CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/03/25

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03156026
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 25, 1959

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25 March 1959
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25 MARCH 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet propaganda treatment of
Eisenhower-Macmillan meeting.
Chinese Communist naval vessels
appear in ,Paracel Islands group;
Saigon may react.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq withdraws from Baghdad Pact.
Turkish and Iranian intelligence
chiefs discuss Iraqi situation; both
countries send Qasim assurances
of support.
Afro-Asian countries show concern
over damage to solidarity caused
by Iraq- (JAR dispute.
Chinese Communists prepare to
open embassy in Morocco.
Burma - Ne Win said to be consid-
ering more openly pro-Western
foreign policy.
� Indonesia - Dissidents in Sumatra
continuing attacks on American-
owned rubber estates.
III. THE WEST
0 West Germany - Government and
opposition parties break truce on
foreign policy.
8 New tensions developing between
Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
LATE ITEM
tch Possible ICBM launch at Tvura
Tam.
FIVID CVPDEIT
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
25 March 1959
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: Soviet propagandists are claiming that President
Eisenhower and Prime Minister MacrnillarLhave, under the
pressure of world opinion, at last accepted the Soviet proposal
for a summit meeting. � Moscow is also stressing alleged dif-
ferences between American and British views and has credited
Macmillan with having persuaded the President to agree to sum-
mit talks not dependent on the outcome of a prior foreign min-
isters' conference. Soviet propaganda says, however, that the
two leaders offered no new proposals on Berlin or on measures
to reduce international tension: such 4.s military disengagement
in PnrnnP
Communist China - Paracel Islands: The recent Chinese
Communist naval activity in the Paracel Islands and increased
naval strength at southern Hainan suggest Peiping's intention
of protecting its commercial enterprises in the area from fur-
ther molestation by the South Vietnamese who, late in February,
briefly detained a group of Chinese fishermen. Aerial recon-
naissance of the Paracels on 20 March disclosed the presence
of a frigate and a PT boat at Woody Island, where the Chinese
Communist colony is located. The frigate had departed Woody
by 22 March but two small patrol craft remained. South Viet-
nam has expressed determination to defend its claims in the
ParacelQ and 111AV rpraipgt a tirlignlav rif fnrepil 1w thp UR 7th
PliaPf
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq: The Qasirn regime's announcement of withdrawal from
the Baghdad Pact, although a long-expected development, is
likely to be interpreted in Iraq and the UAR as a concession to
Communist demands that this step could no longer wait. The
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announcement as such will have little practical effect, since
Iraq has not participated in any pact activities since the July
revolution. Other and more significant Communist demands
include arming the Popular Resistance Force and the execution
of imprisoned leaders nf thp Niivi 0'11[Tia rro Yrt +
Afro-Asian Bloc: Various Asian and African countries
are showing concern over the split in their bloc caused by the
UAR-Iraq quarrel. Some of them, including Indonesia and
Saudi Arabia, have volunteered their good offices in an effort
to restore good relations. Continued
efforts to patch up the dispute seem likely, since the quarrel
might affect adversely the atmosphere of good fellowship at the
Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference scheduled to be held next
month in ludia
Daurocco - communist China: Four Chinese Communist of-
ficials arrived in Morocco on 23 March to set up an embassy.
Agrement has been granted for an ambassador who may arrive
to inaugurate the Chinese Communist pavilion at the Casablanca
International Fair next month. This would be the first Chinese
Communist amb sador in Africa except for the one at Cairo.
(Page 2)
Burma: the Ne Win government, already following a
strongly anti-Communist policy internally, wishes to adopt
a more openly pro-Western posture in international affair
25 Mar 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Ne Win, however, is said to be reluctant to make this
change without a "concrete indication" the United States will
provide Burma with grant aid as a means of justifying this
course in the eyes of the Burmese peop1e:3
(Page 3)
Indonesia: Dissident troops in Sumatra are continuing
destructive attacks against American-owned rubber estates.
The Goodyear Wingfoot estate south of Medan, the largest
rubber estate in Sumatra, has suffered considerable property
damage in three raids this year, the most recent occurring on
20 March. Attacks on other foreign-owned estates, including
US Rubber, have also been carried out, presumably in an at-
tempt to deny their revenues to the central government.
