ALLEGED CHINESE COMMUNIST OFFERS TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE CHINESE NATIONALISTS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03147132
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2020
• Case Number: F-2018-01235
• Publication Date: October 7, 1958

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
SUBJECT:
? OCT 1958
Alleged Chinese Communist Offers To
Negotiate With the Chinese Nationalists
1. Between 28 September and 5 October 1958 CHIANG
Ching-kuol
three letters written to officials of the Chinese
Nationalist government, one to himself and two to HUANG Shao-
ku, the Foreign Minister, setting forth Chinese Communist
conditions for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem with
the Chinese Nationalists. All of these letters were written
from Hong Kong by TS'AO Chu-jen, a Chinese newspaperman
active in leftist Hong Kong news circles who frequently travels
to the China mainland.
2. The letters, which were written on 25, 28, and 30 Sep-
tember, proposed direct negotiations between the Chinese Nationalists
and the Chinese Communists publicly in the framework of the
Warsaw talks or privately between designated representatives.
In the first two letters TS'AO said that Communist China proposed
the inclusion of Taiwan as an autonomous area, similar to Tibet,
under the Chinese Communist government and, among other
concessions, would allow CHIA.NG Kai-shek to remain in full
control of the military and civil government on Taiwan. To prove
his status as a representative of the Chinese Communist government,
TS'AO said he could guarantee that if the Chinese Nationalists
would stop using United States Navy vessels to convoy resupply
missions to Chinmen between 6 and 13 October, the Chinese
Communists would not interdict the supply attempts. In the third
letter TS'AO said that the Nationalists could indicate their willing-
ness to negotiate by stopping the use of United States naval convoys
during this period. Some of the conditions in the letters parallel
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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the conditions for a cease-fire publicly announced by the Chinese
Communists on 5 October 1958. Specifically, the dates of the
cease-fire and the conditions under which it would be maintained
are the same. Other than these facts we have no evidence of
the authenticity of TS'AO's offers.
3. This recent series of letters marks the third time
that TS'AO has represented himself as an intermediary between
the Chinese Communist government and the Chinese Nationalists.
He made similar offers in the summer of 1955 and in 1956;
CHIANG Ching-
kuoj he has received and ignored correspondence from
TS'AO since 1949.
4. CHIA.NG Ching-kuo
stated that the Chinese Nationalists would not dignify the letters
by replying to them and would under no circumstances enter
Into direct negotiations with the Chinese Communists. The
Chinese Nationalists have never accepted TS'AO as being
trustworthy. They believe that TS'AO is a Chinese Communist
political action agent, and refuse to engage in discussions with
him. They say TS'AO has associated with anti-Chinese Nationalist
elements and does anti-Chinese Nationalist propaganda work in
Hong Kong.
5. CHLANG Ching-kuo was first associated with TS'AO
Chu-jen during World War II, and the latter eventually became
chief editor on a newspaper owned by CHIANG; at that time,
CHIANG was Administrative Commissioner for southern Kiangsi
Province. When TS'AO arrived in Hong Kong in 1952, he
associated himself with Third Force and leftist journalists;
his reputation among Third Force persons is poor. His newspaper
and other writings are anti-Chinese Nationalist, and CHIANG
Ching-kuo is often a target.
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)SEOREI
6. A summary of the TSTAO lette
excerpts from the texts of the letters,.
1 Attachment
nd pe tinent
the nciosure.
ALLEN W DULLES
Director
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Summary and Excerpts from TSTA0 Chu-jenrs Letters
. On 28 September 1958, CHIANG Ching-
a letter from TS'A0 Chu-jen
in Hong Kong which was dated 25 September and was
addressed to Cffinese Nationalist Foreign Minister HUANG Shao-ku.
The letter contained a personal note from TS'AO stating that TS1A0 had
been to Peiping from 20 August to 13 September 1958 and had obtained
from the Chinese Communist Government its conditions for a peaceful
settlement with the Chinese Nationalist Government. The letter also
contained a paper outlining Chinese Communist conditions for a settle-
ment and how negotiations should be conducted. The letter was sent
through the regular mail. The following are the significant portions of
a translation of TS' AO's first letter.
a. The personal note pleaded for "negotiations" and
decried the "resort to force" to resolve the present situation.
The note added "I am forwarding "Peiping's conditions" and
asked HUANG Shao-ku to "send a representative to get in
touch with me". TS'AO's note stated, "I have been to Peiping
five times; I have seen more and therefore I know more than
anyone else."
b. The four-page letter, which included "Peiping's con-
ditions", stated that WAG had visited "every part of the country"
In the past two and a half years and had "observed the life of the
farmers and workers and the status of industrial reconstruction".
"Intellectuals today cannot deny progress." "Our generation must
be responsible to the next generation." "We must sacrifice our-
selves for peace." As a non-Kuomintang and non-communist
Chinese, TS' AO said, "I shall work for the coalition." There is
"no other way to peace except that the Chinese Communists and
the Chinese Nationalists should work together again." The
letter continued that, "since the 4 May movement our generation
has the following objectives":
(1) "Free from imperialist's yoke. Fight for
China's liberty and equality."
1
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(2) "Improve production technique. Modernize
our country."
(3) "Eliminate economic classes. Put socialism
into effect."
