THE BAATHIST REGIMES IN SYRIA AND IRAQ

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03151803
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2021
• Case Number: F-2017-00022
• Publication Date: September 27, 1963

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THE BAATHIST REGIMES IN SYRIA AND IRAQ
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27 September 1963
THE BAATHIST REGIMES IN SYRIA AND IRAQ
The Baath Party's seizure of power in Iraq
and Syria last February and March appears to have
drastically transformed the struggle for Arab
unity. Nasir's primacy now has been challenged
by a well-organized power group located in the
center of the Arab world, and his moves to counter
it have thus far made little headway. At the same
time, some of the Baath's strengths and weaknesses
have been revealed to the Arab public, as well as
to the party itself, especially the gap between
Baathist theory and practice. Certain significant
differences in internal policy, moreover, have
developed between regimes in Syria and Iraq. Never-
theless these two countries now are more closely
entwined than at any time since the Ottoman Turkish
period.
Differences With Nasirism
Baathism might be termed
"Nasirism without Nasir," al-
though the Baath party antedated
Nasir's rise to power by ten
years. Both stand for Arab unity,
"Arab socialism," and the elim-
ination of Western influence from
the Arab world. Nasirism
stresses the positive role of
religion while Baathism's empha-
sis is strictly secular,. but both
advocate a secular state and
"republicanism." Their quarrel
arises over the question of
whether Nasir will share leader-
ship of the Arab unity movement
with the Baath.
Nasirism envisages a unity
movement led by one man--Nasir--
whose charismatic qualities will
spur the Arab masses to overthrow
their feudal rulers and bring
their countries under his leader-
ship. Nasir has stated that the
army rather than the party is the
revolutionary vanguard.
The Baath, on the other
hand, is the only non-Communist
international Arab political
party with an ideological basis.
It has long expounded on the
virtues of democratic government,
and does not depend on a single
dynamic leader. Its founder,
Michel Aflaq, is a theoretician
who expounds his theories in
writing and -whose halting
speech lacks the fervor to whip
up Arab masses.
Heavily influenced by Marxist
philosophy, Aflaq has taken a
page from the Communist book and
organized the Baath along Com-
munist lines in cells and with
a supreme international council
directing the various national
branches in the Arab countries.
Although holding no official
position in either Syria or
Iraq, he maintains influence
throughout the Middle East by
virtue of his acknowledged lead-
ership of the international
Baath.
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The Iraqi Experience
The Iraqi coup of 8 Febru-
ary brought to power a small and
closely knit group of young,
inexperienced and ambitious men.
Several members of the new gov-
ernment had shared cells in
Qasim's jails, and similar ex-
periences of this nature ap-
parently has given the party
leadership a sense of cohesion
and of collective identity.
Suspicious and inbred, the party
leaders moved quickly to consoli-
date their hold on the state.
The regime immediately
threw its full weight against
its only organized opposition,
the Communist Party. The swift
and harsh measures taken appear
to have crippled the party in
Iraq. Its cell network has been
disrupted,its leaders have been
jailed, and party activity has
largely ceased. An attempted
coup on 3 July organized by
Communist elements was easily
crushed and led to a new spate
of arrests and to a series of
swift executions. Sporadic ar-
rests continue.
As a consequence, relations
between Baghdad and Moscow sharply
deteriorated until August, when
the regime apparently concluded
that it had moved so far from the
Soviet camp as to open itself to
the charge--serious in the Arab
world--that it had abandoned
neutralism. Talks in Moscow and
Baghdad quickly led to the resump-
tion of interrupted Soviet arms
shipments, and propaganda attacks
on both sides fell off sharply,
although Moscow still maintains
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AFLAQ_
a drumf ire of clandestine broad-
casts castigating the regime.