(Page 4)
III. THE WEST
West Germany: The conflict between Chancellor Adenauer's
government and the opposition parties over the Social Demo-
crats' new unification plan, calling for talks with East Germany
and eventual troop withdrawals, has put an end to the four-month
political truce on foreign policy. In addition, there continues to
be evidence of disagreement within the governing Christian Demo-
crats, A Social Democratic leader believes that Bundestag pres-
ident Gerstenmaier, who has long been hostile to Adenauer's for-
eign policy, may be attempting to line up opposition to the chan-
cellor in his own party in order to force a greater flexibility in
the government's unification policy. (Page 5)
Cyprus: A Turkish Cypriot economic boycott against the
Greek Cypriots, enforced by intimidation, is causing new strains
in cOmmunal rlations on the island, The boycott is designed, ac-
cording to the Turks, to build up the economic status of their
community. Greek Cypriot retaliation, which is likely to occur,
would further embitter relations. (Page 6)
25 Mar 59
DAILY BRIEF
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IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached
by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee
pointed out that its conclusions were to be used in context with
SNIE 100-2-59 (24 February 1959) and with the review of that es-
timate in SNIE 100-2/1-59 (17 March 1959):
1. The USSR will not turn over access controls
to the GDR in the near future. However' the USSR con-
tinues to carry out measures necessary to a withdrawal
of its forces from East Berlin, and the physical transfer
of access controls could be accomplished with little or no
advance warning.
2. A strong effort to play down the appearance of
an ultimatum in the Soviet position on Berlin and to em-
phasize the prospects for negotiations has been increas-
ingly evident in Soviet and East German statements and
propaganda since Khrushchev's German visit. This may
reflect a Soviet conclusion that the prospects for improv-
ing the USSR's position through negotiations have increased.
3. There are no reliable indications of a bloc in-
tent in the near future to harass or blockade Allied or
West German access to West Berlin, or to seal off West
Berlin from the East. However: the USSR could take
such actions with little or no warning.
4. @hancellor Adenauer is reported to have told
his party's I3undestag faction on 16 March that he is will
ing to extend de facto recognition to the East German
Government provided that in negotiating this concession
the status quo in Berlin can be maintainelj
5. The situation in West Berlin remains basically
unchanged. (SECRET NOFORN)
25 Mar 59
DAILY BRIEF iv
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LATE ITEM
*USSR: A valid launch operation was undertaken on the
Tyura Tam Missile Test Range beginning at 1100 hours EST
on 24 March. The countdown proceeded smoothly until two
hours before the scheduled launch. Several delays occurred,
however, and the launch was not made until 0027 hours EST
on 25 March. The nature of the evidence available as of 0500
25 Mar 59
DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
(No Back-up Material)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Turkish and Iranian intelligence Lieaaers Discuss Iraq
The Turks, seeing Nasir as the primary danger in the
Middle East; minimize the danger that Qasim will fall com-
pletely under Communist influence. They also avoid pressure
that might drive Qasim further into the Communist camp. Last
October the Turks played down anti-Turkish violence in Kirkuk;
despite their concern for Iraq's Turkish-speaking minority of
75,000. Turkey might intervene, however, if order broke
down in Iraq; or if the Kurds or any other Iraqi faction mis-
treated the Turkish-speaking minority:]
FA-1,though the Turks have publicly denied that there is any
infiltration from Iraqh
armed mem-
bers of the Barzani Kurdish tribe, had entered Turkish territory
to spread propaganda. The border commander was ordered to
tighten controls]
.ran, on the other hand, fearing encirclement by hostile states
and the possible encouragement of dissident factions at home; is
genuinely concerned over the possibility of a Communist takeover
in Iraq. It feels no direct threat from Egypt, however, with which
it has recently been trying to improve relations
TOP SECRET
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Communist China Establishes Embassy in Morocco
Four Chinese Communist officials arrived in Casablanca
on 23 March to establish an embassy in Rabat in accordance
with an intergovernmental agreement announced on 31 October.
Last month King Mohamed V granted agrement for Pal Jen, who
has been an assistant to the Chinese Communist minister of for-
eign trade and was appointed as Peiping's first ambassador to
Morocco on 19 February. Pai, who may be a Chinese Moslem,
probably will arrive in time to inaugurate the Chinese Communist
pavilion at the Casablanca International Fair opening on 24 April.
Moroccans have been intensely interested in China's economic
and social development, and the observations of various Moroccans
who have visited China since 1956 have been widely publicized. A
$24,300,000 trade agreement signed on 27 October is the second
between Morocco and Communist China but is the first providing
for balanced trade. Morocco expects to offset its purchases of
green tea with exports of canned goods and raw and processed
phosphates.
Rabat may delay the establishment of an embassy in Pe i-
ping, both because of the expense involved and because of a
shortage of trained diplomatic personnel.
WitiFIDENTTAI.