(4) "These objectives have been realized by the
People's Government. Although CHIANG Kai-shek
accomplished a lot, he came out second best on these
objectives." "Over 50 percent of former Kuomintang
military officials have come over to work for New China."
c. "Two years ago there were many problems on the main-
land." "Today all contradictions have been removed, especially
food and farmers' livelihood problems." To verify, "you may send
a private representative to Hong Kong and I shall accompany him"
on a mainland trip "to observe conditions".
d. Because the mainland is strong it can afford to "extend
a hand to peace." "Peace conditions transmitted by me before
and now are all true" and are negotiable. Because of the Chinese
Communists' military strength, "Taiwan's fate is unthinkable
if peace is not possible." The Chinese Communists are unwilling
to adopt "drastic measures" if any hope of peace exists. "This
is my purpose in writing you again." "The question of war or peace
is in your hands." If Taiwan discards the "psychology of relying
on United States military strength, Peiping will not use force."
2. TS'AO's 28 September letter suggested that the Chinese
Nationalist Government first organize an unofficial group to visit the
mainland, observe conditions and then make a decision on negotiating. If
the group preferred, it could travel to Amoy via Chinmen. HUANG was
asked to send a letter to TS'AO identifying the members of the delegation
and their point of arrival on the China mainland. TS'AO said that the
Chinese Communists did not want to fight the Chinese Nationalist Govern-
ment and that there was "no other way to peace except for the Chinese
Nationalists and the Chinese Communists to work together again." To
prove his bonafides, TS'AO said that he could guarantee that if the Chinese
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Nationalist Government would stop using United States Naval vessels
to protect supply convoys between 6 and 13 October, the Chinese
Communists would not interdict the supply of Chinmen and Matsu, re-
gardless of the number of ships. TVA() also "guaranteed" that Chinese
Nationalist soldiers could be withdrawn from the offshore islands with-
out harassment; however, if United States Naval vessels were used in
convoys or the Chinese Nationalists shelled the Chinese Communist
batteries, then the guarantees would be void. If Nationalist China was
agreeable to this test of bonafides, TS'AO directed that HUANG should
send him a cable saying "Okay".
3. The letter then gave these terms and conditions for a settle-
ment:
a. The military and civil government of Taiwan would
still be under full control of CHIANG Kai-shek, but the Chinese
Communists hoped that CH'EN Chreng and CHIANG Ching-kuo
would work together for the reconstruction of Taiwan.
b. The southern part of Lushan and Lake Poyang, Kiangsi,
would be designated as a retirement area for CHIANG Kai-shek,
and MAO Tse-tung would send a message welcoming CHIANG
Kai-shek to return to Lushan as a state guest.
c. After the troops were withdrawn from Chinmen and
Matsu, Chinmen would be used as a trading area for the exchange
of mainland and Taiwan goods, and the Chinese Communist
authorities would be agreeable to an eight-to-one monetary
exchange.
d. Effective as of the "signing of the peace treaty", the
Chinese Communists would shoulder part of the Taiwan military
and civil government budgets.
e. Taiwan would become a part of the Chinese Communist
Government under an autonomous regional setup similar to that
of Sinkiang and Tibet and would send a representative group to
Peiping to participate in the Chinese People's Political Consulta-
tive Conference and the National People's Congress.
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f. The Chinese Communist Government was agreeable
that the Kuomintang remain as an independent political party
on Taiwan, not to be combined with the Kuomintang Revolution-
ary Committee.
g. If Taiwan was agreeable that negotiations be opened
to the public, TVA� would suggest to the Peiping authorities
that the Warsaw talks be moved to Geneva where Cborge YEH or
HSIEH Shou-kang the Chinese Nationalist
Ambassador to the Vatican, could attend.
4. TS'A0 suggested that, after the settlement, the Peiping
delegation be headed by SUNG Ch'ing-ling and include CHANG Chih-chung
and SHAO Li-tsu. Madame SUNG is the widow of SUN Yat-sen and sister
of Madame CHIANG Kai-shek. CHANG and SHAO are former Chinese
Nationalists who are now members of the Chinese Communist
Revolutionary Committee. TStA0 also suggested that CHU Wu
and HSU Tan-lu be included in the "Peiping De egat on
in Taipei".
5. On 5 October, CHIANG Ching-kuo delivered two more letters
received in the past few days from TVA� Chu-Jen, urging peace negotia-
tions between the Chinese Nationalist Government and the Chinese Commun-
ist regime.
6. One of these letters, addressed to CHIANG Ching-kuo and dated
28 September, was almost identical with the earlier letter to HUANG Shao-
ku on 25 September.
7. The second letter, addressed to HUANG Shao-ku and dated 30
September, urged the Chinese Nationalist Government to acknowledge
its willingness to negotiate by:
a. Stopping the American convoys on 6 October, whereupon
the Chinese Communist shelling would stop for one week.
b. Sending a diplomatic representative to participate in
the Warsaw talks or conduct bilateral negotiations with the
Chinese Communists.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENC" `.GENCY
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
7 October 19
FOR: Brig, Gen. Andrew J. Goodpasty
Staff Secretary
The White House
The Director asked me to forward
the attached to you and believes you may
wish to show it to the President.
Exe
Earman
utive Officer
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