CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/09/08

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03156627
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: September 8, 1958

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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Indonesia: In the dissidents' first direct compromise ap-
proaCiTs11-67 hostilities began last March, a Sumatran rebel
leader has sent a letter to four members of Parliament sug-
gesting that Parliament act as a mediator between the central
government and the rebels. Prime Minister Djuanda regards
the approach as unsatisfactory but has said he will think
about it. Dissident sabotage in Sumatra against rubber and
oil installations appears to have died down. A negotiated.:
settlement in the near future is unlikely, but both sides may
now be ready to explore the possibility of holding talks.
(Page 4)
Tunisia: President Bour-
guiba has decided that Tunisia will join the Arab League,
probably on 9 September. Bourguiba, who is reported an-
noyed that Morocco failed to consult with Tunisia before an-
nouncing its intention to join the league, believes that Tu-
nisia cannot afford to be the only Arab state remaining out-
side. He hopes that, as a member, Tunisia may be able to
exert a moderating influence in the Nasir-dominated league.
Iraq: Regime leaders are showing apprehension of a
countercoup. Dissatisfaction among some army officers
may have reached the point where they are considering a
countercoup. Public disillusionment with the regime's prog-
ress is also contributing to unsettled conditions. If the
situation deteriorates, the regime might seek popular sup-
port by some gesture such as nationalizing the oil industry.
(Page 5)
Jordanian infiltration: Jordan's King Husayn may intend
to provoke trouble With the UAR and Iraq as a means of block-
ing implementation of a general Middle Eastern settlement un-
favorable to him.
8 Sept 58
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Nasir-Hammarskjold talks: Nasir was reportedly un-
willing to agree to several of UN Secretary General Ham-
marskjold's proposals for elimination of tension between the
UAR and Jordan. Cairo has taken the position that the UNGA
Middle East resolution of 21 August was intended essentially
to facilitate withdrawal of foreign troops. Nasir shows no
inclination to meet King Husaynts desire for assurances of
noninterference in Jordan before Husayn agrees to withdrawal
of British troops.
III, THE WEST
Venezuela: The failure of a Venezuelan military coup
on 7 SePternber reflects the loyalty of the bulk of the armed
forces to junta President Larrazabal, and the effectiveness
of civilian strength as a checkmate to the threatened return
of military dictatorship. (Page 6)
LATE ITEM
Khrushchev letter: In a letter to President Eisenhower on
7 September, Khrushchev warned that Moscow will view any
attack on Communist China as an attack on the Soviet Union.
This warning is probably intended to show the world that the
Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders are fully prepared for a
/ major test of strength with the United States. By thus attempt-
ing to heighten world-wide apprehension over the possibility of
large-scale hostilities, Khrushchev�in the first official Soviet
pronouncement since the beginning of the present Taiwan Strait
crisis--probably hopes to induce allied and neutral governments
to bring heavy pressure on the United States. The letter con-
tained a hint that Khrushchev may later call for high-level
8 Sept 58
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negotiations between the United States, the USSR, Communist
China, and other countries to consider ways of resolving Far
East tensions through "common efforts,"
8 Sept 58
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Taiwan Strait Situation (as of 0100 EDT, 8 Septea.ber)
The Chinese Communists made no attempt to interfere with
the initial Kinmen resupply operation which was accomplished
on 7 September under United States naval protection. There
was ample opportunity for interference since the supply ships
remained at Kinmen for nearly five hours while Nationalist
aircraft provided continuous air cover.
Peiping immediately issued a statement charging that
four US warships had intruded into Communist China's ter-
ritorial waters. The statement declared that such an encroach-
ment "is dangerous" and "the Chinese Government issues a
serious warning!' A following propaganda commentary called
it an "act of open invasion" and "a serious violation of China's
sovereignty."
Two LSM's made the resupply trip with 300 tons of
ordnance. Two additional LSM's were scheduled to make a
similar trip with US naval escort during daylight hours on 8
September. A preliminary report indicates that a Communist-
Nationalist air engagement occurred southwest of the Kinmen
area about the time the convoy was scheduled to arrive. In a
surprise move on 7 September, the Nationalists also sent two
LST's to Matsu Island with light escort. They were reported
to have unloaded without incident.