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Burma Reportedly Considering More Open Alignment With West
'ale Burmese Gotiernment desires to change its foreign pol-
icy from neutralism to a more openly anti-Communist position,
the gov-
ernment is reluctant to take such action without a concrete indi-
cation that it will receive grant aid from the US as a means of
justifying this policy switch to the Burmese peoplel]
Li-4e Win has sent U Law Yone, the editor of the influential
Rangoon daily Nation, to Washington as his "personal emissary,"
probably to obtain such an assurance and to pave the way for sub-
sequent formal requests for funds. In contrast to his predecessor
U Nu, Ne Win is opposed to additional loan assistance as consti-
tuting too heavy a budgetary strain on the government. In pre-
paring Law Yone for his mission, Ne Win said that once the
Sino-Burma border dispute is settled, Burma will "mince no
words" about Communism and Communist China. The prime
minister indicated that he planned to press for an early decision
on the question by giving Peiping a month in which to answer
Burma's "final" offers after which negotiations would be broken
off:1
N-p. Win told Law Yone Burma cannot commit itself to adher-
ing to SEATO at this times although he personally is glad that
there is such an organization.
& Win and his military followers have the domestic power
and prestige to alter Burma's international course-3 (SECRET NO
FURTHER DISSEMINATION)
-SECRET'
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Indonesian Dissidents Continue Attacks on American-owned
Rubber Estates
A group of 50 armed rebels attacked the Goodyear Wingfoot
estate south of Medan on 20 March, beat several of the company
personnel, and caused considerable property damage. Estate
guards failed to challenge the rebels, and a call to nearby army
troops for assistance was unanswered.
Wingfoot, the largest rubber estate in Sumatra, has been
attacked about once a month during the past year. The local
Indonesian Army commander recently proposed replacement of
the estate guards at Wingfoot with regular army troops for one
year if Goodyear will bear the expense. The proposal envisages
regular pay by Wingfoot for the soldiers as well as a bonus scheme
if and when production increases as dissidence decreases.
Other foreign-owned estates have been subjected to similar
attacks. The latest attack on the US Rubber Company estate oc-
curred on 24 February when a large rebel force burned laborers'
houses and threatened the workers with physical harm if they
continued to live or work on the estate. An attack on a British-
managed estate on 1 March involved the first instance of violence
against a European. This particular attack resulted in the man-
agement's closing of the estate, the third such closure in the
immediate area.
The dissidents' aim is obstruction or even paralysis of pro-
duction in this region--the most important estate area in Indo-
nesia�and the resultant reduction of government revenues.
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III. THE WEST
West German Social Democrats Break Political Truce
On Foreign Policy
ie conflict between unancenor Adenauer's government
and the opposition Social Democratic party (SPD) over the
SPD's 19 March proposal on unification and European security
marks the end of the four-month political truce on foreign pol-
icy. The SPD leadership, following an unsuccessful meeting
with Adenauer on 23 March, may force the first major foreign-
policy debate in the Bundestag since the opening of the Berlin
crisis. Bundestag President Gerstenmaier, a deputy chairman
of Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union (CDU), is meeting
with all party leaders, presumably to forestall a bitter parlia-
mentary debate:3
tThere continues to be some question whether the CDU would
be united in such a debate. SPD deputy party chairman Wehner
is reported to believe that Gerstenmaier is also trying to form
an anti-Adenauer group in the chancellor's party in order to
force a change in the government's unification policy and may
be seeking SPD support for this move. Gerstenmaier and
Adenauer have long differed over whether to negotiate a peace
treaty prior to unification as Gerstenmaier proposes. Gersten-
maier may feel that the time has come to challenge Adenauer's
leadership, following the chancellor's 16 March statement to
CDU leaders that he would accept some de facto recognition of
East Germany in return for retaining the status quo in Berlin]
Eierstenmaier and some CDU dissidents probably feel that
such a move will freeze the division of Germany, and now may
seek support from other anti-Adenauer elements within the CDU
who would consider a government of national unity with the oppo-
sition. Chances of successfully challenging Adenauer at the mo-
ment appear remote.7 "
�J
SECRET
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New Tensions Developing Between Greek and Turkish Cypriots
A Turkish Cypriot boycott of Greek Cypriot business es-
tablishments is causing new strains between the two ethnic
groups. Turkish Cypriot leaders say the widespread boycott
is designed to strengthen the economic status of the Turkish
minority to a point where they will no longer be "the serfs of
Greeks." This statement is indicative of Turkish sensitivity
to the Greek Cypriots' generally higher standard of living.
Turkish Cypriot leaders have further embittered relations by
publicly proclaiming that the ultimate guarantee of their status
depends on the strength of the Turkish troops stationed on Cy-
prus.
If the Turks continue their boycott, the Greek community
will probably seek economic retaliation. Economic warfare be-
tween the two communities would seriously endanger the orderly
transition to independence.
�CONFIDE 71`rrA L
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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