CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/10/06

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: 2018 Sanitization
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03153728
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: October 6, 1957

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.ACILALA
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TELL
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6 October 1957
Copy No.
DOC( ;NA ENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLA
LiECI AF!ED
GLASG CHANGED 10: TS..
NEX r RE 'L/DL.
AUTH: HR 70.2
DATE./
13EVIELAIER:
138
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SECKEI'
NNO
CONTENTS
1)%
1. SECOND MEGATON-YIELD NUCLEAR TEST BY
USSR NEAR NOVAYA ZEMLYA
(page 3).
2. ADDITIONAL DATA CONCERNING SOVIET EARTH
SATELLITE (page 4),
L94?---- 3. SITUATION IN WARSAW
(page 5).
4. EARLY CONVOCATION OF SOVIET PARTY
CONGRESS POSSIBLE (page 7).
5. POLISH PROPOSAL FOR NITCITYAR RAN IN EAST
AND WEST GERMANY (page 8).
6, USSR INTENSIFIES PRESSURE ON ISRAEL
(page 9).
-c> 7. YUGOSLAVS TO POSTPONE RECOGNITION OF
EAST GERMANY (page 10).
71-Z 8. FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS
(!)--1Z_ 9. STATE OF SIEGE IN ARGENTINA
(page 11).
(page 12).
lk--4) 10. SYRIAN ARMY LEADERS BIZRI AND SARRAJ VISIT
KING SAO (page 13).
. THAI MARSHAL SARIT REPORTED ILL
(page 14).
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1. SECOND MEGATON-YIELD NUCLEAR TEST BY
USSR NEAR NOVAYA ZEMLYA
a large explo-
sion occurred at 0900 GMT (0500 EDT)
on 6 October in the vicinity of Novaya
Zemlya.
Comment Since April the Soviet Union has been
testing nuclear weapons alternately at
the Semipalatinsk proving ground and off the east coast of
Novaya Zemlya. The two earlier Soviet nuclear tests at
Novaya Zemlya occurred on 7 September and 24 September
and yielded approximately 25 kilotons and four megatons,
respectively.
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2. ADDITIONAL DATA CONCERNING SOVIET
EARTH SATELLITE
Analysis of available data, indicates
that the Soviet earth satellite probably
was launched at about 1930 GMT on 4
October from Tyura Tam, some 50 miles
east of Novokazalinsk in the Turkistan Military District. The
Soviet announcement was apparently made after the satellite
had made its first orbit of the earth. Observations indicate
that the TASS announcements regarding the orbital axis of 65
degrees to the equatorial plane and the orbital time of one hour
and 36.2 minutes are substantially correct. The satellite is
radiating signals on the announced frequencies of 20� 005 and
40, 002 megacycles, those on the latter frequency being extreme-
ly weak. The extent and nature of additional satellite instrumen
tation have not been firmly established, although there are some
indications that data-transmitting signals have been detected.
No additional information regarding spe-
cific satellite characteristics, other than that disclosed in So-
viet announcements, is presently available. There is no firm
reason to doubt the announced characteristics at this time ex-
cept possibly for the weight, which may be about 165 pounds
rather than the announced 185 pounds.
The launching of a satellite of this weight would re-
quire a launching vehicle approaching ICBM proportions.
Some of the technical advantages to be
gained from even a modestly instrumented satellite include:
complete check of the launching vehicle and procedures, com-
plete exercise of ground surveillance and data-gathering and
handling equipment and related procedures, substantiation of
orbital calculations, data on drag at high altitudes, and the
gathering of signal propagation and ionospheric data.
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"444 1 1 .111-AL V at.. JILL IL Jr.,'
3. SITUATION IN WARSAW (Information as of 1800 EDT,
6 October 1957)
The government still has the situa-
tion under control in Warsaw and ap-
pears determined to maintain its posi-
tion concerning the demands made by
the students. It continues to act with
restraint but at the same time is not
risking any spread of the student un-
rest.
Regime militia and security forces
continued to act with dispatch to break
up demonstrations over the week end.
Numerous resolutions from workers
groups and from the official student
youth group condemning the student demonstrations have
been publicized, indicating that the party control mechanism
remains effective. The Warsaw press has adopted a re-
strained and reasonable attitude toward the students, and
while condemning them, is carefully not inflamatory in its
articles and editorials.
The students apparently have been un-
able to attract any significant popular support for their
position. During the rioting on the evening of 4 October,
bystanders expressed disapproval of student excesses and
lack of discipline. No worker support has been forthcoming
for the students, although they were reported on 5 October
by the American embassy to be negotiating with factory
workers, whose disposition was not to participate. The
rioting on 5 October was not joined in by the students, but
was precipitated by young teen-agers and brawling towns-
people who did not seem to be politically motivated.