The Baath government last
June moved against the rebellious
Kurds in northern Iraq in an
offensive which has been far more
ruthless and far more successful
than any under Qasim. In con-
trast to the campaigns under
Qasim, the war as the Baathist
regime has conducted it is gener-
ally popular both in the army
and in the Arab south, where
Arab nationalist attitudes pre-
vail. Deployment of larger
numbers of troops, greater tac-
tical flexibility, and the use
of Kurdish irregulars who oppose
Kurdish rebel leader Barzani--
and who have in fact borne the
brunt of the fighting�have al-
lowed the army to drive to with-
in a few miles of the Turkish
border.
The regime appears to be-
lieve that indiscriminate bomb-
ing, weight of numbers, and the
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army's overwhelming firepower
will eventually sap Kurdish
morale and cause a breakup of
Barzani's fighting tribal coali-
tion, as occurred in previous
Kurdish rebellions in Iraq. Al-
though Kurdish morale is far
lower than during the fighting
against Qasim, there have been
no major defections from the
rebel forces thus far, and Bar-
zani has managed to keep the
bulk of his fighting force thus
far intact.
Suppression of Opponents
In dealing with its other
domestic opponents the regime in
Iraq has shown some of the ruth-
lessness of its moves against the
Communists and the Kurds, and
also considerable deviousness.
It has continued to mouth the
slogans of democracy and broad
Arab nationalism that Baath
theory calls for, but in fact its
main concern has been the protec-
tion of its power base. Politi-
cal activity other than that of
the Baath itself in effect has
been banned and newspapers are
tightly controlled by the regime.
In power the party has con-
tinued to employ some of the
techniques of a conspiratorial
group. To protect itself from
opposition penetration, it took
in no new members for several
months after the coup. At the
same time it has effectively and
thoroughly penetrated virtually
all opposition parties and groups
and carefully monitors their
activities. These parties are
themselves small, weak, and for
the most part clients of Egyptian
intelligence--a fact which the
Baath has exploited. In late
May it announced it had uncovered
a "foreign plot" and used the
occasion to remove from office
the only pro-Egyptian in the
cabinet and to arrest a number
of prominent anti-Baath politi-
cians, some of whom it later
released. Thus far there have
been no executions of non-Com-
munist opposition elements.
The regime is also making
an attempt to weed out opposition
elements from the government
machinery--in particular the
Ministry of Interior--and from
the army, replacing them with
trusted Baath Party members.
However, many non-Baathists
still hold responsible positions,
particularly in the army, and
the rumors of coup planning that
have been endemic in Baghdad for
several months are probably in
part an attempt by the regime to
smoke out plotters. The Baath
has also created a paramilitary
national board as a partial
counterweight to the army and
to serve as a party security
force. In addition, Baath offi-
cials who are army officers appear
to give primary allegiance to
the party rather than to the
military.
At the same time, the re-
gime has appointed several
nonparty technicians to impor-
tant posts and has attempted to
recruit "independent" Arab
nationalists unaffiliated with
the opposition parties into the
government. In this it has had
little success, for those whom
the regime approaches recognize
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that effective executive power
remains exclusively in the hands
of the Baath party. In an attempt
to overcome this objection, the
government has proposed the estab-
lishment of an "advisory coun-
cil" of prominent figures having
some of the functions of a legis-
lature but little real power.
This idea has yet to be imple-
mented.
Baghdad's Economic Policy
The Baath's advocacy of
socialism, and statements by
Deputy Premier Saadi shortly
after the February coup,gave
rise to fears of rapid wide-
scale nationalization and a
consequent further stagnation
in business activity. However,
the regime has made no move in
this direction and has in fact
made a number of gestures of
reassurance to the merchant
community--a class which Baath
theory regards as the "natural
enemy of the revolution."
As a result of these ges-
tures and of army successes
against the Kurds, business
activity has markedly improved
in the last two months. In
the field of agrarian reform--
which bogged in chaos during
most of the Qasim era--the
government has thus far made
little or no progress, while moves
toward a resolution of the
Iraqi quarrel with the oil com-
panies appear to have petered
out. Apparently the regime plans
to demonstrate that it has the
capacity for survival before
it attempts to implement Baath
social and economic theory into
practice.
