CAPABILITIES OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS FOR FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM - 1967/11/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03137879
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

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SNIE 14.3-67
13 November 1967
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 14.3-67
Capabilities of the Vietnamese
Communists For Fighting in
South Vietnam
Submitted by
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Ai indicated overleaf
13 November 1967
3.5(c)
DECLASSIFIED BY
1 December 197S
Authenticated: Pages 27
OCUTIVE SECRETARY AB
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tax"
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State and Defense, and the NSA.
Concurring:
Vice Adm. Rufus Taylor, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
Mr. Thomas L Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State
Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, the Director, National Security Agency
� Abstaining:
Mr. Howard C. Brown, Jr., the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Com-
mission and Mr. William 0. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM
INTRODUCTORY NOTE 1
CONCLUSIONS 2
DISCUSSION 4
I. CAPABILITIES OF NORTH VIETNAM 4
A. Manpower and Mobilization Potential 4
B. The Armed Forces 5
C. Military Training and Leadership 6
D. Infiltration 6
E. LOCs 8
II. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE SOUTH 10
A. Communist Forces 10
B. The Command Structure 16
C. Logistical Support 16
D. Communist Manpower in the South 20
III. THE OUTLOOK FOR COMMUNIST FORCES 23
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1
CAPABILITIES OF THE VIETNAMESE
COMMUNISTS FOR FIGHTING IN
SOUTH VIETNAM
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists to con-
duct military operations in South Vietnam over the next year or so.'
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
Our earlier understanding of overall Communist capabilities in
Vietnam had, of necessity, to rely heavily on data provided by the
GVN. Much of this turned out to be unreliable, and in many instances
our numerical estimates of Communist forces, other than for the
Regular units, were too low. Our information has improved sub-
stantially in the past year or two, but the unconventional nature of
the war poses difficult intelligence problems, the more so in a social
environment where basic data is incomplete and often untrustworthy.
Manpower, for example, is a key element for the Communists but
we lack precise basic data on population size, rates of growth, and
age distribution for both North and South Vietnam. Assessing Com-
munist capabilities also involves an understanding of the organization
and effectiveness of the various components in the Communist military
and political apparatus in South Vietnam. Much of the evidence on
these components is obtained from a variety of sources, including
captured documents, of varying reliability and timeliness. The analysis
of this data, as well as that concerning North Vietnamese support
to the South and all manpower questions requires complex method-
ological approaches which cannot rise above the uncertain data inputs.
'The figures in this estimate are current as of 1 October 1967.
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Our data and conclusions are therefore subject to continuing review
and revision, especially since capabilities do not remain static. In
this estimate we have concentrated on reaching the best judgments
of the current strength of the Communist forces and, because of
incomplete and unreliable basic data, we have not attempted to recon-
struct Communist strength retrospectively.
Reservations with respect to evidence are explained where appro-
priate in the individual sections of the estimate. The main conclusions
which follow, however, allow for such uncertainties in the supporting
intelligence, represent our best appreciation of the overall situation
as it now stands, and are based on the assumption that there is no
radical change in the scale and nature of the war.
CONCLUSIONS
A. During the past year, Hanoi's direct control and share of the
burden of the war in South Vietnam has grown substantially. This
trend will continue.
B. Manpower is a major problem confronting the Communists.
Losses have been increasing and recruitment in South Vietnam is
becoming more difficult. Despite heavy infiltration from North Viet-
nam, the strength of the Communist military forces and political
organizations in South Vietnam declined in the last year.
C. The major portion of this decline has probably been felt at
the lower levels, reflecting a deliberate policy of sacrificing these
levels to maintain the structure of political cadres and the strength of
the Regular military forces. In particular the guerrillas, now estimated
to total some 70,000-90,000, have suffered a substantial reduction
since the estimated peak of about early 1966. Regular force strength,
now estimated at 118,000, has declined only slightly, but Viet Cong
(VC) units are increasingly dependent upon North Vietnamese
replacements.
D. Given current Communist strategy, and levels of operations,
a major effort will be necessary if the Regular forces and the guerrillas
are to be maintained at or near present levels. To do so will require
both a level of infiltration much higher than that observed in 1967
and intensive VC recruitment as well. Considering all the relevant
factors, however, we believe there is a fairly good chance that the
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overall strength and effectiveness of the military forces and the political
infrastructure will continue to decline.
E. The Communist leadership is already having problems in main-
taining morale and quality. These problems have not yet impaired
overall military effectiveness, but they are likely to become more
difficult.
F. Difficulties in internal distribution will continue to cause local
shortages and interfere with Communist operations from time to time.
But we believe that the Communists will be able to continue to meet
at least their essential supply requirement for the level of forces and
activities in South Vietnam described in this estimate.
G. Communist strategy is to sustain a protracted war of attrition
and to persuade the US that it must pull out or settle on Hanoi's
terms. Our judgment is that the Communists still retain adequate
capabilities to support this strategy for at least another year. Whether
or not Hanoi does in fact persist with this strategy depends not only
on its capabilities to do so, but on a number of political and inter-
national considerations not treated in this estimate.
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DISCUSSION
1. It has become increasingly obvious that Hanoi's share of the burden of
war in South Vietnam has grown substantially. Infiltration of personnel in 1966,
particularly into the northern provinces, was more than twice that of 1965.
Hanoi's direct control of military and political operations has become more
evident. The supply of weapons from the North has continued, and new
weapons of greater firepower have been introduced. The logistical systems
within North Vietnam and in Laos and Cambodia have been expanded since
1965 to provide a greater flexibility to cope with the effects of air interdiction,
thereby enabling the Communists to meet higher levels of combat and support
the growth of their forces to at least their present levels.
I. CAPABILITIES OF NORTH VIETNAM
A. Manpower and Mobilization Potential
2. The growing intensity of the war in the South and more than two years
of US air strikes against the North have made manpower an increasingly im-
portant aspect in estimating Communist capabilities. Since mid-1965 the North
Vietnamese Armed Forces have expanded from an estimated 250,000 men to at
least 470,000. This expansion includes those troops in Laos and South Vietnam.
The bulk of the physically fit draft age class of 17-year-olds (about 100,000 each
year) is being taken into military service. The war in general and the bombing
in particular have forced Hanoi to divert from 500,000 to 600,000 civilians (men
and women, young and old) to full-time and part-time war-related activities.
