CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/05/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03148938
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: May 2, 1960

(//////////////////
110:provec4 forriiiii/623148938
�*41w
2 May 1960
Copy No. C uS
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETI\
DOCUMENT NO,
NO Cie LNGE IN CLASS. pc
CLCLASSIT11::
CLASS, SNCL:f TO: TS S
NEXT OLVILW CATe: 10 to
AUDI: HE 784
JUN 1980
Dalt SEVIRWESt
3.3(h)(2)
rti
3.5(c)
�
TOP SECRET for Release: 2020 / 03 / 13 C 03148938 r/Z/ZZA WiefriefrZyrjr
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148938
Alka, I VII" be-v.4;nm. �
Approved for Release: C03148938
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148938
2 MAY 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
I I. ASIA-AFRICA
Turkish disorders slacken; students re-
portedly plan final demonstration today
asking US support against regime.
Arab shipping boycott begins with little
practical effect thus far.
UAR deputy foreign minister recom-
mends increased contacts with Latin
America.
Iraqi foreign minister says Qasim told
Mikoyan Iraq and USSR don't agree on
meaning of neutrality.
Tunisia may soon announce exchange of
ambassadors with USSR.
Guinea will order Western oil firms to
market bloc petroleum products obtained
by barter.
"UM
III. THE WEST
()French official predicts early statement
of "liberal" Algerian policy by De Gaulle.
�Panama tense over 8 May election, to-
day's anniversary of march on Canal Zone,
and unsubstantiated invasion jitters.
Approve-d-f;;:-ReCe7s-e':-2-6-20703/13 C03148938
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148938
443-T-OP-SEERE-T
'we*
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
2 May 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Turkey: Turkish student demonstrations after four
days have slackened in intensity and may have passed their
peak. The last demonstration is scheduled for 2 May, ac-
cording to one participant. It will be peaceful and will have
as its theme: "The US has helped the South Korean students
to overthrow the regime--why then cannot it help those in
Turkey?" The martial law commander of Ankara has been
unwilling to be tough on the students, and the Turkish chief
of staff took charge to disperse the demonstrations of 30 April.
Army action has been firm but generally careful, and demon-
strators have not shown the same hostility to the army as they
did to the police on the first day of the rioting. he opposition
Republic Peoples' party reportedly is planning to go under-
ground. Some of its members are on their way to Istanbul to
engage in propaganda activities among the foreign correspond-
ents gathered there for the NATO Ministerial Council meetingJ
ipping boycott: [ne AD boycott01 American snip-
ping so far has had little practical effect beyond the diversion
of some American-flag vessels to non-Arab ports. CA Cairo for-
eign ministry official has said that the boycott would be "sym-
I
(Page 1)
1.41
lApproved for Release: 2020/03/13
C0314893k
. .\ 'Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148938
TOP SECRET
�mie
TTAR - Latin Ameriea� TTAR 11pnritv Fnri�n minister Sabri,
advised Cairo
to toilow up contacts with Latin American countries "because the
ground is fertile and augurs firm cooperation in the future." Sabri
also recommended inviting three or four students from each Latin
American university to visit the UAR, reflecting his earlier, stated
belief that student groups are the political prime movers in the
area. His two-month good-will trip, which ends in Montevideo
this week, appears to have had some success in stimulating inter-
est in the concept of a neutralist bloc of Afro-Asian - Latin Amer-
ican Atatpg
Iraq- Ubbl-t: Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim was "quite blunt" in
telling Mikoyan, during his recent visit to Iraq, that neutralism
does not have the same meaning to Iraq that it appears to have to
the Soviet Union, according to Iraqi Foreign Minister Jawad. Qasim
and Jawad assertedly told Mikoyan that they did not consider Iraq's
policy of neutrality should require it to follow the Soviet line at
all times. While Jawad apparently believes this came as some-
thing of a shock to Mikoyan, the Soviet leader's visit to Baghdad
presumably took place because of a desire to examine at firsthand
the obvious differences which have developed in the policies and ob-
iectives of the two governmpnts
Tunisia-USSR: heE establishment of diplomatic relations be-
tween Tunisia and the USSR will probably be announced this week,
according to a responsible Tunisian official. President Bourguiba
has recently shown increasing interest in technical and economic
,aid from bloc countries. A Czech embassy was established in Tunis
in July 1959; subsequently the Tunisians agreed to, but have not yet
implemented, an exchange of ambassadors with Poland. Finance
Secretary Mestiri will apparently be Tunisia's first ambassador to
Moscow:1
Guinea: President Toure's government appears to have decided
not to allow Western companies marketing oil in Guinea to import
further stocks from normal sources. The companies have reportedly
