CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/05/11

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03153741
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RIPPUB
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U
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13
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February 25, 2020
Document Release Date: 
February 27, 2020
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Publication Date: 
May 11, 1959
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Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 K IC I 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 11 May 1959 Copy No. C 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. AlisiV � NO CHANGE IN CLASS. DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: T NEXT REVIEW DATE: AU TI-: T1/21;100 REVIEWER for Release: Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 TAD Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 � Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 11 ivm.y. 1959 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR launches test ICBM to full 3500- ran7 On 9 May. Soviet party central committee to con- vene on 24 June to discuss implemen- tation of economic program. USSR population 208,800,000, accord- ing to official census. Males number 94,000,000, or 5,000,000 fewer than estimated in US. Moscow commentator says Secretary Herter in his 7 May speech has "com- promised faith in good intentions of Western powers." IL ASIA-AFRICA UAR reiterates policy of "positive neu- trality" to its dinlomats abroad. Yemen - Imam and Crown Prince quoted as wanting to "disengage" from commit- ments to 3ino-Soviet bloc. Government crisis in Somalia. \ /N TO RET Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 / / VA Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 0!2-- CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 11 May 1959 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR-ICBM: A valid operation began on the Tyura Tam missile test range at 0701 EDT on 9 May 1959. The count- down proceeded smoothly and culminated in the launching of an ICBM test vehicle at about 1459 EDT. the test ICBM traveled the full 3500-nautical-mile range, probably impacting north- east of Klyuchi on the KamchatkaL ninsula. The success o the re-entry and guidance is not known. This is the fifth ICBM event occurring on the Tyura Tarn range this year: three were successful; one was canceled just prior to launch; and the last previous ICBM firing--on 30 Marc 1959--did not reach the impact area and is considered a prob- able in-flight failure. An ICBM firing at this time would not interfere with a possiblin--1--%-unr-h_i Vanils nrnh on or about 8 June 1959. USSR: Soviet news media hlave announceu tnai tneoviet party central committee, will convene on 24 June and have out- lined its agenda. Publication of such a meeting so far in ad- vance is contrary to past practice. The convening of the plenum reflects determination to maintain heavy pressure for fulfill- ment of its Seven-Year Plan economic goals. The plenum is to discuss implementation of key sectors of the economic program-- expansion of the chemical industry and further mechanization of industry--only a few months after the party congress formally approved the plan. Economic officials apparently have been put on notice that they can expect periodic accountings to high party authorities. The plenum may also be given a formal briefin on the outcome of the Geneva foreign ministers' meeting. (Page 1) TOPS Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C031535ar , A Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 USSR census: The Soviet Union has announced that its total population was 208,800,000 in January 1959, as indi- cated by the results of the first general census taken since 1939. This total is only about 800,000 smaller than current US estimates, but the number of males is about 5,000,000 smaller and the urban population about 5,000,000 larger than estimated. The Soviet population is currently growing at a rate of 1.7 percent per ear which is about the same as that of the United States. (Page 2) t10 USSR-Geneva: A Soviet commentary on Secretary Her- ter's speech"of 7 May claims that he has "compromised faith in the good intentions of the Western powers" by his stand on Western rights in West Berlin--"that the West would not yield one inch." The broadcast, maintaining that the Western pack- age plan for Germany was based on the concept of free elec- tions, attacked it as a sign that the West intends to follow "a line of rigidity and pressure" at Geneva. UAR: II. ASIA-AFRICA Tairo to continue a policy of tepositivp nputralitv" and not to become a "cat's paw" in the prAti war the UAR and the Philippines are in basic agreement in uze bLruggle against the Communists. UAR heads of missions were advised to avoid any Western ef- forts to "draw us away" from neutrality and to avoid being "deceived" by praise of the UARts anti-Communist campaign. Cairo's continuing