CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/04/09

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03156033
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 9, 1959

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9 April 1959
Copy No. C 62
CENTRAL
TELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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II ' I
9 APRIL 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chinese Communists move another
infantry division to Tibetan area.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Arab League fails in effort to recon-
cile UAR and Iraq.
Iraq asks IPC to build pipeline from
Kirkuk to Persian Gulf; would lessen
Iraqi dependence on line through
Syria.
USSR continues to repatriate Kurds
to Iraq.
Yemen - Group of army officers
and tribal leaders plotting to get
rid of Crown Prince Badr; Soviet
diplomat warns Badr of conspira-
cies.
Pakistan - Ayub drafts outline for
new constitution; envisages strong
central government with himself as
president.
0 Cyprus - Makarios' concessions to
former EOKA leaders may have dam-
aged intercommunal confidence.
Grivas, apparently with Greek Gov-
ernment's backing, involved in or-
ganizing new rightist party for Cy-
prus.
0 French seize Czech ship believed
carrying arms to Morocco.
TOP SECRET
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
9 April 1959
DAILY BRIEF �
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - Tibet: The recent movement of a
Chinese Communist infantry division into the Tibet-Tsinghai
border area suggests that although the revolt in the Lhasa
region seems to have been suppressed, rebel activity else--
where in the area continues to pose a problem to the Commu-
nists. This has been the first observed major deployment
into the Tibetan border area since the recent uprisings in
Lhasa. Communist troop strength in the Tibet Military Region
is now estimated at 58,500. - (For fur-
ther comments on this subject,including an analysis of Chinese
troop strength in the Tibetan area see the back-up on Page 1)
(Map)
Watch Committee coliclusion�Berlin: No significant
phnricyag hparinv on the nossibilitie6r-Etilities.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Arab League: The political committee of the Arab League,
in its communiqu�ssued on 7 April, has indicated that its
efforts to reconcile the UAR and Iraq have failed. The meeting
is reported to have been marked by considerable resentment
against UAR efforts to use it merely as a sounding board for
anti-Qasim propaganda. Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia, and Libya,
were not represented in the five-day session. (
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Iraq: In a move designed to weaken Nasir's control over the
70 percent of Iraq's oil transport which moves through Syria, the
strongly pro-Communist Iraqi minister of economy has told the
Iraq Petroleum Company that his government wants the company
to construct a pipeline from Kirkuk to the Persian Gulf. Although
its position is becoming increasingly untenable, IPC probably
will strongly resist this request in view of the costs involved and
the government's probable intention eventually to nationalize the
company. (Page 2)
USSR-Kurds-Iraq: The USSR is continuing to repatriate to
Iraq a number of Kurds, including some families, in a shipload
of some 820 which is due to arrive at Basra about 18 April. Since
the 14 July coup, Qasim has made a series of concessions to the
800,000-strong Kurdish minority and he can probably continue for
the present to count on Kurdish support in the face of UAR threats
to his regime. If Qasim should attempt to curb Iraqi Communists
and loosen his ties with the bloc, Communist-indoctrinated ele-
ments among the Kurds can be expected to join in any pressure ,
tactics against Qasim and would probably renew agitation for an
independent Kurdish state.
*Yemen: An organized group of Yemeni army officers and
northern tribal leaders reportedly plans to depose or assassinate
Crown Prince Badr at the earliest opportunity. The group is re-
ported to be conservative and xenophobic in outlook, and it is said
to be aware that a general revolution in Yemen would be neces-
sary if the Imam opposed their action against Badr)
Badr has been warned by the Soviet charg�n Cairo that
there are plots against him. (Page 3)
Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: Situations sus-
ceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc hostile action
which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East,
particularly in Iraq. The situation in the area remains precari-
ous, but a deliberate initiation of large-scale hostilities is
unlikely in the immediate future.
Iraq: The rapid progress of the Communists toward control
of Iraq is continuing. Tension along the Syrian-Iraqi border has
increased and incidents are likely.
