CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/03/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03156602
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: March 1, 1958

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1 March 1958
Copy No. 137
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
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1 MARCH 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Unusual lull in Soviet air activity
see special
Watch Committee meeting conclusion,
Page 1.
USSR agrees to foreign ministers'
conference to prepare for summit
talks.
Saud gives first formal audience to
Soviet diplomat.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
French and Tunisian differences
could lead to new incidents as heavy
fighting with Algerian rebels con-
tinues near Tunisian border.
Indonesia - Djakarta continues
preparations for attack on Sumatra.
Iran - Shah greatly disturbed over
alleged conspiracy against him;
tension mounts as leaders are
arrested.
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\\
0 Morocco believes itself near con-
flict with St-Jain, but pushes for
annexation of additional Saharan
regions.
III. THE WEST
Two cabinet resignations weaken
Greek Government.
London - Labor party, trades
unions plan joint national cam-
paign on disarmament and East-
West talks.
New Guatemalan president will
begin term on 2 March hampered
by bitter partisan rivalries.
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1 March 1958 i
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Lull in Soviet air activity,: The Watch Committee
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee met on 28 Feb-
ruary 1958 to consider an unusual lull in Soviet air
activity. After examining all available evidence, the
Watch Committee recommended no change in its con-
clusion of 27 Februkry 1958 which stated that there
was no indication of Sino-Soviet intention to initiate
hostilities. The lack of Soviet air activity remains
the subject of close scrutiny by the intelligence com-
munity. (Page 1)
*USSR... Summit talks: Moscow has abandoned
its adamant opposition to a foreign ministers' confer-
ence to prepare for summit talks. Gromyko has given
an aide -memoire to Ambassador Thompson proposing
a meeting on this level in April to work out an agenda
for a summit conference, determine its composition,
and fix its time and place. Page 2)
Soviet approach to King Saud: The USSR is prob-
ably using the 27 February visit to King Saud by the
Soviet ambassador to Syria to make exploratory of-
fers of Soviet support and to request the establish-
ment of formal relations. Saud has previously been
firm in to �do business with the Soviet
Union. (Page 3)
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
France-Tunisia: A member of Foreign Minister
Pineau's personal staff warns that "serious incidents"
are inevitable if the Tunisian blockade of French gar-
risons is not alleviated "within a maximum of two
weeks." Although France's top political and military
leaders are committed to try to maintain strict con-
trol, the possibility of further incidents has been in-
creased by Bourguiba's recent public statements and
heavy fighting in Algeria near the Tunisian border. If
the impasse continues much longer, Bourguiba will take
his case back to the UN Security Council, and serious
disorders inside Tunisia may erupt.
(Page 4) (Map)
Indonesia: The Djakarta government is continuing
its preparations for an invasion of Central Sumatra,
which the dissident EI believe is imminent.
These troops would presumably
De moved inland to 13upport paratroop forces which
Djakarta apparently plans to drop in the area of the oil
center of Pakanbart[. (Page 5)
(Map)
Iranian conspiracy: The Shah is greatly disturbed
over an alleged conapiracy headed by General Gharani
which aimed at forclng the Shah into a purely titular
role. Gharani, former army G-2, is under arrest
and awaiting secret trial. An all-out government-
directed press campaign against the "conspirators
who have secret meetings with foreigners" has been
launched. The atmosphere in Tehran is rapidly be-
coming more tense as arrests are announced and as
rumors spread that many others are under suspicion.
(Page 6)
1 Mar 58 DAILY BRIEF
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Morocco: The government apparently believes it
may be on the verge of conflict with Spain,
The King has instructed his
cabinet to continue efforts to annex large portions of
French- and Spanish-controlled regions of the Sahara.
(Page 7)
In. THE WEST
Greek Government: The resignation of two prominent
Greek cabinet ministers opens a period of political un-
certainty which could result in the fall of the Karamanlis
government. The resignations, in any event, will tempo-
rarily weaken the government and restrict its maneuver-
ability on international problems such as Cyprus.