3. Nevertheless, it does not appear that North Vietnam is encountering insur-
mountable problems in obtaining sufficient able-bodied men to support the war
in South Vietnam. Of North Vietnam's total population of over 18 million,
about 4 million or so are males between 15 and 49, and about half of these are
probably physically fit for military service.3 At present, the North Vietnamese
Armed Forces have taken less than one-quarter of the fit males aged 15 to 49
and less than two-fifths of the approximately 1.2 million fit males in the prime
military ages of 17 to 35. Though there is some evidence of lowering of draft
standards and extending of age limits, it appears that, with a few local excep-
tions, Hanoi is still drafting only those between the ages of 17 and 35.
4. The number of physically fit males above and beyond the annual incre-
ment of those reaching age 17 and who are not yet in the armed forces is sub-
stantial. The most obvious source of manpower is agriculture, where there are
almost 3 million men of all ages, and where per capita production is low. There
are also about half a million men in the service sector of the economy, including
These figures are based on US Census Bureau estimates of North Vietnam's population,
which do not accept entirely the figures of North Vietnam's 1960 census and subsequent
demographic statistics published through 1963.
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170,000 in consumer services; almost half a million men in industry, over half
of whom are in handicrafts; and some 60,000 male students of military age.
5. There is of course no fixed percentage of these men who can be spared for
military duty. Hanoi has already drawn men from the civilian economy for
military and war-related tasks, replacing them where possible with women.
Taking large additional numbers of men would obviously involve some addi-
tional costs to the civilian economy, but this would be a question of priorities in
Hanoi. Losses in agricultural and industrial production can be made up by im-
ports to the extent necessary to maintain essential subsistence levels of consump-
tion; consumer services are to some degree expendable and education can be
postponed. Thus we believe that the manpower problem, while growing more
serious, is still manageable in North Vietnam. At a conservative estimate we
believe there are some 100,000 to 200,000 men who could be called into military
service, in addition to the annual draft class.
B. The Armed Forces
6. The North Vietnamese Armed Forces expanded last year and are now
estimated to total about 470,000. Despite better evidence on their strength,
there are still some uncertainties concerning the actual strength of units, the
number of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops in Laos, and the size of the
Armed Public Security Forces. The following table should be regarded as a
conservative estimate.
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES
1 October 1967
SUMMARY
Army
447,500
Air Force
4,500
Navy
2,500
Armed Public Security Forces
16,500
TOTAL Armed Forces
471,000
North Vietnamese Army Breakdown
Out-of-Country
South Vietnam
54,000
Laos
18,000
TOTAL
72,000
In-Country
Infantry
171,500
Air Defense
93,000
Other b
111,000
TOTAL
375,500
This includes only regular army personnel in AAA units, radar, and SAM battalions. It
does not include part-time air defense personnel such as militia, or logistical troops supporting
air defense.
b This includes artillery, armor, high command, logistics, engineers, and transportation.
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7. If the recruitment of men for replacements and for unit infiltration into
the South should become a critical problem for Hanoi, as a last resort it could
draw down its standing military establishment in North Vietnam. The number
of troops which could be released for out-of-country duty would be influenced
greatly by Hanoi's concern to retain a sizable force for defense against a possible
invasion. If, for example, Hanoi should want to keep some 225,000 troops for
the defense of North Vietnam and another 85,000 as a training base and for com-
mand and administration, then some 65,000 additional NVA troops could be
made available for use outside of North Vietnam.
C. Military Training and Leadership
8. Special preinfiltration training of North Vietnamese recruits has averaged
about 3 months, although increasing numbers of prisoners report training of only
1 month prior to infiltration. There is evidence of a growing deficiency of prop-
erly trained personnel to fill the ranks of squad leaders, platoon sergeants, and
platoon leaders. There are indications that the normal source of� platoon
leaders, the Infantry Officers' School near Son Tay, has reduced its 2-year
course to 8 months. The bulk of the reserve officers and noncommissioned
officers have been recalled to active duty. The largest single source of junior
officers is now from battlefield commissions.
D. Infiltration
9. North Vietnam has the capability to train 75,000-100,000 men a year for
infiltration. By shortening current training cycles or increasing the number of
units involved in the training of new recruits, this number could be substantially
increased. Training replacements at the rate of 75,000-100,000 annually, however,
would not permit organizing all of them into units and providing them with the
necessary leadership at the same rate. Theoretically, North Vietnam could train
and form 24-36 infantry regiments (48,000-72,000 men) per year, but at this pace
there would be a considerable reduction in quality. In any case, actual forma-
tion and training of organized units for infiltration has been well short of this
theoretical capability.
10. During 1966 at least 55,000 and possibly as many as 86,000 North Vietnam-
ese troops were sent into South Vietnam ( see Table 2). Through July 1966, the
bulk of the infiltration was accounted for by the introduction of organized infantry
regiments, including three regiments that moved directly across the DMZ. After
July the pace of infiltration slackened somewhat, and it appeared that the Com-
munist Regular force structure had reached planned levels. Most of the infiltra-
tion thereafter was to provide replacements in existing units.
11. During 1967, however, the introduction of organized units resumed�six
regiments thus far�and the flow of individual replacements has continued. This
mixture of units and individual replacements, plus the special situation along
the DMZ, complicates an estimate of total infiltration. Not only is there the
usual lag in identifying new units and infiltration groups, but there is less chance
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TABLE 2
MONTHLY INFILTRATION: 1966-1967 '
(Data as of 30 September 1967)
Accepted
Possible
Monthly
TOTALS
Confirmed
Probable
TOTAL
1966 Jan
4,200
1,800
6,000
3,000
9,000
Feb
6,900
2,200
9,100
2,100
11,200
Mar
11,700
1,400
13,100
3,600
16,700
Apr
100
500
600
600
1,200
May
1,300
500
1,800
3,600
5,400
June
12,300
700
13,000
1,700
14,700
July
4,000
700
4,700
4,100
8,800
Aug
1,800
400
2,200
3,700
5,900
Sept
1,400
700
2,100
600
2,700
Oct
100
600
700
4,700
5,400
Nov
500
100
600
600
1,200
Dec
800
600
1,400
2,500
3,900
TOTAL 1966
45,100
10,200
55,300
30,800
86,100
1967 Jan
1,000
800
1,800
3,600
5,400
Feb
1,700
2,000
3,700
1,300
5,000
Mar
3,600
400
4,000
4,600
8,600
Apr
3,700
600
4,300
300
4,600
May
2,700
1,500
4,200
1,600
5,800
June
3,300
-
3,300
300
3,600
July
-
400
400
-
400
Aug
1,100
-
1,100
700
1,800
Sept
-
-
-
-
-
� Infiltration includes only arrivals in South Vietnam. Statistics for 1967 are subject to
retroactive updating because of the continuing receipt of new information. In particular, the
figures for the last 6 months or so are incomplete, and inadequate to determine trends. These
figures include the following categories:
ACCEPTED: Accepted Confirmed: A confirmed infiltration unit/group is one which is accepted
in South Vietnam on the basis of information provided by a minimum of two
POW's or returnees from the unit/group, or two captured documents from the
unit, or a combination of personnel and documents.