9 Apr 59
DAILY BRIEF
--TOP-SECRET
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Pakistan: resident Ayub has taken the first step toward
returning the Pakistani Government to civilian hands, which he
promised to do as soon as the army had "cleaned up the mess"
left by politicians. Ayub has drafted an "outline" of a new na-
tional constitution envisaging a strong central government, a
powerful presidency--which he expects to retain--and indirect
elections to national offices. Although he recognizes the need
for popular support, Ayub plans nevertheless to maintain firm
control of t e mechanism whereby the public participates in
government (Page 4)
Cyprus: Archbishop Makarios apparently made substan-
tial concessions to former EOKA leaders in the selection of
provisional cabinet ministers. By o doing, he has probably
damaged intercommunal confidence It is also apparent
that former Greek Cypriot terrorist leader General
rivas is directly involved with the organization and activities
�/, of the new rightist Greek. Cypriot political party EDMA which
was formed on 1 April by former leaders of EOKA. The Greek
eForeign Ministry appears to be intimately involved in further-
ing these activities. (Page 5)
France-Morocco: rench seizure on 8 April of a 580-ton
cargo of Czech arms believed consigned to the Moroccan Gov-
ernment, but which France feared were destined for the Algerian
rebels, seems certain to create new tensions in Morocco's re-
lat4cins with France. These arms may have been the second lot
of materiel ordered by the Balafrej government last year after
France had demurred on supplying all the materiel Morocco de-
sired. Moroccans, following up informal approaches to the
United States, may soon present a list of materiel desired from
the United States. They are likely to interpret any delay in ship-
ment as American support for France.)
9 Apr 59
DAILY BRIEF lii
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JAMMU AND
NAINMIN
(11TAT. IM 0111,TV
904 08
SINKIANG UIGHUR
AUTONOMOUS REGION
LANCHOU MIL RE6I0N:
TSINGHAI
CHINA 82,000 , KANSUC",
TIBET MIL REGION
58,500
TIBET S ZSHIPW A N
Lhasa.
CHENGTU MIL
':REGION
INDIA
AKISTA
590
30371
BURMA
YUNNAN
THAILAND
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NORTH
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - Tibet
The Chinese Communist 11th Independent Infantry Divi-
sion has deployed from its former station in Kansu Province
to the Tibet-Tsinghai border area. Because of its experi-
ence in anti-guerrilla operations in southwest Kansu during
1958, the division may have been selected to reinforce the
18th Army in southeastern Tibet. Although there have been
numerous reports that minor ground units have moved into
dissident areas of West China, this is the first evidence that
a major unit has moved.
This movement suggests that although the revolt in the
Lhasa area has been suppressed, rebel activity elsewhere
continues to pose a serious problem to the Communists.
Chinese Communist ground force strength for the Tibet
Military District was estimated at 64,000 earlier this year.
The figure was lowered under reappraisal. The additional
division now is estimated to bring the total to 58,500. Forces
in the adjoining military districts of Chengtu and Lanchou,
which have large Tibetan minorities, are estimated at
59,600 and 82,000 respectively.
-TOP-SEGRET
9 Apr 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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Petroleum Developments in Iraq
---eGespite disclaimers that it intends to nationalize the coun-
try's oil industry, Baghdad has made a number of moves con-
sistent with eventual nationalization. Prime Minister Qasim
recently stated that although plans for nationalizing the 23.75-
percent French share in the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC),
had not been discussed, they would be in the future.
a move designed to weaken Nasir's control over the 70
percent of Iraq's oil transport which moves through Syria, the
strongly pro-Communist Iraqi minister of economy has told
IPC that the government wants the company to construct a pipe-
line from the Kirkuk oil fields in northern Iraq to the Persian
Gulf. Refusal could provide the Baghdad regime with a pre-
text fpr beginning the piecemeal nationalization of the oil in-
dustry_.
At the American-operated but government-owned Dura re-
finery at Baghdad, Communist infiltration and the discharge of
increasing numbers of American technicians have greatly in-
creased the likelihood of fires and explosions. In any such
event, mob violence against American employees appears likely.
Moscow is assisting in operating the Khanaqin oil conces-
sion relinquished by IPC last fall. There is no confirmation,
however, of reports that Baghdad has granted Moscow an offshore
concession in the Persian Gulf area also given up by IPC.