2 May 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
N TOP SECRET
\Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C0314893k
//;,
/
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148938
TO
*al
1
been told they must buy and distribute petroleum products com-
ing from the Soviet bloc under ,barter agreements�an arrange-
ment which conserves Guinea's extremely limited foreign ex-
change reserves. An initial 4,000-ton POL shipment from the
bloc was to arrive in Conakry on 30 April, and a second, slightly
larger shipment is due in mid-May. (Page 3)
III. THE WEST
France-Algeria: ff.:1.e Gaulle will make a major Algerian
policy statement some time before 14 May which will "go far
in .a liberal direction," according to the Gaullist deputy dele-
gated by the government to prepare for the 29 May cantonal ele
tions in Algeria. He added that the elections may be postponed
If a preliminary understanding with the FLN develops from con-
tacts allegedly taking place now through intermediaries. Rebel
spokesmen have recently indicated that they regard peace pros-
pects as at the lowest ebb since De Gaulle's 16 September. pro-
posal!) (Page 4)
Panama: [Fensions over the 8 May national elections, the ac
tivities of Communist-infiltrated and Cuban-influenced student
groups, and growing labor unrest combine to raise the possibility
of violent outbreaks during the coming week. Leftist students may
try to promote a march into the Canal Zone on 2 May to commemo-
rate the anniversary of a student-led flag-planting expedition two
years ago. Also, the government is apprehensive over unsupported
rumors of an imminent revolutionary attack. A relatively minor
spark could touch off violence by Panama City's restive, dissatis-
fied lower-income aroutos.:.1
2 May 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
,, TOP ..S.PPRFT
XApproved for Release: 2020/03/13
C03148938
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148938
Noe
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Arab Shipping Boycott
Two American freighters, at opposite ends of the Suez
Canal, were the first vessels affected by the Arab boycott of
American shipping, which began at midnight on 29 April. Arab
repairmen walked off the Bennshipper at Suez, and a tugboat
carrying demonstrators shouting "No canal for Israel" subse-
quently picketed the Sir John Franklin at Port Said. Neither
ship, however, was prevented from using the canal. In Beirut
about 3,000 people, most of them students from the American
University there, demonstrated in an orderly fashion in support
of the boycott, shouting anti-American slogans. Longshoremen
in Montreal ignored a seafarers' union picket line and began un-
loading the UAR's Star of Assuan, thereby preventing the inclu-
sion of Canadian ships in the boycott.
The chief practical effect of the boycott so far has been to
cause the diversion of several American-flag vessels to non-
Arab ports, with the result that for the time being Arab dock-
workers and other demonstrators may have little or nothing to
boycott. The UAR Government plans to divert PL-480 ship-
ments bound for the UAR on US ships to Greece and Italy for
transshipment on non-US vessels, while consignees in Beirut
are instructing New York not to send their purchases on Amer-
ican-flag vessels. Lebanese Foreign Minister Uwayni, who
said union leaders had made it unmistakably clear they were de-
termined not to work American vessels, asked the American
Embassy to inform the owners of the Santa Alicia, an American
ship scheduled to arrive at Beirut on 1 May, that the Lebanese
Government is prepared to defray all additional costs of trans-
shipping its Beirut cargo, in order to avoid an incident. The
consulate in Alexandria reported that during the week before the
boycott officially went into effect US vessels were unloaded only
as a result of police pressure on dockworkers.
Arab government officials publicly support the boycott against
the "Zionist conspiracy" which they believe caused the picketing of
TOP SECRET
2 may 60 ce, page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148938
"Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148938
the Cleopatra in New York, but many of them, a. ncluding Nasp
have privately expressed concern over the effect a prolonged
dispute may have on American relations with the Arab states,
due to the highly emotional character of the issue.
(The undersecretary of the UAR Foreign Ministry said the
boycott initially will be "symbolic," possibly involving one ship
in each Arab porIj
The UAR.nevertheless,is known to be considering a possible fu-
ture boycott of American goods as well.
The secretary general of the International Confederation of Arab
Trade Unions (ICATU) has told American Embassy officials that
a boycott of American aircraft would be a later step if the boycott
continued, and another ICATU spokesman is quoted as saying that
measures would be taken to prevent the loading of American tank-
ers.
Despite his expressed concern for UAR-American relations,
Nasir indicated his determination that
the boycott "must be carried out by any means." He made specific
reference to Lebanon where the UAR apparently is ready to com-
pensate Lebanese dockworkers.