Accepted Probable: A probable infiltration unit/group is one which is accepted
in South Vietnam on the basis of information provided by one POW or returnee
from the unit/group, or a captured document, supported by information from
other sources which can be evaluated as probably true.
POSSIBLE: A possible infiltration unit/group is one which may be in South Vietnam on the
basis of information which can be evaluated as possibly true even though no
POW, returnee, or document is available to verify the reports.
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of capturing personnel or documents from each of the numerous small replace-
ment groups. There is also the problem of the units that suffer\casualties in the
DMZ area and return to North Vietnamese territory for replacements; these
latter cannot always be identified as new infiltrators when the units return to South
Vietnamese territory. A similar problem applies to other border areas.
12. Infiltration thus far in 1967 totals about 35,000 in all categories ( accepted
and possible). Allowing for the probability that later information will raise
these figures, and extrapolating, it now appears that total infiltration for 1967
will be no more than last year's and possibly somewhat less. We estimate that
some 65 to 75 percent of the infiltration will probably consist of replacement
personnel for existing units. The remainder will probably include seven to nine
organized regiments which will add to the Communist force structure but not
necessarily their total military strength, because losses have resulted in generally
lower unit strengths. There still appears to be no clear-cut seasonal pattern in
infiltration or any significant indication that Hanoi is unwilling to dispatch addi-
tional men and units to South Vietnam. 1
E. LOCs4
13. Supplies for Communist forces move into South Vietnam by various means.
In North Vietnam, truck, rail, and water transport are used to bring supplies
through Military Region 4 ( MR-4). From MR-4, most supplies are trucked
through Laos, although some use of waterways is also made in Laos. Some sup-
plies move directly across the DMZ, and some are moved by sea. In addition,
some supplies from Cambodia enter South Vietnam directly while others are
routed through Laos.
14. Roads. The Communist logistical roadnet in MR-4 in North Vietnam
and in Laos was improved over the past year. Though the improvements have
increased tonnage capacities somewhat, they were intended primarily to provide
additional flexibility for the system and better year-round movement. One
development was the extension of a new motorable road from Laos directly
into the A Shau Valley of South Vietnam. In addition, the administration and
operational control of the LOCs have been improved and expanded. The ca-
pacity of the entire system for delivery of supplies to South Vietnam through
Laos continues to be limited by the capacities of the routes in Laos rather than
by those of North Vietnam.
15. Trucks. We estimate that at the end of 1965 the North Vietnamese had
an inventory of between 11,000 and 12,000 trucks. Losses from air attack have
been substantial, and North Vietnam has been forced to increase its imports
to counter this attrition. Imports from Eastern Europe, the USSR, and China
have enabled North Vietnam roughly to maintain the size of its inventory.
16. Maintenance problems have increased, and as many as 30 percent of the
trucks may not be operable on a daily basis. There is a lack of well-equipped,
See centerspread map.
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properly manned maintenance facilities, and the variety of truck imports has
resulted in a fleet of over 30 models from at least seven different countries. POL
imports into North Vietnam during the first half of 1967 have been at record
levels, and we have had no evidence of any serious POL shortages affecting
the movement of supplies to South Vietnam.
17. Waterways. The coastal and inland waterway system in North Vietnam
provides a useful supplement to the road and rail system and has been used
extensively, particularly since the start of the US bombing program. Although
the mining of some North Vietnamese waterways has reduced the movement of
large craft, small boat traffic continues. Increasing imports of barges and barge
sections into North VieLnam and a program of �vatenvay improvement indicate
that the Communists intend to exploit further the potentialities of these water
routes. In Laos, there has been increased use of small pirogues and motor-
boats on rivers over the last year. The use of these waterways will probably
continue to increase.
18. Rail. The North Vietnamese also use the rail line south of Hanoi for
movement of supplies into MR-4. Despite repeated US air attacks, the North
Vietnamese have been able to construct bypasses and keep sections of the line
serviceable from Hanoi to Vinh. South of Vinh the rail line is not operable for
regular rail equipment. The North Vietnamese can only use light gear, princi-
pally trucks with converted wheels, to transport supplies over the remaining
rail segment in this area.
19. Impact of Air Attacks. Air attacks in North Vietnam, Laos, and the
DMZ have destroyed trucks, railroad rolling stock, and watercraft, have damaged
the highway and rail systems, and have restricted the movement of cargo and
personnel particularly during daylight hours. They have created construction
problems and delays, caused interruptions in the flow of men and supplies,
caused a great loss of work-hours, and forced North Vietnam to tie up large
numbers of people in air defense and�in the repair of LOCs. Communist coun-
termeasures in North Vietnam and Laos have included diversification of the
means of transport to include greater use of inland waterways and porter trails,
construction of alternate roads, and of multiple bypasses at important bridges.
A number of truck parks and vehicle pulloffs for quick convoy dispersal have
been built. These measures have increased the ability of the Communists to
cope with the effects of air attacks, although at a considerable cost and effort.
Units and personnel moving to South Vietnam have been forced to move under
cover of darkness, slowing their movement and subjecting them to the rigors
of the trail for longer periods.
20. Cambodia. The importance of Cambodia as a sanctuary and a source of
supply ( principally rice) to the Communist war effort is substantial and growing.
Recently captured documents indicate that some Communist units in Tay Ninh
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Province have substantially increased their purchases in Cambodia since March
1966. The movement of supplies in Cambodia to Communist forces along the
border, particularly on the Se San and Tonle Kong Rivers in the northeast and
along Route 110 in Laos, has increased in the past year. Indications are that
Communist units along the Cambodian border have been stockpiling some of
the food and other materials obtained from Cambodia.
21. There is still no good evidence, however, that substantial amounts of
weapons or ammunition are being obtained by the Communists from Cambodian
stocks or through Cambodian ports. On the other hand, there is evidence that
Communist units, particularly in the border area, receive arms and ammunition
from stockpiles maintained on Cambodian territory. These munitions probably
were moved south through Laos. Should infiltration of arms into South Vietnam
through Laos be substantially reduced, Cambodia could be an alternative route
for the Communists.