(Page 8)
Britain: Recent Labor party trends point to possible
intensification of pressures on the Macmillan government
to show further initiatives on disarmament and East-West
Issues. A group of some 70 Labor MP's is advocating that
Britain renounce nuclear weapons and missile bases. With-
out going this far, the party and trade union leaderships are
planning a joint national campaign this spring on disarma-
ment questions. (Page 9)
Guatemala: Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, who starts his
six-year presidential term on 2 March, will be hampered
in his efforts to restore political stability by bitter partisan
rivalries and divisions among his own supporters. His ap-
pointment of a moderate leftist, Carlos Garcia Bauer, as
foreign minister has already aroused opposition within his
own party. (Page 10)
1 Mar 58
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I. THE: COMMUNIST BLOC
Findings of a Special Watch Committee Meeting, 28 February 1958
The apparent low level pf Soviet air activity which has been evi-
dent since 23 February has affected in varying degree all Soviet as
well as satellite military ai!7 units. The lull is of a greater scope
than would be warranted by either weather factors or maintenance
requirements after the exceptionally high level of activity during
the past week, although additional influencing factors are present
in the armed forces holiday of 23 February and in the expected
communications change on 1 March.
The USSR has encounte::.ed no major internal or diplomatic re-
verses recently which might prompt the USSR to resort to hostilities
to achieve 'Its objectives and the evidence available concerning
naval, ground forces, Iogislic, internal or clandestine preparations
does not denote a concerted effort by the USSR to improve its gen-
eral readiness for early hostilities. We know of no US or Allied
actions which would prompt the Soviets to assume a ready posture
which, in the air context, might be reflected in a maintenance
standdown.
Thus, the low level of Soviet flying could be attributed to a pre-
planned period of inactivity which has no relation to hostilities; it
could also be preparatory to forward deployment for attack, but this
cannot be supported by avai..able evidence. (It is possible, though
not probable, that a forward deployment could be taking place under
radio silence.) Therefore, while the Watch Committee does not
recommend a change in either Conclusion A. or B., the intelligence
community is maintaining a condition of special watchfulness,
CONCLUSIONS A. and B. from Watch Report No. 395,
19-26 February 1958:
A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against the continental US or its possessions in the im-
mediate future.
B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral
to the orbit in the immediate future.
1.1.4a-SECITirT
1 Mar 58
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Pagel
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USSR Agrees to Foreign Ministers' Conference to Prepare for
Summit Talks
The USSR has abandoned its adamant opposition to a foreign
ministers' conference and has proposed discussions on this level
for April 1958 limited to questions relating to the "organizational
side of preparation of a meeting at the summit." Presentation of
the proposal in an aide-memoire to the US ambassador probably
was designed to meet President Eisenhower's call for an end to
"repetitive public debate" and his suggestion that the impasse in
the summit exchange "can be broken by less formal and less pub-
licized contacts...."
The foreign ministers, according to Gromyko, should work
out an agenda for the summit conference, determine its composi-
tion, and fix its time and place. He asserted that "approximately"
the same countries should be represented in the foreign ministers
talks as will participate in the summit, meeting and offered two
alternatives: all members of NATO arid the Warsaw Pact, plus
such neutrals as India, Afghanistan, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Sweden
and Austria; or a "narrower" conference to include the United
States, Britain, France, Italy, the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and Rumania, plus India, Yugoslavia, and Sweden. Gromyko
gave no hint of future Soviet insistence on Chinese Communist
participation.
The Soviet foreign minister repeated Bulganin's nine-point
agenda proposals but added a new item entitled "conclusion of a
German peace treaty." This apparently was intended as a "con-
cession" to Western insistence that the German question must be
discussed. He stated that representatives of the two German gov-
ernments should participate in the discussion of this question.
Gromyko, however, carefully drew a distinction between the peace
treaty question and the unification issue. He repeated the long-
established Soviet position that unification must be negotiated by
the two German states alone and cannot be discussed at a summit
meeting.
Moscow may be preparing to put forward a draft peace treaty
which would define the future international status of a reunified
Germany. Its terms probably would include neutralization, ceil-
ings on armed forces, withdrawal of foreign troops, and a prohibi-
tion on nuclear weapons and missiles.
SECRET
1 Mar 58
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3t,L11r,/
Saud Gives First Fprmal Audience to Soviet Diplomat
S. S. Nemchina, the Soviet ambassador to Syria,
arrived in Riyadh from Damascus on 27 February in
a plane sent by 1Cing Saud. The visit is the result of
long Soviet efforts to establish direct relations with
the King. In mid-January, Nemchina requested an
audience with Saud but was turned down. He then
said he wished to deliver a personal message from
Premier Bulganin. At that time Saud assured the Am-
erican ambassador that whether he saw Nemchina or
not, his policy toward the USSR and Communism would
in no way change.
