LETTER TO HONORABLE HERBERT HOOVER, JR. FROM ALLEN W. DULLES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03114342
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2019
• Case Number: F-2016-01131
• Publication Date: January 21, 1956

Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
21 Jsaias.ry 1956
V
The Honorable Herbert
tinges Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.
Dear Herta:
Attached is a draft of a proposed letter
cot the scientific intelligence problems. I am not
sending it formally until I have had a chance to
discuss it with you.
Allen W. Dulles
Director
AWD:hea
Distribution:
Addressee - Orig
DC1 - 1 cc
ER 1 cc
Reading - 1 cc
DD/I - 1 cc
AD/OSI - t cc
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
se
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
20 January 1956
The Honorable Herbert Hoover, Jr.
Under Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.
Dear Herb:
Attached is wry draft let-ter on the
.�cientific
Encl.
problem.
lien W iiuiles
Dire or
cl
CA-44-11
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342 ati. 7- y 3.17
21 January 1956
&ANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
UZLIM;CT: Sc
*e Intelligence
1. lateliigence with respect to scientific schieveni
the Communist Bloc countries is a highest priority target.
addition to the information to be obtained within the Bloc, contacts
with non-Soviet Bloc scientists and coverage of international
scientific conferences in the Free World are increasingly valuable
for obtaining information on Soviet Bloc activities.
2. It is my firm belief that our national security requires the
utmost effort and coordination of effort to build up this type of
intelligence coverage and also to follow significant scientific develop-
ments in the Free World. In the overt field the Department* of State.
Defense. the CIA and certain other agencies hay* a substantial potential.
The coordination of this work and the capabilities of each *Iseult be
strengthened.
3. Recommendation No. 6 of the Clark Task Force report on
Ltitelligencs. transmitted by the Hoover Commiselon stated: ' That the
responsibility for collection of scientific intelligence be removed froze
the State Department and placed in the hands of the CIA, with authority
to appoint such scientific attaches as may be necessary to carry on this
work abroad. V.-e do not concur in this recommendation in the form
presented. We believe that the scientific attache structure should be
reconstituted under the Department of State but with technical support
and gaidance on the intelligence aspects furnished by CIA through its
Office of Scientific Intelligence and with guidance from the Department
of Defense as its interests may appear.
� r
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
4. Accordi y.
appointroont of a Science
title and authorAty as you
cosistituted iathe Dopier
that you we consideratmet
r to Om Secretary of State wi
*tortoise, sad that a small e bt,t
f State voiler th� Science Adviser. CIA
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
C.
appropriate.
sham" withia
may flow throe,
ertake the appropriate anal
Si the scientific intelligenc� r
5. It is further recems*ded that the
.ousailtation with CIA. Science Attaches to appropr
in particular to i-coadon, Paris. I4ew D.lh. Stockholni. Tokyo,
poets within the Gonannanist orbit1 Inchadiag ui particvlar Moscow,
situatiosi may permit. Th� sitnation presents spacial
prbtem. sad_ may require. at the nieutent different handling. (b)(3)
NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
7. Arrangsonents should be mate tkr
Adviser and through the Office of Scientific lattalligen
to draw apes the resources of the National Academia.
National Scieace Youridatio", the Massachitsettai Institu � of Tochaelogy.
that Galiforsia bastitate of Technology1 and like institutions, and to enlist
their support in obtaining appreqpriate designees for the posits Si Science
Attache and a supplementing the work outlined in this mernorandexe.
6. This incietiag foreign facilities of the Department Si Stat.,
Defense and CIA in the overt leiliarilite intelligence collect-Asti field
should be closely coordinated with the above proposed structure
for a foreign 2:tontine COUOCtialli FCT ign targets
-2-
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
opportunities sb�dd be appropriately assivied as between the
respective divestments and agencies so as to cover the field wit
adequately as possible to ensure that friendly foreign scientists
ineowledgoable is k.oviet Bloc sciontific teeboitques or in new
'scientific advances in their own countrteo are contacted and that
the flow of foreign scientific 11V:traitors, particularly from Sovivt
orbit countries be increased.
1. I consider this a matter of grast urgency
From my conversations I feel assured that the Azoorian sc A
community will lend its cooperation in siring this program effective
and in helping with the analysis of information which may be received.
bespeak your early attention to thin important matter.