4
Baghdad and Arab Unity
In dealing with the question
of Arab unity--a cardinal aim
of Baath theory--the regime has
used a more subtle approach.
The talks which the Baath initi-
ated last April in Cairo to bring
Egypt, Iraq, and Syria into a
new United Arab Republic were
in form a public demonstration
of the party's sincerity on this
issue, while in substance they
were an attempt to secure from
Nasir terms that would allow the
Baath to retain its power base
in Syria and Iraq. There is no
indication that the party actually
expected Nasir to acquiesce to
these terms, and its subsequent
actions in this field have been
not more determined moves to
implement unity, but rather a
series of maneuvers designed to
saddle Nasir with responsibility
for the stillbirth of the tri-
partite unity idea.
In this maneuvering the
party has shown itself far more
adroit than any previous oppo-
nent of Nasir. Throughout this
period Iraqi relations with Egypt
have remained correct, if not
cordial. Nasir has appeared
to be reluctant to engage in a
head-on confrontation with
Iraq, where pro-Egyptian sentiment
is far less strong than in Syria,
although he has maintained clan-
destine contact with anti-Baath
groups plotting against the re-
gime.
Baath Role in Syria
In Syria, on the other hand,
the Baathist regime has been under
almost constant pressure by
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pro-Nasir elements since shortly
after its seizure of power on
8 March. The Syrian coup was
a new demonstration of Baath
strength in the Arab world, but
the Syrian leaders, more ex-
perienced but more faction-ridden
than those in Iraq, as well as
subject to far greater Nasirist
pressures, were less securely
in power. Subsequent moves to-
ward unity, undertaken by Iraq
in concert with Syria, have been
designed to reduce Nasirist
pressure on Syria and to maintain
the Baath in power there.
In early April while a
Syrian delegation was in Cairo
conducting unity negotiations,
the Egyptians made direct propa-
ganda attacks on the Damascus
regime and instigated violent
demonstrations. The Baath
strongly resisted these pressures
and crushed a pro-Nasir coup
attempt in mid-July.
Partly as a consequence of
this steady pressure and the
existence of a considerable pro-
Nasir following in Syria, the
regime has resorted to harsh
internal security practices and
has deviated widely from its past
publicly proclaimed policies.
Once having seized control, the
Baathist leadership instituted
an unprecedented and sweeping
purge not only of Nasir sympathiz-
ers in the army and civil serv-
ice, but of old-line political
civil servants as well. Appar-
ently, Syrian Baathist leaders
believe that their social revolu-
tionary goals cannot be suitably
carried out by executives who
lack Baathist sympathies.
The Syrian regime has jailed
many opponents, and executed
over a score. This willingness
to execute opponents when it is
in power distinguishes the
Baath from Syria's traditional
politicians.
The Syrian Baath, like the
party in Iraq, has carried out ,
its policy of opposition to Nasir
with some skill. While main-
taining an outwardly conciliatory
posture toward him, it has method-
ically undercut his bases of
support through purges of the
government administration, the
press, and other pro-NaSir group-
ings. As in Iraq, the party
created a National Guard as a
force directly subject to its
will. Conservative forces have
been removed from the political
scene.
Attitude Toward Communists
Syrian Communists--deci-
mated during Nasir's rule--have
been little molested by the
Baathist regime, probably not
so much out of consideration for
the Soviet Union as for their
strong anti-Nasir attitude.
However, there has been no repeti-
tion of Baathist-Communist
cooperation so prevalent before
the union with Egypt. Should
the Baath feel that the Commu-
nists were becoming a menace
there is little doubt that they
would be as ruthlessly suppressed
as the country's pro-Nasir eleMent--
and as they have been in Iraq.
Syrian relations with the
Soviet bloc took a turn for thp
worse after the Baath seized
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power, but never have reached
the depths that Iraqi-Soviet
relations did at the start of
the campaign against the Kurds.