Saud will probably reiterate these sentiments fol-
lowing the visit of lhe Soviet envoy. He has indicated
that he will keep the United States fully informed about
any message he receives from the USSR. Moscow is
probably hopeful that Saudi Arabia's economic difficul-
ties and differences with the West over the Gulf of
Aqaba will make Saud more amenable to fuller rela-
tions with the bloc.
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TUNISIA
FRENCH TROOP DISPOSITIONS
Bone
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Constantine
BIZERTE
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TUNIS.
2850
� MEDJEZ ILeA13
420 -
eGAFSA
580
GABES.
1560 � MARETH
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ALGERIA
1 MARCH 1958
Miles
� SFAX
680
1700 IN AREA
REMDA
200
ITALY
TRIPOLITANIA
LIBYA
80228 3
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
New� French-Tunisian Incidents Foreseen
A member of French Foreign Minister Pineauis per-
sonal staff has warned American representatives in Paris
that "serious incidents" are inevitable if Anglo-American
good offices cannot relax the confinement of isolated
French garrisons in Tunisia to their barracks within a maxi-
mum of two weeks. The spokesman stated that there was
"a limit beyond which even the best troops will not take
such treatment," - particularly since they could force their
way through the blockade "without undue difficulty."
In view of France's interest in facilitating the progress
of the good offices mission while attempting to avert con-
sideration of the Algerian situation, French political and
military authorities are expected to try to maintain strict
control over their troops. Nevertheless, the adamant
position adopted publicly by Bourguiba, who is now blamed
by Paris for all France's Algerian difficulties, together
with the heavy border fighting between French and well-
equipped and -trained rebel units crossing from Tunisia,
increases the possibility of incidents in the near future.
If the present impasse continues much longer, Bour-
gniba will press his case in the UN Security Council, and
serious disorders are likely to erupt in Tunisia.
-CONFIDENTIAL
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Name
MEDAN �
SIAK R
PAKANBARU.
� BUKITTINGGI
PADANG
SUMATRA
1 MARCH 1958
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MILES
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PALEM BANG.
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DJAKARTA
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Invasion of Central Sumatra May Be Imminent
A military invasion of Central Sumatra by troops
loyal to the Djakarta government may be imminent. The
Indonesian naval commander in the Riau area off the east
coast of Central Sumatra informed Djakarta on 21 Feb-
ruary that he would be prepared on the 26th to begin re-
ceiving troops "provided they proceed direct to their posi-
tions."
These troops presumably would be moved up the Siak
River to defend the oil center of Pakanbaru which, accord-
ing to the army chief of staff's reported plan, is to be
seized by paratroopers. The recent Chartering of com-
mercial aircraft by Djakarta may have been for the purpose
of assisting the air force to carry out this operation. The
operation against Pakanbaru probably would coincide with
an amphibious landing on the west coast by several army
battalions with instructions to capture the rebel strongholds
of Padang and Bukittinggi.
The rebels expect to be attacked in the "next few days,"
and are preparing their defenses. They have a long coast
line to defend, however, and it is questionable that they
have sufficient forces to repulse a government landing.
The dissidents may also be harassed from the rear
by irregular forces, particularly by paramilitary groups
drawn from among Javanese plantation workers affiliated
with SOBSI, the Communist-dominated labor federation.
the Commu-
nists are infiltrating agents into Central Sumatra from the
north to serve as guerrillas as well as to attempt the
kidnaping and execution of dissident leaders.
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Shahof Iran Moving Vigorously Against Conspiracy
The Shah is moving quickly against an alleged con-
spiracy of army and political leaders, headed by the
army intelligence chief, General Valiollah Gharani, to
reduce the Shah to a figurehead. Announcement of more
than 30 arrests and rumors of many additional suspects
are increasing nervousness in Tehran. Adding to the
stress is an intensive press campaign, being conducted
under the direction of the National Information and Se-
curity Agency, against conspirators who are accused
of covertly meeting with foreigners.
The Gharani group was known to be conspiring last
June, but its plot against the Shah was not implemented
because it failed to obtain desired support. Action was
then planned for March 1958, to begin with a series of
interpellations in the Parliament designed to bring a no-
confidence vote, after which the Shah would be forced to
accept a new prime minister responsible to the Majlis--
presumably Gharani himself. The current arrests, which
included Gharani, may have paralyzed the group since its
security, compartmentation, and communications have
been poor.
