CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/10/12

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03153732
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: October 12, 1957

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
Copy No. 138
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REVEWLR:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
3 3(h)(2)
12 October 1957 3.5(c)
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CONTENTS
A-o 1. DISARMAMENT SITUATION IN UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
(page 3).
(942_
2.
SUPREME SOVIET MAY MEET IN DECEMBER
(page 4).
0-42- 3. YUGOSLAVIA REPORTEDLY TO RECOGNIZE
EAST GERMANY NEXT WEEK
71-0
4. TITO REPORTEDLY WARNED
CURTAIL LIBERALIZATION
UNREST CONTIN
NORTH VIETNAM
(page 5).
TO
(page 6).
TRY IN
(page 7).
).L..o 6. ADDITIONAL SOVIET AIRCRAFT TO ARRIVE IN
7.
04� 8.
SYRIA LATER THIS YEAR (page 8).
THE SITUATION IN JORDAN
(page 9).
SUDANESE PRI7E MINTSTER rOMMENTS ON
COTTON CRISIS (page 10),
9. RESIGNATION OF PAKISTANI PRIME
MINISTER SUHRAWARDY
(page 11).
(1)42_ 10. FRENCH ARMY POLITICAL ROLE SEEN
POSSIBLE IN CRISIS (page 12).
)1-4z- 11. NEW TENSIONS IN ARGENTINA (page 13).
ANNEX�Correction for Watch Report of the ratellivence
12 Oct 57
Advisory Committee
(page 14).
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1. DISARMAMENT SITUATION IN UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Comment on:
The chief Japanese UN delegate.
expressed the belief that
neither the Western nor the Soviet
proposal is likely to get the neces-
sary two majority support,
in which case the Japanese proposal
might "ride straight through this
General Assembly."
The Japanese proposal, which
calls for an immediate suspension of nuclear tests and
for a resumption of subcommittee negotiations on super-
vision and inspection, will appeal to many UN members
apprehensive about modern weapons developments and the
dangers of radioactivity. It does not provide for immedi-
ate supervision of the test ban or for the halting of weap-
ons production, both considered vital by the West. Nor
does it meet the USSR's demand for a two- to three-year
test suspension and a five-year renunciation of the use
of nuclear weapons.
Swedish Foreign Minister linden
on 10 October stressed to the US delegate to the Disat-
mament Subcommittee the desirability of reaching an
agreement on a nuclear test ban, commenting that "it
would be no great sacrifice to the West to agree to a
simple ban." He argued that solution of this question
would be an important step forward and said that, in
this respect, Japan's initiative was constructive and
could lead to a break in the deadlock.
Yugoslav delegates told the Amer-
ican delegation on 9 October that they were dissatisfied
with the way the disarmament debate was developing,
and that Yugoslavia took a position midway between both
sides.
12 Oct 57
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2. SUPREME SOVIET MAY MEET IN DECEMBER
Comment on:
The USSR Supreme Soviet will con-
vene in December, according to an
unconfirmed report from the Austrian
ambassador in Moscow. Although the
Supreme Soviet has already met twice in 1957 as required
by the constitution, another meeting might be called at the
end of the year to give formal approval to the 1958 state
budget and probably to adopt the economic plan for 1958.
Opposition to Khrushchev's economic
program apparently is continuing and might be intensified
as the 1958 plan is drafted this fall. This might also lead
to further disagreements next spring in drafting the seven-
year plan scheduled for presentation by mid-1958. There
could be political repercussions, possibly affecting Ithru-
shchev's position or the status of other top leaders.
This session may also approve new
governmental personnel assignments. Reports of an im-
minent demotion for Premier Bulganin continue to appear,
some alleging that he will replace Voroshilov as chairman
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Important person-
nel changes would probably necessitate a meeting of the
party central committee for prior approval.
The Soviet leaders may also consider
the time ripe for another report on the international situa-
tion and Soviet foreign policy in view of the purge in June
of former foreign ministers Molotov and Shepilov and the
earth-Satellite and ICBM developments. The last report
on foreign policy was made to the Supreme Soviet in Feb-
ruary by Shepilov.
12 Oct 57
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3. YUGOSLAVIA REPORTEDLY TO RECOGNIZE
EAST GERMANY NEXT WEEK
Comment on:
Yugoslavia will extend de jure
recognition to the East German
government on 15 October.
x ugo WAIT Am-
bassador Kveder, who is returning
to Bonn on 13 October, has re-
quested an urgent appointment with
rentano and will advise him of the
Since Belgrade appears to believe
that West German retaliation will not extend to the
breaking of diplomatic relations, such action by the
Yugoslays becomes increasingly likely. The Yugoslav
ambassador has been instructed to state that his gov-
ernment believes that the action will actually be help-
ful to German reunification.
Bonn apparently is as yet unde-
cided regarding steps to take fbllowing such a Yugoslav
act. State Secretary Hal'stein Aas indicated to Ameri-
can officials, however, that he would favor withdraw-
ing diplomatic representatives, but leaving an economic
mission in Belgrade. Bonn hopes such a policy would
tend to discourage further recognition of East Germany
by non-NATO countries. A complete break with Bel-
grade would complicate Bonn's improving relations
with Poland,which recognizes the East German regime.