TOP SECRET
2 May 60 CEA-p-p-rOv-edicTP-eise:-2610/073./.1.3. F031.48938 Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148938
Guinea Obtaini on Supplies From Soviet Blor
N."
President Toure's government has apparently decided to re-
ly henceforth on Soviet bloc sources for a major part, if not all,
of Guinea's petroleum requirements. Until now, four Western oil
companies--Texaco, Mobiloil, Shell, and British Petroleum--
have imported and marketed petroleum products consumed in Guinea.
The approximately $1,800,000 worth of imports handled by the four
companies last year constituted the eighth largest item on Guinea's
list of imports for 1959.
Since Guinea broke away from the French franc zone in March,
the Western companies have been unable to obtain any convertible
foreign exchange for the replenishment of their petroleum stocks
from normal sources. Guinea's director of mines told the Amer-
ican Embassy in Conakry that the companies have refused to con-
tinue importing their products on the basis of government assurances
that payment arrangements would be worked out later. The Texaco
representative maintains, however, that the government rejected of-
fers by the four companies to continue importing on this basis and
that Texaco was denied permission to unload a tanker now en route
to Guinea, even without such assurances.
The Texaco source also revealed that he and the other representa-
tives of the Western companies were told by Guinea's director of
mines at a meeting on 27 April that they now must buy and distribute
bloc petroleum products. At the meeting, the Directorate of Mines'
Polish "technical counselor" played a prominent role. The com-
panies were informed that an initial 4,000-ton POL shipment from
the bloc was scheduled to arrive in Conakry aboard a Soviet tanker
on 30 April. This shipment and a second, slightly larger one being
carried by a Soviet-chartered Norwegian vessel due in mid-May will
supply Guinea's POL needs for three months at present consumption
rates. The imports from the bloc are reportedly to be paid for out
of next year's banana production, the current crop being already over-
committed.
While the Western companies have apparently agreed to handle
the bloc products for the time being in the hope their prospects may
improve, they are unlikely to stay on for long simply as distributors.
For its part, the Guinean Government will probably not be willing to
use its scarce foreign exchange to buy the companies' products as
long as it can fill its POL needs from the bloc through barter arrange-
ments.
CONFIDENTIAL
2 May 60 CE1`,^73-prO:ved`On-F,6eie---.0;76:-10-;20/-63713 d03148938 Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148938
'muse'
III. THE WEST
New Possibility of Frch-Algerian Agitement Reported
General de Gaulle will make a major policy statement on
Algeria sometime prior to 14 May, according to Lucien Neuwirth,
a Gaullist (UNR) deputy in the French National Assembly who is
the UNR's Algerian expert and party whip and who has been dele-
gated by the government to prepare for the 29 May cantonal.elections
in Algeria. Neuwirth told the American Embassy that he expects
the speech to be very liberal in tone, capable of modifying the re-
sistance of the Moslem population to French policy, and of reassur-
ing those who feared a hardening of De Gaulle's policy after his
March speeches to the army in Algeria. He also said the speech
might even include an announcement of some agreement with the
Algerian rebel (FLN) governmer_11.3
[...Contacts with the FLN are currently taking place through in-
termediaries, arranged through "other channels" than the abortive
contacts in February, according to the source. Neuwirth's opti-
mism concerning the interest of both sides in negotiating a cease-
fire along the lines previously stipulated by De Gaulle may involve
a large measure of personal reaction, but, because of his close
ties with Premier Debre, it might be an indication of the current
attitude of the French GovernmenI.7
aTeuwirth's mention of the possibility of postponing the May
elections in Algeria if some "preliminary understanding" is
reached with the FLN may be tied in with previous reports that
Paris was having second thoughts about these electionc)
¢ statements by rebel spokesmen indicate that they re-
gard peace prospects as at the lowest ebb since De Gaulle's 16 Sep-
tember proposals. The dispatch of an FLN ministerial delegation
to Peiping, with the apparent mission of negotiating for Communist
aid, appears designed also to demonstrate the rebels' willingness
to continue the war. Although the rebels would be prone to attribute
any new French overtures to concern over the cantonal elections,
they accept the necessity of negotiations with the French and would
probably receive any French emissary.?
2 May 60
CEAFP-roVed for Release:20-20/03/13 e03.148938
Page 4
"14,11% 7 IrTh T1 ATTE' A-Ir_
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148938
*Pi
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
AIN ..,"� T 1,17 1r, 11 TM 1r 1 I'
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148938
/i,
_Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148938 4
1%101� .7G%il�G I
4/00
9;001
/100
///do#
/
ZMZIWZMZ/My Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148938Wf eZZ f/i ,/,///7,/j,