CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/05/28

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03156042
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: May 28, 1959

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CEN'TRAL
F\TELLIGENCE
28 May 1959
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BULLETIN
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28 MAY 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Ithrushchey raises possibility of mis-
sile sites in Balkans.
USSR offers to build entire Aswan
Dam in six years.
More Soviet arms to Afghanistan;
principal significance is political.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
French operations against Algerian
rebels may be extended outside Al-
geria.
Laotian Government considering at-
tack on Pathet unit and suppression
of Communist-dominated party.
Thailand -- Key figures in ruling
group maneuvering to move against
Sarit should his control weaken.
III. THE WEST
Haiti -- President Duvalier's illness
could bring unrest, possibly violence. 0
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
28 May 1959
DAILY BRIEF
� I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*USSR: Khrushchev warned in a 26 May speech at Tirana
that establishment of US missile bases in Italy and Greece
would invite Communist countermeasures, pointing out that
short-range "rockets" could reach these targets from Albania
and Bulgaria. He implied that in any event the USSR could
retaliate with long-range missiles based elsewhere in the bloc.
The US Embassy in Moscow believes that one purpose of the
reference to missiles in Albania and Bulgaria could be a So-
viet attempt to line up Yugoslavia in favor of a nuclear-free
zone. Khrushchev renewed a proposal originally made by
Bulgarian Premier Yugov in January 1958, that nuclear weap-
ons and missiles be prohibited in the Balkans.
Spyros Markezinis, leader of a minor Greek opposition
party, has been publicizing such a ban for Greece, Bulgaria,
Albania, and Rumania on the basis of his interviews with
Khrushchev and Mikoyan a month ago. Greek public reac-
tion to Markezinis is likely to influence Greek Government
decisions on future measures in the field of atomic arma
ments71
Watch Committee conclusion�Berlin: No significant in-
dications bearing on the possibility of hostilities.
USSR-UAR: The Soviet Union has offered to build the en-
tire Aswan High Dam in less time and at less cost than original-
ly estimated, according to the Cairo press. A number of West-
ern experts are scheduled to review the Soviet construction
plans, which involve some substantial changes in previous con-
cepts as to how the dam would be built. Soviet specialists will
28 May 59
DAILY BRIEF
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participate in these discussions, after which Cairo will de-
cide whether or not to accept Moscow's, offer. The USSR
probably hopes its offer will improve political relations be-
tween the two countries as well as preclude Western par-
ticipation in the project. Cairo, however, will probably
still attempt to obtain some degree of Western_particina-
tinn
� USSR-Afghanistan: (Moscow has recently concluded a
new arms agreement with Kabul, which apparently includes
additional jet aircraft as well as "light and heavy" arms,
some of which may be provided as an outright grant. Af-
ghanistan's ability to absorb this equipment is limited but
such agreements have a political and economic impact.
Since 1956, Afghanistan is estimated to have received from
the bloc at a substantial discount arms worth $75 million.]
(Page 1)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
France - North Africa: he French seem to have de-
cided to extend into adjacent countries their operations
against the Algerian rebels. Despite US objections, the
French Air Force is said to be preparing to conduct aerial
reconnaissance over Libya. as a result of reports that the
rebels have acquired aircraft which would be based in Libya.
These reports are not confirmeg Radio Algiers has car-
ried a French Army announcement of a penetration into Tu-
nisia to wipe out a rebel band and is again asserting the
"doctrine of hot pursuit,"
(Page 2)
Watch Committee conclusion�Asia-Africa: Situations
susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action
which would jeopardize US interests exist in Laos and in the
Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Iran. The situation in
the Middle East remains precarious, but a deliberate initiation
28 May 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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of large-scale hostilities is unlikely in the immediate fu-
ture.
Iraq: The Communists have reduced their public pres-
sures for legalization and participation as a party in the cab-
inet in the face of Qasim's current opposition to these demands.
They will probably concentrate for the present on strengthen-
ing their position by other means.