22. Sea Infiltration. We are unable to estimate the extent of the infiltration of
supplies by sea into South Vietnam. We believe, however, that such infiltration
has been greatly reduced by US counterefforts. Much of the Communists' use
of sea routes, at present, is for the movement of supplies along the South Viet-
namese coast. We believe that when a pressing need exists North Vietnam will
increase attempts to move some supplies by sea, primarily arms and ammunition.
II. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE SOUTH
A. Communist Forces
23. For the purpose of this estimate, we consider the following elements of
the Communist organization in South Vietnam: the Regular forces (NVA and
VC Main and Local forces), the administrative service units which support them,
the VC guerrilla forces, the political cadres, the self-defense forces, the secret
self-defense forces, and the "Assault Youth." The contribution of these diverse
elements to the Communist effort in South Vietnam differs widely in value.
Their capabilities and missions are set forth in the following paragraphs.
24. We believe that, with the exception of the Regular forces, we have pre-.
viously underestimated the strength of these elements. The figures carried in
this estimate for these elements reflect new information and analysis rather than
an increase in actual Communist strength. Furthermore, our information on
the strength and organization of the different elements varies widely. For the
Regular forces it is good; for other components it is much less reliable, less
current, and less detailed. The resulting uncertainties are explained in the fol-
lowing paragraphs and are reflected by the use of ranges in the estimates we
present.
25. Regular Forces. We are reasonably confident that the Communist Regu-
lar forces in South Vietnam now total about 118,000 troops who are generally
well-armed ( see Table 3). This strength has fluctuated over the past 12 months;
it is now somewhat less than it was at this time last year. During this period,
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however, an increasing number of NVA replacements have been introduced into
VC Main force units.
ESTIMATED STRENGTH
Type
Regular NVA Forces
TABLE 3
OF REGULAR
(As of 1
Number
54,000
VC Main and Local Forces 64,000"
TOTAL 118,000
COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
October 1967)
Organization
3 Front Headquarters'
7 Division Headquarters'
26 Regiments (18 divisional and 8 separate)
106 Battalions (76 regimental and 30 separate)
2 Division Headquarters'
11 Regiments (7 divisional and 4 separate)
96 Battalions ( 34 regimental and 62 separate)
234 Separate Companies
54 Separate Platoons
A Front is a military organization designed to perform tactical and administrative functions
and to control a number of units in a specific area. A Front is intentionally flexible, its military
force composition changes as operational requirements dictate. Vietnamese Communist Fronts
currently operating against South Vietnam are the B-3 Front, the DMZ Front, and the North-
ern Front or Subregion (now called the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region). (See map on
page 17.)
NVA/VC divisions in South Vietnam are considered as light infantry divisions tailored
specifically for operation in South Vietnam. These divisions are highly foot-mobile and are
flexible in force structure, organization, and strength. They normally are composed of three
regiments ( of about 1,500-2,000 per regiment) with varying technical and fire support elements.
They lack wheeled transport and the type of artillery normally associated with NVA conventional
divisions.
e In addition to the seven NVA divisions in South Vietnam, elements of the 341st division in
North Vietnam have been committed from time to time to operations south of the DMZ under
control of the DMZ Front.
"This total includes some NVA replacements; see paragraph 56.
26. Administrative Service Units. There is an extensive system for the ad-
ministrative support of both NVA and VC Regular forces. It operates through-
out South Vietnam and extends into Laos and Cambodia as well as the area
immediately north of the DMZ. In South Vietnam it includes the military per-
sonnel in the staff and service elements ( e.g., medics, ordnance, logistics, etc.)
comprising the central, regional, provincial and district military headquarters,
and in rear service technical units of all types directly subordinate to these head-
quarters. The need for administrative service forces, and hence their size, varies
widely from province to province.
27. We cannot be confident of the total size of the administrative service
forces at any given time. Information on the current strength of the administra-
tive services at the various echelons is insufficient to establish a firm estimate.
This force has almost certainly suffered attrition and has probably been drawn
down to provide some combat replacements. Moreover, we do not estimate
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LAOS PANHANDLE AREA
COMMUNIST ROADNET
0 25 50 75 100 Miles
II I
0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers
EXPANSION OF THE COMMUNIST ROADNET
Kham
Keut
N.,
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Saravane
�
THAILAND:
0
Ubon
Ratchathani
CAWBODIA
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INFILTRATION AND ROAD CAPACITIES
N
Muong 0 R
15
hanh Hoa
VIETN
'
.1/4./���,
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',, ,= 740, 7,_50-,
15
k m u Gio Pass
180/40, Ban Na Phao
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IA
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Vinh
460/120
Ha-Tinh
Ron
12
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; ammouane
(111811rtisek)
r
:
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Communist roadnet
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Personnel infiltration
(by foot)
Motorable road capacity (uninterdicted)
in short tons per day (June 1967)
Dry season� 500/100�Rainy season
Q841161Khe
Dong Hoi
23 23
Muong San
Ba on
Mouang
-, _..----. --S\-----
k-4 _ �Se fang
..................z
LA
912
200/50'.
,-550/50
911 .
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he Sanh
914
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OF
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20
ang
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
Linh
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A A N D
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Sara na
( f Khong Sedone
Ban _
Bouang
Nam
Ben Slang
Paks"
Phiafay
CHINA
HAINAN
Tam KY
S 0�U
58
VIETNAM
58
Kontum
5
Phum Troun
s
Plei
CAM_pODIA
14
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GROUP I
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NMI
the size of the administrative service units located outside the boundaries of
South Vietnam which support the forces in the DMZ and the western highlands.
In light of these considerations, we estimate that there are now at least 35,000-
40,000 administrative service personnel in South Vietnam who are performing
essential administrative support functions. In addition, almost anyone under
VC control can be and is impressed into service to perform specific administrative
or support tasks as local conditions require.
28. Guerrillas. The guerrillas provide an essential element of the VC combat
capability. They are organized into squads and platoons which are not neces-
sarily restricted to their home village or hamlet. Typical missions for guerrillas
are terrorist and sabotage activities, protection of villages and hamlets, provision
of assistance to VC Main and Local force units as well as NVA, and the creation
of local threats in order to divert allied forces to local security missions.
29. The guerrilla force has been subject to conflicting pressures. On the one
hand, increasing numbers of guerrillas have been drawn upon to provide replace-
ments for the VC Main and Local forces, because these have suffered heavy
casualties as a result of more intense combat. At the same time, numerous
captured documents as well as VC propaganda indicate a concern to increase
the guerrilla force substantially. There is evidence which suggests that the
leadership set very high force goals for the guerrillas but had, by mid-1966, fallen
far short of its aims.
