party,
the Communists are probably the real gainers.
The Congress Party is too weak to govern
the state effectively, and there is no evidence that it has enhanced
its popularity since it fell from power in September 1953. The in-
effectualness of the Praja Socialists while in power has discredited
their party.
The Communists in both Travancore-
Cochin and nearby Andhra, where critical state elections are sched-
uled to begin on +11 February, are thus enabled to substantiate their
charge that it is futile for the land-hungry and underemployed south
Indian voter to expect vigorous reform governments from either the
Praja Socialists or the Congress Party.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Anti-Western, leftist blocs seen entering next Syrian cabinet:
Ambassador Moose in Damascus, com-
menting on the resignation of Prime
Minister Khuri on 7 February, states
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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that two parliamentary blocs opposed to the proposed Iraqi
Turkish pact and "tainted with neutralism or anti-Westernism"
will probably be represented in the next Syrian cabinet in a
coalition with the conservative Nationalists. These blocs are
a group of independents led by nand al Azin and the extreme
Arab Socialist-Resurrectionist Party led by Akram Hawrani.
Comment: The entrance into the Syrian
government of the Azm-Hawrani group, leftist and anti-Iraqi,
would probably make it impossible for Iraq to persuade Syria to
join, the projected Middle East defense system, of which the pro-
posed Iraqi-Turkish accord is the beginning. Syria's refusal to
join would, in turn, probably block Lebanese and Jordanian par-
ticipation, thus frustrating Iraqi hopes to lead an Arab bloc into
the "northern tier" arrangement.
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