Laos: tq"he government is considering an attack on the
rebellious Pathet unit and suppression of the Communist-
dominated Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ) party. The British fear
such measures would undermine London's efforts to prevent
the reconvening of the International Control Commissioq
Ellie Laotian Army has reports that demobilized former
Pathet Lao soldiers have left their villages and are regroup-
ing in many provinces. Prince Souphannouvong, chief of the
NLHZ, reportedly disavowed the actions of the mutinous bat-
talion on 25 May and requested government permission to ap-
peal personally to its officet2j, (Page 3)
Thailand: Ccf, rtain key figures in the ruling military group
appear to be maneuvering to improve their positions for a
move against Marshal Sarit should his control materially
weaken or should it appear that his health is approaching a
final breakdown. Sarit seems well aware of these intrigues,
but may feel his present strong position makes counterac-
tion unnecessari,73 (Page 4)
III. THE WEST
Haiti: The tenuous political stability which has existed
during iTcent months may give way to renewed unrest and
violence if President Duvalier's illness is as serious as re-
ported. Dissident elements, encouraged by the possibility
of the President's death or prolonged illness, could spark
sufficient unrest to topple the weak and unpopular govern-
ment. (Page 5)
28 Mayi 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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THE COMM CNTST BLOC
New
New Soviet-Afghan Arms Deal
/he Soviet Union and Afghanistan this month concluded
a new arms deal in Moscow by which the USSR will supply ad-
ditional "jet aircraft" and "light and heavy arms," according
to a message from the Afghan Embassy to Kabul. Some of the
arms contracted for may be provided as an outright grant
the remaining materiel�possibly covere
oy a new soviet credit�will probably be provided at a substantial
discount,. Moscow's willingness to supply some military aid on a
grant basis suggests the Afghans may secure improved terms for
additional economic assistance;)
rAn expansion of Soviet aid to Kabul has apparently been
in the piocess of developing since late 1958, when Kabul became
apprehensive over whatjt considered a hardening in Pakistan's
attitude and a cooling of _Western interest. An Afghan delegation
has been in Moscow since mid-March bargaining on a variety of
Soviet assistance programs, including arms aid. If Kabul has ac-
cepted a new Soviet credit, it has violated assurances given US
officials in 1958 that it would approach the United States first if
it decided to seek additional loans. These assurances followed
Kabul's 1957 policy decisionto refuse further loans from either
the bloc or the West and to accept only grant aid-�i
Prime Minister Daud recently reaffirmed Afghanistan's
basic neutrality and emphasized that his country had no desire
1 or military agreements which might lead to the stationing of
foreign troops on Afghan soil. He may consider such a reaf-
firmation helpful in allaying anticipated Western concern when the
new arms agreement is made publiq
icrIc, bloc has delivered to Afghanistan an estimated $75,000,�
-
000 worth of military aid since 1956. Since Afghanistan was given
discounts on these purchases, however, its obligations to the bloc
for arms probably total only $32,000,000--the amount of arms
credits which Kabul acknowledged it h
and Czechoslovakiq
28 May 59
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
French Threaten Air Reconnaissance of Libya
ahe French military seem to have decided tb carry offen-
sive operations against the Algerian rebels (FLN) into coun-
tries bordering Algeria if necessary:3
French Air Force is preparing to begin air reconnaissance
over Libya soon on the basis of reports that the FLN is ac-
quiring aircraft which may be based in Libya. Although there
is no confirmation of reports that the rebels have received
or expect to receive several aircraft, French Chief of Staff
Ely warned the Foreign Ministry in April of the imminence
of such a threat. Although any rebel air operations would
presumably be limited to airdropping weapons inside Algeria
or to hit-and-run tactics against isolated French units, the
creation of a rebel air force would hamper current French
efforts to convince the rebels that they should surrender soon.]
ISVIeanwhile, the French military announcement over Radio
Algiers on 27 May that French troops had penetrated Tunisia
approximately one mile to kill a rebel band fleeing Algeria re-
vived the "doctrine of hot pursuit" as justification. Both the
French announcement of such a border incident and the revival
of "hot pursuit"--which had been soft-pedaled in view of in-
ternational reaction to the Sakiet Sidi Youssef incident in early
1958--seem unusual]
[Bath Washington and London, the latter bound by a mutual
defense treaty with Libya, have already objected to the French
proposal to conduct air reconnaissance over Libya, which
would probably ask both allies to "defend" it against any such
French activity� French-Tunisian talks on the Bizerte base,
which are just beginning, also might be seriously jeopardized
by highly publicized French pursuit of rebels into Tunisia3
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Laotian Government Inclinecl, to Suppress Communist
Front Party
_he Laotian Government is consiaering imlitary action
to destroy the rebellious Pathet Lao battalion, and is be-
coming disposed to suppress the Communist-front Neo Lao
Hak Zat (NLHZ). An attack on the battalion might do little
more than to disperse it,
the
army was not strong enough to cope with a nationwide up-
rising of the NLHZ-3
(Lhe Laotian Army has reports that demobilized former
Pathet Lao soldiers in many provinces are regrouping, but
it is unclear whether they are attempting to evade anticipated
government repression or whether they have been ordered
to resume guerrilla warfare.
a small group of North Vietnamese Communists
had established contact with the rebellious Pathet battalion.