12 Oct 57
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4. TITO REPORTEDLY WARNED GOMULKA TO
LIZATION
Gomulka's "tightening-up process"
was influenced by his talks with
Tito, according to the Israeli min-
ister to Poland,
in� was saia to nave cautioned Uomulka to pay more
attention to the defense of socialism if he hoped to pre-
serve the "Polish road" and avert Soviet intervention.
He reportedly declared that neither Poland nor Yugo-
slavia could hope to exercise any influence on other
Eastern European countries if developments in either
country got out of control to the point of threatening
the existence of socialism. According to Ambassador
Beam, the Yugoslav military attache in Warsaw has
said that Tito has expressed to Gomulka his concern
over loosened police controls in Poland.
Comment The Yugoslays have in the past ex-
pressed concern over the extent of
liberalization in Poland. Tito is particularly concerned
over any developments in Eastern Europe which could
threaten Khrushchev's position and his professed policy
of permitting the satellites' increased independence in
their internal affairs. Tito's views would probably
be persuasive to Gomulka because of the Yugoslav
leader's success in controlling pressures for liberaliza-
tion in his country and maintaining his independence
of Moscow.
Gomulka's antipathy toward liberal
writers is well known, and his banning of the liberal
journal Po Prostu appears to be a step toward curtail-
ing excessive criticism rather than an abandgnment of
his program and objectives,
12 Oct 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
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5. UNREST CONTINUING AMONG PEASANTRY IN
NORTH VIETNAM
Comment on:
The North Vietnamese peasantry,
largely alienated from the regime by
the excesses of an ill-considered and
hasty land reform program in 1955-
56, has not been mollified by flanoi's
"mistake-correction" program. Al-
tkough the program was to have been
lompleted this year,
it is nonsense to say that the mistakes have
been corrected. Premier Pham Van Dong has admitted
that the "re-education" of some rural officials may stretch
into 1956,
Large-scale riots broke out in north
central Vietnam last fall when peasant demands for the
redress of grievances were not immediately met by local
officials. Similar incidents on a smaller scale have since
been reported in other areas. In addition, government
officials have repeatedly complained that agricultural
taxes--paid in kind�are difficult to collect. Speculative
profits from private sales of hoarded farm products
have exacerbated inflationary pressures and contributed
to the regime's inability to meet the goals for the first
half of the 1957 state plan.
Hanoi is also failing to pacify the
minority ethnic nationalities in the rural areas of upper
Tonkin. Last July a meeting of 1, 000 persons in the
Thai -Meo autonomous region protesting forced-labor
levies had to be broken up by police action. According
to reports received in the past month, discontent in this
region is widespread.
12 Oct 57
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6. ADDITIONAL SOVIET AIRCRAFT TO ARRIVE IN
SYRIA LATER THIS YEAR
Comment on:
The Syrian arms-purchasing
mission in Moscow reported
to Damascus
that "the" IL-28 jet light bomb-
ers, a squadron of 15 MIG-17
jet fighters, and a number of IL-14 transport aircraft
are to be delivered in the "last quarter of this year."
The Syrian mission also re-
ports that Moscow suggests that a pilot, navigator,
and radioman for each IL-28 be sent to the USSR for
training, indicating that Syria's capability to use these
planes with its own personnel will be very limited at
the outset. The acquisition by Syria of jet bombers
will arouse concern in Turkey and Israel, neitiaer of
which possesses jet light bombers, since this would
ultimately increase Syria's offensive capabilities.
In mid-September, Damascus
directed that all but six of its pilots being trained in
the bloc be returned to Syria immediately following
completion of their courses. The six remaining
pilots are to take a "squadron commander course."
12 Oct 57
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7. THE SITUATION IN JORDAN
Comment on:
Jordan's lower house of parliament
has voted to reconvene on 15 Octo-
ber to hear the statement of policy
presented by the pro-Western govern-
ment of Prime Minister Ibrahim
Hashim. Despite strong popular feeling against the gov-
ernment, the opposition probably will not be able to
muster the two-thirds vote required to pass a motion
of no confidence following the policy statement. King
Hussayn's speech from the throne last week was ac-
cepted by a vote of 26 to 6, although not without bitter
exchanges and near violence during the debate. Eight
of the 40 deputies are either under arrest or in exile
as a result of the unsuccessful conspiracy by Jordanian
nationalists against the King in April.
Meanwhile, the Egyptian- and
Syrian-directed war of nerves against King Hussayn's
regime and the Hashim government continues. At
least three more explosions, directed against Jorda-
nian government installations and pro-Hussayn politi-
cians, occurred on 8 and 9 October. On 10 October,
the Jordanian cabinet approved new measures to in-
vestigate the political activities of government em-
ployees, and Jordanian security forces claimed to
have seized the third cache of smuggled Czech arms
and explosives uncovered during the last month.