Dissatisfaction with the Shah's personal direction of
the government is growing and, regardless of the degree
to which he destroys the potential of this coalition, he
will probably be faced in the future with conspiracies of
an increasingly desperate nature,
1 Mar 58
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Nome
The Moroccan Situation
The Moroccan Government believes that it may be
onAhe verge of conflict with Spaiii:because of Spanish
military activities in Ifni and Spanish Sahara,
iess,. tfle icing nas in-
structed his cabinet to proceed with its efforts to annex
large portions of the Sahara controlled by France and
Spain.
The King initiated this campaign on 25 February
when he declared that Morocco will press "for the re-
turn of our Sahara." The president of the Moroccan
Consultative Assembly, who is emerging as one of the
outstanding leaders of the dominant Istiqlal party, has
indicated that initially Morocco
expects to acquire the Tindouf area of western Algeria
as well as Spanish-held Southern Morocco.
Madrid takes
a serious view oi the King's "'naked claim" to Spanish
African territory, and implied that a negotiated settle-
ment with Morocco on the relinquishment of Southern
Morocco is unlikely at present.
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III. THE WEST
Greek Cabinet Resignations
The resignations on 27 February of Minister of
Trade and Industry Panagiotis Papaligouras and Min-
ister of Public Works George Rallis will probably lead
to a period of confusion and uncertainty in the Greek
Government. The resignations are not likely to cause
its fall at this time, but may temporarily weaken it to
sucha point that it would hesitate to push forward on
such foreign policy issues as a Cyprus settlement.
Papaligouras and Rallis, both energetic and
ambitious young moderates, had threatened previous-
ly to resign. Papaligouras has been dissatisfied ever
since he assumed office in early 1956. The immediate
cause of the resignations was the authoritarian way in
which Prime Minister Kararnanlis presented a new
electoral law to his cabinet. There may have been
other reasons, however, such as an imminent re-
shuffling of the cabinet, which Karamanlis reportedly
has been planning for some time.
Karamanlis' party, the National Radical Union
(ERE), controls 164 of 300 seats iri the Greek Chamber
of Deputies. Even if Papaligouras and Rallis leave the
ERE and secure the defection of other members, it is
unlikely that they can draw enough adherents to bring
down the government. In addition, Karamanlis may
be negotiating with opposition leaders in,order to
strengthen his position
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ILL,/ tr 113.E4/ N
New
British Labor Plans New Assault on Disarmament Policy
The British Labor party and the trade union movement
are planning a joint campaign to demand a greater British
initiative in seeking international agreement on disarma-
ment and disengagement. The Macmillan government's
susceptibility to such public pressure is illustrated by a
government spokesman's remark on 27 February that mis-
sile sites would not be completed before any summit meet-
ing in the near future.
The Labor party and the Trades' Union Congress are
preparing a joint policy statement which endorses the
Gaitskell plan for a neutral zone in Central Europe and
calls for a unilateral British suspension of thermonuclear
testing for a limited period and a disarmament agreement
in several stages beginning with test suspension. A splinter
Labor group of some 70 Members of Parliament demands
an even more radical approach, proposing a ban on the use
and production of nuclear weapons and complete rejection
of missile bases in Britain. While this split may hurt the
party's public standing, the group will provide a focus for
more far-reaching attacks on the government's defense and
foreign policies.
1 Mar 58 CFNTRAI IKITFI I inFKirF RI III FTIN page 9
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Ydigoras Will Have Difficulty Restoring Stability
In Guatemala
Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, who is scheduled to as-
sume the presidency of Guatemala for a six-year term on
2 March, will be hampered in his efforts to restore politi-
cal stability by divisions among his own supporters and by
bitter partisan rivalries.
The 62-year-old Ydigoras won a plurality in the 19
January election more because of his personal appeal than
because of any well-defined program. His followers range
from extreme conservatives to moderate leftists, and he
is certain to lose some support as his policies evolve.
His cabinet and other appointments will also cause
disillusionment among his supporters. His first appoint-
ment, that of the moderate leftist Carlos Garcia Bauer to
head the Foreign Ministry, has already caused consterna-
tion in his party. Garcia is not a member of Ydigoras'
party. Ydigoras is also obligated, by a postelection agree-
ment with Jose Luis Cruz Salazar, one of his opponents in
the election, to give some posts to Crug followers. The
agreement is resented by many Ydigoras supporters. One
of Ydigoras' party officials, the ambitious Roberto Barrios
Pena, already plans to break with Ydigoras and set up his
own party, Barrios
says he doubts Ydigoras' ability to retain sufficient support
to remain in power for long.