Soviet support of Syria in the
UN in early September against
Israeli charges have in fact
raised Soviet popularity in
Damascus considerably. A Syrian
economic-military delegation
is in Moscow now, apparently
negotiating new agreements.
Internal Differences
Although the Baath is a
civilian political party, its
base of power in Syria--as is
the case with Nasir's Egypt--
is the army. The regime's
ruling body, the National Revolu-
tionary Command Council (NRCC)
includes both civilians and
military men. When the Baath
came into power last March,
the Syrian Army was as faction-
alized as it had been in the
past--conservatives, pro-
Nasirists, Baathists, and non-
political officers all were vying
for control. Since then purges
have left the Baath dominant,
even though a considerable residue
of pro-Nasir officers and noncoms
remains.
Within the NRCC, reports
indicate that there is disagree-
ment on a number of basic issues,
notably over the amount of
socialization to be carried out.
The present army strongman, Gen.
Amin al-Hafiz, is believed to
lead a pragmatic group which in-
sists on no compromise with Nasir
and a de-emphasizing of the math's
social theories. The party's
secretary general Nur al-DinAtasi
sides with Hafiz. The doctrinaire
Baathists under the leadership
of Prime Minister Bitar--supported
by Col. Umran, who controls the
key 70th Armored Brigade--are
said to favor full implementation
of Baathist theory. The position
of the party's international leader,
Michel Aflaq, is not known, but
may be presumed to lie with Sitar,
who is his long-time colleague.
So far, it appears that disagree-
ments have been confined within
the ruling body.
Despite the disagreements,
Baathist socialist doctrine has
been carried out to a considerable
degree. Socialist measures were
speedily instituted partly to ward
off possible criticisms from Cairo,
as well as to gain a measure of pop-
ular support within Syria. The
regime has nationalized all banks,
reimposed and extended existing
agrarian reform laws, and imposed
foreign trade controls--largely
because of a shortage of foreign
exchange. The state may yet take
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over direction of foreign
trade and much internal com-
merce, and possibly nation-
alize Syria's few industries
not previously taken over,
especially the large cotton
textile industry centered in
Aleppo. Baathist control of
the press is tight--no anti-
regime papers are allowed.
The Goal of Unity
As the idea of unity with
Egypt has faded, there have
been indications that Syria
and Iraq might move toward
bilateral union. Iraq placed
its air force and part of its
army under Syrian command in
a propaganda gesture of sup-
port during the recent Syrian-
Israeli border crisis, and the
communiqu4 issued after Iraqi
President Arif's visit to
Syria during August discussed
closer economic relations
between the two countries
and of a joint military com-
mand.
However, the two regimes
have moved in this direction
with great circumspection;
while economic relations be-
tween them might become
closer, the two governments
have thus far been reluctant
to fling down the gauntlet
that joint military command
or true political union would
represent to Egyptian inter-
est. In the fields of party
activity--both in Syria and
Iraq and in clandestine ac-
tivity in Jordan and North
Africa--and of intelligence
and countersubversion the
two regimes work in closest
concert.
The Baath's successes in
Iraq and Syria have greatly
BITAR
heartened its sympathizers in
the other Arab states and
have alarmed rulers in these
countries. King Husayn felt
it necessary to place Jorda-
nian party leaders under pre-
ventative arrest. Libyan
authorities have expressed
alarm at Baathist penetration
of the government--although
there is no evidence that such
fears are warranted. Several
Yemenis in important official
positions are reported to be
Baathists, a fact which causes
the Egyptians considerable
distress.
Syrian and Iraqi students
in Egypt were expelled recently,
and the Baath has threatened
to carry its struggle to Nasir's
homeland. The longer the
party remains in power, the
more it will become a rallying
point for young nationalists
throughout the Arab world.
Recognizing this, Nasir has
moved to create a counter
party--a united Arab nation-
alist movement--to give his
adherents outside Egypt
organizational strength.
This maneuver has made almost
no headway thus far. (SECRET)
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