CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/05/08

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03153739
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: May 8, 1959

8 May 1959
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. . .
NO CHANGE IN CLA
: DECLASSIFIED
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8 MAY 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq - Communists renew demands for
overt political role; more bloc techni-
cians arriving.
Shah of Iran convinced USSR is deter-
mined to overthrow him.
King Husayn and new Jordanian prime
minister forecast no policy changes.
Indonesia planning first direct approach
to USSR about buying arms.
Sino-Soviet bloc influence in Cambodia
abetted by leftist Information Ministry.
Ceylon - Bandaranaike faces another
potential crisis as bulk of cabinet
threatens to resign.
III. THE WEST
0 One of Adenauer's top advisers sees re-
duced threat of war over Berlin.
0 Austria - Parliamentary elections on
10 May; no major shifts expected.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
8 May 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq�Communists and government: After an initial
cautious reaction to Qasim's rejection of their political de-
mands on 30 April, the Communists now have renewed pres-
re for the return of political parties and for participation of
ommunist party representatives in the government. (Page 1)
-Bloc aid: Increasing numbers of Communist bloc
technicians are arriving in Iraq. In addition to those provided
14 for under the economic and military aid agreements concluded
th the USSR, Baghdad is negotiating with other bloc countries
r experts to work in a variety of fields including health, educa-
tion, and municipal development. (Page 2)
Iran: rq'he Shah is now
convinced that the Soviet Union is determined to overthrow him
and that a vigorous counterattack is essential to frustrate these
efforts. While he described the current Soviet propaganda ca
paign as ineffectual, he admitted that it is potentially dangerous.
He sees no present threat from the Qashqai tribes who are un-
armed and lack effective leadership, but considers.. the Kurds
f 'still a factor owing to the possibility of their obtaining arms
from Iraq. He again protested the inadeauacv of Iranian arms
and air defenses]
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Jordan: Hazza Majalli's cabinet includes old-line politi-
cians, with two holdovers from the Rifai government, as well
as a new group of younger, less experienced men. King Husayn
will probably attempt more direct control of government affairs
than he did during the Rifai regime, .3oth the King and Majalli
are anxious to maintain a high level of American aid and have
assured Charg�n Jordanian
policy :1 (Page 5)
Indonesia-USSR: an Indonesian military mission may go
to the USSR shortly to visit Soviet military installations and dis-
cuss the possibility of military purchases. In 1958 Indonesia
contracted for military items worth at least $170,000,000 from
the Sino-Soviet bloc. This mission would represent the first
direct military contact with Moscow.E The Indonesian Govern-
ent may now feel that, in order to maintain its neutral position,
recent military mission visits to the West, including the US,
should be balanced by one to the USSR.]
(Page 6)
, IV
Cambodia: Growing Sino-Soviet bloc influence in Cambodia
is being abetted by the pronounced leftist influence in the Informa-
tion Ministry. E3uring his recent visit to Cambodia, Ambassad
0 Parsons expressed his concern to top Cambodian officials that
the leftist trend in the press and other information media was
gradually conditioning the people to accept Communist ideology.
(Page 8)
Ceylon: grime Minister Bandaranaike faces another pos-
sible political crisis. Ten moderate ministers have threatened
to resign from the 15-man cabinet unless Agriculture Minister
Gunawardena is expelled, because they oppose his leftist tende
cies. Bandaranaike may have to make some political concession
to the moderates, but neither he nor the moderate group is likely
to risk a cabinet crisis because neither wants to force new national
elections at this tim_g (Page 9)
8 May 59
DAILY BRIEF Ii
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III. THE WEST
West Germany: [Heinrich Krone, who is one of Adenauer's
top advisers, says the chancellor is satisfied with preparations
for the Geneva meeting. Krone is much less concerned abou
0 hostilities over Berlin than he was several months ago and ex-
pects that the access problem will be solved by regarding the
pnct Clprmans as in some manner "agents" of the USSR./
Austria: The 10 May parliamentary elections are likely
to r eiVITIrra cabinet shuffle in the People's party - Socialist
coalition government which has ruled Austria since the war.
No radical shifts in party strengths or Austrian policies are
anticiptited, but growing antagonism between the two parties
may delay formation of a new government for some time.
(Page 10)
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Outlook for Pakistan. NIE 52-59. 5 May 1959.