12 Oct 57
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8� SUDANESE PRIME MINISTER COMMENTS ON
rtrITTYINT r1:2MTg
The Sudan's Prime Minister Khalil
will not accept cotton barter
agreements with the USSR if the present cotton crisis
Is resolved by sales to the West or by a British loan
with cotton as security.
Khalil, who returneU a iew clays ago irom aiscussion
with officials and potential buyers in France and Brit-
ain, is "pessimistic" about the civantity of cotton which
the world market can absorb.
Comment In August the Soviet Union offered
to take Sudanese cotton in exchange
for Soviet commodities and large-scale economic
assistance, but Khalil has opposed acceptance of this
offer, Press reports from Khartoum on 9 October
state that the Sudanese cabinet has asked the USSR for
more information about its proposals. The Sudanese
minister of interior is now en route to Moscow.
12 Oct 57
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9. RESIGNAVICN OF PAKISTANI PRIME
MINISTER SUHRAWARDY
Comment on: �
The resignation of Pakistani Prime
Minister Suhrawardy on 11 October
plunges Pakistan into a new period
of instability. Suhrawardy's 13
months in office had provided the
country with the most effective lead-
ership since Lialaatt Ali Khan.
The crisis was precipitated by Presi-
dent Mirza's Republican party, major partner in the cen-
tral government coalition with Suhrawardy's Awami
League, velki.Wi withdrew its support from the prime min-
ister because of his attacks on the Republicans. Mirza,
under heavy pressure from his party, called for Suhra-
wardy's resignation.
Mirza faces a difficult task in form-
ing a new coalition, since no party can command even
a near majority. His recognition of this fact is suggested
by his early request that Siihrawardy continue as prime
minister for the time being. Nevertheless, Mirza is re-
ported to have asked Ismail Chundrigar, Moslem League
leader of the opposition, and Hamidul Huq Choudhury,
leader of a moderate East Pakistani political faction, to
consult on forming a government with the Republican
party.
Any cabinet emerging from this bar-
gaining would function in effect as a front for Mirza's
authoritarian rule. It is unlikely that such a front would
be effective for long, and instability might increase _rap-
idly in both East and West Pakistan. In this event, Mirza
might have to resort to emergency powers and invoke
direct executive rule. Before taking this step, however,
he might as a last resort try to form an all-party coali-
tion government and recall Suhrawardy as its leader.
No major changes in Pakistan's pro-
Western foreign policy are anticipated, although increased
political and economic instability will reduce its ability to
continue its support of American policies.
12 Oct 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
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10. FRENCH ARMY POLITICAL ROLE SEEN
POSSIBLE IN CRISIS
Comment on:
As the political crisis in Paris
lengthens, the French army may
abandon its traditional noapolitical
role in the interest of securing the
strong national leadership which it deems necessary
to extricate it from the Algerian morass and enable
Its reconstitution as a modern fighting force. There
have been indications for several months that the
army high command feels the purely military pacifica-
tion policy to which successive governments have
committed it is impossible to achieve and that it had
pressed both the Mollet and later the Bourges- ,
Maunoury government for more constructive policies
in regard to Algeria. News of the defeat of Bourges-
Maunoury% basic statute was reportedly received
with considerable bitterness among military elements
In Algeria. A spokesman for Minister for KIEPria.
Lacoste has credited the army with having blocked
Pleven's bid for the premie.,
12 Oct 57
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11. NEW TENSIONS IN ARGENTINA
Reference:
Peronista-inspired strikes and labor
unrest are continuing ill the city and
province of Buenos Aires despite the
state of siege decreed on 5 October,
and this has prompted demands by con-
servative military elements for harsher
repressive measures,
The return to
Argentina on 7 October of one of Peron's most capable and
dangerous agents, former air force intelligence chief Luis
Lapuente, and the -escape from a Chilean penitentiary of
Patricio Kelly, former head of Peron's civilian shock troops,
may be adding to military uneasiness. The government re-
portedly expects a wave of demonstrations on 17 October,
the twelfth anniversary of Peron's rise to power.
Military demands for repressive
action--put forth at a 9 October cabinet meeting by the
powerful, rabidly anti-Peronista group nicknamed "the
gorillas"--include extension of the state of siege to the
entire country, a new crackdown on labor aeitator, and
certain cabinet changes. while
"the gorillas" are at present limiting their demands to
changes in labor policy, their intention is to use the
labor situation as a pretext for ousting President Aram-
buru "in the near future" and for postponing the general
elections Aramburu insists will be held in February.
12 Oct 57
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ANNEX
Correction for Watch Report 375, 10 October 1957
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee
Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities
Paragraph C should read:
Unstable conditions and tensions stemming from develop-
ments concerning Syria, in particular the deployment of
major Turkish forces on Syria's frontiers, continue to
create possibilities for conflict in the Middle East. Con-
tinuing border incidents, Turkish military maneuvers
on the Syrian border scheduled for mid-October, and fur-
ther Soviet warnings to Turkey and the West and declara-
tions of Soviet support for Syria combine to make this
period particularly tense.
12 Oct 57
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