The only known support for the students
so far was a resolution passed by the Association of Jour-
nalists on 4 October calling for a lifting of the ban on
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Po Prostu, the student journal. A number of unconfirmed
reports have been received by the embassy that students
in other cities are preparing to engage in sympathy demon-
strations.
A five-man student delegation met on
5 October with a government commission appointed the day
before which included officials of the Ministry of Higher
Education and the rector of the Polytechnical University,
which has been closed "until the situation improves."
Another meeting was also held the same day by Gomulka
and other high government officials with 50 leaders of the
Warsaw and provincial press. The outcome of these meet-
ings is not known.
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v.-A.51 I A�
4. EARLY CONVOCATION OF SOVIET PARTY
CONGRESS POSSIBLE
The American embassy in Moscow
suggests that Khrushchev may call
a party congress before the theoret-
ically mandatory date of early 1960
in order to elect a new enlarged central committee.
An editorial in the latest issue of
Problems of CPSU History discusses the activities of
the "a,ntiparty group" and includes extravagant definitions
of the role of the central committee. It lauds earlier ex-
pansions of the committee as having "great significance...
in the formation of a strong Leninist directing core."
The embassy believes it is virtually
certain that some criticism or at least lack of support of
Khrushchev must have developed in the early stages of the
June plenum. If this antipathy continues he might consider
it wise to convene a party congress in order to elect a fully
reliable central committee. The ostensible reason for its
convocation might be to consider the new Seven-Year Plan.
Comment Several recent reports allege that Khru-
shchev continues to face opposition within
the higher echelons of the party. An attempt by Khrushchev
again to pack the central committee would probably compel
any such opponents either to conform or muster forces against
him. Recent Soviet successes with the ICBM and earth satel-
lite will probably boost Khrushchev's domestic popularity and
at least temporarily strengthen his position in dealing with any
dissidents.
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tiouri.V.L1-1...1J1-/J. V -111.
5. POLISH PROPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR BAN IN EAST
AND WEST GERMANY
According to the Norwegian UN dele-
gate, the statements in the General
Assembly by the Polish and Czech
delegates on 2 October that if the two
German states should agree to pro-
hibit the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons
on their territories, Poland and Czechoslovakia would
"take the same action," may cause the West considerable
embarrassment unless a convincing response is developed.
Ambassador Lodge notes that the proposal contains noth-
ing essentially new, but has been greeted with such in-
terest by other delegations that it cannot be ignored.
Comment The West German government's press
chief has stated that the proposal is un-
likely to reduce world tension and noted that such an agree-
ment between states which do not produce nuclear weapons
makes little sense. The opposition Social Democrats, how-,
ever, term the Polish proposal a "suggestion of importance."
The Polish and Czech proposals proba-
bly have the dual purpose of bringing pressure on the Bonn
government on the nuclear arms issue and generating in-
terest in Soviet proposals for a European collective security
system. Soviet disarmament proposals since March 1956
have called for the creation of a European zone of limitation
and inspection of armaments, covering the two German states
and undefined adjacent countries, in which nuclear weapons
would be prohibited. Soviet spokesmen have contended that
such a zone would facilitate agreement on disarmament,
European security, and a general political settlement.
These latest proposals are also in line
with the East German proposal of 27 July for a confederation
of the two German states, endorsed by Khrushchev during his
visit to East Germany in August, which included a prohibition
of the storage and production of nuclear weapons in both parts
of Germany.
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6. USSR INTENSIFIES PRESSURE ON ISRAEL
oviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
arned Israeli Foreign Minister
Meir on 30 September, in a con-
ersation she described as "fright-
ening," that relations between the
wo countries could not be improved
s long as Israel remains subservient
to "aggressive policies" in the Middle
East. She told a member of the Amer-
ican delegation, "We do not scare eas-
ily, but, frankly, after that conversa-
tion I am very scared." Since the first
public report of the substance of Gro-
ihyko's warning was by Cairo radio, the
warning was probably made largely for
its propaganda effect in the Arab states.
Gromyko's threats also reflect the
USSR's concern for protecting the Syrian regime. His
conversation reiterates Soviet Ambassador Abramov's
warning to Mrs. Meir immediately prior to her depar-
ture for New York on 9 September, in which he took her
sharply to task for Israel's "aggressive posture" and
warned Israel to avoid "provocative moves" against Syria:
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7. YUGOSLAVS TO POSTPONE RECOGNITION OF
EAST GERMANY
Belgrade has postponed its plans
for early de jure recognition of the
East German government because of extreme concern
over the anticipated adverse Western reaction. As a
compromise, the Yugoslays will undertake government-
to-government commercial negotiations and will weigh
Western reactions.
The French government reportedly
approached the Yugoslav delegation at the United Nations
and informed it that recognition of East Germany would
be considered an unneutral act.