ALLAN W. DULLF.S
Director
AWD:hea
Distribution:
Addressee - Orig & 1 cc
DCI - 1 cc
ER - 1 cc I (ret1/404-,
,/
Reading - 1 cc
DD/I -1 cc
AD/OSI -1 cc
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
19 January January 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SUBJECT: Scientific InteLli'gence
uvk.1-41'
1. Intelligence with respect to scie ific achievements 4ri.
the ComuninistUloc countries is a ki est priority target. alike
-eleveickprnesits in-the
4eIr1 a at m1 c weap-A-kna_ lgaided,,i/esiies, a reraft, jet prepuLaien
7"Ciaesilifoalh.tagiRt4Q4itz, devices andAounter devices, and the like.
eontacts with non-Soviet bloc stti ntists and coverage of inter-
national scientific conferencesitare sea.a.ideasa.to-ire increasingly
valuable for obtaining information on Soviet bloc activities.
2. It is my firm belief that our ational security requires
the utmost effort and coordlnatioii6f effort to build up this type
of intelligence coverage and also/to follow significant scientific
developments in the free world. 4 'the Departments of State, Defense,
the CIA and certain other agencies * .pave a substantial potential:
toki-e�fie4d. The coordination of theer work and the capabilities of
each should be strengthened.
3. Recommendation No. 6 of the Clark Task Force report on
Intelligence, transmitted by the Hoover Commission stated: "That
the responsibility for collection of scientific intelligence be removed
from the State Department and placed in the hands of the CIA, with
authority to appoint such scientific attaches as may be necessary to
carry on this work abroad." We do not concur in this recommendation
in the form presented. We believe that the scientific attache structure
should be reconstituted under the Department of State but with technical
support and guidance on the intelligence aspects furnished by CIA
through its Office of Scientific Intelligencea.mat C-r44.2- 04--CLAA 44. bkIZAA.'"
0/144.4.1Jk. Oa) ;--fs *(4-ALA-44-la_ NV/Leta 4weitatifekkoaa
Approved for for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
4. Accordingly, we suggest that you give consideration to
the appointment of a Science Adviser to the Secretary of State
with such title and authority as you may determine, and that a
small office be constituted in the Department of State under the
Science A.dviser. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
the extent we may mutually determine to be appropriate. CIA
will undertake the appropriate analysis and dissemination within
the government of the scientific intelligence reports which may
flow through this office.
5. It is further recommended that the State Department
designate, after consultation with CIA., Science Attaches to
appropriate embassies abroad, in particular to London, Paris,
New Delhi, ihmor., Stockholm, Tokyo, and to posts within the
Communist orbit, including in articular Moscow, as the
situation may permit. The situation presents special
problems and may require, at the moment, different handling.
(b)(3)
NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
7. Arrangements should be made through the office of the
Science A.dviser and through the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI)
of CIA. to draw upon the resources of the National Academy of Science,
the National Science Foundation, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, the California Institute of Technology, and like
institutions, and to enlist their support in obtaining appropriate
designees for the posts of Science Attache and in supplementing
the work outlined in this memorandum.
S. The existing foreign facilities of the Department of State,
Defense and CIA in the cientific intelligence collection field should
be closely coordinated ithr-opriestaggentedzinishl the above proposed
structure for a for scientific collection mechanism. Foreign
15kYv"" -2-
;
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
targets and opportunities should be appropriately assigned as
between the respective departments and agencies so as to cover
the field as adequately as possible to ensure that friendly foreign
scientists knowledgeable in Soviet bloc scientific techniques or in
new scientific advances in their own countries are contacted and
that the flow of foreign scientific literature, particularly from
Soviet orbit countries be increased.
9. I consider this a matter of great urgency and importance.
Rom my conversations I feel assured that the American scientific
community will lend its cooperation in making this program effective
and in helping with the analysis of information which may be receiv-
ed. I bespeak your early attention to this important matter.
/ a a
NM NON NNW RPM OR 4 ill Vial
i.4:7C444 mow
4�110 IMPIO UM
A LEN . DULLES
Dire tor
-3-
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
DRAFT
16 January 1956 Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
AWD:at
It Co, /1,5 , 4 E/cc SU.MIS
Cr-i C � h-c A 4 1(41 6.^-1' a j
Cr � C c 477 1 s /c14:20re c," la
f_01 inut
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State 14(fve-rkieciir)) 04:
SUBJECT: Scientific Intelligence S'ae:c14:V111/1-7e,s/-4
1. Intelligence with respect to scientific achievements in the
Communist bloc countries is a highest priority target. This includes
in particular intelligence relatiAg to developments in the field of atomic
weapons, guided missiles, aircraft', jet propulsion engines, electronic
devices and counter devices, and the like It is my firm belief that
our national security requires the utmost effort and coordination of
15 tif " f
effort to build up o.kicknIelligrlicg coverage-in thio ctiLA4t ct-6-0
kraut-v. Zo�cvt,4k t-C4.4.4,41-Ztr-t-t4+-14,0-4A...2.4 LA_ tA,
yrThe Departments of State, Defense, the CIA, and certain
other agencies have a substantial potential in this field. The co-
ordination of their work and the capabilities of each should be
strengthened.