The army will be likely to oust Ydigoras when ad if
it becomes apparent that he has lost most of his present
popular support.
1 Mar 58
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Nome
DISTRIBUTION
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Operations Coordinating Board
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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CENTRAL INTELL
IGENCE BULLETIN
1 March 1958
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Lull in Soviet air activity; The Watch Committee
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee met on 28 Feb-
ruary 1958 to consider an unusual lull in Soviet air
activity. After examining all available evidence, the
Watch Committee recommended no change in its con-
clusion of 27 Februkry 1958 which stated that there
was no indication of Sino-Soviet intention to initiate
hostilities. The lack of Soviet air activity remains
the subject of close scrutiny by the intelligence com-
munity. (Page 1)
*USSR... -Summit talks: Moscow arlbandoned
its adamant opposition to a fore' ministers' confer-
ence to prepare for summ ks. Gromyko has given
an aide -memoire to assador Thompson proposing
a meeting on thi vel in April to work out an agenda
for a sum onference, determine s composition,
and fix time and place. (Page 2)
Soviet approach to King Saud: The USSR is prob-
ably using the 27 February visit to King Saud by the
Soviet ambassador to Syria to make exploratory of-
fers of Soviet support and to request the establish-
ment of formal relations. Saud has previously been
firm in his refusal toll) business with the Soviet
Union. (Page 3)
II
i=UtZ4,
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*.,09 TOP SECRET
Morocco: The government apparently believes
may be on the verge of conflict with Spain, accor g
to a confidant of the King. The King has inst ed his
cabinet to continue efforts to annex large pr !ions of
French- and Spanish-controlled regions �e Sahara.
(SECRET NOFORN) (Page 7)
THE ST
Greek Government: T resignation of two prominent
Greek cabinet ministers ns a period of political un-
certainty which could re it in the fall of the Karamanlis
government. The res nations, in any event, will tempo-
rarily weaken the go rnment and restrict its maneuver-
ability on internati& al problems such as Cyprus.
(Page ,
Britain: 0Recent Labor party trends point to possible
intensificatipn of pressures on the Macmillan government
to show figiher initiatives on disarmament and East-West
issues A group of some 70 Labor MP's is advocating that
Britain renounce nuclear weapons and missile bases. With-
).
out going this far, the party and trade union leaderships are
planning a joint national campaign this spring on disarma-
ment questions. (Page 9)
Guatemala: Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, who starts his
six-year presidential term on 2 March, will be hampered
in his efforts to restore political stability by bitter partisan
rivalries and divisions among his own supporters. His ap-
pointment of a moderate leftist, Carlos Garcia Bauer, as
foreign minis eady aroused opposition within his
own party. (Page 10)
1 Mar 58
DAILY BRIEF iii
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vie Nor
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Findings of a Special Watch Committee Meeting, 28 February 1958
The apparent low level of Soviet air activity which has been evi-
dent since 23 February has affected in varying degree all Soviet as
well as satellite military air units. The lull is of a greater scope
than would be warranted by either weather factors or maintenance
requirements after the exceptionally high level of activity during
the past week, although additional influencing factors are present
in the armed forces holiday of 23 February and in the expected
communications change on 1 March.
The USSR has encountered no major internal or diplomatic re-
verses recently which might prompt the USSR to resort to hostilities
to achieve 'its obiSctives and the evidence available concerning
naval, ground forces, logistic, internal or clandestine preparations
does not denote a concerted effort by the USSR to improve its gen-
eral readiness for early hostilities. We know of no US or Allied
actions which would prompt the Soviets to assume a ready posture
which, in the air context, might be reflected in a maintenance
standdown.
Thus2 the low level of Soviet flying could be attributed to a pre-
planned period of inactivity which has no relation to hostilities; it
could also be preparatory to forward deployment for attack, but this
cannot be supported by available evidence. (It is possible, though
not probable, that a forward deployment could be taking place under
radio silence.), Therefore, while the Watch Committee does not
recommend a change in either Conclusion A. or B., the intelligence
community is maintaining a condition of special watchfulness,
CONCLUSIONS A. and B. fP frWaretrIreintlia
A.
No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against the continental US or its possessions in the im-
mediate future.
B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas nerinheral
to the orbit in the immediate futurp.
TO RET
1 Mar 58
CENTRAI INITFI I l(ZFsiC I IIIprim
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