CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/03/12

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03157415
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: March 12, 1960

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12 March 1960
Copy No. C 68
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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12 MARCH 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
VAR would support Cuban complaint in
UN in the event of US action on Cuban
sugar quota but urges Castro to try to
improve relations with US and Latin
American countries.
General Ne Win postpones US visit; con-
cerned about incoming U Nu government.
South Vietnam--Communist terrorism in
southern provinces widespread.
Tn CINC'T
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III. THE WEST
�French agricultural interests, angry
over farm prices, are trying to press
De Gaulle for special parliamentary
session.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
12 March 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IL ASIA-AFRICA
UAR-Cuba:
instructed to urge
Cuba to make every effort to improve its relations with the
United States and Latin America before lodging its projected
complaint in the United Nations in the event of future US action
on the Cuban sugar quota. the UAR
would support such a complaint if made.
(Page 1)
South Vietnam: Incidents of Communist terrorist activity
in the southern provinces continue to be widespread, and are
eroding popular confidence in the g ability to main-
tain security in the affected areas. (Page 2)
Burma: .2.4enera1 Ne Win, the outgoing premier, has post-
poned his visit to the United States for medical treament. Ne
Win feels his presence in Burma is necessary to ensure the
smooth transfer of government and has expressed strong reser-
vations about the incoming government of former Premier U Nu.
j 2 Be has served notice on U Nu that he would seize control again
if conditions required 1.3 (Page 3)
III. THE WEST
France: Agricultural interests, increasingly angry over
farm prices, are trying to press De Gaulle into a special ses-
sion of parliament which might prove an embarrassing accom-
paniment to the Khrushchev visit. They claim to have 260 of
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Nor'
the 277 deputies' signatures necessary to call such a session.
The US Embassy believes that a De Gaulle refusal to agree to
the deputies' petition would strengthen antigovernment extrem-
ists, who last month used a farmer demonstration to precip-
itate violence. (Page 4)
12 mar 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA -AFRICA
UAR-Cuban Relations
The UAR has told its ambassador in Havana to advise
Cuban officials that it would back a projected Cuban com-
plaint to the United Nations in the event of future US action
on the Cuban sugar auota,
The ambassador was told to urge
Havana, however, to make every effort to improve its re-
lations with the United States and Latin America before
lodging such a complaint.
Cairo, although anxious to maintain favor with the Cuban
Government, appears to be exercising caution in its political
relations with the Castro regime. The UAR is sensitive to
the anti-Castro sentiment expressed by representatives of
other Latin American countries. Cairo has been enlarging
its effort to gain friends throughout the area, hoping to gain
sympathy for its neutralist policies and support in the various
controversies in which the UAR is involved before the United
Nations. It is also attempting a considerable increase in its
economic activities in the area.
The UAR has expressed approval of Castro's highly pub-
licized plans for a Havana conference of underdeveloped na-
tions, but has warned Cuba against inviting attendance by
Communist states. Cairo has also advocated a conference
agenda sticking to strictly nonpolitical themes, which would
give Cuba less opportunity to stage an "anti-imperialist"
show.
TOP ET
12 Mar 60
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New Nov
Communist Terrorism in South Vietnam Intensifies
The growing aggressiveness of the estimated 3,000 Viet-
namese Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam is highlighted
by recent attacks in the vicinity of Saigon. On 7 March a well-
armed Communist band of about 200 men and women pillaged a
hospital about 15 miles north of Saigon, making off with medi-
cine, money, and equipment.� The Communists harangued the
staff on how the Diem government and the Americans were "ruin-
ing the country." aarlier in March, twenty Communists, in a
daylight assault on a militia post about six miles southwest of
Saigon, killed three men and took eighteen rifles.]
These incidents are symptomatic of the marked deterioration
in security of southern and southwestern provinces, particularly
since a successful raid by about 300 Communists on a regimental
cantonment last January. Vietnamese security forces have had
several stiff encounters in recent weeks with sizable guerrilla
forces. The increase in ambushes and attacks against govern-
ment patrols and security posts, assassinations of local offi-
cials and villagers, and sabotageends to support South Viet-
namese estimates that the Communists intend to eliminat
Saigon's control over the countryside in these provinces.] resi-
dent Diem apparently is convinced that the Communists�have
opened "all-out guerrilla war.'3 There are reports of possible
additional infiltration, by land and sea, of Communist guerril-
las from North Vietnam.