30. Information from captured documents leads us to believe that we have
previously underestimated the guerrilla strength. Certain Communist docu-
ments which date from early 1966 assert that there were then about 170,000-
180,000 guerrillas. This figure was almost certainly exaggerated. There is evi-
dence which suggests that the Communists sometimes consider other groups
part of the guerrilla force and therefore carry a larger number of guerrillas on
their rolls. There is also considerable uncertainty over the accuracy of VC report-
ing at the lower levels. We believe that guerrilla strength has declined over
the past year or so because of losses, upgrading of some personnel to Main and
Local force units, and recruiting difficulties. We are unable to substantiate the
extent to which the VC have been able to replace guerrilla losses. Considering
all the available evidence and allowing for some uncertainties, we estimate that
the current strength of the guerrilla force is 70,000-90,000.
31. The Political Organization. Presiding over the Communist effort is the
political apparatus. This includes the leadership and administration of the
National Liberation Front ( NLF) and the People's Revolutionary Party ( the
name under which the North Vietnamese Communist Party operates in South
Vietnam), both of which extend down to the hamlet level. The apparatus not
only acts as a government in VC-controlled areas but also has major responsibil-
ities for maintaining morale and for mobilizing manpower and other resources
in support of the war effort. Its functions are not primarily military and it is
therefore not included in the military order of battle. Nevertheless, it does
represent a continuing potential for organizing and motivating the military
forces. Through this apparatus the Communists seek to control the people of
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15
South Vietnam. It is, therefore, a key element which ultimately will have to be
overcome along with the military and guerrilla forces. Its numbers are large�
with a hard core estimated at about 75,000-85,000--but more important is the
wide geographical extent of its power and the dedication and effectiveness of
its personnel.
32. Other Communist Organizations. The Communists make a deliberate
effort to organize most of the people under their control into various work
forces and semimilitary organizations. Among the more significant of these organ-
izations are the self-defense forces, secret self-defense forces, and groups such as
the "Assault Youth." Moreover, when occasion demands, almost every able-
bodied person under VC control may be called upon to support the war effort.
33. The self-defense force is described by the Communists as a military organi-
zation. It is clear, however, that its organization and mission differ from that
of village and hamlet guerrillas. Self-defense forces include people of all ages
and a substantial percentage of them are females. They are largely unarmed and
only partially trained. The duties of self-defense units include the maintenance
of law and order, the construction of bunkers and strong points, warning against
the approach of allied forces, and the defense of villages and hamlets in VC
controlled territory. Self-defense forces do not leave their home areas, and mem-
bers generally perform their duties part-time. Their existence poses an impedi-
ment to allied sweeps and pacification, however, and in their defensive role, they
inflict casualties on allied forces.
34. Another element, the secret self-defense forces, operates in government-
controlled and contested areas. They provide a residual Communist presence
in such areas and support the Communist effort primarily by clandestine intelli-
gence activities.
35. During the past year we have learned more about a VC organization called
"Assault Youth." They serve full time at district level and above, and they are
organized into companies and platoons. Although some are armed, the Com-
munists do not consider them a combat force; their primary mission appears to
be logistical, frequently in battlefield areas. This organization also serves as
a manpower pool and provides a training program for youth who later go into
the VC Main and Local forces. Little information is available to indicate the
strength or distribution of the "Assault Youth."
36. Our current evidence does not enable us to estimate the present size of
these groups ( self-defense, secret self-defense, the "Assault Youth," or other similar
VC organizations) with any measure of confidence. Some documents suggest
that in early 1966 the aggregate size of the self-defense force was on the order
of 150,000. This force and the other groups, however, have unquestionably
suffered substantial attrition since that time, as well as an appreciable decline
in quality, because of losses, recruiting of some of their members into the guer-
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rillas or other VC military components and, particularly, the shrinkage in VC
control of populated areas. Though in aggregate numbers these groups are still
large and constitute a part of the overall Communist effort, they are not offensive
military forces. Hence, they are not included in the military order of battle total.
Nevertheless, some of their members account for a part of the total Communist
military losses.
37. In sum, the Communist military and political organization is complex, and
its aggregate numerical size cannot be estimated with confidence. Moreover,
any such aggregate total would be misleading since it would involve adding
components that have widely different missions and degrees of skill or dedication.
The VC/NVA Military Force ( Main and Local forces, administrative service
elements and guerrillas) can be meaningfully presented in numerical totals and,
as indicated above, we estimate that this Military Force is now at least 223,000-
248,000. It must be recognized, however, that this Military Force constitutes
but one component of the total Communist organization. Any comprehensive
judgment of Communist capabilities in South Vietnam must embrace the effective-
ness of all the elements which comprise that organization, the total size of which
is of course considerably greater than the figure given for the Military Force.
B. The Command Structure
38. The Communists have continued to modify their command apparatus,
and, in particular, Hanoi has significantly increased its direct control. This is
most apparent in the DMZ and central highlands areas where Hanoi increasingly
bypasses both COSVN and Military Region 5 (MR-3) Headquarters. With the
exception of two VC divisions and one NVA division, all division headquarters
and all the confirmed Fronts are in MR-5 or the DMZ area.6 In addition to the
creation of the DMZ Front, which is controlled directly by Hanoi, it appears
almost certain that MR-5 has been divided into three operational areas: The
Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region ( formerly the Northern Front or Subregion), the
B-3 or Western Highlands Front, and the remaining coastal provinces of the
region.' There is substantial evidence that Hanoi also exercises direct military
control over the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region and the B-3 Front.
C. Logistical Support
39. During the past year captured documents and POW interrogations have
provided a better basis for estimating how much of each class of supplies was
needed and consumed by the Communist forces. Table 4 shows the estimated
total daily Communist requirement in South Vietnam for Regular and Admin-
istrative Service Forces and that portion of it which comes from external sources.
40. About one-quarter of the daily requirement for both 1966 and 1967 was
drawn from sources outside of South Vietnam. There is a growing dependence
The remainder of the command structure consists of provincial commands and of separate
units, both directly subordinate to the respective VC military regions.
' See map on opposite page for provinces included in these areas.
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C2NIUQUOC
DA�
(man aiAna)
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
Demilitarized Zone
Nang
I CORPS
Corps boundary
Province boundary
Autonomous municipality
SOUTH VIETNAM
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
OCTOBER 1967
COMMUNIST (VIET CONG)
DMZ FRONT Demilitarized Zone
TRI-THIEN-HUE MR
(Formerly Northern Subregion)
II CORPS
MR 5
III CORPS
Vung Tau
Capital Special Zone
IV CORPS
CON Sago.