suspicion of theWest ntailLtheappearance of neutrality. Yemen- rthe Imam told the Italian ambassador to Yemen and Crown Prince Badr agree that now is a good time for Yemen to "disengage" from its commit- ments with the USSR and Communist China. The Imam said that if Western countries, meaning the United States, will fi- nance and continue road and port construction, he is inclined 11 May 59 DAILY BRIEF ii TOP ET ii r/ // ,kp�p�rove'd for Release: 2Z20/02/21 C03153741/ f A Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 A. Now 5 end his agreements with the Communist countries. The Italian ambassador believes that the reported plan for closing all diplomatic missions in Yemen is a sincere effort to oust the Communists, but a top Yemeni official told him that it would take months to; carry out the plan.) (Page 3) *Somalia: Prime Minister Issa's action in accepting the res- ignation of Minister of Interior Bogor, an influential tribal lead- er, has precipitated a government crisis in the Italian Trust Territory of Somalia and threatens to cause a split along tribal lines in the governing party, the Somali Youth League (SYL). The issue of a party split is expected to come to a head at the SYL party congress, scheduled to begin on 16 May. Political Instability resulting from a party split along tribal lines would ide influence, especially from the UAR. (Page 5) 11 May 59 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET ,Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 ,/,/ r 'Ng-% rth Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 ,00�1 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Soviet Central Committee Meeting Scheduled Moscow announced on 9 May that a plenum of the Soviet Com- munist party central committee is scheduled to begin on 24 June. The plenum will discuss implementation of directives laid down at the party congress in January on the extension of mechanization and automation in Soviet industry. For various reasons--preoccupation with maximum output at the expense of efficiency being one of the more important--the level of Soviet technology varies both between and within the sev- eral sectors of the economy. Under the theme of "catching up with the West," the gap between "average" and "best" practices in Soviet production is to be narrowed considerably by 1965; the agenda for the June meeting suggests that such improvements are to receive immediate impetus. The plenum will also review the first year of the program to expand the Soviet chemical industry by an outlay of between 15 and 20 billion dollars. This programs outlined by Khrushchev at a May 1958 plenum, appears to be in jeopardy unless increased amounts of chemical equipment can be procured from the West. Before last December's central committee meeting, which the Soviet press reported on a day-to-day basis, public announce- ment of plenums had always been withheld until their conclusion. The advance notification of the June meeting and of its principal agenda topics may be a further step in stripping the secrecy from central committee sessions in cases where this secrecy is self- defeating. In the present instance, fuller publicity for the central committee proceedings will help goad economic officials toward maximum performance and will indicate that the party intends to maintain constant pressure for fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan goals. Although the central committee has little or no substantive role in the formulation of foreign policy, the timing of the plenum would permit the Soviet leadership to review the results of the Geneva conference and the USSR's premsummit position for the ben- efit of top party officials. CONF AL 11 May 59 CFKITRAI INITFI I InFt�ICT RIII I FTIN Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 Page 1 Approved forfiele3.s7:2020/02/21 C03153741 Nor' USSR Census The USSR has announced that its total population at the be- ginning of 1959, as determined by a nationwide census conducted during the week of 13-22 January, was 208,800,000. This figure is essentially in line with the last Soviet estimate--200,200,000 in April 1956�and with subsequent Soviet statements of the rate of increase. The announcement states that the total population has increased 18.1 million, or 9.5 percent, since 1939, the date of the last Soviet census, and places the total urban population at 99,800,000--about 5,000,000 more than estimated by the United States. If the latest census was conducted as planned, the results should be quite reliable. It was planned as a house-to-house canvass of the entire country, to be carried out by a staff of 500,000 persons. The figures show there are 94,000,000 men and 114,800,000 women in the USSR, the excess of women being the result of two world wars. Since US estimates had placed the number of men at about 99,000,000, the United States may have overestimated the size of the military age group. SE 11 May 59 CFKITDAI INTF1110.FkIrF RI II I FTIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 Prrtri c' r1 