CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/11/25
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
03148924
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
February 25, 2020
Document Release Date:
February 27, 2020
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 25, 1959
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15787660].pdf | 347.51 KB |
Body:
'f,Z1r/4/4/ZZA/ZZ.f/////////////////////////////////
,
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148924
UCCI-
Nres
Niue
DOCUMENT V �. 2./
tie MINCE IN Oria.
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CNA WGID ?Os It
NEXT REVIEW DATic
ADM NH 704
JUN 1980 DAM mown,
25 November 1959
Lopy NO. L. b 5
C TRAL
I :VII ELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
TOP, SECRET
zArprovecT4rlease:2626/L/21A-00(14862V
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)7
4
Approved for Release:�270707127703148924
*NO �04
--TOP-SrFaRgr_
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148924
Approved for Release: 2020/02%21 C03148924
N.101
25 NOVEMBER 1959
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Activity at Tyura Tam indicates space
launchin may be imminent
Peiping admits drought has caused seri-
ous crop losses.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Ghana irritated by Western opposition to
Afro-Asian UN resolution against French
atom tests; government urged to reap-
praise policy toward bloc.
Cairo orders press campaign against
Bourguiba; UAR seeks identifi
champion of Algerian rebels.
Factional rivalries may split South Ko-
rea's only opposition party.
III. THE WEST
0 Cuba--Communists gained several ob-
jectives in recent labor congress,
--TiaD_C rt." D rr
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148924
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148924
iib
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
25 November 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: CActivity at the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range
indicates that a significant operation such as the launch-
ing of a lunar vehicle or a possible attempt to recover a
vehicle from space, may occur in the near future. Exten-
sive preparations, including unusual aircraft activity, have
been noted during the past three weeks. The next optimum
lunar launching date is 26 November 1959.,)
CommunistChina: Peiping now acinowieages uia
summer's drought in at least one key central China rice-
growing province resulted in an almost total loss of crops
from 25 percent of the land and sharp reductions on another
15 percent. The regime has been taking the line that the ef-
fects of the drought, while serious, had been overcome through
a combination of the "superior organization of communes" and
the party's fight against "rightist-inclined tendencies." This
year's crop will almost certainly be no better than last year's,
and Peiping is taking measures to restrict consumption and
Improve distribution in a major effort to avoid the shortages
which developed late lastwinter.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Ghana: Ghana appears to be highly irritated over West-
ern opposition to the recent Afro-Asian UN resolution urging
France not to conduct nuclear tests in the Sahara. Newspapers
controlled by the Nkrumah government--which has spearheaded
--T-01)�SEC�Rg-T
AApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148924r
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148924
,��� � Pe Owl MO, mr�
wimol
the campaign in tropical Africa against the tests--have ye-
-ipmentiv denounced the position taken by the US and Britain.
1
14�
Cdhana's representative at the UN urged Accra on 16 No-
vember to make official representations to the US and Britain,
and also to consider "reappraisal of our foreign policy toward
the Western countries and the Soviet Union.")
UAR-Tunisia: Cairo ordered its embassy in Beirut on
22 November to begin a campaign of attacks in the UAR-
subsidized press in Lebanon against Tunisian President Bour-
guiba. The press will charge that Bourguiba has hamstrung
Algerian rebel efforts and contrast this with the UAR's alleged
all-out support. The UAR probably hopes the campaign will
not only embarrass Bourguiba, but--more importantly�bol-
ster Cairo's prestige vis-a-vis Baghdad as the leading suppor-
rr of the rebels.
Watch Committee Conclusions: CSituations susceptible of
direct exploitation by Sino- Soviet bloc action which would
jeopardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East,
particularly in Iraq. Although situations in Laos and Iraq ap
pear relatively quiet at the present, there are many elements
of continuing danger in both countries
South Korea: Rivalries in the South Korean Democratic
party may result in confusion and possible violence at the
party's national nominating convention on 26 and 27 Novem-
ber. This could split and critically weaken the only organ-
ized political opposition to the Rhee administration. The
outcome of the contest for the Democratic presidential nom-
ination between Vice President Chang Mvon and titular party
.0 head Cho Pyong-ok is uncertain.
1\1 the
Rhee administration has ordered the national police to hinder
the attendance of Cho's supporters at the convention, appar-
ently in an effort to aggravate factionalisn
(Page 1)
25 Nov 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
TOP SECRET
AApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO3148924, A
V
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148924
"Ittoo
III. THE WEST
so
Cuba: The final results of the congress of the Cuban
Workers' Confederation (CTC)� which ended on 23 Novem-
ber, included gains for the Communists. The congress
rejected the "unity" slate for the top positions on the CTC
executive committee which included Communists and was
strongly endorsed by Fidel Castro. However, the "non-
Communist" slate elected includes some who are Commu-
nist-oriented. An important Communist objective was
achieved when the CTC voted to withdraw from the anti-
Communist Inter-American Regional Organization of Work-
ers. The CTC congress also passed several strongly anti-
US resolutions.
25 Nov 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
TOP SECRET
AAWroved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148924,
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148924
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Future of South Korean �position Party Threatened
The future of South Korea's opposition Democratic party
may hinge on the outcome of the struggle between party lead-
ers Cho Pyong-ok and Vice President Chang Myon for control
of the party at the Democratic national convention on 26 and
27 November, at which the party's 1960 presidential and vice-
presidential candidates will be selected. Should either faction
be able to steam-roller the convention, a split in the party
might develop and undermine the only significant organized
opposition to the Rhee administration.
Neither faction appears confident of its strength among
the delegates. In an apparent effort to intensify party faction-
alism, the national police have been ordered by the Rhee ad-
ministration to "hinder" the attendance of Cho's supporters at
the convention. Similar police tactics were used against
Chang's supporters last month, when a party split may have
been averted only by postponement of the convention, orig-
inally scheduled for 15 October. This police interference, if
continued at the convention itself, will increase the possibility
of an outbreak of violence.
The American Embassy in Seoul has noted that the mod-
erate elements in the party have had little success in promot-
ing a compromise which would separate the presidential can-
didacy from the post of party leader and divide other leadership
positions between the rival factions. A close vote for the pres-
idential nomination would make a compromise more likely.
Even should the split be avoided at the convention, however,
the party will probably continue to be plagued by factionalism.
SECRET
25 Nov 59 CFNITRAI IKITFI I InFKICF RI III PTIKI
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 003148924
Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148924
'Noe v.4.01
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148924
rA r o