CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/11/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03148923
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: November 21, 1959

,j717,1 v/r rfi ZrZZ/ZZZZ/r/Z/Z/1
Approved for Release. 2020/02/21 C03148923
---Palij-5rEeRET
OWNER U. �(4
KO CRANK IN cuss. )01(
o DECULISIrlis
KLASS. tri*Ktio 13s 17.01,14.004_
Orr 0A/�1
KOMI 10104
,OATIP JUN 198Ouviimps
21 November 1959
1
3.3(h)(2
Copy No. C 65 3.5(c)-r
CENTRAL
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN-
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148923/7"/M/MMZ//
Approved for Release: 2020/02121C03148923
Noe'
,
-
Tel Mb Ir".110'7"
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148923
21 NOVEMBER 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR rejects latest Iranian counterpro-
posal which repeated Shah's offer to ex-
clude missile bases.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Algerian rebels name five officials im-
prisoned in France to discuss guaran-
tees for self-determination.
LATE ITEM
ICBM launched at Tyura Tam,
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148923
3-1
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148923
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148923
vitts0
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
o�
21 November 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Iran: The Soviet Government, which has been
pressing Iran to exchange guarantees prohibiting all foreign
military bases on their territories, has rejected Tehran's
counterproposal,
The draft protocol pro-
posed by Tehran was limited to the Shah's original /offer to
exclude "medium- and long-range" foreign missile bases and
was turned down because it did not preclude other types of mil-
itary bases in Iran. Foreign Minister Gromyko was described
as "very severe and angry" over the meeting of CENTO regional
leaders in Tehran. The Shah appears firm in refusing to expand
his original offer. Soviet leaders probably feel, however, that
he can be induced to accept some compromise agreement which
the USSR could subsequently use in exerting pressure against
any further development of Iran's military ties with the West.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Algeria-France: Action by the Algerian rebels in em-
powering five leaders imprisoned in France to discuss guar-
antees for self-determination is in response to De Gaulle's
repeated urgings that the rebels send truce emissaries to
Paris. The rebels' move reflects their distrust concerning
the protocol treatment which might be accorded a delegation
sent from Tunis, and their desire to avoid any appearance of
capitulation. The action was probably also taken with an eye to
its propaganda value prior to the UN debate expected in early
9Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148923'
Z6W//,',/7.6%/VX/E/MOYA,M977/27////.77
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148923
, A NS' A 11.-, g % La A
4.04
December on the Algerian problem. The rebels are unlikely
� to undertake cease-fire negotiations prior to the UN debate.
*De Gaulle probably wants to clarify his self-determination
proposal before the UN acts, but his reluctance to accept these
rebel emissaries underscores his unwillingness to undertake
talks which would be construed as political negotiations rather
than a military cease-fire discussion. (Page 1)
LATE ITEM
*USSR: A Soviet ICBM test vehicle was launched from Tyura
Tam at approximately 1606:16 EST on 20 November after a smooth
countdown with no delays. Successful flight of the vehicle to the
Kamchatka impact area, 3,500 nautical miles down-range,
The latest firing is believed to be the nineteenth successful
ICBM test vehicle launched on the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range.
21 Nov 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
TOP SECRET
AApproved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148923,
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148923
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Algerian Rebels Name Cease-Fire Negotiators
The Algerian rebels nave responded to De Gaulle's re-
iterated Lutxestion that they send truce emi,saries to Paris
by emp,:.)w.-,,,ring five leaders imprisoned in France to diocuis
guarar.tee6 fur self-determination. The prisoners include
the rebels deputy premier, Mohamed ben Zelda, who was
captured in 1950 when the French Air Force caused the air-
liner in which he was traveling from Rabat to Tunis to land
in Algiers.
The naming of the imprisoned leaders reflects rebel dis-
trust regarding the treatment which might be accorded a del-
egation sent from Tunis. The rebels have been reluctant to go
to Paris, fearing they might be required to meet with low-level
French military officers rather than a high-level representa-
tive of De Gaulle. Moreover, the appointment of prisoners as
negotiators serves to avoid any appearance of capitulation, while
underscoring the rebel desire for a settlement. The rebels, how-
ever, may expect no substantive negotiations until after the UN
debate on Algeria, probably early in December. They probably
hope for a resolution favoring a negotiated settlement which
would strengthen their bargaining position.
De Gaulle wants to avoid any implication that an Algerian
settlement is subject to outside pressure. In his 16 September
and 10 November statements, De Gaulle committed France to
a broad program which gives him freedom to discuss the polit-
ical future of Algeria with the rebels.
De Gaulle would be willing
to discuss "all aspects" of the rebels' future now, but cautions
that he would be "unable" to do so after a UN debate, particu-
larly if the Algerians came bearing a UN resolution calling for
negotiations.
CONFIDENTIAL
21 Nov 59 CENTRAL INTELLIC;FNCF RIB I FTIN Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 003148923
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148923
. aa.r.a.� � l�
Soo' wis0
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Uncier Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
riruttrrnrialrry
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 C03148923
rVZZZZZZ