3. Recommendation No. 6 of the Clark Task Force report on
Intelligence, transmitted by the Hoover Commission stated: "That
the responsibility for collection of scientific intelligence be removed
from the State Department and placed in the hands of the CIA, with
authority to appoint such scientific attaches as may be necessary to
carry on this work abroad." We do not concur in this recommendation
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 003114342
in the form presented. We believe that the scientific attache structure
should be reconstituted under the Department of State but with technical
support and guidance furnished by CIA through its Office of Scientific
Intelligence.
4. Accordingly we propose for your consideration that the
State Department Department appoint a Scientific Adviser to the Secretary of
State with such title and authority as you may determine, and that a
small office be constituted in the Department of State under the
Scientatc- Adviser
(b)(1)
(.(00 )NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
mutually determine to be appropriate. CIA will undertake the appro-
priate analysis and dissemination within the government of the
h,ditemce,
scientific Areports which may flow through this office.
5. It is further recommended that the State Department designate,
after consultation with CIA, scientific ttaches to appropriate embassies
abroad, in particular to London, Paris, .ii,,Qataxzej iru,Steaturt, Stockholm,
Tokyo, and to posts within the Communist orbit, including in particular
Moscow, as the situation may permit.
- -
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 003114342
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
(b)(
(b)(
7. Arrangements should be made through the office of the
1)
3) NatSecAct
Scientific -Adviser and through the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI)
of CIA to draw upon the resources of the National Academy of Science,
the National Science Foundation, the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, the California Institute of Technology, and like institutions,
and to enlist their support in obtaining appropriate designeis for the
. cr .
posts of scientkilt attache and in supplementing the work outlined in
this memorandum.
8. The existing foreign facilities of the Departments of State,
Defense, and CIA in the scientific intelligence collection field should
be closely coordinated with, or integrated into, the above proposed
structure for a foreign scientific collection mechanism. Foreign
targets and opportunities should be appropriately assigned as between
the respective departments and agencies so as to cover the field as
- 3 -
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
adequately as possible to ensure that friendly foreign scientists
knowledgeable in Soviet bloc scientific techniques or in new scientific
advances in their own countries are contacted and that the flow of
foreign scientific literature, particularly from Soviet orbit countries
be increased.
9. I consider this a matter of great urgency and importance.
From my conversations I feel assured that the American scientific
community will lend its cooperation in making this program effective
and in helping with the analysis of information which may be received.
I be'speak your early attention to this important matter.
-4
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
A.A/4
/
4. A.ccordingly, we propoae forA you, consideration tivrt the
State Departnaaut. appoint a Science Adviser to the Secretary of
State with such title and authority as you may determine, and
that a small office be constituted in the Department of State under
the Science Adviser. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
the extent we may mutually determine to be appropriate. CIA
will undertake the appropriate analysis and dissemination within
the government of the scientific intelligence reports which may
flow through this office.
5. It is further recommended that the State Department
designate, after consultation with CIA., Science Attaches to
appropriate embassies abroad, in particular to London, Paris,
New Delhi, Bonn, Stockholm, Tokyo, and to posts within the
Communist orbit, incllidimy in nartirn1r Moscow, as the .._..
situation may permit. s '(b)(1) .
AkketakA, (j-'' (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
7. Arrangements should be made through the office of the
Science Adviser and through the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI)
of CIA to draw upon the resources of the National Academy of
Science, the National Science Foundation, the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, the California Institute of Technology,
and like institutions, and to enlist their support in obtaining
appropriate designees for the posts of Science Attache and in
supplementing the work outlined in this memorandum.
8. The existing foreign facilities of the Department of State,
Defense and CIA. in the scientific intelligence collection field should
be closely coordinated with, or integrated into, the above proposed
structure for a foreign scientific collection mechanism. Foreign
-2-
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
Approved for Releate': '2-01 9/05/30 C03114342
17 January 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Scientific Intelligence
1. I return herewith your draft of a memorandum to the
Secretary together with my attempt at a compromise version.