8 May 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
No Back-up Material
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Communist Political Pressures on Iraqi Government
The Iraqi Communist party on 5 and 6 May renewed
its demands for a return to a system of officially sanctioned
political parties and for direct Communist party representa-
tion in the government. The majority of the present Iraqi
cabinet is non-Communist; while the cabinet includes several
pro-Communists, it contains no acknowledged representatives
of the party itself.
The Communists' avowed aim is the establishment of a re-
vived "united national front" which would also include the Nation-
al Democratic party and the Kurdish United Democratic party.
The Communist leaders are apparently certain that they would
exercise real control of such a national front; they have even
indicated willingness to include pliable remnants of the I3aath
and Istiqlal parties.
Premier Qasim told labor organizations on 30 April that
Iraq was in a "transitional stage" and that the time had not yet
come for the return of political parties. Even if political parties
are not given official sanction for some time to comes, the Commu-
nist leadership will probably obtain open cabinet representation in
the near future. 'oreign Minister Jawad, a leader of the National
Democrats, told the American ambassador on 4 May that Commu-
nist representation was likely, but added that any such appointment
would be on, the basis of "individual merit" and not party affiliation.
Communists reported most likely to receive cabinet portfolios are
Abd al-QaCir Ismail Bustani, Amir Abdallah, and Aziz Sharif, all
of whom are central committee members and capable, experienced
party professionals:3
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Bloc Technical Assistance to Iraq
There are now believed to be about 200 to 300 Soviet bloc
military and economic specialists in Iraq, and Baghdad--which
has relatively few trained native technicians--is negotiating with
the Soviet Union and other bloc countries for additional experts
in a variety of fields. To facilitate the dis-
patching of bloc personnel to Iraq, Baghdad has authorized the
Iraqi Embassy in Moscow to omit obtaining specific approval
"when granting visas to the citizens of the Soviet Union and the
other Socialist nations."
Soviet technicians now arriving in Iraq to implement the
projects called for under the economic aid agreement include
industrial, agricultural, and petroleum experts. In addition,
the USSR is providing personnel for scientific and educational
exchange programs under its cultural agreement with Iraq.
Moscow has agreed to supply Iraq with an atomic furnace for
the production of radioactive isotopes, presumably as a gift,
and will soon provide technicians for this and allied projects.
Finally, Baghdad is considering inviting Soviet physicians to
practice in Iraqi hospitals and lecture at its medical schools.
The European satellites are also planning to participate
in the bloc technical assistance program in Iraq, mainly through
cultural and scientific agreements. Apart from agreements
known to have been concluded, Poland, Hungary, and East Ger-
many have expressed their readiness to participate in Iraqi
municipal development projects. Some of the projects under
consideration are the improvement of water, lighting, and
sewerage systems.
The bloc technical assistance program also provides for
the training of Iraqi personnel in bloc countries in an enually
wide variety of fields.
8 Apr 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Shah Believes Iran Faces Critical Summer
he Shah of Iran, two days before his departure for Europe,
stated that while Iran is in a secure position at pres-
ent, he is convinced,
that the USSR is working systematically toward the over row
of his regime by subversion and other means. He emphasized
that greater attention must be paid to the detection and frus-
tration of Soviet efforts against Iran. His plan to be absent
from Iran until about 4 June while visiting Britain, Denmark,
and Holland, however, offers increased opportunity for plot-
ters. The Shah regards the intensive Soviet radio propaganda
campaign against Iran since 10 February, which attacks him
personally, as "potentially dangerous," although he asserts
that at present it is "not very effective." He is satisfied with
Iran's counterpropaganda and considers it bolder than that of
any other country
Possibly with the recent unauthorized Soviet overflights of
Iranian territory in mind, the Shah again pointed out that Iran
lacks sufficient antiaircraft weapons, radar, and airfields.
Iran is exploring the possibility of bringing the question of
overflights before the UN but may have difficulty in document-
ing such charges.
The chief delegate to the UN has been instructed to consult with
the secretary general on the tactics
the overflights and the propaganda.