IN-Thiess the government can check Communist terrorism,
the loyalty of the local population--already strained by high-
handed behavior of provincial officials--will be further eroded,
opening the way to the extensive control of the countryside which
the Communists exerted under French rul_g
ET
12 Mar 60 CENTRAI INTFI I inmirc Dliii CTIk1 Page 2
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LIEN114- AL
Nemo
Retiring Premier Fears for Burma's Future
� [General Ne Win, who is to turn the government of Burma
back to U Nu in April, has postponed for several months a
planned visit to the United States for medical treatment. He
feels that his personal supervision is necessary, to ensure
the smooth transfer of government and has expressed serious
reservations over Burma's prospects under his successor.
Ne Win ousted Nu in October 1958 to halt Burma's drift to-
ward economic chaos and civil wal..3
LiTe Win considers Burma's political leaders inept or cor-
rupt. He had hoped that the February elections would produce
two balanced parties in parliament instead of the landslide
victory for Nu's following. Since the elections he has felt
it necessary to warn Nu bluntly that to forestall a return to
the chaotic conditions of 1958 he is prepared to seize con-
trol of the government again. During Soviet Premier Khru-
shchev's recent visit to Rangoon, he declined an invitation
to visit Moscow, saying, "At present I am busy preparing
for a change of government; after that I will be too occupied
to visit MoscovKfn
eneral Ne Win apparently feels that U Nu personally
may be Burma's most serious problem in the immediate fu-
ture. In a conversation with Ambassador Snow, he recent-
ly described Nu as a "very dangerous man... not entirely
sane�loose and vague at times mentally.. , shrewd and cal-
culating, .. petulant and changeable... quite willing to play
one person or country off against another." He feels that
Nu may have difficulty in forming an adequate government
because of the paucity of able men in his party...3
CCi_eneral Ne Win clearly believes that the future stability
and growth of Burma will be dependent upon control and
supervision of politicians by the army. He hopes to exercise
that supervision, however, without direct varticination in
thP crnvornmanf
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II. THE WEST
French Farmers Pressing De Gaulle for Special
Parliamentary Session
French agricultural interests, increasingly angry over
declining farm prices and the government's continuing re-
fusal to reinstate a price system tied to the cost-of-living
Index, now claim to have 260 of the 277 deputies' signatures
necessary to call a special session of the French parliament
before the scheduled opening on 26 April. Farmer discon-
tent has already led to a number of demonstrations, includ-
ing the Amiens riot in February which was exploited by
rightist opponents of De Gaulle's Algerian policy. The farm-
ers apparently hope to extract concessions at a time when,
in view of Khrushchev's impending arrival, the government
presumably is anxious to avoid any display of parliamentary
hostility.
The government objects that farmer demands are infla-
tionary and would lead to a new round of price increases and
wage demands. It seeks to mollify the farmers with a bill
providing for increased government assistance in agricultural
modernization, education, marketing, and distribution. It
insists, however, that farm commodity prices must be re-
lated to farm costs, instead of to the cost-of-living index.
Premier Debre is trying to accelerate drafting of the gov-
ernment bill to permit early consideration by the agricul-
tural committee in parliament, and he may try to get agree-
ment for a special session of parliament to convene a few
days before 26 April.
The embassy believes that if De Gaulle, as Debre has
hinted, refuses to act on the deputies' petition for a special
session, a dangerous breach between the government and as-
sembly will result and mass farmer agitation will be re-
newed. Rightists who oppose De Gaulle's invitation to Khru-
shchev see farm discontent as a vehicle for embarrassing
the President.' Moreover, left and center parties, who
believe De Gaulle's recent tough statements on Algeria in-
dicate a backward step from a liberal settlement, may view
a special session of parliament as an opportunity to attack
the government on Algerian policy.
12 Mar 60
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFID AL
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