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 �4.00 II. ASIA-AFRICA Imam Favors Yemeni Disengagement From Sino-Soviet Commitments dhe Imam of Yemen has informed the Italian ambassador that Yemen is now inclined to "disengage" itself from commit- ments made with the Sino-Soviet bloc, provided the West-- meaning the United States�will "take over." He added this would involve financing and continuing Sino-Soviet work now in progress in Yemen, as well as talFirnr narp nf thck r1p1-11- in- curred for work already performed3 Bloc commitments to Yemen under the economic aid pro- gram consist of a $25,000,000 Soviet credit and a $16,000,000 Chinese Communist interest-free loan; about $25,000,000 of the total commitment has actually been allocated. Soviet techni- cians are engaged in constructing port facilities and airfields, opening industrial and agricultural schools, and other projects. Communist China is building a road from the Red Sea at Al- Hudaydah to the capital at Sana and, along with some of the European satellites, is providing aid for the development of light industrial enterprises. Soviet military aid to Yemen, under which the Imam re- ceived aircraft, armor, artillery, and other weapons, amounts to over $30,000,000. Yemen, however, presumably is required to repay only about one third the amount�probably in the form of exports, such as coffee. There are believed to be more than 400 bloc personnel in Yemen, including over 50 military specialists. Approximately 300 of those working on economic projects are Chinese Commu- nists engaged in road building. here have been indications that Crown Prince Badr� who previously favored closer ties with the bloc, is moving to curtaili 11 may 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCF RIII I FTIKI Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 Nor ino-Soviet influence, presumably with UAR,encouragement. Sino-Soviet missions appear to be the primary target of a re- ported plan to close all diplomatic installations in Yemen; a top-ranking Yemeni official reportedly stated, however, that this action cannot take place for many months. Foreign rela- tions would be conducted through Cairo for the United Arab States�the UAR-Yemeni federation.) Back has recently expelled a number of Soviet doctors from Yemen and may be taking steps to strengthen his control over other bloc person- nel. The recent arrival of an Egyptian economic mission and plans for accepting a similar mission for agricultural train- ing appear to be additional moves to reduce dependence on Sino-Soviet aic3 71�f?E79 11 May 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETiN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 Approved for7R-el-e-a7e:-25-2-0702/21 603153741 Split in Somalia's Governing Party Appears Imminent The long-expected split in Somalia's moderate governing party--the Somali Youth League (SYL)--may be imminent fol- lowing the government's acceptance on 8 May of Minister of Interior Hagi Musa Bogor's resignation. Hagi Musa is the recognized leader of the Darots--the country's second largest tribal group--and they, together with the politically advanced Hawias, constitute the coalition SYL. The Darots frequently have charged the Hawias with using their government positions to increase their control over the SYL and their prestige in the government. This issue prompted Hagi Musa to precipitate a government crisis in December 1957. Hagi Musa's surprise resignation, which set off a gov- ernmental crisis, resulted from his unilateral order--against the will of the prime minister, who is a Hawia--to withdraw the 25 February ban imposed by the government on two smaller par-- ties accused of inciting violence preceding the March parliamen- tary elections. The resignation must be confirmed by the Ital- ian administrator, but in the past he has always supported the prime minister. As a result of his resignation, Hagi Musa probably will either leave the SYL voluntarily or be expelled from the party at its forthcoming party congress, which is scheduled to begin on 16 May to consider the composition of the government for the next five years. Hagi Musa then may join the UAR-supported Greater Somalia League--one of the two parties banned by the government on 25 February--or form a new party composed largely of Darots. The semblance of political unity which the SYL sought to preserve before the world and the United Nations, at least un- til the country achieved independence in December 1960, will end abruptly if the party splits along party lines. Moreover, the political instability which would result from such a split would provide an atmosphere conducive to further outside in- fluence, especially from the UAR. CL) NE I D 'ENT I A 11 may 59 CPKITPAI IRJTFI I InFKICT R1111 FTIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 -vale THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director CONEID ENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03153741 rd rdrZfdrd rjed Approved firCsleasealirrik .7z 0 T. 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