&he Shah admitted that there are weaknesses in Iranian
security in northwestern Iran, and is sending Major General
Teimur Bakhtiar, chief of the intelligence organization, to
eliminate subversion among the Kurds during the "coming crit-
ical summer..D
0th
[He sees no present threat, however, from the Qashqai
tribes in southern Iran, because of their expressions of loyalty
during a recent visit to their area and because of the impres-
sion created on them by demonstrations of the effectiveness of
army weapons. He believes that the influence of the four exile.f9
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Qashqai chiefs is weak among the tribesmen and that this weak-
ness will grow as the lands of these chiefs are distributed. The
exiled tribal chiefs, however, who supported Premier Mossadeq
before his overthrow in 1953, may have some capacity for creat-
ing trouble by cooperating with the nationalists. Nasr Khan, pre-
dominant among the exiled chiefs, claims that he recently re-
ceived offers of Soviet arms to pursue his tribal property claims.
While the estimated 300,000 Qashqais still hate the Shah and his
family, they probably are no threat in themselves, but could
cause unrest if they ally with other tribeN
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New Cabinet in Jordan
The new Jordanian cabinet of Premier Hazza Majalli is
unlikely to prove strong. It contains both old-line politicians,.
including two holdovers from the Rifai government, and a
new group of younger, less experienced men. Majalli is for-
eign minister as well as premier. The Interior Ministry is
headed by Wasfi Mirza, a close friend of the premier. The
Defense Ministry is under a young lawyers Anwar Nashashibi;
Akif Fayiz, representative of the influential Bani Sakhr Bedouin
tribe, remains minister of agricultuie. CBoth King Husayn
and Majalli, anxious to maintain a high level of American aid,
have assured the American charge that there will be no change
in Jordanian policy.]
It is apparently King Husaynts intention to assert more
direct control of government affairs than he did during the
Rifai regime. Although the transition to the new government
took place without incident, harge Wright reports that gen-
eral reaction to the new cabinet was less than enthusiastic in
view of Majallits reputation as a British protege, and because
of fear of increased instability. The absence of Rifails firm
hand may increase the opportunity for subversive activity,
while Husayn's apparent intention to intervene more actively
in government has aroused apprehension of still greater power
for the army under the direction of the Kin!3
The new government has publicly stated what appears to
be an offer for a return to overtly correct relations with the
UAR. In a policy statement on 7 May, Majalli declared twin
aims of combating Communism and checking Zionism. "For
the sake of these two principles," he added, "Jordan is pre-
pared to put its hand in the hand of anyone who shows a sin-
cere desire to follow the same road...." Cairo has commented
on Majalli's appointment, however, as the replacement of an
American puppet with a British puppet.
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Indonesia Plans to Semi Military Mission to Moscow
LT"Lie Indonesian Government expects to Ond a military
mission to the Soviet Union shortly to visit military establish-
ments and discuss the possible purchase of arms,
The Soviet Union
welcoming the mission at any
time. Prior to the mission's departure, the Ministry of Defense
will submit to the Soviet Embassy a list of the arms and equip-
ment Indonesia is interested in purchasing,3
is is Indonesia's first open approach to the Soviet Govern-
ment for arms and equipment under the military purchase program
which has been in progress for a year and a half. In early 1957,
Indonesia bought 4,000 jeeps from the Soviet Union. The coordinat-
ed all-service purchase program, however, which began in Jan-
uary 1958, has resulted thus far in contracts for military items
from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Communist China amounting
to at least $170,000,000. Although Indonesia has heretofore care-
fully avoided direct arms dealings with Moscow, it has an agree-
ment with the Soviet Union for economic assistance amounting to
more than $100,000,000-.1
(in order to maintain its neutral position, the Indonesian Gov-
ernment may now feel that recent military missions to the West, _
including the United States, should be balanced by one to the USSRJ
ime Minister Djuanda told American officials
he had established a ceiling on military purchases and had sent out
positive instructions that no further commitments be made. He is
undoubtedly concerned not only over meeting future payments from
Indonesia's meager financial resources but also over the emphasis
on the arms program at the expense of civilian problems. The
armed services, however, may request a withdrawal or postpone-
ment of the prime minister's directive.