At the biggest mass rally ever held in Peiping, politburo
member Peng Chen reaffirmed Peiping's "determination" to take
Taiwan and all the coastal islands. Peiping's propaganda media
reported "angry" citizens voicing support for Premier Chou
En-lai's statement, stressing those passages which condemned
the United States for "interference" and "war provocations." On
the same day, youth groups issued a joint statement declaring
that all Chinese youth will "take up arms immediately and go
to the front" if war breaks out. Demonstrations also were held
in other major cities, including Shanghai, Foochow, and Canton.
8 Sept 58
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Chou En-laits statement that Communist China is ready to re-
sume Sino-American talks is drastically underplayed in the
Peiping press.
At least 88 jet fighters in the Liencheng-Nanchang area
engaged in what appeared to be local training exercises for
a four-hour period during the morning of 6 September. Some
of these aircraft may have been from the coastal airfields and
may have moved to these rear area fields for further train-
ing. No activity by bombers has been detected in southeast
China since 3 September, but this may be partly attributable
to typhoon weather conditions.
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Soviet Party Congress
The 21st Soviet party congress, called for 27 January,
will probably be an important milestone in Khrushchey's move-
ment toward full political control. Called to approve a new
Seven-Year Plan, the congress will also give Khrushchev the
opportunity to revamp both the central committee and its
presidium. Conferences and elections in preparation for the
congress will now be held at all levels in the party. The re-
sulting personnel changes will not only provide clues as to the
composition of the new central committee, but also will help
to pinpoint those areas throughout the country where Khru-
shchev feels it necessary to strengthen his support.
No formal agenda for the congress has yet been published.
Moscow has only announced that IChrushchey will report on the
Seven-Year Plan and that "theses" on the plan will be published
before the congress convenes. Normally, "draft directives"
for long-term plans are issued. The use of the term "theses"
may indicate that the new draft plan is more subject to discus-
sion and revision than former draft directives, possibly re-
flecting continuing uncertainty over future economic policy.
There have been recent suggestions that the plan will revert
to the traditional optimism in economic planning which gave way
to a more conservative outlook in 1957-58.
Ideological tenets which have become outmoded since the
last party congress in 1956, p rticularly those dealing with
intrabloc relations, will probably be redefined.
The central committee plenum on 5 September which called
the congress relieved former Premier Bulganin of his member-
ship on the party presidium, thus formalizing his prolonged po-
litic 1 decline. The situation in the Taiwan Straits may also
have been discussed.
Several members of the presidium seem to have been away
from Moscow during the plenum, raising the possibility that
the decision to convene the copgress was
currence of its full membership.
8 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLInFNCF RI II I FTIM
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II, ASIA-AFRICA
Indonesian Dissidents Make Direct Approach to Central
Government on Compromise
Colonel Djambek, a Sumatran dissident leader, has sent
a letter to four members of Indonesia's Parliament appealing
for parliamentary mediation between the central government
and the dissidents to stop hostilities. Djambek admitted the
rebel regime is unconstitutional and said it was ready to "with-
draw itself"if constitutional government is resumed in Djakarta.
Although dissident peace feelers have been reported previously,
Djambek's letter is the first direct approach from an official
of the rebel regime to members of the Djakarta government.
Although the letter includes accusations against President
Sukarno and the central government, it is aparently less ex-
treme and less blunt than earlier demands which reached the
government indirectly,_
Mohammed Roem, a leader of the anti-Communist Mas-
jumi party which has been sympathetic to the rebels, has
shown the letter to Prime Minister Djuanda. Although Djuanda
considers Djambek's approach unsatisfactory, he is willing
to think about it and may consult with Roem about it again.
Djuanda mentioned--perhaps to indicath that the two sides
are moving toward common political ground--that President
Sukarno has definitely dropped the idea of bringing the Com-
munist party into the cabinet.
Djuanda told Roem he doubted that the army would be in-
terested in the Djambek letter. Army Chief of Staff General
Nasution, however, has just assigned as consul general to
Singapore a high-ranking army officer who may pursue covert
explorations with dissident representatives there.
Although a negotiated settlement in the near future is un-
likely, both sides may now be ready to explore with increased
seriousness means of arranginq Base-fire and an eventual
compromise.