2. In my view, your draft necessarily requires a supple-
mental memorandum to deal with essential specifics of the program
and to refute the arguments that we know are being made against
the program generally in some circles in the Department.
3. I believe it would be more economical of the Secretary's
time to address his attention to my somewhat longer draft which is
approximately two-thirds as long as the original, omitting the
descriptive material about CIA and specific examples of scientific
intelligence achievements and possibilities.
4. My memorandum could be further shortened perfectly
easily by putting a period at the end of the fourth line of page
5 and eliminating all the subparagraphs on pages 5 and 6, in
which case it would be less than three pages single-spaced in
final form.
5. I have only the following specific objections to your
draft if you decide to use it:
a. In paragraph 4, I believe we should be quite specific
that the job should be at the highest civil service grade as
that has been the big complaint of the scientific community
ever since Keofli left.
b. Paragraph 5. Our people
believing the latter can be covered
prefer (b)(3)
cAct
from and prefer (b)(3)
for closer association with the Embassy. (b)(3)
NatSecAct
(b)(3)
CIAAct
(b)(6)
ROBERT AroaY, JR. 1 /
Deputy Director (Intellige4de)
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
DRAFT
RAmory: jb
16 January 1956
ItIENORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
SUBJECT : Scientific Intelligence
1. Intelligence with respect to scientific achievements in the
Communist bloc countries is a highest priority target. This includes
in particular intelligence relating to developments in the field of atomic
weapons, guided missiles, aircraft,jet propulsion engines, electronic
devices and counter devices, and the like. It is also essential for 112
to keep fully informed of scientific developments elsewhere in the free
world. The recent history of major achievements in the field of theoretical
physics and mathematics, which underlie most forms of technical advance
in weaponry and communications, indicates the heavy dependence of the United
States on the minds of European scientists.
2. It is my firm belief that our national security requires the utmost
effort and coordination of effort to build up our intelligence coverage in
this field. The Departments of State, Defense, the CIA, and certain other
agencies have a substantial potential in this field. The coordination of
their work and the capabilities of each should be strengthened.
3. Recommendation No. 6 of the Clark Task Force report on Intelligence,
transmitted by the Hoover Commission stated: "That-the responsibility for
collection of scientific intelligence be removed from the State Department
and placed in the hands of the CIA, with authority to appoint such
scientific attaches as may be necessary to carry on this work abroad."
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
We do not concur in this recommendation in the form presented. We
believe that the scientific attache structure should be reconstituted under
the Department of State but with technical support and guidance furnished
by CIA through its Office of Scientific Intelligence.
I. Security measures are of course extreme in the Soviet Bloc and
are by no means negligible in countries of the free world. It would be
naive to assume that really significant advances would come to our attention
automatically through open literature and normal professional contacts
in the scientific community.
5. To obtain scientific intelligence information abroad requires a
balanced utilization of normal, professional contacts at one extreme and
clandestine operations at the other. As to the first, we are reasonably
confident that through our Contacts Division we are receiving and dis-
seminating virtually all of the significant information obtained. Our
Contacts Division has over
scientific and technical "sources" on its
(b)(3)
active list, and in the last two years has issued to interested agencies (b)(1)
nearly
sources.
technical intelligence reports based on debriefings of these (b)(1)
But with rare exceptions such people cannot be adequately briefed (b)(3)
or have their attentions sufficiently pointed in the direction of critical
missing links in our information and the result is that much of what they
report is repetitive and not responsive to our most critical needs, Unbriefed,
haphazard operations are not only extremely inefficient, but also at times
can be positively harmful. On the other hand every effort is being made
through our covert services, using American and foreign nationals, witting
or unwitting, to produce as much scientific intelligence as possible.
6. There remains a substantial area between the overt and virtually
automatically receivable information and that which requires both the risks
and the detailed and expensive preparation for clandestine operation. This
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
is the area whereby through assiduous and continued cultivation, on an
open and aboveboard professional basis, confidence can be established with
leading foreign scientists and scientific groups so that they will
voluntarily, either gratis or on a quid pro quo basis, vouchsafe to us
A
information, ideas, and operational opportunities that would otherwise not
be forthcoming. It is in this field that the Scientific Attache is
indispensable. The non-intelligence activities of the Science Attaches put
them in contact with all segments of the foreign scientific
rrovide unique opportunities for overt collection of useful
including information on Soviet Bloc scientific activities.
have been also of assistance
commnity, and
information
The attaches
in suggesting or
evaluating sources, evaluating scientific information collected by clan-
destine means, and in facilitating contacts. The Science Attaches can be
of great assistance in collecting and reporting information regarding the
activities of Soviet scientists visiting non-bloc countries; this type of
information may well become of increasing importance in the future.