(Administered from Sm.,)
MR 10
MR 1
MR 2
(11,101 QUOC
DAO
MR 3
CON SONci.
MR 6
MR 4 -Saigon, Cho Lon,
Gia Dinh Special Sector
Special Region 10
tjAgt
SOUTHERN
SUBREGION
Military Region boundary
Province boundary
Autonomous municipality
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on external sources, not only for Classes II and IV ( weapons and equipment),
Class V ( ammunition), but also for Class I (food). This is partly because of
allied denial efforts and partly a result of the growing proportion of North
Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, especially since these are generally deployed
in food deficit areas. VC guerrilla forces probably require a small amount of
food and ammunition from external sources, but the bulk of their supplies is ob-
tained from local sources within South Vietnam. We have not included guer-
rilla forces in the logistical computations.
TABLE 4
ESTIMATED DAILY LOGISTICAL RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FOR NVA AND VC
REGULAR AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(As of 30 September 1967)
Class
Short Tons Per Day
External Total
I (Food)"
38-40
177-183
II dr IV (Weapons, Quartermaster, Engineer, Medical, Signal,
Chemical, etc.)
6-7
93-24
III (POL)
Negl.
Negl.
V ( Ammunition)'
10
11
TOTAL
54-57
211-218
" Based on 118,000 NVA and VC Main and Local force troops, and 35,000-40,000 admin-
istrative support troops. Requirements are computed on the basis of actual strength, which
is about 70 percent of full TO&E strength. In estimating weapons requirements, losses due
to capture or destruction were considered, as were losses due to normal attrition. In addition,
an allowance was made to provide for the reequipping of those forces who are not presently
equipped with the new family of weapons. These requirements, of course, will change as
weapons losses fluctuate over time. Ammunition requirements are based upon estimates
of actual ammunition expenditures in combat, and may be subject to a considerable margin
of error.
Includes a 15 percent factor for spoilage: but does not include replacement of food captured
or destroyed by friendly forces.
One-third of the weight of the external requirement represents a packaging factor; two-
thirds of the weight is actual ammunition. No packaging factor is included in estimating
internal ammunition requirements. The total ammunition requirement does include the
external packaging factor.
41. Communist logistical requirements from external sources vary considerably
in both amounts and class in the different areas of South Vietnam. In the north-
ern provinces, for example, the requirement is probably higher per soldier than
elsewhere in South Vietnam because the rate of combat there has been higher,
and the troops are predominantly NVA and are better equipped. In the rice-
deficit highlands, the external requirement for food is high. On the other hand,
in the Delta and the Saigon area, Communist troops probably have no external
requirement for food.
42. While we cannot estimate with confidence what proportions of external
logistic resupply requirements are met by the respective routes into South Viet-
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nam, some generalizations can be made about the logistical systems involved.
The road network through the Laotian Panhandle is used primarily to supply
weapons, equipment, and ammunition. A portion of the food requirement for
Communist forces in the northern provinces is infiltrated through or around the
DMZ along with some other supplies. Cambodia is primarily a source for food
(probably over 80 percent of the� Communists' external requirement) and some
items such as medical supplies and radios. Within South Vietnam, the Com-
munist procurement and distribution system is usually organized under the
Communist military regional headquarters.
43. Food Supply. The Communists continue to have problems with food sup-
plies in certain areas, because of local shortages, distribution bottlenecks, and
the effects of allied military operations which have increasingly intruded into
Communist base areas and disrupted the supply network. The amount of Com-
munist food supplies captured or destroyed by allied forces in 1967 is sub-
stantial. From 1 January through 30 August it amounted to an average of 55
to 75 tons per day, which is more than one-fourth the Communist Regular and
Administrative Forces' daily requirement, and greater than their external re-
quirement. But despite some severe local difficulties, the overall effectiveness
of the Communist military forces has not yet been seriously impaired by these
problems. The food requirements for the Communists in many areas are met
from internal sources through taxation, purchase, and coercion. However, the
Communist military forces in the DMZ area and in the rice-deficient areas in
the highlands are largely dependent on imports from North Vietnam and Cam-
bodia.
44. On balance, we believe that food supply problems for the Communists are
likely to become more burdensome, and in some areas will impede military
operations. Nevertheless, we do not believe that food shortages will greatly
restrict overall Communist operations in the near future as long as the Com-
munists have access to Cambodian rice.
45. Impact of New and Heavier Weapons. Communist forces in South Viet-
nam have increased their mortar, rocket, and artillery attacks. Over a year ago,
120 mm mortars and 70 mm and 75 mm howitzers began to be used. Other
types of weapons have been employed since early 1967. These include Chinese
Communists 102 mm rockets, Soviet 122 mm and 140 mm rockets, and RPG-7
antitank grenade launchers. In addition, the NVA has fired light and medium
artillery into South Vietnam from positions within or north of the DMZ. The
use of these heavier weapons in the DMZ area has increased substantially in
1967, and during periods of peak fire in September it is estimated that Com-
munist forces in that area were expending mortar, rocket, and artillery am-
munition at a rate of close to 4 tons per day.
46. The estimated ammunition expenditure for all mortar, artillery, and rocket
weapons, of the Communist forces in South Vietnam for the first 8 months of
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1967, not including that fired against allied forces just south of the DMZ aver-
aged less than 1 ton per day. While logistic problems would inhibit increased
use of these heavier weapons throughout South Vietnam on the scale they have
been used near the DMZ, it is likely the Communists will increase their capa-
bilities for mortar, rocket, and artillery attack against selected fixed targets.
47. Hanoi has recently concluded a new agreement with the USSR for military
aid. It is possible that Hanoi has sought more sophisticated types of equipment
than those now arriving on the scene. These might include cruise missiles
and tactical rockets which could be used to support North Vietnamese opera-
tions in the DMZ area and against US warships.8 A continuing and intensive
watch has been maintained for any indications of the presence of these or larger
missiles in North Vietnam. So far, no deliveries have been detected.
48. The North Vietnamese already have some SA-2s in the vicinity of the
DMZ and we think it likely they might increase the numbers of SA-2s there.
It is also possible, but less likely, that they would deploy SA-2s in Laos. They
would almost certainly not introduce them into South Vietnam. It is possible
that Hanoi would use aircraft against South Vietnam but we think this unlikely.
In general, we believe that during the coming months the Soviets will continue
to supply equipment designed to strengthen air and coastal defenses in North
Vietnam and to increase the firepower of both the regular North Vietnamese
forces and the Communist forces fighting in the South.