-SECRET
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8 Sept 58
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Possible Iraqi Countercoup
Dissatisfaction among some army officers with the over-
all program of the Iraqi revolutionary regime has prompted
"exploratory talks" regarding the organization of a countercoup.
The "treason" trials of former military leaders has added to
this dissatisfaction and has created sympathy for the accused.
In the eyes of many officers these men were only carrying out
orders, and it has become apparent to the officer corps that
obedience to orders is no defense against possible treason
charges.
Cairo fears the Iraqi regime maybe drifting too rapidly
toward the left and away from UAR influence. The struggle
between elements favoring union with the UAR and leftists and
Communists fighting against such a union has seriously worried
Nasir
The UAR has
been making strenuous efforts to dominate the policies of the
Iraqi regime and to frustrate the goals of leftist nationalist and
Communist elements, as well as those of Prime Minister Qasim,
who apparently is cooperating closely with these groups.
Should the internal situation deteriorate and public disillu-
sionment increase, the regime might nationalize the oil in-
dustry in a bid for popular support, despite the economic and
international implications of such a move. The threat of cut-
ting off oil revenues might not deter the fanatic nationalists
if they believed nationalization would be to their immediate
political advantage.
OP SE
8 Sept 58
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HI. THE WEST
Venezuelan Military Coup Fails
The failure of a Venezuelan military coup on 7 September
reflects the loyalty of the majority of the armed forces to
junta President Larrazabal and the effectiveness of civilian
strength as a check against a return to military rule. The re-
volt, which apparently was quickly suppressed, was led by of-
ficers recently exiled for involvement in the coup reportedly
planned by former Defense Minister Castro Leon on 22 and 23
July.
An elaborate civilian organization has been developed since
the ouster of dictator Perez last January to ensure the election
of a constitutional regime next November and to guard against
future military dominance of the government. It consists of
labor, student, and political groups, some of which are armed
and all of which can be mobilized rapidly for a display of force.
The responsible top leaders in the structure may not in the fu-
ture be able to control the radical and unruly elements, which
could convert the organization into a force of anarchy and vio-
lence.
The divided armed forces, apparently reluctant to clash
openly with civilians, have suffered a substantial decline in
prestige and power in recent months. The military may still
unite for a violent showdown with civilian groups before or after
elections, however, if they feel their role in government is
seriously endangered or that the junta has become captive to
periodic mob action.
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LATE ITEM
Khrushchev Warns That Attack on Communist China Will Be
Regarded-as Attack on the USSR
Premier Khrushchev's letter of 7 September to President
Eisenhower contains the strongest statement to date of Soviet
support for the Chinese Communists in the Taiwan Strait
crisis. Following a pointed warning against the danger of mis-
calculation, Khrushchev declared that "an attack on the Chinese
People's Republic, which is a great friend, ally, and neighbor
of our country, is an attack on the Soviet Union." He said that
the USSR, "true to its duty," will "do everything," together with
Peiping, "to defend the security of both states...." He warned
that the Chinese People's Republic "has true friends ready to
go to its aid at any moment in case of aggression...since the
interests of the security of People's China are inseparable from
the interests of the Soviet Union."
These blunt warnings are aimed at impressing upon world
opinion the fact that the Soviet and Chinese Communist lead-
ers are fully prepared for a major test of strength with the
United States. Khrushchev probably believes these pronounce-
ments will greatly increase the atmosphere of crisis through-
out the world and induce America's allies and neutral govern-
ments, under pressure of public opinion, to bring heavy pressure
on Washington to avoid any actions which might lead to large -
scale hostilities.
Khrushchev's denunciation of American policy toward China
and American actions in the Taiwan Strait crisis foreshadows
the line of the Soviet attack in the forthcoming session of the UN
General Assembly. The Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders
probably believe they can exploit the Taiwan Strait crisis in an
all-out effort to settle the question of Chinese representation at
this session of the General Assembly. Khrushchev declared that
"only the unrealistic position of the United States prevents the
members of the UN from taking the only correct decision--to
throw out the political corpse of the Chiang Kai-shek imposter
and grant the representatives of great China their legal place in
the UN."
8 Sept 58
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the. Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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