&-he British have expressed concern that any harsh anti-
Communist actions by the Laotian Government would under-
mine British efforts to oppose the Communist-bloc campaign
to reconvene the International Control Commission in Laos.
London probably feels that these actions would be construed
by international opinion as a violation of the Geneva agree-
ment prohibition of reprisals against the former Pathet Lao-.)
"pier
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Nor
Maneuvering Within Ruling Thai Military Group
There are persistent reports that Lt. Gen, Krit Punnakan
and his brother, Maj. Gen, Pong Punnakan, are plotting
against Marshal Sarit, Thailand's premier and leader of the
ruling military group. The Punnakans probably do not plan
early action, but rather are trying to maneuver themselves
into a better position to seize power should Sarit's control
materially weaken or his health approach a final breakdown.
The Punnakans lack the direct command of key Bangkok mili-
tary units, but may count on their self-claimed popularity
among junior army officers to secure enough defections among
these units to make a coup feasible. They have also made a
calculated effort to create the impression that they stand at
the head of a reformist group which would deliver Thailand
from the vicious circle of corrupt:military rule.
There is a report that Maj. Gen. Krit Sriwara, commander
of the First Infantry Division in Bangkok; is involved in what
may be a separate plot.
Sarit is riding high on a new crest of popularity engendered
by his clever turning of a recent currency scandal to his own
advantage. Although he appears to have recovered from his
February operation, there is some indication that he may again
not be feeling well, and his doctors are reportedly concerned over
his unwillingness to consult with them during the past two
weeks.
In the normal sequence of events, Sarit would be succeeded
by General Thanom, who is deputy premier and defense minis-
ter. This arrangement apparently has at least the tentative
support of General Prapat, the powerful interior minister who
is generally expected to emerge eventually as Thailand's new
strong man. Prapat presumably feels that he could gradually
supersede the less dynamic Thanom. So long as this alliance
persists, the Punnakan brothers, or any others wishing to take
a shortcut to power, will face an uphill fight in advancing their
aspirations.
"fel? glE
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III. THE WEST
Haitian President's Illness May Spark Serious Unrest
The sudden serious illness of Haitian President Duvalier
may endanger the tenuous political stability which has existed
in Haiti since the abortive seven-man invasion attempt last
July. The government has minimized the President's illness,
but a medical specialist has been called in from the United
States.
Opposition elements, which have recently become increas-
ingly active inside Haiti as well as abroad, may now be en-
couraged to move against the weak and unpopular regime. Al-
though all leading opposition figures are in exile, dissident
elements within the country, particularly the followers of former
provisional president _Daniel. Fignold, have recently engaged
in organized acts of harassment, including strikes, against the
government. The various groups might combine forces in an
attempt to oust the government, but there undoubtedly would
be a sharp struggle for power if the government should fall. An
attempt to unify the opposition earlier this year failed.
The Duvalier regime has long been almost totally depend-
ent on the President's repressive security police for survival.
The armed forces, weakened and alienated by a series of purges
designed to eliminate officers of questionable loyalty to Duvalier,
could not be relied on to support the government. A prolonged
economic and financial crisis and inefficient administration have
further weakened the government, and it seems doubtful that
the regime could hold together if Duvalier's illness should spark
serious disorders.
_DIF isi-Mr.
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CORRECTION
In the item "Disorders Reported Imminent in South Africa,"
published in the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 27 May 59, page
3, the second paragraph should read:
&th 31 May--Union Day--and 26 June�African
Freedom Day--are considered likely dates. The
African National Congress has already called for
the first national boycott of Afrikaner-owned in-
dustry to start on 26 June, the anniversary of the
Communist-inspired freedom charter against
racial repression. Furthermore, the police an-
ticipate a mass burning of native identification
passes on that date. Such a protest would be the
most serious native civil disobedience in the
Union's history and could easily provoke nation-
wide bloodshed and arrests if the police react with
expected severity]
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%tai *NV
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
/Nan. I& I 111-411101,11 I If
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