D. Communist Manpower in the South
49. Communist Losses. Total Communist losses have been rising sharply
over the past 2 years. On the basis of the latest data, we estimate that total
losses for 1967 will amount to about 170,000�an increase of about two-thirds
compared with 1966. The bulk of these losses are killed-in-action as reported
from body count. Our estimate of permanent losses from wounds is based on
evidence indicating that for every 100 killed there would probably be 150
wounded, and that, of these, at least 35 die or are permanently disabled. Ob-
viously, these figures involve a margin for error, but since they cannot take into
account all casualties from air attacks or from artillery fire, or losses from sick-
ness and accident, the killed and wounded estimates are probably not over-
stated. Figures for military returnees and prisoners are firm. But the number
of deserters is an estimate based on a study that suggests there is likely to be
one permanent desertion for every military returnee. If the overall totals do
err, it is likely to be on the low side.
� For more detailed information on the types of weapons which the Soviets might supply
the North Vietnamese, and the likelihood of their doing so, see SNIE 11-11-67, "Soviet Attitudes
and Intentions Toward the Vietnam War," dated 4 May 1967, SECRET. We believe the
conclusions are still valid.
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MM.
TABLE 5
ESTIMATED COMMUNIST LOSSES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
21
1966
1967
(Estimated Total)"
Killed-in-Action
55,500
90,000
Permanently Lost from Wounds
19,000
31,000
Military Returnees
13,000
21,000
Prisoners
2,500
7,000
Deserters
13,000
21,000
TOTAL
103,000 i"
170,000
'The 1967 estimated totals are the projections of averages of Communist losses during the
first 9 months of 1967.
These totals include not only losses for Regular and Administrative Service Forces and
guerrillas, but also losses for an unknown number of other Communist elements such as self-
defense, secret self-defense forces, and "Assault Youth," etc.
50. A major problem in assessing the significance of these Communist losses
is that we are unable to determine what proportion are suffered by the fighting
forces and what proportion by such elements as the self-defense forces, "Assault
Youth," conscripted laborers and other civilians caught up in combat areas, What
is clear is that not all of the killed and wounded are members of primary fighting
units (NVA Regular forces, VC Main and Local forces, and guerrillas). Con-
sequently, we cannot estimate the loss to these Communist military forces for
any given year.
51. VC Manpower Inputs. In the face of these increasingly heavy losses, the
manpower resources available to the VC and the actual rate of recruitment are
critical elements in an estimate of Communist capabilities to continue military
operations. A calculation of manpower available to the VC for recruitment is
difficult because of the absence of trustworthy population statistics. But even
if such statistics were fairly accurate, major assumptions have to be made con-
cerning what percentage of able-bodied males are available to the VC recruit-
ment apparatus in their own areas, in the contested areas, and in GVN-con-
trolled areas.
52. Bearing in mind these caveats, we estimate that the VC may have access
to approximately 1.4 million males between the ages of 15 and 45. From this
total, we believe that the VC could recruit from a manpower pool of some
700,000-800,000 men, though less than half of this total are in VC-controlled areas.
53. It is difficult to reconcile this apparently large block of manpower derived
from limited demographic data, with the increasing evidence over the past year
of VC problems in obtaining recruits. One reason for this discrepancy is that
the manpower in VC areas is already subject to other important requirements
which are related to the war effort, such as food production, and some of these
tasks are increasing. A second reason for VC difficulties is that losses of all
types have probably reduced the real, as opposed to the theoretical manpower
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available to the VC. The third, and perhaps most important reason is the de-
clining ability of the VC to obtain recruits because of allied forays into con-
tested areas, the mounting flow of refugees out of these areas, and the likelihood
that individuals are more reluctant to enlist in the VC movement than in 1964-1965
when the Communists appeared to be riding a crest of success.
54. These increasing recruitment problems are least evident in the Regular
forces and most conspicuous among the guerrillas and self-defense forces, and
have resulted in unfilled recruitment quotas, reduced standards (as to age,
physical condition, and political reliability), and greater employment of women
and youth. They have been particularly severe in areas of intense allied military
pressure, but have not been totally absent elsewhere. Moreover, the Revolu-
tionary Development (RD) program poses a threat to Communist access to the
population, and is undoubtedly one of the reasons the VC have decided to exert
heavy pressure against it.
55. We estimated that during 1966 the VC were probably able to recruit
about 7,000 men per month. A reevaluation of recruitment for early 1967, how-
ever, shows that this performance has fallen off. We estimate that the average
monthly recruitment probably falls within the range of 3,000 to 5,000 men per
month for the Main forces, the Local forces, and the guerrillas. In addition,
however, the VC commonly upgrade personnel from the lower to the higher
echelons of the Communist organization. For example, a Local force unit will
receive replacements from village guerrillas in the area; and these guerrillas in
turn may be replaced by hamlet guerrillas, self-defense forces, or "Assault
Youth." Some recent evidence suggests that in IV Corps, hamlet guerrillas and
hamlet self-defense forces are being consolidated.
56. In any case, a persuasive indication of growing manpower problems for
the VC is the increasing number of individual NVA soldiers serving as replace-
ments in VC Main forces units. A study in late 1966 of a number of VC units
in III Corps area indicated that at least 23 percent of the men in VC Main
force units were NVA replacements, and the percentage is probably higher now.
VC units in I and II Corps probably contain a higher percentage of NVA per-
sonnel, but we have not found NVA personnel in VC units in the Delta.
57. Quality and Morale. The rapid manpower turnover caused by increasing
casualties has lowered the quality of all the VC fighting forces, but it is not yet
apparent that this has seriously impaired their military effectiveness. The Com-
munists have been forced to rely more and more on coercion to obtain recruits,
have made greater use of women to free men for combat, and have reduced
their recruitment and training standards. The decline in quality has been great-
est at the lower levels, where personnnel have repeatedly been siphoned off for
higher echelons. More important, though probably not so pronounced, is the
decline in the quality of the cadres�the cement of the VC organization.
58. In an endeavor to rectify this situation the Communists are resorting to
several expedients to overcome weaknesses in their political operations. These
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include intensive reindoctrination sessions and the infusion of North Vietnamese
cadre into the VC organization. Since mid-1966, the VC have also been shifting
some experienced cadre down to the lower levels to improve the quality of
leadership and to eliminate the overdependence of village and hamlet party
chapters on higher echelons. Some administrative reorganizations have also
been instituted in an attempt to strengthen local responsibility and initiative.
The effects of such measures are not yet evident, but could somewhat improve
VC efficiency at lower levels.