9 Apr 59
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Possible Attempt to Overthrow Yemeni Crown Prince Badr
An attempt will be made by an organized group, composed
predominantly of Yemeni army officers in Sana and northern
tribal leaders, to depose or assassinate Crown Prince Badr
shortly after his return from the UAR,
Badr repor e y
left Cairo for Yemen on 6 April. The post-Ramadan festivities,
starting the night of 8 April and lasting for three or four days,
could afford an opportunity for such an attempt. The conspi-
ratorial group is said to represent conservative, strongly na-
tionalist, and patrician interests who traditionally elect each
new Imam and oppose the present Imam's designation of his son
as crown prince. They reportedly hope to install the present
Imam's brother, Prince Hasan, as either prime minister or
Imam. The leaders of the conspiracy are aware that their plan
must culminate in a general revolution if the Imam, as is likely,
were to take strong counteractiontotheir planned attack on Ba
&creased unrest has been evident in Yemen in recent
months. In December some officials and army officers sus-.
pected of disloyalty were arrested or reassigned, and addi-
tional security precautions were taken by the Imam and the
crown princ.9
On 28 March,
Badr informed the Imam that the Soviet charg�n Cairo had
warned him against an alleged Anglo-American conspiracy to
bring about a revolt in Yfrnen Radr warned his father to take
npopqsary nr Peautions.
-Tar SECRET
9 Apr 59
rCkITD A I IhITFI I InFNCE BULLETIN
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Pakistani President Ayub's Ideas for New Constitution
alkistani President Ayub is drafting an initial "outline"
of a new constitution for Pakistan. He apparently considers
his own leadership vital and intends to use his power as pres-
ident of the present military regime to promulgate a constitu-
tion unilaterally at some unspecified time)
Arub envisions a strong central government and a powerful,
De Gaulle-type presidency. He intends to be president himself
and maintain firm control of the government by limiting popular
participation mainly to local matters. As yet undefined concepts,
such as making the constitution "Islamic," and long-standing prob-
lems, such as the relationship between East and West Pakistan,
will encounter divergent views wtthiq the military regime, and
some compromises will be required
ub may not intend to publicize his proposals until he con-
siders that his martial-law regime has at least a minimum rec-
ord of instituting reforms and improving governmental effici-
ency. At that time, he apparently intends to wage a brief prop-
aganda campaign to gain public acceptance of a constitution. He
expects to be assisted in this by a constitutional commission
which will elicit reactions to the proposeds constitution and which
will help persuade the people to accept it.)
SECRET
9 Apr 59 CFKITRAI INTRLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Greek Cypriot Extremists Gain Influence
(Leaders of the former terrorist organization, EOKA,
appear to be gaining a dominant role among Greek Cypriots.
On 1 April they announced the establishment of a new right-
ist party, the United Democratic Reform Front (EDMA),
and were able to persuade Archbishop Makarios o give them
strong representation in the transitional cabinet)
Despite his recent public pledge to end all political ac-
tivity, former EOKA leader George Grivas personally secured
the approval of Makarios for the establishment of the ED1VIA.
Grivas?
followers put pressure on Makarios to nominate EOKA choices
for the new cabinet, which will gradually assume responsibil-
ity from the British. Makarios apparently revised his original
list of appointees following a meeting with former EOKA mem-
bers, and placed well-known EOKA leaders in three of the seven
posts controlled by the Greek Cypriots. The sympathies of
some of the other nominees are apparentl divided in primary
allegiance between EDMA and Makarios.
While Makarios continues to exert substantial influence,
such broad concessions to EOKA will put a strain on the polit-
ical truce prevailing among the Greek Cypriots. In contrast
to EDMA's strong desire to counter strongly entrenched left-
wing elements, Makarios appears anxious to retain at least
surface unity among all Greek Cypriots, and reportedly has
offered the Communists a fixed number of legislative seats in
return for their support. He announced on 3 April that he was
urging Governor Foot to end the ban on the Cyprus Communist
party, AKEL. Makarios further said that he is including AKEL
members in a 50-man consultative committee, which will advise
the transitional cabinet. AKEL has the most experienced po-
litical organization on Cyprus, but appears to be playing a wait-
ing game until non-Communi t Greek Cypriots embroil them-
selves in contests for power.
The presence of youthful former EOKA terrorist leaders in
important cabinet posts, including the Interior Ministry, can be)
9 Apr 59
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6xpected to cause Turkish Cypriot apprehension over their ul-
timate status. Despite xpressions of intense dis-
pleasure at sitting down witn y iing "EOKA thugs;' the Turkish
representatives are participating in the provisional cabinet.7
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9 Apr 59
CrkITI2A1 INTFI I InENCE BULLETIN
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II" A���� 1. VII ,1 V � IL V PfrIW I r
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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