Comment Yugoslav recognition of East Germany
probably would cause Tito severe dif-
ficulties regarding Yugoslav trade with West Germany and
would increase suspicion of his continued independence of
Moscow. Belgrade has recently shown concern about its
relations with the West
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'Wo" -twS
80 FRENCH POLITICAL CRISIS
Comment on:
Despite ex-premier Guy Mollet's failure
to get Independent backing in an attempt
to form a new cabinet, the French polit-
ical crisis has probably been shortened
as a result of his efforts. Monet seemed
to feel he had narrowed discussions to the
primary question of necessary and strin-
gent financial measures to shore up the
national economy. The next candidate, pre-
sumably Rene Pleven, vVill probably try to
convince the Independents, that an austerity
rogratn muSt at least be given lip service.
Speculation on a possible return to power
by General de Gaulle will be intensified. An important factor
in Mollet's willingness to make the first attempt to form a new
government was probably Socialist party apprehensions in this
regard.
supporters of De Gaulle , had brought abOut
Bourges-Maunoury's downfall and that De Gaulle is working
toward a coup. the Socialist belief that the re-
call of De Gaulle would lead to rank-and-file Socialists coop-
erating with the Communists, despite Socialist party leaders'
desire to prevent it.
De Gaulle's advisers are reported at present
to be split into two main groups, one pressing him to act now,
the other arguing that the moment is premature.
The crisis tias reportedly strengthened the
view of labor that prices will be forced upward, but for the
moment the unions seem willing to makk time. If the crisis
is prolonged, however, and prices continue to rise, the labor
situation could deteriorate rapidly.
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--- �46 � T -AL .E.1. ALL,'
9. STATE OF SIEGE IN ARGENTINA
Comment on:
The 30-day state of siege imposed on
the Argentine capital and surrounding
uenos Aires Province on 5 October
as probably designed to prevent new
eronistia.-Communist labor disorders
nd possibly also to quiet reported mili-
ary fears that the Aramburu regime is
oo lenient with its political enemies.
One report states that the preventive ar-
rest of some 250 "antidemocratic" labor leaders was under-
taken independently by General Curanta, chief of the State
Intelligence Service, on 4 October and was then hastily le-
galized by proclaiming the state of siege. Some Peronista-
influenced unions that participated in the partially successful
general strike of 27 September are still defying a government
back-to-work order, and incidents of sabotage in the communi-
cations system have been reported.
a courier of the "Peronista High Command' arrived
in Buenos Aires from Chile on 26 September with instructions
for widespread demonstrations on 17 October, and the govern-
ment may now have learned of these plans.
A government spokesman told the press
that the action was aimed exclusively at "defending the normal
development of the government's political plan" leading up to
general elections in February. Some observers believe the
Peronistas' now hope the military will oust Aramburu, call
off the elections, and demons trate demo-
cratic government.
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10. SYRIAN ARMY LEADERS BIZRI AND SARRAJ
VISIT KING SAUD
Comment cm �
Chief of Staff Bizri and G--2 chief
Sarraj of the Syrian army embarked
secretly on 2 October for Riyadh to
see King Saild
the Egyptian command-
er in chief of the Arab Joint Command
had agreed to the visit, but opposed a
Saudi proposal to employ former Syrian
officers in Saudi. Arabia unless they were approvectby the
Egyptian'military attache in Damascus.
Saud presumably desires to continue his
efforts to exert a moderating influence on the Syrian leaders
in the hope of preventing them from moving too close to the
USSR. At the same time, he may be endeavoring to provide
jobs outside of Syria for moderate officers who were ousted
in the August "coup." He has employed for the past five
years Col. Fawzi Silaw, former chief of state under Syrian
dictator Shishakli. Bizri and Sarraj probably are seeking to
enhance their own positions by appearing to be in King Saud's
good graces.
King Hussayn on 5 October sent his aide-
de-camp and a palace official to Riyadh on a previously sched-
uled trip to present Hussayn's views on the Syrian situation and
to warn King Saud against the course of events in Syria. Whether
Saud timed the Bizri-Sarraj visit to coincide with that of Hus-
sayn's emissaries is not known, but Saud may feel that a personal
meeting between them would be a step toward bettering Arab
unity.
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11. THAI MARSHAL SARIT REPORTED ILL
The possibility that Field Marshal
� Sarit may be physically unable to
exercise firm control over the rul-
ing military junta in Thailand is sug-
gested by Interior Minister Prapat's
announcement on 1 October that Sarit
is ill and confined to his home. In
making his statement, Prapat revealed
to the public for the first time that the armed forces chief
is suffering from cirrhosis of the liver.
This chronic disease
Ts1Jk�wever,to force Sarit to give up close direction
of affairs, thus undermining his efforts to keep Prapat and
others of his ambitious and contending followers in line.
Prapat, a leading contender to succeed
Sarit, may possibly have revealed the nature of Sarit's ill-
ness to the public as the first step in contesti
fitness to be Thailand's de facto ruler.
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