In any event, Moscow has seen fit recently to agree to supply arms
to the UAR at one third their cost and, therefore, in order to en-
courage further Indonesian reliance on the bloc for military aid-,/
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night offer the purchasing mission extreme y attractive credit
terms for arms
Although Indonesia's foreign reserves have slowly increased
during recent months from the 1957-1958 low and are expected to
continue their rise, the country's internal financial situation con,-
tinues to deteriorate. It is highlighted by annually increasing
budgetary deficits, rising inflation, and the contributing factors
of low production. poor distribution, and a raoidlv erowine DODulation
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Communist Influence Growing in Cambodia
dile increasingly apparent pro-Communist bias of the
Cambodian press and other mass media, reflecting the pro-.
nounced leftist influence of the Information Ministry, is
facilitating the steady growth of Sino-Soviet bloc influence
in Cambodia. Cambodia now draws heavily on handouts sup-
plied by international Communist news agencies. Recent
editorials in influential newspapers have contained "straight
Communist textbook material," according to the American
Embassy in Phnom Penh. Peiping, meanwhile, has given
Cambodia powerful transmitters, is training two Cambodian
radio supervisors in China, and is sending several techniciains
to Cambodia:7
be leftist trend has been accelerated recently by Commu.
nist exploitation of Cambodia's bitterness over Vietnamese and
Thai involvement in plotting against the Sihanouk government,
and Phnom Penh's attendant suspicion of American motives. In
addition to an important asset in the person of crypto-Commu-
fist Secretary of State for Information Tim Dong, the Commu-
nists also benefit from venality in the Cambodian huresuerairv.1
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Ceylon's Prime Ministeip in Difficult PolitiCal Situation
'ffhe strong stand which the moderate members of Ceylon's
coalition cabinet are taking in their long-standing dispute with
far-leftist Agriculture Minister Philip Gunawardena is placing
Prime Minister Bandaranaike in an increasingly difficult posi-
tion. At a conference with the prime minister on 6 May, some
ten ministers threatened to resign from the cabinet unless
Gunawardena is expelled. The group appears to be attempting
more vigorously than before to eliminate leftist influence from
the governmeng
Tieither Bandaranaike nor the moderate group is expected
to press the issue to a final showdown at this time, however, as
neither side seems likely to risk forcing the new national elec-
tions which would probably become necessary following mass
resignations from the cabinet or the withdrawal of Gunawardena
and his supporters from the government coalition. While the
moderate group considers it has some 36 supporters in the 56-
member government coalition, it cannot safely predict their re-
election nor count on sufficient cooperation from the formerly
ruling United National party or from Tamil representatives
to form a majority in the 101-member Parliament. Should
Gunawardena resign, the position of his few followers would
be even more precarious, as his prospects for a workable
alignment with other leftist opposition elements are remotes.)
(The most probable outcome of the controversy is a
compromise which would temporarily silence the threats of
the moderate cabinet members. Bandaranaike probably will
have to make some political concessions to this group, which
will further erode his influence with the public and the governmen
-
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III. THE WEST
Many Changes in Austrian Government Expected to Follow
10 May Elections
The 10 May parliamentary elections seem likely to result
in a number of changes in the People's party - Socialist coali-
tion which has given Austria a stable government since 1945.
The coalition probably will be re-established in some form,
but interparty antagonisms have sharpened despite a some-
what lethargic campaign, and the negotiations for a new gov-
ernment are likely to be prolonged.
Post-election negotiations on a new cabinet will center on
Chancellor Raab's demands for a less rigid coalition pact which
would permit parliament to settle outstanding issues between
the two parties by vote. If the People's party maintains its pres-
ent parliamentary lead over the Socialists, it will be in good
position to push these demands or even to force the Socialists
from the government. Raab's bargaining position would be fur-
ther enhanced if, as some observers anticipate, the small
Liberal party now in the opposition should also score a come-
back. The Nazi-tainted Liberals are pan-German in outlook,
and in such a key role, would exert a highly disruptive influ-
ence.
In any case, some of Vienna's most experienced men are
expected to leave the government. Minister of Interior Helmer,
who established a reputation for fearless opposition to the Soviet
occupation forces, has already announced his retirement. He
is reported deeply indignant over the insistence by younger mem-
bers of his Socialist party that he give up the Interior Ministry.
Leopold Figl, of the People's party, a reliably pro-Western
chancellor during much of the occupation period
is similarly being pressed
by his party to accept a provincial office. Changes are also
expected in the justice. agriculture, and communications min-
istries.
CON NTIAL
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CO NTIA1.
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