7. It may well be desirable at an early date to have Scientific
Attaches in Iron Curtain countries, but the security and policy questions
involved need further study. Relying on a peripheral-reporting arrangement
for the time being, we therefore propose the following establishment of
Scientific Attaches in Embassies overseas.
3
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
Total
Cost (Estimated)
Present
Proposed
Increase
Total
(b)(3)
NatSecAct
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
7
11
460,000
4105,000 4165,000
In our view a senior attache should be a scientist of considerable repute
but who is reasonably young, energetic and with prospects of earning
further prestige in the scientific world in years to cone. We have reason
to believe that with the assistance of leading scientists and scientific
organizations in the country, such men can be recruited for this work on
two year terns with leave of absence status from their universities or
companies.
(b)(1) (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatS((b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
8. Washington support for the activity of the science attaches
would be drawn from the entire intelligence community coordinated through
the Office of Scientific Intelligence of CIA. Admittedly the above
intelligence organization could handle the mechanics of guiding scientific
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
� Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
attaches abroad and processing and distributing their reports. But for
a variety of reasons I feel most strongly that to eliminate the State
Department's Science Adviser's Office would be undesirable from the point
of view of this Agency, of the Department, and the national interest generally:
a. The formulation of national policy is so intimately affected
by scientific developments that, in my opinion, the Secretary of State
should have available as part of his personal staff an outstanding
scientist. The position of Special Assistant for Atomic Energy
Affairs has existed for several years but interrelation of science
and foreign policy are by no means restricted to the field of Atomic
Energy.
b. There is a definite need for a focal point within the Department
of State where policy guidance on scientific matters can be obtained
by individual scientists, scientific organizations, and other depart-
ments and agencies for the government including our awn clandestine
services.
c. To attract the best qualified individuals into the attache
program will require the backing generally of the scientific community.
This will be most readily obtainable if the Department of State rather
than CIA is not only the ostensible but also the actual sponsor and
headquarters of the program. The non-intelligence duties of the
scientific attache will increase the attractiveness of the job and
facilitate recruitment. Furthermore these duties will permit the
scientific attache to do a better job of intelligence by improving
his contacts in scientific circles.
5
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
d. The science attaches can perform many useful services in
supporting the Embassy in other than intelligence activities. To
maximize this potential it is highly desirable that there be a senior
officer in the Department cognizant of their potentialities and need
for support. It would be quite inappropriate for CIA to assume
responsibility for this portion of the program.
e. The fact that the Hoover Commission recommended transfer
of the science collection activity to CIA was published. In certain
areas of the world the establishment, therefore, of a scientific
attache simultaneously with the abolition of the science adviser's
office in the Department would be taken as clear proof that the
attache was in fact a CIA employee. At best this would seriously
inhibit success of his mission and at worst might result in his being
declared persona non grata.
f. Substituting the National Science Foundation or some other
government body as the nominal apex of the structure would introduce
undesirable complexity and difficulties with regard to transmitting
highly sensitive requirements and information of an operational nature.
Moreover it would initially involve indoctrinating an entire new
agency in the activities of the intelligence community.
9. I, therefore, propose that the Department at an early date appoint
an outstanding scientist as Science Adviser at the highest Civil Service
grade. For his immediate staff we estimate that two or three professional
and two or three clerical employees should be assigned. CIA would assist
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342
Approved for Release: 2019/05730 C03114342
10. This program would constitute a minimum effort and would have
to be supplemented by appropriate use of other agencies of the government
such as the National Science Foundation and by private organizations such
as the National Academy of Science and various more specialized professional
bodies. This could be done on a well coordinated basis to take advantage
of particularly talented individuals when specific opportunities to utilize
them develop.
11. I consider this a matter of great urgency and importance.
From my conversations I feel assured that the American Scientific
community will lend its cooperation in making this program effective
and in helping with the analysis of information which may be received.
I bespeak your early attention to this important matter.
ALLEN W. DULLES
Director
Approved for Release: 2019/05/30 C03114342