59. Captured documents and evidence from prisoners amply demonstrate that
morale problems are becoming serious and are likely to become worse as the
war continues. But there have been no mass defections. This year's returnee
rate, a statistical indicator of morale, is well above last year's rate. Captured
documents have repeatedly noted this trend as one of the Communists' major
shortcomings. Since the bulk of the returnees come from the lower levels of
the VC structure, the immediate effect of these losses has not been critical. The
troops continue to fight well, and the VC infrastructure remains generally strong.
Over the longer term, however, such losses not only deprive the Communists
of manpower, but, more important, they erode the base of the VC infrastructure.
III. THE OUTLOOK FOR COMMUNIST FORCES
60. In early 1965, prior to the commitment of sizable US forces, the Com-
munists apparently expected to administer a knockout blow. After a period of
some uncertainty and hesitation created by the US intervention in 1965, and cer-
tain tactical setbacks to the Communist forces, a general political-military strategy
was worked out at the 12th Plenum of the North Vietnamese Communist Party
in December 1965. This spelled out how to fight the war and manage its inter-
national aspects under the altered circumstances.
61. The essence of these decisions was to maintain sufficient forces in being to
support a prolonged and aggressive war of attrition. Their objective in pursuing
this strategy was and is to persuade the US that it cannot win; that it must even-
tually pull out or settle on terms favorable to Hanoi's further pursuit of its political
goals. As part of this strategy, the war would be conducted without specific
timetables; negotiations would be avoided unless from a position of significant
military successes; and an effort would be made to limit the risks of an expanded
war in the North or throughout Southeast Asia. This strategy aimed at main-
taining a continuous threat by Regular forces, avoiding combat under unfavor-
able conditions, sustaining a high level of guerrilla activity, and undertaking lim-
ited objective offensives when favorable opportunities arise.
62. During 1966 and thus far in 1967, the Communists have apparently adhered
to these basic decisions. For example, a new debate arose in late 1966 over the
role of the guerrillas with some officials advocating a greater role for these forces
at the expense of the Main forces. This proposition has apparently been rejected
as tantamount to accepting a "strategic" reversal. Nevertheless, it is clear that
debates over military-political tactics are continuing.
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63. Perhaps the most important problem for Hanoi during the last year has
been how to maintain military pressure in the face of the superior firepower and
mobility of the Allied forces. Its answer to this problem has been to emphasize
artillery, rocket, and mortar attacks, especially on I Corps, and to develop sub-
stantial threats by large units in border areas in such a way as to spread thin the
Allied forces, open opportunities for localized "victories," and create better condi-
tions for attacks against the RD program. Over the past year the Communists
have used elements of at least three and possibly four divisions in the DMZ area
plus artillery and some air defense units. Another buildup of Communist forces
has taken place in the highlands along the Cambodian border. Such threats tie
down large US forces in these areas, thereby lessening Allied military pressures
elsewhere.
64. Future Force Levels. Regardless of their previous policy decisions, the
Communists will assess the actual situation as it evolves. Their decisions as to
force structure and strengths over the next year will be affected in part by the
level of combat, their casualty rates, the extent of any further buildup of Allied
forces in the South, and the overall impact of the war effort against the North.
Another factor which complicates estimates of future force structure and strength
levels is that North Vietnam retains the capability to move division size forces
across the DMZ. Should they exercise this option, then the total force structure
in South Vietnam could be expanded relatively quickly by introducing one or two
divisions into Quang Tri Province. Regardless of whether they introduce these
divisions in the DMZ area, we feel the NVA will still try to expand its Regular
forces in South Vietnam, by the deployment of some new combat infantry regi-
ments. However, this may not result in any net increase in the numerical strength
of Regular forces since continuing losses may further reduce the average unit
strength.
65. Taking into consideration the estimated rates of infiltration, and allowing
for the downward trend in population control by the VC, the rising Communist
casualties, and VC recruiting problems, we conclude that the strength of the
Communist military forces and political organizations in South Vietnam declined
in the last year. The major portion of this decline has probably been felt at the
lowest levels, reflecting a deliberate policy of sacrificing this level to maintain
the structure of political cadres and the strength of the Regular military forces.
Whether this trend will continue is difficult to estimate. There are still important
unknowns and variables involved in measuring total losses against inputs from
recruiting and infiltration. Moreover, there are alternative strategies, such as
avoiding combat for prolonged periods, which the Communists might adopt to
reduce casualties and conserve their forces. Another option, though less likely,
would be for the Communists deliberately to reduce the strength of the Regular
forces, in order to preserve guerrilla forces and strengthen the political apparatus.
The locale and effectiveness of all allied operations will also have an important
bearing on future Communist force levels; losses in the northern provinces and
western highlands could be made up more readily through infiltration than losses
in the Delta, where the burden is on VC recruitment.
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66. In any case, we believe that a major effort will be required to maintain the
Regular forces and guerrillas at or near present levels. To do so will call for
both a level of infiltration much higher than that observed in 1967 and intensive
VC recruitment as well. Considering all the relevant factors, however, we believe
that there is a fairly good chance that the overall strength and effectiveness of
the military forces and the political infrastructure will continue to decline.
67. Logistical Support. The Communists will continue to have difficulties with
internal distribution of supplies in South Vietnam that will cause local shortages
and interfere with Communist operations from time to time. Their dependence
on supplies from external sources is growing and could increase further over the
next year, even if their strength declines somewhat. Nevertheless, we believe
that the Communists will be able to continue to meet at least their essential supply
requirements for the level of forces and activities in South Vietnam described
in this estimate.
68. Future Strategy. The Communists apparently recognize that the chances
of a complete military victory have disappeared, and they aim instead at a pro-
tracted war. Their objectives in this phase of the war are to immobilize and
wear down the Allied military forces, to maintain base areas, expand their po-
litical agitation and control in contested and CVN areas, and defeat the RD pro-
gram. In pursuit of these objectives, their tactics are to combine and coordinate
closely their military operations and political activity.
69. Our judgment is that the Communists still retain adequate capabilities to
support this strategy for at least another year. Whether or not Hanoi does in
fact persist with this strategy depends not only on its capabilities to do so, but
on a number of political and international considerations not treated in this esti-
mate, such as the state of Sino-Soviet relations, conditions inside China, and
Hanoi's view of US will and determination. Even if some combination of cir-
cumstances should make it impossible or undesirable for Hanoi to continue em-
ploying large conventional forces, the Communists would still have the capability
to continue some forms of struggle�though at greatly reduced levels.
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3.5(c)